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Spirit, Soul, and Flesh

Spirit, Soul, and Flesh

The Usage of Πνεῦμα, Ψυχή, and Σάρξ in Greek Writings and Translated Works from the Earliest Period to 225 A.D.; and of their Equivalents רוח, נֶפֶשׁ, and בָּשָׂר in the Hebrew Old Testament

HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES

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VOLUME III

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By

ERNEST DE WITT BURTON

*Professor and Head of the Department of New Testament
and Early Christian Literature in the
University of Chicago*



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PREFACE

The subject of this monograph is the use of the words for "spirit," "soul," and "flesh" in the ancient Greek and Hebrew writers. The purpose of the study is to lay a lexicographical foundation for the interpretation of *πνεῦμα*, *ψυχή*, and *σάρξ*, more especially of *πνεῦμα* and *σάρξ* in their relation to one another, in the New Testament.

The ground, especially of the first two chapters, has often been covered more or less fully, and the present writer makes no claim to be adding significantly to the sum of human knowledge in this territory. He writes, indeed, after diligent and repeated study extending over years, but with a consciousness of the vastness of the field and of the complexity of the problem, made more difficult by its ramification into many related fields, which bars any but the most modest claims. He has not undertaken to write a history of the psychology and anthropology of the Semites and the Greeks, desirable as such a history would be as a basis for the study of the ideas of the New Testament writers on this subject. In full recognition of the fact that the meanings of words can never be dealt with adequately except in connection with the history of thought, these studies nevertheless decline the larger task and limit themselves to an attempt to set forth from the point of view of lexicography the usage of the three important words named above. They justify themselves in the mind of the writer by two considerations. First, even such a study as is here made of the usage of the words in literature older than the New Testament books, or approximately contemporaneous with them, is a useful foundation for the study of New Testament usage and ideas; and second, such an assembling of the linguistic evidence as is possible in a lexicographical study may, by furnishing the material for it, facilitate the more adequate study of the history of ancient thought in the field of psychology or anthropology.

The intimation of the title-page that the investigation covers the usage of Greek writers from the earliest period to 180 A.D., is

substantially correct. Later writers are frequently cited for their testimony to earlier usage and occasional reference has been made, especially in Chapters iv and vi, to later literature because of its reflex light on the usage of the first century. On the other hand it has been deemed unnecessary to include Christian writers later than the New Testament, the usage of the latter being the goal of the study. Otherwise the limits indicated have been adhered to, and the range of literature examined in each period is sufficient, it is believed, to furnish a safe basis of induction. Only in the Hebrew Old Testament, the Apocrypha, and the New Testament has absolute inclusiveness been attempted. But in the case of most of the individual writers quoted the lists are believed to be at least approximately complete.

Having on more than one occasion within the period in which he has been engaged in this study made it the subject of a seminar in the University of Chicago, the writer desires to acknowledge with appreciation the assistance which he has received, both in assembling and in interpreting the material, from those whom he has had the pleasure of counting among his students. Among these he desires especially to acknowledge the assistance of Rev. William R. Schoemaker, Ph.D., of Des Moines, Iowa, Professor Irving F. Wood, Ph.D., of Smith College, Professor Frank G. Lewis, Ph.D., of the Crozer Theological Seminary, Professor Hermon H. Severn, A.B., of Kalamazoo College, and Professor Arthur Wakefield Slaten, Ph.D., of Chicago. To these it would be necessary to add a still longer list if all those were included who have aided by collecting lists of passages.

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¹ The more familiar Greek authors, editions of which may be supposed to be known to every reader, have been omitted from this list, as also the numerous concordances and lexicons of Greek authors and of the Old and New Testaments of which use has been made. In the citation of unlisted authors the notation is in general that of the edition listed in Liddell and Scott's *Greek Lexicon*.

² Scriptorum classicorum bibliotheca oxoniensis.

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CHAPTER I

ΠΝΕŪMA, ΨΥΧΗ, AND ΣΑΡΞ IN GREEK WRITERS FROM HOMER TO ARISTOTLE

The three Greek words that stand at the head of this chapter have all had a long history. The earliest instance of *πνεῦμα* in extant Greek literature is in Aeschylus, of the fifth century B.C., but Diogenes Laertius ascribes it, apparently as a term in familiar use, to Xenophanes of the sixth century. *Ψυχή* and *σάρξ* occur in the earliest Greek writers whose writings we possess. All three are still in use today. In the period covered by this chapter—to anticipate the presentation of evidence in detail by a broad statement which will find its support in that evidence—*πνεῦμα* and *σάρξ* are terms of substance; *ψυχή*, prevailing at least, a functional term. *Πνεῦμα* denotes the most intangible of substances—wind, breath, air. *Σάρξ* stands at the opposite extreme of tangibility, denoting the flesh (or body) of an animal, usually of man. In contrast with both, *ψυχή*, whatever substantial or physical sense it may once have had, in prevalent usage finds its definition in its functions, denoting that element of a living being, usually man, by virtue of which he lives, feels, acts. In the language of Aristotle (p. 43) “the soul is that by which primarily we live and have sensation and understanding.” When the *ψυχή* is said to be *πνεῦμα*, this signifies, not that the terms are synonyms, but that that which functions psychically is composed of the substance *πνεῦμα*.

I. ΠΝΕŪMA

Πνεῦμα does not occur in Homer, Hesiod, or Pindar, but first appears in Aeschylus. Its meanings are:

1. Wind, whether a gentle breeze or blast. This is decidedly the most frequent use, being found in Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, Aristophanes, Herodotus, Thucydides, Demosthenes, Plato, Aristotle, and is apparently the only usage, so far as occurrences of the word have been noticed, in Herodotus and Aristophanes.

Eurip. *Suppl.* 962: δυσαίων δ' ὁ βίος, | πλαγκτὰ δ' ὥσεί τις νεφέλα |
πνευμάτων ὑπὸ δυσχίμων ἄισσω.

Miserable my life; like a cloud hard driven, I am driven by fearful winds.

Herod. 7. 16. 1: κατὰ περ τὴν χρησιμωτάτην ἀνθρώποισι θάλασσαν πνεύματὰ φασὶ ἀνέμων ἐμπίπτοντα, οὐ περιορᾶν φύσι τῇ ἑωυτῆς χρᾶσθαι.

Just as blasts of wind falling upon the sea which is most useful to men, they say prevent it from acting according to its own nature (cf. also Aesch. *Prom.* 1086; Eurip. *Her. Fur.* 102).

Plato *Phaedr.* 229B: ἐκεῖ σκιά τ' ἐστὶν καὶ πνεῦμα μέτριον.

There is shade and a gentle breeze.

Aristot. ii. 940b. 7: ἔστι γὰρ πνεῦμα ἀέρος κίνησις.

For wind is the motion of air (cf. i. 387a. 29).

Metaphorically for a force powerfully affecting the mind, in—

Aesch. *Prom.* 884: ἔξω δὲ δρόμον φέρομαι λύσσης | πνεύματι μάρ-
γῳ, γλώσσης ἀκρατῆς.

And I am driven out of my course by a furious wind of madness, with no control of my tongue.

Aesch. *Suppl.* 30: δέξαίθ' ἰκέτην | τὸν θηλυγενῇ στόλον αἰδοίῳ |
πνεύματι χώρας.

Receive this suppliant female train with a merciful spirit(?) of the country.

Aesch. *Theb.* 708: ἐπεὶ δαίμων | λήματος ἐν τροπαίᾳ χρονία μεταλ-
λακτὸς ἴσως ἂν ἔλθοι θαλερωτέρῳ [some editors read θελεμωτέρῳ] |
πνεύματι· νῦν δ' ἔτι ζεί.

For fortune changed by your tardy change of temper might perhaps come with fresher [or gentler] breeze; but now it is still raging (lit. boiling).

Soph. *Oed. Col.* 612: θνήσκει δὲ πίστις, βλαστάνει δ' ἀπιστία, |
καὶ πνεῦμα ταῦτόν οὐποτ' οὔτ' ἐν ἀνδράσιν | φίλοις βέβηκεν οὔτε πρὸς
πόλιν πόλει.

Faith dies, distrust springs up, and the wind is never the same between friends or between city and city.

Tempted by the later use of πνεῦμα in the sense of spirit and by the use of the English word "spirit" in the sense of disposition, one might be disposed to find in these passages some such meaning for πνεῦμα. It should be observed, however, respecting Aesch. *Suppl.*

30, that the words are an apostrophe to the city, land, and water, the heavenly gods, and Jove, and that they are followed by an appeal to these same powers to send the "male-abounding insolent swarm" into the deep with their swift ships and there meet them with a furious whirlwind. The expression αἰδοίω πνεύματι χώρας probably means, therefore, either literally or figuratively, a favorable breeze from the land. Similarly in *Theb.* 708 the author has in mind the figure of a gentle or favoring breeze, and in *Soph. Oed. Col.* he is describing the change that comes over everything by saying that the wind never blows twice the same way. These instances suffice to show that as early as Aeschylus πνεῦμα, meaning wind, was used in figurative expressions referring to disposition, relationship, or destiny, but not that the word itself had acquired such a secondary meaning.

See other examples of πνεῦμα meaning wind in Aesch. *Prom.* 1047; *Suppl.* 165, 175; *Pers.* 110; *Soph. Aj.* 558, 674; *Trach.* 146; *Philoct.* 639, 643, 1093; *Elect.* 564; Eurip. *Helen.* 406, 1663; *Suppl.* 554; *Her. Fur.* 216; *Cycl.* 278; *Ion* 1507; Thucyd. 2. 77. 1, 16; 2. 84. 28, 32 (ἄνεμος in immediate context is used in the same sense; cf. πνεύματα ἀνέμων above in Herod., Aesch., and Eurip.); 2. 97. 13; 3. 49. 35; 4. 26. 7; 4. 30. 28; Aristoph. *Eq.* 441; *Pax* 175; *Ran.* 1003; *Nub.* 164; Xen. *Hellen.* 6. 2. 27; *Anab.* 4. 5. 4 (following ἄνεμος in the same sense); 6. 1. 14; 6. 2. 1; *Cyneg.* 8. 1. 4; Dem. 48. 24; 49. 8; 94. 5; 328. 10; Plato *Phaedr.* 255C; *Cratyl.* 410B, C.; *Phaedo* 77E; *Theaet.* 152B; *Tim.* 43C; *Legg.* 747D; 797E; *Pol.* 394D; 405D; 488D; 496D. Aristot. i. 146b. 29, 35; 360b. 27; 361b. 13 *passim*; 394b. 10; ii. 932b. 29, 30, 32, *et freq.*¹

2. Air, or vaporous substance, tenuity rather than motion being the chief characteristic thought of.

According to Aristot. (*Phys.* ix. 6, cited by Ritter and Preller, *Hist. Phil. Graec.*, ed. ix. 75a) i. 213b. 22, the Pythagoreans

¹The notation of all references to Greek authors in this chapter is that of the editions listed in Liddell and Scott, except that references to Aristotle are to volumes, pages, columns, and lines of the Editio Borussica, Berlin, 1831; these are also indicated in the translation of Smith and Ross, Oxford, 1908-, and in the editions of the *περὶ ψυχῆς* by E. Wallace, Cambridge, 1882, and R. D. Hicks, Cambridge, 1902. The lists make no claim to be complete; especially is no attempt made to give exhaustive lists for Plato and Aristotle.

applied the name πνεῦμα to that which surrounds the heavens and from which the heavens derive their space, κενόν.

εἶναι δ' ἔφασαν καὶ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι κενόν, καὶ ἐπεισέναι αὐτὸ τῷ οὐρανῷ ἐκ τοῦ ἀπείρου πνεύματος, ὡς ἀναπνέοντι καὶ τὸ κενόν; cf. pseudo-Hippoc. ed. Littré, Vol. VI, p. 94, cited p. 80.

In Plato *Tim.* 49C πνεῦμα apparently means vapor; water is said by condensation to become earth and stone, and these latter in turn by melting and dissolution to become πνεῦμα καὶ ἀήρ, the air (ἀήρ) again becoming, by being heated, fire. Aristotle uses πνεῦμα in a similar sense, also associating it with ἀήρ, in i. 387a, 24-30, but seems clearly to regard motion as the distinguishing quality of πνεῦμα. Distinguishing things that can be volatilized from those which can be vaporized, he says, ἔστι γὰρ ἀτμὶς ἢ ὑπὸ θερμοῦ καυστικοῦ εἰς ἀέρα καὶ πνεῦμα ἔκκρισις ἐξ ὑγροῦ διαντικῆ, but a little lower down, ἔστι δὲ πνεῦμα ῥύσις συνεχῆς ἐπὶ μῆκος ἀέρος. Cf. also i. 341b. 22 f. ἔστι γὰρ ἡ φλόξ πνεύματος ξηροῦ ζέσις.

3. Breath of a living being, man or lower animal. This usage occurs in Aeschylus, Euripides, Thucydides, Xenophon, Demosthenes, Plato, and Aristotle.

Aesch. *Eumen.* 568: κήρυσε, κῆρυξ, καὶ στρατὸν κατειργαθῶν, | ἢ τ' οὖν διάτορος Τυρσηνικῆ | σάλπιγγ' βροτείου πνεύματος πληρουμένη | ὑπέρτονον γήρυμα φαίνεται στρατῶ.

Proclaim, O herald, and call the people to order, and let the piercing Tuscan trumpet, filled with mortal breath, pour forth its thrilling voice to the multitude.

Plato, *Tim.* 78A, B: σιτία μὲν καὶ ποτὰ ὅταν εἰς αὐτὴν ἐμπέσῃ στέγει, πνεῦμα δὲ καὶ πῦρ σμικρομερέστερα ὄντα τῆς αὐτῆς συστάσεως οὐ δύναται. τούτοις οὖν κατεχρήσατο ὁ θεὸς εἰς τὴν ἐκ τῆς κοιλίας ἐπὶ τὰς φλέβας ὑδρεῖαν, πλέγμα ἐξ ἀέρος καὶ πυρὸς οἷον οἱ κύρτοι συνυφηνάμενος.

When food and drink are put into it (the belly) it holds them, but air and fire being of finer particles than its own substance it cannot hold. These elements accordingly God used for sending moisture from the belly into the veins, weaving a basket-like network of air and fire.

The πνεῦμα καὶ πῦρ of the first part of the passage is evidently synonymous with the ἀήρ καὶ πῦρ of the latter part. But in the first instance πνεῦμα is definitely thought of as taken into the body

by respiration, in the second instance *ἀήρ* denotes the substance itself. Consistently with this distinction *ἀήρ* is constantly used in the ensuing context, which describes the construction of the body, but in 79B, when the subject of respiration is taken up for discussion, the use of *πνεῦμα* is resumed and maintained, till in 79D reference is again made to the network above mentioned, when *ἀήρ* is again used.

Aristot. i. 473a. 3, 4: ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τροφῆς γε χάριν ὑποληπτέον γίνεσθαι τὴν ἀναπνοήν, ὥς τρεφομένου τῷ πνεύματι τοῦ ἐντὸς πυρός.

But it must not be supposed that respiration is for the purpose of nourishment, as if the inner fire were fed by the breath.

In Eurip. *Troiad.* 758, *πνεῦμα*, meaning breath, seems to be used figuratively for odor. In Eurip. *Hipp.* 1391, *θεῖον ὀσμῆς πνεῦμα* signifies the odorous breath of the goddess.¹ In Eurip. *Phoen.* 787, the breath breathed through a tube is called *λωτοῦ πνεύματα*. Similarly in Eurip. *Bacch.* 128, *Φρυγίων αὐλῶν πνεύματι*, and in *Elect.* 749. In Soph. *Fr.* 13, *ἄνθρωπός ἐστι πνεῦμα καὶ σκιά μόνον*, the word *πνεῦμα* clearly means air or breath as unsubstantial and perishable.

Other examples of *πνεῦμα* meaning breath are found in Aesch. *Theb.* 464; *Eumen.* 137; Eurip. *Iph. in Taur.* 1317; *Hec.* 567; *Or.* 277; *Phoen.* 851; *Med.* 1075, 1119; *Hipp.* 1391; Thucyd. 2. 49. 23; Xen. *Cyneg.* 7, 3; Dem. 60. 24; Plato *Tim.* 79B, 91C; *Phileb.* 47A; *Legg.* 865B; Aristot. i. 471a. 27; 472a. 35; 587a. 4, 5; 631a. 27; 669a. 13; 718a. 3.

Closely associated with the idea of breath, perhaps not in reality distinguished from it, is the idea of air as capable of being breathed in or out.

Eurip. *Hel.* 867: ὥς πνεῦμα καθαρὸν οὐρανοῦ δεξώμεθα.

That we may receive the pure air (breath?) of heaven.

Cf. Plato *Tim.* 66E; *Phaedo* 70A.

¹ ὦ θεῖον ὀσμῆς πνεῦμα· καὶ γὰρ ἐν κακοῖς
ὦν ἡσθόμην σου κἀνεκουφίσθην δέμας·
ἔστ' ἐν τόποισι τοισιδ' Ἀρτεμὶς θεά.

"O heavenly whiff of perfume. I am aware thou comest to bring me solace. For thou lightenest my pains. My patroness, the goddess Artemis, is here."

Similarly, denoting air as necessary to life (yet not precisely the breath of life) the word occurs in

Plato *Tim.* 77A: τὴν δὲ ζωὴν ἐν πυρὶ καὶ πνεύματι συνέβαινεν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔχειν αὐτῷ (i.e., τῷ θνητῷ ζώῳ).

And it is characteristic of the mortal animal that its life depends on (consists in?) fire and air. Cf. also Aristot. i. 394b. 10 ff.

In Plato *Tim.* 84D, E, πνεῦμα seems to denote air in various parts of the body, being furnished to these parts by the lungs, which are designated as ὁ τῶν πνευμάτων τῷ σώματι ταμίαις.

4. In a comparatively few passages, yet these scattered over a considerable period of time, πνεῦμα has a distinctly vital sense, signifying breath of life (loss of which is death), or life, or even more generally the primeval principle or basis of life. In the latter case we may perhaps translate it by the English word "spirit," though it must be remembered that the Greek word remains unchanged and that this change of translation may exaggerate the change of thought in Greek. The transition of usage from the non-vital to the vital sense is perhaps illustrated by a passage in Aeschylus in which the expression πνεῦμα βίου occurs.

Aesch. *Pers.* 507: πίπτον δ' ἐπ' ἀλλήλοισιν· εὐτυχὴς δέ τοι | ὅστις τάχιστα πνεῦμ' ἀπέρρηξεν βίου.

And they fell upon one another, and happy he who most quickly broke off the thread (lit. breath) of life.

But in the same period we find πνεῦμα without βίου, having the same meaning.

Aesch. *Theb.* 981: σωθεὶς δὲ πνεῦμ' ἀπώλεσεν.

But after having been saved he lost his life.

Eurip. *Or.* 864: λεγ', ὦ γεραῖε, πότῃρα λευσίμῳ χερὶ | ἢ διὰ σιδήρου πνεῦμ' ἀπορρήξαι με δεῖ.

Tell me, old man, whether by hand raised to stone or by sword I must die (lit. break off breath). See also Eurip. *Troiad.* 756, 785; *Hec.* 571.

Of peculiar interest are two fragments from Epicharmus, a contemporary of Sophocles, or, as is more probably the case, one passage diversely quoted:

126: Συνεκρίθη καὶ διεκρίθη ἀπῆλθεν ὅθεν ἦλθεν πάλιν, | γὰ μὲν εἰς γᾶν, πνεῦμα δ' ἄνω· τί τῶνδε χαλεπόν; οὐδὲ ἔν.

Joined it was, is now dissevered and is gone again whence it came; earth to earth, and spirit above. What difficulty does this occasion? Surely none.¹ (Ahrens, *De Dialecto Dorica*, II, 457; Diels, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, I, 122, quoted from Plutarch *Cons. ad Apoll.* 15.)

146: Εὐσεβῆς νόῳ πεφυκὼς οὐ πάθοις κ' οὐδὲν κακὸν | κατθανών· ἄνω τὸ πνεῦμα διαμενεῖ κατ' οὐρανόν. (Ahrens, *op. cit.*, p. 460; Diels, *op. cit.*, p. 124, quoted from Clemens Alexandrinus *Str.*, iv, 170.)

If with pious mind thou shouldst live, thou wouldst suffer no ill at death. Above the spirit will continue to exist in heaven.

In view of these quotations from Epicharmus, the former of which is probably nearer to the original than the latter (cf. p. 77), it is not strange to read the following in Euripides:

Suppl. 531-36: ἑάσατ' ἤδη γῇ καλυφθῆναι νεκρούς. | ὅθεν δ' ἕκαστον ἐς τὸ σῶμα' [Mss L and P read φῶς] ἀφίκετο, | ἐνταῦθα ἀπῆλθε, πνεῦμα μὲν πρὸς αἰθέρα, | τὸ σῶμα δ' ἐς γῆν· οὔτι γὰρ κεκτήμεθα | ἡμέτερον αὐτό, πλὴν ἐνοικῆσαι βίον, | κἄπειτα τὴν θρέψασαν αὐτὸ δεῖ λαβεῖν.

Suffer now the dead to be hidden in the earth, and whence each part came into the body [or, into the light] thither it departs, spirit to air, and the body into the earth. For we do not at all possess it as our own, except to live in for a lifetime, and then the earth that nourished it must receive it.

But Stobaeus (*Ecl.* IV, 55. 3) ascribes these lines to Moschion, a writer of the second century A.D., and modern editors such as Kirchhoff and Nauck (cited by Paley with apparent approval) so far agree at least as not to ascribe them to Euripides.²

If we may trust the testimony of Diogenes Laertius, writing in the second or third century A.D., concerning the views of a philosopher of the sixth century B.C., a century before Sophocles

¹ Cf. Eccles. 12:7: "The dust shall return to earth as it was, and the spirit shall return to God who gave it." Cf. also Job 34:14; Gen. 2:7.

² In the traditional text of Phocylides, lines 106-8 (Bergk, *Poetae lyrici Graecae*, II, 450 ff.), occur the following sentences, πνεῦμα γάρ ἐστι θεοῦ χρῆσις θνητοῖσι καὶ εἰκῶν· σῶμα γὰρ ἐκ γαίης ἔχομεν κἄπειτα πρὸς αὐτὴν λυόμενοι κόνις ἐσμέν, ἅηρ δ' ἀνὰ πνεῦμα δέδεκται, which, with their most interesting context, would be of capital importance for our purpose, if they were really from Phocylides (sixth century B.C.). But the poem is now universally admitted to be a forgery and is assigned by Bernays (see Christ, *Gesch. der gr. Lit.*, 4th ed., p. 134) to an Alexandrian Jew writing sometime between the second century B.C. and the middle of the first century A.D.

wrote, Xenophanes declared that the soul was πνεῦμα.¹ But lacking the full context of Xenophanes' statement, or other evidence by which to interpret it exactly, we cannot tell precisely what he meant by πνεῦμα as a predicate of ψυχή. The preceding statement, "everything that comes into being is perishable," taken with the contemporary evidence as to the use of πνεῦμα, leads one to suspect that by πνεῦμα he meant breath, or air, and that the statement should be understood to mean that Xenophanes, as against the views of his predecessors, who maintained that the ψυχή lives after death as a shade, was the first to affirm that everything that comes into being is also subject to extinction, and that under this general law the soul also is but breath or air. If this is the meaning of the passage it is evident that πνεῦμα does not here mean a (living) spirit or (living) soul-stuff, but belongs under 3 above (cf. *Soph. Fr.* 13 cited p. 17), and that, if the statement of Diogenes about Xenophanes is correct, it had not yet in the sixth century B.C. acquired the former meaning.² Apparently, however, we find in Xenophanes the first definite traces of that association of πνεῦμα and ψυχή which was destined to play so large a part in the subsequent history of the two words.

To Anaximenes, a contemporary of Xenophanes, Plutarch ascribes the words:

οἶον ἢ ψυχῇ, φησὶν, ἢ ἡμετέρα ἀήρ οὔσα συγκρατεῖ ἡμᾶς, καὶ ὅλον τὸν κόσμον πνεῦμα καὶ ἀήρ περιέχει.³

As our souls, being air, control us, so wind(?) and air encompass the whole world.

¹ Diog. Laert. ix. 2. 3: πρῶτος τ' ἀπεφώνηκε ὅτι πᾶν τὸ γινόμενον φθαρτὸν ἐστὶ, καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ πνεῦμα.

² Between this statement and that of Siebeck, *Geschichte der Psychologie*, II, 132, that air in motion (πνεῦμα?) was from very early times regarded by the Greeks as more than a blind mechanical power, and the breath as life-giving, there is no necessary conflict. The latter conception, so obviously suggested by experience, would naturally precede the conception of the πνεῦμα as itself alive, either a spirit or spirit-substance possessing life (cf. the passage from Epicharmus); and between the two there might easily arise the thought, apparently expressed by Xenophanes, that the ψυχή is πνεῦμα, breath or air, life-giving indeed, but not living, and hence the ψυχή perishable, how he does not expressly say, but doubtless through the departure of the πνεῦμα from the body and its return to the general mass of unconscious air.

³ *Plac. Phil.* i. 3. Of course πνεῦμα was not the only term which the ancient Greeks used to describe the quality or nature of the ψυχή. Both before and after

While *πνεῦμα* is not here predicated of ἡ *ψυχή*, yet it is evident that *πνεῦμα* and *ἀήρ* are nearly synonymous terms, and the parallelism of the two clauses, together with the affirmation that the *ψυχή* is *ἀήρ*, throws some light upon the question what other writers mean when they say that the *ψυχή* is *πνεῦμα*.

Aristotle has certain usages which are apparently peculiar to him, and which demand attention in this connection. He uses the expression *σύμφυτον πνεῦμα* to denote air that belongs in, apparently is born in, the body as distinguished from that which is inhaled. He ascribes to it various functions in the body, such as smell, motion, hearing, and cooling. Thus in i. 659b, 17-19, speaking of animals that have no nostrils, he says:

τὰ δ' ἔντομα διὰ τοῦ ὑποζώματος αἰσθάνονται τῶν ὀσμών, καὶ πάντα τῷ συμφύτῳ πνεύματι τοῦ σώματος ὥσπερ κινεῖται· τοῦτο δ' ὑπάρχει φύσει πᾶσι καὶ οὐ θύραθεν ἐπείσάκτον ἔστιν.

And the insects detect odors through the hypozome, and all (animals not having nostrils) possess the power of smell, as of motion, by virtue of the inborn air of the body; and this belongs to all by nature, and is not brought in from outside.

So also in i. 669a. 1, distinguishing animals that have lungs and those that have not, and the different ways in which they are "cooled," whether by water or air, he says:

τὰ δὲ μὴ ἔναιμα καὶ τῷ συμφύτῳ πνεύματι δύναται καταψύχειν.

And the non-sanguineous animals by the inborn air are able to be cooled.

But in i. 743b. 37 ff., speaking of animals in general, he says:

ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν τῆς ἀφῆς καὶ γεύσεως εὐθύς ἔστιν σῶμα ἢ τοῦ σώματος τι τῶν ζώων, ἢ δ' ὁσφρησις καὶ ἡ ἀκοὴ πόροι συνάπτοντες πρὸς τὸν ἀέρα τὸν θύραθεν, πλήρεις συμφύτου πνεύματος.

But while the [sense-organ] of touch and taste is simply the body or some part of the body of animals, those of smell and hearing are passages connecting with the outer air and full of inborn air.

Xenophanes there was the view that the soul was fire, the two conceptions, however, not being sharply antagonistic, *πῦρ* being in some cases at least thought of as transmutable into *πνεῦμα*, and in others it being affirmed that the *ψυχή* was *πνεῦμα θερμόν*. The full discussion of this matter, fundamental for the history of psychology, would carry us too far afield from our lexicographical study. But see Siebeck, *Geschichte der Psychologie*, I, 43 ff.; Arnold, *Roman Stoicism*, p. 243.

Again in 741b. 37 ff., speaking of the development of offspring of animals, he says:

διορίζεται δὲ τὰ μέρη τῶν ζώων πνεύματι, οὐ μέντοι οὔτε τῷ τῆς γεννούσης οὔτε τῷ αὐτοῦ, καθάπερ τινὲς τῶν φυσικῶν φασίν.

And the parts of animals are differentiated by πνεῦμα, not however by either that of the mother or that of the offspring itself, as some physicists say.

Then follows an argument from the case of animals produced from an egg, and from the fact that viviparous animals do not breathe till the lungs are produced. Jaeger¹ argues that though σύμφυτον is omitted, it is the σύμφυτον πνεῦμα that is referred to, and that it is this which, according to Aristotle, differentiates animate beings from inanimate things. This is not impossible, but neither is vital power distinctly ascribed to σύμφυτον πνεῦμα, nor is it definitely attributed to plants, so far as the present study has discovered.

In the Περὶ Κόσμου, however, there occurs a passage in which πνεῦμα seems clearly to bear a vital sense:

i. 394b: ἐκ δὲ τῆς ξηρᾶς ὑπὸ ψύχους μὲν ὡσθείσης ὥστε ρεῖν ἄνεμος ἐγένετο· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔστιν οὗτος πλὴν ἀήρ πολὺς ῥέων καὶ ἀθρόος· ὅστις ἅμα καὶ πνεῦμα λέγεται. λέγεται δὲ καὶ ἑτέρως πνεῦμα ἢ τε ἐν φυτοῖς καὶ ζώοις καὶ διὰ πάντων διήκουσα ἔμψυχός τε καὶ γόνιμος οὐσία, περὶ ἧς νῦν λέγειν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον.

But from the dry (air?), when it is impinged upon by the cold so that it flows, wind arises. For this is nothing but a large amount of air, flowing and massed together; and it is also called πνεῦμα. But in another sense the word πνεῦμα is applied to the substance which is in both plants and animals and permeates all and is both living and generative—concerning which it is not necessary to speak at this time.

One might be disposed to think that Aristotle is here speaking of the σύμφυτον πνεῦμα to which he ascribes so important functions, but the σύμφυτον πνεῦμα is apparently limited to animals, while the πνεῦμα of which he is here speaking is in both plants and animals; if indeed it does not permeate all things. It seems clear therefore that he is here using πνεῦμα in the sense of a universal principle of life, if not even of existence.²

¹ "Das Pneuma in Lykeion," in *Hermes*, XXXVIII, 43 ff.

² Sextus Empiricus, writing in the third century A.D., ascribes to the followers of Pythagoras and Empedocles the doctrine that there is one spirit (πνεῦμα) which

From this evidence, though somewhat scanty and not altogether clear, it nevertheless appears that from the sixth century B.C. *πνέυμα* was predicated of the soul, and that from the time of Sophocles at least the idea of life was associated with the term. In Epicharmus it seems to denote soul-substance, that of which all souls are composed, from which they are all taken, and to which they all return, and in Aristotle's time the notion appears to have been so expanded that *πνέυμα* signified the basis of all life, whether of plants or animals.

It should be observed, however, that in none of the passages cited is the term individualized, so as to denote the soul of the individual, nor do the affirmations made concerning it involve the assertion of individual immortality.¹ The conception of a soul-substance out of which souls are made does not indeed exclude personal immortality; but the affirmation that at death it returns to the ether or whence it came is not naturally associated with a belief in personal immortality. That Sophocles and Euripides should use the expression *πνέυμα ἀπορρηῆσαι* for death is not surprising, for here *πνέυμα* means only breath [of life]. We are nearer to an assertion of the personal immortality of the *πνέυμα* in the statement ascribed to Epicharmus (p. 19) that the pious man has nothing to fear because his spirit will abide in heaven; but in its original form the passage probably refers to reabsorption in the universal *πνέυμα*. It is at any rate significant that Plato and Xenophon, who speak definitely of the immortality of the soul (see below under *ψυχή*), seem never to have used *πνέυμα* as it is employed in these passages from Epicharmus and Sophocles, and that it is in

permeates the whole world like a soul and unites us to the irrational animals (*ἐν γὰρ ὑπάρχειν πνέυμα τὸ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ κόσμου διήκον ψυχῆς τρόπον τὸ καὶ ἐνοῦν ἡμᾶς πρὸς ἐκεῖνα*. Diels, *Vorsokrat.*, I, 275, B 136). If this view really belonged to Pythagoras and Empedocles themselves, it would be an anticipation even of the view which, according to Aristotle, was held in his time. But, in view of the uncertainty as to the persons referred to as the followers of Pythagoras and Empedocles, it is necessary to treat the passage along with other post-Christian testimony. Cf. pp. 130, 139 f.

¹ Even in the Potidaea inscription quoted on p. 30, in which the individualizing *ψυχή* is used, it is affirmed, not that the *ψυχή* lives as such after death, but that the ether receives it. Cf. Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers*, II, 84: "What was called in question [by Epicharmus and Euripides] was the personal, not the conscious, survival of the soul; for the ether, or heavenly substance, was conceived as the vehicle of a world-soul identified with the supreme deity."

Aristotle, who distinctly rejects the idea of the immortality of the individual soul, that the usage reappears, though, to be sure, modified by Aristotle's notion of life as common to plants and animals. It is indeed not wholly clear, nor is it, for our present purpose, of any great significance whether in the *obiter dictum* quoted from Aristotle he meant for himself to affirm the existence of such a universal life-substance or only to say that the word was used by some of his contemporaries in this sense. What is of importance is that in the time of Aristotle *πνεῦμα* had not yet come to mean a spirit, the immaterial element of an embodied being, or an unembodied person, but that it had for some two centuries been used to mean spirit in a non-individualized sense constituting or proceeding from a sort of reservoir of soul-substance or life-principle. From the quotation of Clement of Alexandria from Epicharmus we might infer that this soul-material present in an individual about to surrender it in death might be called *τὸ πνεῦμα*, but the presence of the article is probably due to Clement rather than to Epicharmus, and in any case the individual human spirit conceived of as the seat and organ of psychic activities was apparently never so spoken of.¹

II. ΨΥΧΗ

Ψυχή is throughout the history of its use in extant Greek writers prevaillingly a vital term, i.e., a word carrying with it the idea of life, and, until Aristotle (who applies the term to plants), life involving some measure of consciousness or possibility of consciousness. It is found, moreover, even in Homer, both in the more abstract sense of *life-principle*, the loss of which is death, and of *soul* as a conscious entity existing after death. It is evident, therefore, that in the earliest extant literature we are already at an advanced stage in the development of the usage of the word. We cannot, accordingly, reason as if the Homeric usages were the original sources from which all others were developed. Later usages may have their roots in usage antecedent to Homer or may have arisen from the

¹ Completeness of treatment would require a discussion of the usage of the Socratic schools. See Zeller, *Socrates and the Socratic Schools*; Mullach, *Fragmenta Philosophorum Graecorum*; Diogenes Laertius, Book ii and Book vi. Inasmuch, however, as these schools were largely absorbed either in Epicureanism or Stoicism, and such influence as they had upon later thought was exerted through these latter schools, in the interest of brevity completeness is sacrificed.

influence of usages first developed in other words. For example, *ψυχή* meaning *soul* as the seat of emotions does not appear in Homer. But *θυμός*, which Homer uses to express this idea, also means, as *ψυχή* does, life, the loss of which is death. The usage of *ψυχή* meaning soul as the seat of emotion may have therefore existed in Homeric times, though for some reason excluded from Homer by *θυμός*; or in post-Homeric times it may have passed over to *ψυχή* from *θυμός*, which was already a synonym of *ψυχή* in the meaning "life."

Tabulating meanings not wholly on a chronological basis, but guided partly by kinship in meaning, we have the following exhibit of usage:

1. Life, loss of which is death, sometimes of lower animals, but usually of men: common from Homer to Xenophon.

Hom. *Il.* xi. 334: τοὺς μὲν Τυδεΐδης δουρικλειτὸς Διομήδης | θυμοῦ καὶ ψυχῆς κεκαδὼν κλυτὰ τεύχε' ἀπηύρα.

The son of Tydeus, Diomedes, spearman renowned, having deprived them of soul and life, took away their glorious armor.

Herod. 3. 130: ἔλεγον πρὸς τὰς γυναῖκας ὡς βασιλεῖ οὗτος εἴη ὃς τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπέδωκε.

And they said to the women that this was the man who had restored to the king his life.

Xen. *Cyr.* 4. 4. 10: νῦν τε ὅτι ἐπέθεσθε, τὰς ψυχὰς περιποιήσασθε. Because you have now submitted you have saved your lives.

See also Eurip. *Troiad.* 1213-15: νῦν δέ σ' ἡ θεοστύγης | ἀφείλεθ' Ἑλένη, πρὸς δὲ καὶ ψυχὴν σέθεν | ἔκτεινε, καὶ πάντ' οἶκον ἐξαπώλεσεν.

And now heaven-detested Helen has bereft thee, and besides taken away (lit. killed) thy life, and destroyed all thy house. Cf. also Aristoph. *Thesmoph.* 364: ψυχὰι . . . ἔθανον.

By metonymy, *ψυχή* is used for the joy of life, or, more inclusively, for all the possibilities of good associated with the fact of living.

Eurip. *Med.* 226: ἐμοὶ δ' ἄελπτον πρᾶγμα προσπεσὼν τόδε | ψυχὴν διέφθαρκ'· οἴχομαι δὲ καὶ βίου | χάριν μεθεῖσα κατθανεῖν χρήζω, φίλοι.

And this unexpected event befalling me has ruined my life. I am going, and having given up the joy of living, I wish to die, my friends. Cf. Mark 8: 35.

Similarly, but with a double metonymy, *ψυχή*, meaning the source of the joy of life, occurs in Euripides:

Eurip. *Androm.* 419: *πᾶσι δ' ἀνθρώποις ἄρ' ἦν | ψυχή τέκν'.*

And to all men, then, their children were their life. Cf. also Hes. *Op.* 684.

In certain passages in Homer (*Il.* v. 696) the expression, *ἔλιπε ψυχή*, which elsewhere means to die (*Od.* xiv. 134; xviii. 91), or *ψυχὴν ἐκάπυσσεν* (*Il.* xxii. 467), is used of one who faints or falls into a swoon. Here is perhaps an approach to the meaning of soul as the seat of consciousness. Yet probably in the thought of the writer *ψυχή* meant life, and the thought as expressed is that his life left him (for a time).

Other examples of *ψυχή* meaning life occur in Hom. *Il.* v. 296; viii. 123, 315; ix. 322, 401; xiii. 763; xiv. 518; xvi. 453, 505; xxii. 161, 257, 325, 338; xxiv. 168, 754; *Od.* i. 5; iii. 74; ix. 255, 423, 523; xix. 426 (of an animal); xxi. 154, 171; xxii. 245, 444; Pind. *Nem.* i. 47 (of an animal); *Pyth.* 3. 101; *Ol.* 8. 39 (of an animal); Aesch. *Agam.* 965 (938), 1457, 1466, 1545; *Eumen.* 115; Soph. *Oed. Tyr.* 94, 894; *Oed. Col.* 1326; *Antig.* 559; *Elect.* 786, 1492; *Ai.* 1270; Eurip. *Hec.* 22, 176, 182; *Orest.* 643, 845, 1034, 1163, 1171, 1517; *Phoen.* 1005 (998), 1234 (1228), 1291; *Med.* 968; *Alc.* 301, 704, 715; *Rhes.* 183; *Troiad.* 1135; *Herac.* 15, 297, 530; *Her. Fu.* 1146; *Ion* 1499; *Hipp.* 440, 726; Aristoph. *Acharn.* 357; *Vesp.* 37. *Nub.* 712, 719; *Pax* 1301; Antipho 115. 15; Herod. i. 24; 2. 13. 7. 39; Thucyd. i. 136; 3. 39; 8. 50; Xen. *Cyr.* 3. 1. 36; 4. 4. 1. 4. 6. 4; *Hier.* 4. 9; *Eq. Mag.* i. 19. I have observed no example of this usage in Plato or Aristotle, both writers usually employing the word in the meaning "soul" indicated below under 3. But it would be hazardous to say that no instance of the meaning "life" occurs.

2. A shade, the soul of man existing after death, or departing from the body in death. This usage, appearing in Homer, clearly implies the thought of the *ψυχή* as existent in the body; since otherwise it could not depart from the body and exist separately. Yet instances of the term *ψυχή* definitely denoting an entity existing in the body in life do not appear, unless they be found in the passages cited above referring to fainting or *Il.* ix. 408, cited below. As

denoting a "shade" *ψυχή* occurs in Homer, Pindar, Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, and Aristophanes.

Hom. *Il.* i. 3: Μῆνιν αἶδε, θεά, Πηληϊάδεω Ἀχιλῆος | οὐλομένην, ἣ μυρὶ Ἀχαιοῖς ἄλγε' ἔθηκεν, | πολλὰς δ' ἰφθίμους ψυχὰς Ἀϊδὶ προΐαψεν | ἡρώων, αὐτοὺς δὲ ἐλώρια τεύχε κύνεσσιν | οἰωνοῖσιν τε δαῖτα.

Sing, goddess, the destructive wrath of Achilles, son of Peleus, which brought upon the Achaeans innumerable woes, and sent to Hades many strong souls of heroes, and gave them [their bodies] a prey to dogs and a feast for birds of prey. Cf. *Od.* x. 560; xi. 65; *Il.* xvi. 856.

Hom. *Od.* xi. 205: ὧς ἔφατ', αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ γ' ἔθελον φρεσὶ μερμηρί-
ξας | μητρὸς ἐμῆς ψυχὴν ἐλέειν κατατεθνηκυῖης. | τρὶς μὲν ἐφωρμήθην,
ἐλέειν τέ με θυμὸς ἀνώγειν, | τρὶς δέ μοι ἐκ χειρῶν σκιῇ εἵκελον ἦ καὶ
ὄνειρῳ | ἔπτατ'.

So she spoke, and I anxious in my heart desired to seize the spirit of my dead mother. Thrice indeed I sprang toward her, and my soul impelled me to seize her, but thrice she escaped out of my hands like a shadow or a dream. See also *Il.* xxiii. 65, 72, 100, 104, 106; *Od.* xi. 150, 222, 471.

Soph. *Oed. Col.* 999: τοιαῦτα μέντοι καὶ τὸς εἰσέβην κακά, | θεῶν ἀγόντων' οἷς ἐγὼ οὐδὲ τὴν πατρὸς ψυχὴν | ἂν οἶμαι ζῶσαν ἀντειπεῖν ἐμοί.

Into such ills I myself entered, the gods leading; which statement of mine I believe not even the spirit of my father, if he were alive, would deny.

The close relationship between the two meanings "life" and "shade" is illustrated in the following passage:

Hom. *Il.* ix. 408: ἀνδρὸς δὲ ψυχὴ πάλιν ἐλθεῖν οὔτε λειστή | οὔθ' ἐλετή, ἐπεὶ ἄρ' κεν ἀμείψεται ἔρκος ὀδόντων.

But a man's life (soul?) comes back again neither by seizure nor by force when once it has passed beyond his teeth. Cf. also *Il.* xxi. 569; Pind. *Isth.* i. 68; Soph. *Antig.* 559.

Other examples of *ψυχή* denoting a shade are found in Hom. *Il.* v. 654; vii. 330; xi. 445; xvi. 625; xxii. 362; xxiii. 65, 72, 221; *Od.* x. 492, 530, 565; xi. 37, 51, 84, 90, 141, 165, 385, 387, 467, 538, 541, 543, 564, 567; xxiii. 251, 323; xxiv. 1, 14, 15, 20, 23, 35, 100, 102, 105, 120, 191; Pind. *Nem.* 8, 44; *Pyth.* 4. 159; 11. 21; Aesch. *Pers.* 630; *Agam.* 1545; Soph. *Oed. Col.* 999; Eurip. *Hec.* 87; Aristoph. *Av.* 1557; *Pax* 829.

3. Soul, as a constituent element of man's nature, the seat of emotions of all kinds; from Sophocles on, the human mind in the large sense of the word as the seat of emotions, will, thought, and character. So used in Pindar, Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, Herodotus, Thucydides, Aristophanes, Xenophon, Isocrates, Plato, and Aristotle.

Pind. *Nem.* 9. 39: παῦροι δὲ βουλευσάμενοι φόνου | παρποδίου νεφέλαν
τρέψαι ποτὶ δυσμενέων ἀνδρῶν στίχας | χερσὶ καὶ ψυχᾷ δυνατοί.

But there are few who are able with hands and soul to turn back the cloud of impending war against the ranks of the enemy.

Soph. *Antig.* 176: ἀμήχανον δὲ παντὸς ἀνδρὸς ἐκμαθεῖν | ψυχὴν τε
καὶ φρόνημα καὶ γνώμην.

But it is impossible to learn fully every man's soul and mind and judgment.

Aristoph. *Acharn.* 375: τῶν τ' αὖ γερόντων οἶδα τὰς ψυχὰς ὅτι |
οὐδὲν βλέπονσιν ἄλλο πλὴν ψήφηδακεῖν.

And I know again the minds of the elders, that they care for nothing but to annoy by their vote.

See other examples in Eurip. *Ion* 1170: ὥς δ' ἐπληρώθη στέγη, |
στεφάνοισι κοσμηθέντες, εὐόχθου βορᾶς | ψυχὴν ἐπλήρουν.

But when the tent was filled, adorned with crowns, they filled their soul with abundant food.

Xen. *Cyr.* 1. 2. 1: εἶδος μὲν κάλλιστος ψυχὴν δὲ φιλανθρωπότατος
καὶ φιλομαθέστατος καὶ φιλοτιμώτατος.

Most beautiful in appearance, and in soul most humane, most eager for learning, and most ambitious.

Isocr. 1C: τὰ μὲν γὰρ σώματα τοῖς συμμέτροις πόνοις, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ
τοῖς σπουδαίοις λόγοις αὔξεσθαι πέφυκε.

For bodies grow by moderate labor, but the soul by excellent words. Cf. also 2C and 4A.

By metonymy *ψυχὴ* is used for the state or experience of the soul.¹

¹ Xenophon puts into the mouth of Araspes the opinion that there are two souls in man, one good, one evil.

Cyr. 6. 1. 41: δύο γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ Κῦρε, σαφῶς ἔχω ψυχὰς· νῦν τοῦτο πεφίλοσόφηκα μετὰ τοῦ ἀδίκου σοφιστοῦ τοῦ Ἑρωτος. οὐ γὰρ δὴ μία γε οἶσα ἅμα ἀγαθὴ τέ ἐστι καὶ κακὴ, οὐδ' ἅμα καλὸν τε καὶ αἰσχρὸν ἔργων ἐρεῖ, καὶ ταῦτά ἅμα βούλεται τε καὶ οὐ βού-

Dem. 842. 15: τίν' οἶσθ' αὐτὴν ψυχὴν ἔξειν;

What state of mind do you think she will be in?

Other examples of *ψυχή* used to denote the soul or mind of man occur in Pind. *Ol.* 2. 70; *Pyth.* 3. 41, 61; 4. 122; *Nem.* 9. 32; *Isth.* 3. 71; Aesch. *Coeph.* 275; *Prom.* 693; *Pers.* 28, 442, 841; Soph. *Theb.* 1034; *Oed. Tyr.* 64, 666, 727; *Antig.* 176, 227, 317; *Ai.* 559, 1361; *Elect.* 219, 903, 1127; *Philoct.* 55, 1014; *Trach.* 1260; Eurip. *Hec.* 580; *Elect.* 208, 297; *Orest.* 525; *Med.* 474; *Hipp.* 160, 255, 1006; *Alc.* 107; *Troiad.* 1171; *Heracl.* 174; *Suppl.* 1103; *Her. Fur.* 626; Aristoph. *Vesp.* 380, 756; *Acharn.* 375, 393; *Pax* 675, 1068; *Nub.* 94, 319, 413, 420, 1049; *Ran.* 1334, 1468; *Hipp.* 457, 482; *Lycist.* 960; *Orn.* 466; *Plut.* 524; Herod. 3. 14, 108 (of animals); 5. 124; Thucyd. 2. 40; Isoc. 17B; Xen. *An.* 7. 7, 43; *Econ.* 1. 19; 10. 4; 20. 15; *Hellen.* 3. 4, 29; *Cyr.* 1. 2. 1, 10; 1. 3. 18; 2. 1. 11; 3. 3. 18; 5. 4. 11, 35; 6. 1. 41; 6. 2. 15, 28, 33; 8. 2. 20; 8. 7. 4; *Mem.* 1. 3. 5; 3. 11. 10; *Eq.* 11. 1 (of an animal).

4. By natural metonymy, the vital or conscious element in man standing for the man himself, *ψυχή* is used with the meaning "person." So in Sophocles, Euripides, Xenophon, and Plato.

Soph. *Oed. Col.* 499: ἀρκεῖν γὰρ οἶμαι κἀντὶ μυρίων μίαν | *ψυχὴν τὰδ' ἐκτίνοσαν, ἣν εὐνοῦς παρῆ.*

For I suppose that one soul expiating these things would suffice for ten thousand, if it were present with good intent. See also Soph. *Ai.* 154; *Oed. Col.* 499; *Philoct.* 712; Eurip. *Phoen.* 1305; *Med.* 247; *Hipp.* 259; Xen. *Cyr.* 7. 3. 8; Plat. *Rep.* 491E, 496 B.

5. Quite by itself is Aristotle's use of *ψυχή* denoting the principle of life or intelligence in the lower animals, plants, and the universe. Aristot. i. 411b. See fuller discussion and other examples of Aristotle's usage on pp. 43 ff.

Concerning the essential qualities of the *ψυχή*, and, in particular, the possibility and nature of its existence apart from the body, there was much difference of opinion among the Greeks which

λεται πράττειν, ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι δύο ἐστὸν ψυχά, καὶ ὅταν μὲν ἡ ἀγαθὴ κρατῇ τὰ καλὰ πράττεται, ὅταν δὲ ἡ πονηρά, τὰ αἰσχροὶ ἐπιχειρεῖται.

But this is evidently to be taken, not as a philosophic statement, but as a description in popular language of the fact familiar in every man's experience of the existence of strongly conflicting impulses in the soul.

cannot be fully reflected in a tabular analysis of meanings. Though from Homer down there is clear evidence of the belief that the *ψυχή* survives the death of the body, yet definite affirmations that the *ψυχή*, which in the period of bodily life is the seat of consciousness, mentality, and feeling, lives after death, retaining its individuality, apparently occur in Greek writers first in the fifth century; and in the same period we find evidence of the notion that in surviving death the soul also lost its individuality, becoming absorbed in a larger entity. Pindar seems indeed to deny immortality altogether:

Pyth. 3. 61: μή, φίλα ψυχά, βίον ἀθάνατον | σπεῦδε, τὰν δ' ἔμπρακτον ἄντλει μάχαναν.

Crave not, my soul, immortal life, but make the most of things within your power.

But the context shows that he is speaking here of the unending continuance of the present life, and in *Ol.* 2 he indicates clearly that he believed in a life after death in which men were rewarded for the good or evil done in this life. In a memorial inscription to those who fell at Potidaea, presumably a half-century or so later than Pindar, occur the following words:¹

Αἰθήρ μὲν φσυχὰς ὑπεδέχσατο, σῶ[ματα δὲ χθών] | . . . παῖδες Ἀθηναίων φσυχὰς δ' ἀντίρρο[πα θέντες] | ἡ[λλ]άχσαντ' ἀρετὴν καὶ πατ[ρίδ'] εὐκλεΐασαν.

Then the air received their souls, the earth their bodies . . . Athenian youths sacrificing their souls [lives?], exchanged them for virtue and glorified their country.

The language reminds us at once of the words of Epicharmus (p. 19). It is significant both that, while there *πνεῦμα* is used, here we have *ψυχή*, and, on the other hand, that despite this difference this passage no more than the others implies personal immortality.²

Herodotus, writing only a few years before Potidaea, ascribes to the Egyptians the origination of the belief in the immortality of the soul and the transmigration of the soul. Apparently he distin-

¹ Hicks and Hill, *Historical Inscriptions*, p. 94; Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers*, II, 84.

² Cf. on the former point what is said above on pp. 23 f. concerning the relation between *πνεῦμα* and *ψυχή*, and on the latter the quotation from Gomperz in footnote, p. 23.

guished between the immortality of the soul and the shadowy kind of existence which Homer ascribes to the dead, perhaps also between immortality and reabsorption; unless indeed he was thinking chiefly or exclusively of the belief in transmigration as that for the origination of which the Egyptians were responsible.¹

Herod. 2. 123: *πρῶτοι δὲ καὶ τόνδε τὸν λόγον Αἰγύπτιοι εἰσι οἱ εἰπόντες, ὡς ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴ ἀθάνατός ἐστι, τοῦ σώματος δὲ καταφθίνοντος ἐς ἄλλο ζῶον αἰεὶ γινόμενον ἐσδύεται, ἐπεὰν δὲ πάντα περιέλθῃ τὰ χερσαῖα καὶ τὰ θαλάσσια καὶ τὰ πετεινά, αὐτὶς ἐς ἀνθρώπου σῶμα γινόμενον ἐσδύνειν.*

And the Egyptians were also the first to affirm that the human soul is immortal, and when the body dies it always passes into another animal which is at the moment being born, and so goes the round of all the land and water animals and the birds, and again enters the body of a man that is being born.

Xenophon ascribes to Cyrus a not altogether unwavering belief in the continued existence and consciousness of the soul after death.

Xen. Cyr. 8. 7. 17 ff: *οὐ γὰρ δὴπου τοῦτό γε σαφῶς δοκεῖτε εἶδέναι ὡς οὐδὲν ἔτι ἐγὼ ἔσομαι, ἐπειδὴν τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου βίου τελευτήσω· οὐδὲ γὰρ νῦν τοι τὴν γ' ἐμὴν ψυχὴν ἐωρᾶτε, ἀλλ' οἷς διεπράττετο, τοῦτοις αὐτὴν ὡς οὖσαν κατεφωρᾶτε. τὰς δὲ τῶν ἄδικα παθόντων ψυχὰς οὐπω κατενόησατε οἷους μὲν φόβους τοῖς μισοφόνοις ἐμβάλλουσιν, οἷους δὲ παλαμναίους τοῖς ἀνοσίοις ἐπιπέμπουσι; τοῖς δὲ φθιμένοις τὰς τιμὰς διαμένειν ἔτι ἂν δοκεῖτε, εἰ μηδενὸς αὐτῶν αἱ ψυχαὶ κύριαι ἦσαν; οὗτοι ἔγωγε, ὦ παῖδες, οὐδὲ τοῦτο πώποτε ἐπέισθην ὡς ἡ ψυχὴ ἔως μὲν ἂν ἐν θνητῷ σώματι ᾖ, ζῇ, ὅταν δὲ τούτου ἀπαλλαγῇ, τέθνηκεν. ὁρῶ γὰρ ὅτι καὶ τὰ θνητὰ σώματα, ὅσον ἂν ἐν αὐτοῖς χρόνον ᾖ ἡ ψυχὴ, ζῶντα παρέχεται. οὐδέ γε ὅπως ἄφρων ἔσται ἡ ψυχὴ, ἐπειδὴν τοῦ ἄφρονος σώματος δίχα γένηται, οὐδὲ τοῦτο πέπεισμαι· ἀλλ' ὅταν ἄκρατος καὶ καθαρὸς ὁ νοῦς ἐκκριθῇ, τότε καὶ φρονιμώτατον εἶκος αὐτὸν εἶναι. διαλυομένου δὲ ἀνθρώπου δηλὰ ἐστὶν ἕκαστα ἀπιδύοντα πρὸς τὸ ὁμόφυλον πλὴν τῆς ψυχῆς· αὕτη δὲ μόνη οὔτε παροῦσα οὔτε ἀπιοῦσα ὁρᾶται. ἐννόησατε δ', ἔφη, ὅτι ἐγγύτερον μὲν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων θανάτῳ οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ὕπνου· ἡ δὲ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴ τότε δὴπου θειοτάτῃ καταφαίνεται, καὶ τότε τι τῶν μελλόντων προορᾷ· τότε γάρ, ὡς ἔοικε, μάλιστα ἐλευθεροῦται. εἰ μὲν οὖν οὕτως ἔχει ταῦτα ὥσπερ ἐγὼ οἶμαι καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ*

¹ Paus., iv. 32. 4, says that the first people that he knows of who asserted that there is an immortal soul of man were the Chaldeans and the Indian magicians.

καταλείπει τὸ σῶμα, καὶ τὴν ἐμὴν ψυχὴν καταιδούμενοι ποιεῖτε ἃ ἐγὼ δέομαι· εἰ δὲ μὴ οὕτως, ἀλλὰ μένουσα ἡ ψυχὴ ἐν τῷ σώματι συναποθνήσκει, ἀλλὰ θεοὺς γε τοὺς αἰεὶ ὄντας καὶ πάντ' ἐφορῶντας καὶ πάντα δυναμένους, οἳ καὶ τήνδε τὴν τῶν ὅλων τάξιν συνέχουσιν ἀτριβῇ καὶ ἀγήρατον καὶ ἀναμάρτητον καὶ ὑπὸ κάλλους καὶ μεγέθους ἀδιήγητον, τούτους φοβούμενοι μήποτ' ἄσεβες μηδὲν μηδὲ ἀνόσιον μήτε ποιήσητε μήτε βουλεύσητε.

For you surely do not suppose that you know that I shall no longer exist when I end my human life. For not even now have you seen my soul, but from what it did have inferred its existence. And have you never observed respecting the souls of those who have died unjustly, what fears they create in their murderers and what avengers they send on the impious? And do you think that honors would still continue to the dead if their souls had power over nothing? For my part, my sons, I have never been convinced that the soul lives only so long as it is in a mortal body, and when it is separated from it it is dead. For I see that the soul keeps the mortal bodies alive so long as it is in them. Nor am I convinced how the soul will be without sense when it is separated from the senseless body; but it is probable that when the mind [ὁ νοῦς], unmixed and pure, is separated [from the body], then it will be most intelligent. But when a man dies, every part is clearly seen going to that which it is like except the soul; but this alone is seen neither remaining nor departing. And consider, he said, that nothing is more like the death of men than sleep. But it is then, is it not, that the soul appears most divine, and then foresees something of the future? For then, as it seems, is it most free. If therefore these things are so, as I at least believe them to be, and the soul leaves the body, then, out of reverence for my soul do the things that I request. But if otherwise, and the soul remaining in the body dies, even then from fear of the gods who exist forever, who see all things and are able to do all things, who maintain the existing order of all things unimpaired, undecaying and without defect, and, by reason of its beauty and greatness, indescribable, neither do nor contemplate at any time anything impious or profane. (See also 8. 7. 26.)

According to Plato's *Apology*, 40, Socrates took an entirely agnostic position on the future of the soul, uncertain whether "death is a state of nothingness and utter-unconsciousness, or as men say, there is a change and migration of the soul from this world into another"—but confident in either case that it is a good and not an evil. In Xenophon's *Memorabilia* he is reported as affirming that death is no evil, but as saying nothing concerning the future of the soul.

Plato's own conception of the soul is evidently influenced in no small degree by his doctrine of ideas,¹ as well as by his predecessors, the Orphics and the Pythagoreans. It is not surprising, therefore, that he should be not altogether consistent in his definition of its nature, his explanation of moral character, or his arguments for immortality. He ascribes *ψυχή* to the universe and to the sun and stars (*Legg.* 897-99) as well as to man, not thereby, however, denying life to the human *ψυχή*, but ascribing it to the universe. The human *ψυχή* is not only immortal, as Xenophon makes Cyrus say, but, as Orphism declared, pre-existent, and, as the Pythagoreans held, transmigratory. He clearly affirms that the soul determines its own destiny, but also that the body is an evil in the sense that it is a burden on the soul. Whether he converts the latter thought into the doctrine that the body is evil in the sense that it is the cause of moral evil is less clear. From a purely intellectual point of view the soul has four faculties, *νόησις* (or *νοῦς*), *διάνοια*, *πίστις*, *εἰκασία*, i.e., reason, understanding, faith (or conviction), and representation (or conjecture). These are arranged in a descending scale, the first pair belonging to the sphere of conception, the second to that of experience.² The following passages set forth the main elements of his teaching:

Tim. 30B: λογισάμενος οὖν ἠϋρίσκειν ἐκ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ὁρατῶν οὐδέν ἀνόητον τοῦ νοῦν ἔχοντος ὅλον ὅλον κάλλιον ἔσεσθαι ποτ' ἔργον, νοῦν δ' αὖ χωρὶς ψυχῆς ἀδύνατον παραγενέσθαι τῷ. διὰ δὲ τὸν λογισμὸν τόνδε νοῦν μὲν ἐν ψυχῇ, ψυχὴν δ' ἐν σώματι συνιστάς τὸ πᾶν σύνετε κταίνετο, ὅπως ὅτι κάλλιστον εἶη κατὰ φύσιν ἄριστόν τε ἔργον ἀπειργασμένος. οὕτως οὖν δὴ κατὰ λόγον τὸν εἰκότα δεῖ λέγειν τόνδε τὸν κόσμον ζῶον ἔμψυχον ἔννοον τε τῇ ἀληθείᾳ διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ γενέσθαι πρόνοιαν.

On reflection, therefore, he discovered that of all things that are by nature visible, no work that is without intelligence will ever be more beautiful as a whole than a thing that has intelligence taken as a whole, and again that it is impossible that anything should have intelligence without a soul [*ψυχή*]. Because then of this reasoning, in framing the universe, he puts intelligence in soul and soul in body, that he might be the creator of a work most beautiful

¹ Siebeck, *Geschichte der Psychologie*, I, 187.

² Cf. Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers*, III, 86 ff.; Jowett, *Dialogues of Plato*, V, 514.

and also by nature best. According to probability, therefore, we must say that this world is a living creature, in reality endowed with soul and intelligence by reason of the providence of God. Cf. also *Tim.* 34.

Men. 81C: ἄτε οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατός τε οὔσα καὶ πολλάκις γεγονυῖα, καὶ ἑωρακυῖα καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε καὶ τὰ ἐν Ἄιδου καὶ πάντα χρήματα, οὐκ ἔστιν ὃ τι οὐ μεμάθηκεν, ὥστε οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ περὶ ἄλλων οἶόν τ' εἶναι αὐτὴν ἀναμνησθῆναι ἃ γε καὶ πρότερον ἠπίστατο· ἄτε γὰρ τῆς φύσεως ἀπάσης συγγενοῦς οὔσης, καὶ μεμαθηκυῖας τῆς ψυχῆς ἅπαντα, οὐδὲν κωλύει ἐν μόνον ἀναμνησθέντα, ὃ δὴ μάθησιν καλοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι, τᾶλλα πάντα αὐτὸν ἀνευρεῖν, ἐάν τις ἀνδρείος ᾗ καὶ μὴ ἀποκάμνη ζητῶν· τὸ γὰρ ζητεῖν ἄρα καὶ τὸ μαθάνειν ἀνάμνησις ὅλον ἐστίν.

The soul then being immortal and having been often born, and having seen all things whether here or in Hades, there is nothing that it has not learned, so that it is not to be wondered that it is able to remember the things that it formerly knew about—virtue and other things. For all nature being akin, and the soul having learned all things, there is nothing to hinder a man, having recalled one thing (which is what men call learning), from searching out all the others, if he be courageous and do not weary of seeking. For seeking and learning are nothing but remembering.

Phaedr. 249B: ἔνθα καὶ εἰς θηρίου βίον ἀνθρωπίνῃ ψυχῇ ἀφικνεῖται, καὶ ἐκ θηρίου ὅς ποτε ἄνθρωπος ἦν πάλιν εἰς ἄνθρωπον. οὐ γὰρ ἢ γε μήποτε ἰδοῦσα τὴν ἀλήθειαν εἰς τόδε ἥξει τὸ σχῆμα.

Then also a human soul passes into the life of a beast, and from the beast he who was formerly a man passes again into a man. For the soul which has never seen the truth will never come into the human form.

Of the relation between soul and body Plato sometimes speaks as if the latter had no influence upon the former and the source of evil were quite distinct from the body. Thus in *Gorg.* 524D, following the statement that death is nothing but the separation of the soul from the body (made also in the *Phaedo* 64 ff., quoted below, where the soul is spoken of as simple), he says:

οἷος εἶναι παρεσκευάσατο τὸ σῶμα ζῶν, ἐνδηλα ταῦτα καὶ τελευτήσαντος ἢ πάντα ἢ τὰ πολλὰ ἐπὶ τινα χρόνον. ταῦτόν δὴ μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτ' ἄρα καὶ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις· ἐνδηλα πάντα ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπειδὴν γυμνωθῇ τοῦ σώματος, τὰ τε τῆς φύσεως καὶ τὰ

παθήματα ἃ διὰ τὴν ἐπιτήδευσιν ἐκάστου πράγματος ἔσχεν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἄνθρωπος.

Of whatever character one has made his body to be while alive, these characteristics will be in evidence either wholly or in part for some time after death. And the same thing seems to be true of the soul, Callicles. When it is stripped of the body, all the things come to light that are in the soul, its natural qualities and its passions which the man has had in his soul by reason of his devotion to this or that.

Even more significantly, in the familiar passage in *Phaedr.* 246 ff., in which he compares the soul to a pair of winged horses and their driver, and the soul is divided into three, it has these parts or elements before it acquires a body—the composition of body and immortal soul constituting a mortal creature. The source of moral evil seems thus to be definitely located in the soul itself—a fact the significance of which is all the greater if, as is commonly supposed, the unruly horse is the symbol of sensual passion, since in that case such passion is represented as existing in the soul before it takes up its abode in the body.

In the *Republic* (439–441; cf. also 550A; *Tim.* 89E) we have a similar view of the matter. Here Plato distinguishes within the soul itself three principles (εἶδη), τὸ λογιστικόν, τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν, and τὸ θυμοειδές, which may be rendered in English by the words reason, desire, and spirit or passion. Of the third he says that when not corrupted by bad education it is the natural ally of reason, but to the second he ascribes the influence that makes for evil.

Apparently, however, the philosopher, struggling with the problem given in every man's experience, wavers between a more and a less inclusive definition of the soul, and now assigns certain elements of experience to a faculty or principle of the soul,¹ and now to the body as over against the soul.

Thus in the *Phaedo* (64–68) Plato seems to represent the soul as simple in essence, and pure thought as its essential function, and to ascribe to the body all desire for everything except the vision of the truth.

Phaedo 66B: οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ἐκ πάντων τούτων παρίστασθαι δόξαν τοιάνδε τινὰ τοῖς γνησίως φιλοσόφοις, ὥστε καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους

¹ See Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers*, III, 37 f.

τοιαῦτα ἅττα λέγειν, ὅτι κινδυνεύει τοι ὥσπερ ἄτραπός [τις] ἐκφέρειν ἡμᾶς [μετὰ τοῦ λόγου ἐν τῇ σκέψει], ὅτι, ἕως ἂν τὸ σῶμα ἔχωμεν καὶ συμπεφυρμένη ἢ ἡμῶν ἢ ψυχῇ μετὰ τοῦ τοιοῦτου κακοῦ, οὐ μὴ ποτε κτησόμεθα ἱκανῶς οὐ ἐπιθυμοῦμεν: φαμὲν δὲ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ἀληθές, etc.

Jowett translates the whole passage as follows:

And when real philosophers consider all these things, will they not be led to make a reflection which they will express in words something like the following? "Have we not found," they will say, "a path of thought which seems to bring us and our argument to the conclusion that while we are in the body, and while the soul is infected with the evils of the body, our desire will not be satisfied? and our desire is of the truth. For the body is a source of endless trouble to us by reason of the mere requirement of food, and is liable also to diseases which overtake us and impede us in the search after true being: it fills us full of loves, and lusts, and fears, and fancies of all kinds, and endless foolery, and, in fact, as men say, takes away from us the power of thinking at all. Whence come wars and fightings and factions? Whence but from the body and the lusts of the body? Wars are occasioned by the love of money, and money has to be acquired for the sake and in the service of the body, and by reason of all these impediments we have no time to give to philosophy, and, last and worst of all, even if we are at leisure and betake ourselves to some speculation, the body is always breaking in upon us, causing turmoil and confusion in our inquiries, and so amazing us that we are prevented from seeing the truth. It has been proved to us by experience that if we would have pure knowledge of anything we must be quit of the body—the soul in herself must behold things in themselves; and that we shall attain the wisdom which we desire, and of which we say we are lovers, not while we live, but after death; for if, while in company with the body, the soul cannot have pure knowledge, one of two things follows—either knowledge is not to be attained at all, or, if at all, after death. For then, and not till then, the soul will be parted from the body and exist in herself alone. In this present life I reckon that we make the nearest approach to knowledge when we have the least possible intercourse or communion with the body, and are not surfeited with the bodily nature, but keep ourselves pure until the hour when God himself is pleased to release us. And thus having got rid of the foolishness of the body we shall be pure and hold converse with the pure, and know of ourselves the clear light everywhere, which is no other than the light of truth. For the impure are not permitted to approach the pure. These are the sort of words, Simmias, which the true lovers of wisdom cannot help saying to one another, and thinking. You will agree with me in that?

Certainly, Socrates.

But if this is true, O my friend, then there is great hope that, going whither I go, I shall there be satisfied with that which has been the chief concern

of you and me in our past lives. And now that the hour of departure is appointed to me, this is the hope with which I depart, and not I only, but every man who believes that he has his mind purified.

The last portion of the passage is of importance as showing that Plato is here putting into the mouth of Socrates an argument to the effect that death, which he was facing, was in reality no evil. In such a connection one naturally states at its strongest the argument for the evil of the body, ascribing to it all the evils of life. Whether Plato not only holds the Orphic doctrine that for the prenatal sins of the soul embodiment is the punishment,¹ but also that the body thus acquired as the result of sin itself becomes in turn the cause of sin is not wholly clear. The latter doctrine is commonly ascribed by modern writers (Adam, *Religious Teachers of Greece*, pp. 101, 106), not only to Plato, but to Orphism. The transition from the body as an evil, i.e., as a burden, to the thought of it as evil, i.e., as corrupting, is, of course, easy. But when made it introduces another, if not a contradictory, theory of the cause of sin; and it is not wholly clear either that Orphism took this step, or that Plato went beyond the thought that the body was a hindrance to the soul's highest development. It is significant that in *Phaedo* 66, quoted above (see also *Phaedo* 79; *Crat.* 400C), he traces not only the coarser sensual evils to the body, but even ambition and confusion of mind, and that in accordance with his general intellectual point of view he here finds the *chief* harm done to the soul by the body in distraction of the mind from the pursuit of philosophy. Morality is largely swallowed up in intellectuality, in the perception of the truth. So also it is perception or non-perception of truth that determines the destiny of the soul as it passes from one incarnation to another.

Even in *Tim.* 86 he makes the body rather an incentive to moral evil than matter the effective cause of it.

¹ Cf. Windelband, *History of Philosophy*, E. T. p. 124: "The sin for the sake of which the soul is ensnared in the world of sense is to be sought in a pre-existent state; its destiny in the hereafter will depend upon how far it has freed itself in the earthly life from the sensuous appetite, and turned to the higher vocation—the knowledge of the Ideas. But inasmuch as the ultimate goal of the soul appears to be to strip off the sensuous nature, the three forms of activity are designated also as parts of the soul."

καὶ τὰ μὲν περὶ τὸ σῶμα νοσήματα ταύτῃ συμβαίνει γιγνόμενα, τὰ δὲ περὶ ψυχὴν διὰ σώματος ἔξιν τῇδε. νόσον μὲν δὴ ψυχῆς ἄνοιαν συγχαρητέον, δύο δ' ἀνοίας γένη, τὸ μὲν μανίαν, τὸ δὲ ἀμαθίαν. πᾶν οὖν ὅτι πάσχων τις πάθος ὁπότερον αὐτῶν ἴσχει, νόσον προσρητέον, ἡδονὰς δὲ καὶ λύπας ὑπερβαλλούσας τῶν νόσων μεγίστας θετέον τῇ ψυχῇ· περιχαρὴς γὰρ ἄνθρωπος ὢν ἢ καὶ τάναντία ὑπὸ λύπης πάσχων, σπεύδων τὸ μὲν ἐλεῖν ἀκαίρως, τὸ δὲ φυγεῖν, οὐθ' ὁρᾶν οὔτε ἀκούειν ὀρθὸν οὐδὲν δύναται, λυττᾷ δὲ καὶ λογισμοῦ μετασχεῖν ἥκιστα τότε δὴ δυνατός· τὸ δὲ σπέρμα ὅτῳ πολὺ καὶ ῥυῶδες περὶ τὸν μυελὸν γίγνεται καὶ καθαπερεὶ δένδρον πολυκαρπότερον τοῦ συμμέτρου πεφυκὸς ἦ, πολλὰς μὲν καθ' ἕκαστον ὠδίνας, πολλὰς δ' ἡδονὰς κτώμενος ἐν ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ τοῖς περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τόκοις, ἐμμανὴς τὸ πλείστον γιγνόμενος τοῦ βίου διὰ τὰς μεγίστας ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας, νοσοῦσαν καὶ ἄφρονα ἴσχων ὑπὸ τοῦ σώματος τὴν ψυχὴν, οὐχ ὥς νοσῶν ἀλλ' ὥς ἐκὼν κακὸς δοξάζεται· τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς ἢ περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια ἀκολασία κατὰ τὸ πολὺ μέρος διὰ τὴν ἐνὸς γένους ἔξιν ὑπὸ μανότητος ὅστων ἐν σώματι ῥυῶδη καὶ ὑγραίνουσιν νόσος ψυχῆς γέγονεν. καὶ σχεδὸν δὴ πάντα ὁπόσα ἡδονῶν ἀκράτεια καὶ ὄνειδος ὥς ἐκόντων λέγεται τῶν κακῶν, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὀνειδίζεται· κακὸς μὲν γὰρ ἐκὼν οὐδεὶς, διὰ δὲ πονηρὰν ἔξιν τινὰ τοῦ σώματος καὶ ἀπαίδευτον τροφήν ὁ κακὸς γίγνεται κακός, παντὶ δὲ ταῦτα ἐχθρὰ καὶ ἄκοντι προσγίγνεται. καὶ πάλιν δὴ τὸ περὶ τὰς λύπας ἢ ψυχὴ κατὰ ταῦτα διὰ σῶμα πολλὴν ἴσχει κακίαν.

Thus then the diseases that pertain to the body happen, and those that pertain to the soul because of an affection of the body are as follows. It will be admitted that folly is a disease of the soul, but there are two kinds of folly, viz., madness and ignorance. Whatever affection produces either of them may be called disease, and excessive pains and pleasures must be set down as the greatest diseases of the soul. For when a man is overjoyful or, on the other hand, is suffering from grief, being unduly eager to grasp the one or to escape the other, he can neither hear nor see anything aright, and is utterly incapable at such a time of participating in reason. And he whose seed about the marrow is excessive and free-flowing like an overproductive tree, has on the one hand many pains and on the other many pleasures in his desires and their gratifications, and is for the most part of his life mad because of his very great pleasures and pains, having his soul diseased and foolish by reason of the body, and is regarded not as sick but as willingly wicked. But the truth is that sexual intemperance for the most part becomes a disease of the soul by reason of the moist and fluid condition of one element, due in turn to the porousness of the bones. And almost all the things that are called intemperance in pleasure and a disgrace,

as if they were the voluntary actions of evil men, are unjustly so charged. For no one is bad willingly, but the bad man becomes bad because of some evil quality of the body and an undisciplined bringing-up, and to every man these things that are evil happen against his will. And in like manner in respect to its pains, the soul acquires much of its viciousness because of the body.

But what shall be said concerning *Polit.* 273B, in which Plato certainly goes beyond a common-sense theory of the body as inferior to the soul and a hindrance to the realization of its highest possibilities, finding in the primeval matter of which the world is composed a cause of its disorder?

The reason of the falling off was the admixture of matter in the world; this was inherent in the primal nature, which was full of disorder, until attaining to the present cosmos or order. From God, the constructor, the world indeed received every good, but from a previous state came elements of violence and injustice, which, thence derived, were implanted in the animals. While the world was producing animals in unison with God, the evil was small, and great the good which worked within, but in the process of separation from him, when the world was let go, at first all proceeded well enough; then, as time went on, there was more and more forgetting, and the old discord again entered in and got the better, and burst forth; and at last small was the good, and great was the admixture of the elements of evil, and there was a danger of universal ruin of the world and the things in the world. Wherefore God, the orderer of all, seeing that the world was in great straits, fearing that all might be dissolved in the storm, and go to the place of chaos and infinity, again seated himself at the helm, and, reversing the elements which had fallen into dissolution and disorder when left to themselves in the previous cycle, he set them in order and restored them, and made the world imperishable and immortal.

Here the evil of the world is ascribed to "the admixture of matter in the world"; violence and injustice, to be sure, to "a previous state," but nevertheless to the effect of this previous state upon matter. While, therefore, it is not affirmed that matter *per se* is evil, yet the matter which is used in the construction of this world has in that previous state become of such character that it is now the cause of evil.

It is this passage perhaps more than any other which justifies Aristotle's statement (988A. 14, 15) that "Plato assigned the cause of good and evil to the elements, one to each of the two." The context shows that by the two elements Aristotle means Essence

and the Material Cause, or the One and Matter. Bäumker (*Problem der Materie*, p. 205) says, indeed, that the doctrine of matter as the source of evil is not found in this form in Plato's own writings. But this applies to the form, not to the doctrine itself, as the passage just quoted from Plato shows.

With this passage should also be compared the statement of Aristotle 1075a. 32-36, that there were those—who he does not say, but perhaps means, as Bäumker (p. 205) maintains, disciples of Plato—who make one of the two contraries matter, and the bad itself one of the two principles, which seems to identify matter with evil as one of the ultimate principles.

But too much must not be built on this one passage of Plato, as if it represented his prevailing doctrine or controlled his thought. Most of his utterances on the origin of moral evil in man do not go beyond a common-sense experiential doctrine that the body is inferior to the soul, and a hindrance to it in the achievement of its highest possibilities, and even *Polit.* 273B does not expressly connect the moral evil in men with matter as the cause of evil in the world at large. Nor does he anywhere expressly associate his theory that the body is a burden upon the soul with the view of *Polit.* 273B that the disorder of the world is the result of the admixture of matter in the world. The evil of which he found the cause in matter was not sin, but the primordial disorder of the universe, and even this was corrected by God before the present order of things began. The body is a hindrance to the realization of the soul's highest possibilities, but personal moral evil he regarded as an inheritance from a previous state. With the Orphic doctrine that the body is not the cause but the penalty and result of sin, precisely the opposite, therefore, of the theory that it is the cause of sin, Plato was undoubtedly familiar, and shows the influence of it (Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers*, I, 128; II, 364) in his frequent statements about the relations of the body to the soul. Between it and the rarely expressed view of *Polit.* 273B he apparently effected no reconciliation, but left them as unrelated elements.

It is perhaps still a third explanation of the evil in human nature that is implied in *Tim.* 41, 42, where man is described as a compound of mortal body and immortal soul, and it is said that the Creator,

having himself sown the seed of that which is worthy to be called immortal, committed the task of the creation of the human race to the lesser gods, i.e., the heavenly bodies.

The doctrine of the immortality of the soul ($\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$) is, as is well known, defended by Plato by various arguments and from different points of view, which it does not fall within the scope of this paper to expound at length. It must suffice to observe that the argument of the *Symposium* (206-9), which seems to imply that immortality is achieved only through offspring and the children of the brain, does not represent the author's usual or deliberate opinion, and that it is the soul in the narrower conception of it, the rational element, to which he means to ascribe immortality. Such at least seems to be the thought of the *Phaedo*, which is so largely devoted to this subject. But see also *Phaedr.* 245C; *Rep.* 608-11. For a discussion of the argument of the *Phaedo* and its relation to the views of the *Symposium* and the *Apology*, see Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers*, III, chap. x; also Jowett's translation of Plato, *Introduction to the Phaedo*. For a fuller exposition of Plato's idea of the soul, in general, see Jowett's *Plato*, V, Index, pp. 512-16.

Aristotle devotes three books of his *Metereologica* to the discussion of the $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$ and makes frequent mention of it elsewhere. His conception of its nature differs in important respects from that of Plato. Abandoning the Platonic doctrine of ideas (though probably still influenced by it in his conception of the $\nu\omicron\delta\varsigma$) he rejects with it the conception of the pre-existence of the soul. The $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$ has no existence apart from a body, being separable from it in thought but not in fact. We must no more ask whether the soul and the body are one than whether the wax and the image impressed upon it are one, or generally whether the material and that of which it is the material are one. Nor is this conception contradicted by his use of the word $\acute{o}\nu\sigma\iota\alpha$ to define the nature of the soul (i. 412b. 10), as is clearly shown by the context of this statement (*Περὶ Ψυχῆς* ii. 1. 7, ed. Borussica i. 412b).¹ Aristotle's constant term to define the soul's relation to the body is $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\tau\epsilon\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\chi\epsilon\iota\alpha$, which may itself be defined as absoluteness, perfect realization, though its meaning may be

¹ See the edition of Wallace or that of Hicks; also Rand, *The Classical Psychologists*, Part IV, Boston, 1913.

approximately expressed in modern terms by the phrase "perfect functioning." The *ἐντελέχεια* of anything is its actuality or full realization as opposed to mere potentiality. In discussing the soul, however, Aristotle distinguishes a first and a second entelechy, and defines *ψυχή* as the first entelechy of an organized body having potentiality of life. In other words, while body is potentiality only, and the soul in action is the second or explicit realization of the potentialities of the body, the soul in itself is the first or implicit realization of these potentialities, comparable to knowledge which is not at the moment present to consciousness as distinguished from knowledge actively exercised. As the *ἐντελέχεια* of the body, even though implicit rather than explicit, the soul is superior to the body, being its reality as distinguished from its substance which is potentiality.

i. 412a, b: ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ σῶμα τοιόνδε, ζῶν γὰρ ἔχον, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ σῶμα ψυχή· οὐ γάρ ἐστι τῶν καθ' ὑποκειμένου τὸ σῶμα, μᾶλλον δ' ὡς ὑποκείμενον, καὶ ὕλη. ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα τὴν ψυχὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι ὡς εἶδος σώματος φυσικοῦ δυνάμει ζῶν ἔχοντος. ἢ δ' οὐσία ἐντελέχεια. τοιούτου ἄρα σώματος ἐντελέχεια. αὕτη δὲ λέγεται διχῶς, ἡ μὲν ὡς ἐπιστήμη, ἡ δ' ὡς τὸ θεωρεῖν. φανερόν οὖν ὅτι ὡς ἐπιστήμη. ἐν γὰρ τῷ ὑπάρχειν τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ὕπνος καὶ ἐγρήγορσις ἐστίν, ἀνάλογον δ' ἡ μὲν ἐγρήγορσις τῷ θεωρεῖν, ὁ δ' ὕπνος τῷ ἔχειν καὶ μὴ ἐνεργεῖν. προτέρα δὲ τῇ γενέσει ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἡ ἐπιστήμη. διὸ ψυχή ἐστίν ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη σώματος φυσικοῦ δυνάμει ζῶν ἔχοντος.

Hicks translates as follows:

And since in fact we have here body with a certain attribute, namely, the possession of life, the body will not be the soul: for the body is not an attribute of a subject, it stands rather for a subject of attributes, that is, matter. It must follow, then, that soul is substance in the sense that it is the form of a natural body having in it the capacity of life. Such substance is actuality. The soul, therefore, is the actuality of the body above described. But the term "actuality" is used in two senses; in the one it answers to knowledge, in the other to the exercise of knowledge. Clearly in this case it is analogous to knowledge: for sleep as well as waking implies the presence of soul; and, whilst waking is analogous to the exercise of knowledge, sleep is analogous to the possession of knowledge without its exercise; and in the same individual the possession of knowledge comes in order of time before its exercise. Hence soul is the first actuality of a natural body having in it the capacity of life.

ι. 414a: ἡ ψυχὴ δὲ τοῦτο ᾧ ζῶμεν καὶ αἰσθανόμεθα, καὶ διανοούμεθα πρῶτως· ὥστε λόγος τις ἂν εἴη καὶ εἶδος, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὕλη καὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον. τριχῶς γὰρ λεγομένης τῆς οὐσίας, καθάπερ εἶπομεν, ὦν τὸ μὲν εἶδος, τὸ δὲ ὕλη, τὸ δὲ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν· τούτων δ' ἡ μὲν ὕλη δύναμις, τὸ δὲ εἶδος ἐντελέχεια· ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἐμψυχον, οὐ τὸ σῶμά ἐστιν ἐντελέχεια ψυχῆς, ἀλλ' αὕτη σώματός τινος. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καλῶς ὑπολαμβάνουσιν οἷς δοκεῖ μητ' ἄνευ σώματος εἶναι μήτε σῶμά τι ἢ ψυχὴ· σῶμα μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι, σώματος δέ τι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐν σώματι ὑπάρχει, καὶ ἐν σώματι τοιούτῳ, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ οἱ πρότερον εἰς σῶμα ἐνῆρμοζον αὐτήν, οὐθὲν προσδιορίζοντες ἐν τίνι καὶ ποίῳ.

The soul is then that by which primarily we live and have sensation and understanding. It is therefore a certain idea and form, not matter and the underlying (substance). For substance being spoken of, as we have before said, in three ways, of which one is form and the second matter and the third the combination of the two, matter is potentiality, but form is perfect realization. Since then it is the product of the two that is animate, the body is not the perfect realization of soul, but, the soul of some body. They therefore are right who hold that neither does the soul exist without a body nor is it a body. For it is not a body, but it is something which belongs to a body. And therefore it exists in a body, and in such and such a body, and not as the earlier writers introduced it into a body, but did not determine what or what sort of a body.

In Aristotle's view all things that have life have ψυχὴ, plants included (i. 411b, 415b). But of the several functions or powers which are possible to souls, viz., nutrition (θρεπτικόν), sensation (αἰσθητικόν), desire (ὀρεκτικόν), motion (κινητικὸν κατὰ τόπον), understanding, or reasoning (διανοητικόν), the plants possess only the first, animals possess one at least of the sensations (αἰσθήσεων), viz., touch, and some animals various other powers (i. 413b. 29-414a. 14), and man possesses all of them. The human soul therefore combines in itself what some modern writers have called the life-principle and the functions of feeling, thinking, and willing. It is evidently the human soul that Aristotle has chiefly in mind in the following passage:

ι. 411a. 24 ff.: φανερόν οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὡς οὔτε τὸ γινώσκειν ὑπάρχει τῇ ψυχῇ διὰ τὸ ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων εἶναι, οὔτε τὸ κινεῖσθαι αὐτὴν καλῶς οὐδ' ἀληθῶς λέγεται. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ γινώσκειν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι τε καὶ τὸ δοξάζειν, ἔτι δὲ τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ βούλεσθαι καὶ

ὅλως αἱ ὀρέξεις, γίνεται δὲ καὶ ἡ κατὰ τόπον κίνησις τοῖς ζώοις ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς, ἔτι δ' αὔξη τε καὶ ἀκμὴ καὶ φθίσις.

It is evident, therefore, from what has been said that neither does knowledge belong to the soul because it consists of elements, nor can it be properly or truly said to be moved. But since knowledge is a property of the soul, and also sensation and opinion, as well as appetite and will and the desires in general, so also it is to the soul that the animals owe their power of locomotion, and growth and culmination and dissolution.

In i. 432a. 22-b. 8, he discusses the question whether the soul is divisible into parts without pronouncing a definite opinion, and here and in ii. 1260a classifies the functions of the soul under the heads τὸ λόγον ἔχον and τὸ ἄλογον, using also in the latter passage the phrase τὰ μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς. But in i. 411b, immediately after the passage just quoted, he definitely rejects the opinion that the soul is composite. Nor indeed is it easy to see how he could hold this view consistently with his general conception of the soul as an entelechy of the body rather than an objective existence (cf. Wallace, *Aristotle's Psychology*, pp. xxxix-xlix, especially xlv; or more briefly in his *Outlines of the Philosophy of Aristotle*, chap. vi). The theory of a universal soul Aristotle expressly rejects:

i. 411a. 7 ff.: καὶ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ δέ τινες αὐτὴν μεμίχθαι φασιν, ὅθεν ἕως καὶ Θαλῆς ᾤήθη πάντα πλήρη θεῶν εἶναι. τοῦτο δ' ἔχει τινὰς ἀπορίας· διὰ τίνα γὰρ αἰτίαν ἐν μὲν τῷ ἄερί ἢ τῷ πυρὶ οὖσα ἡ ψυχὴ οὐ ποιεῖ ζῶον, ἐν δὲ τοῖς μικτοῖς, καὶ ταῦτα βελτίων ἐν τούτοις εἶναι δοκοῦσα;

And some say that the soul is diffused throughout the universe, which is perhaps the reason that Thales held that all things are full of gods. But this theory has some difficulties. For why does not the soul produce an animal when it is in the air or in the fire and yet do so when it is in the compounds of these, and that too though, as is believed, the soul in the former case is superior?

Does this statement point to the conclusion that in the statement previously quoted (p. 22), in which Aristotle speaks of πνεῦμα as diffused throughout all things and living and generative, he was not representing his own opinion but that of others, or that he was speaking only of things that have life, while here he is, as is evidently the case, denying ψυχὴ to things that have no life,

either animal or vegetable; or do the two passages indicate a certain wavering of opinion? The second seems the most probable. But in any case it remains that πνεῦμα is non-individualized, ψυχή individualized.

Though it lies outside the scope of this discussion to enter fully into the difficult question of the relation of the νοῦς to the ψυχή in Aristotle's thought, for the sake of the light which it may throw upon his definition of the ψυχή we may cite a few passages dealing also with the νοῦς.¹ And first a passage which seems to be a definition of νοῦς and its relation to the ψυχή:

i. 429a. 22 ff.: ὁ ἄρα καλούμενος τῆς ψυχῆς νοῦς (λέγω δὲ νοῦν ὃ διανοεῖται καὶ ὑπολαμβάνει ἢ ψυχή) οὐθέν ἐστιν ἐνεργεία τῶν ὄντων πρὶν νοεῖν . . . καὶ εὖ δὴ οἱ λέγοντες τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι τόπον εἰδῶν, πλὴν ὅτι οὔτε ὅλη ἀλλ' ἢ νοητικὴ.

What is called the reason of the soul (and I mean by reason that by which the soul reasons and understands) is in reality identical with none of the things that exist before reasoning. . . . And they are right who say that the soul is the place of general ideas, only not the soul as a whole, but the soul as exercising reason.

In arguing against the doctrine of Empedocles that the soul is composed of the elements (στοιχεῖα) and that its power of knowledge is in accordance with the general principle that like perceives like, Aristotle says:

i. 410b. 12-15: τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς εἶναι τι κρεῖττον καὶ ἄρχον ἀδύνατον· ἀδυνατώτερον δ' ἔτι τοῦ νοῦ· εὐλογον γὰρ τοῦτον εἶναι προγενέστατον καὶ κύριον κατὰ φύσιν, τὰ δὲ στοιχεῖα φασὶ πρῶτα τῶν ὄντων εἶναι.

But it is impossible that anything should be superior to the soul and have dominion over it, but still more impossible is this in the case of the reason. For we must believe that the latter is by nature first-born and supreme. And yet they say that the elements are the primary things of those that exist.

Ibid. 21-26: ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὅσοι τὸν νοῦν καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων ποιοῦσιν· φαίνεται γὰρ τὰ τε φυτὰ ζῆν οὐ μετέχοντα φορᾶς οὐδ' αἰσθήσεως, καὶ τῶν ζώων πολλὰ διάνοιαν οὐκ ἔχειν. εἰ δέ τις καὶ ταῦτα παραχωρήσειε, καὶ θέη τὸν νοῦν μέρος τι τῆς ψυχῆς, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ

¹ According to Aëtius iv. 5. 12 (Diels, *Vorsokrat.*, p. 172, l. 42), Parmenides, Empedocles, and Democritus say that νοῦς and ψυχή are the same thing. See also Diels, *Vorsokrat.*, p. 105, l. 36; p. 112, l. 5.

τὸ αἰσθητικόν, οὐδ' ἂν οὕτω λέγοιεν καθόλου περὶ πάσης ψυχῆς οὐδὲ περὶ ὅλης οὐδὲ μίᾱς.

So also respecting those who hold that the reason and the sense faculty are produced out of the elements. For it is evident that the plants live though they have neither power of motion nor sensation, and of the animals many have no reasoning power. But if anyone should waive these considerations, and should make the reason a part of the soul and likewise the power of sensation, not even thus would he make a comprehensive statement respecting every soul or respecting the whole or any one soul.

It is evident, therefore, that Aristotle neither admitted that the *ψυχή* was composed of the elements, nor that the *νοῦς* was a part of the *ψυχή*, holding rather that the *νοῦς* was the *ψυχή* itself in a certain form of its activity, viz., engaged in abstract thought and reasoning—the *ἡ νοητικὴ ψυχή*.

But this is not the whole of his thought. Another phase appears later.

i. 430a. 10 ff.: ἐπεὶ δ' ὥσπερ ἐν ἀπάσῃ τῇ φύσει ἐστὶ τι τὸ μὲν ὕλη ἐκάστῳ γένοι (τοῦτο δὲ ὁ πάντα δυνάμει ἐκεῖνα), ἕτερον δὲ τὸ αἷτιον καὶ ποιητικόν, τῷ ποιεῖν πάντα, οἷον ἡ τέχνη πρὸς τὴν ὕλην πέπονθεν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὑπάρχειν ταύτας τὰς διαφοράς. καὶ ἔστιν ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος νοῦς τῷ πάντα γίνεσθαι, ὁ δὲ τῷ πάντα ποιεῖν, ὡς ἔξισ τις, οἷον τὸ φῶς· τρόπον γάρ τινα καὶ τὸ φῶς ποιεῖ τὰ δυνάμει ὄντα χρώματα ἐνεργείᾳ χρώματα. καὶ οὗτος ὁ νοῦς χωριστὸς καὶ ἀπαθὴς καὶ ἀμιγῆς τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὧν ἐνεργείᾳ . . . ἄλλ' οὐχ ὅτε μὲν νοεῖ ὅτε δ' οὐ νοεῖ. χωρισθεὶς δ' ἐστὶ μόνον τοῦθ' ὅπερ ἐστὶ, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἀθάνατον καὶ αἰδῖον. οὐ μνημονεύομεν δέ, ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν ἀπαθές, ὁ δὲ παθητικὸς νοῦς φθαρτός, καὶ ἄνευ τούτου οὐθὲν νοεῖ.

But inasmuch as in all nature there is for each kind of existence the material substratum, which is potentially all the various things, and on the other hand the causal and creative element by virtue of its producing all things, standing in the same relation to the other as art does to the things with which it works, these things must necessarily hold of the soul also. And reason is such as it is on the one hand by becoming all things, and on the other by creating all things, acting as a kind of permanent quality, like the light. For in a certain way the light makes the potential colors actual colors. And reason is separate and unsusceptible to influences from without, being in reality unmixed with substance. . . . And it does not at one time think and at another not think. And when it is separated (from the body?) it is the only thing that is, and it is the only thing that is immortal and eternal. But we do not remember

because this (the reason that is eternal) is unsusceptible (to impressions from without), but the susceptible mind is perishable, and apart from this (the eternal reason) does not think.

i. 736b. 27: *λείπεται δὲ τὸν νοῦν μόνον θύραθεν ἐπεισιέναι καὶ θεῶν εἶναι μόνον.*

It remains then that the reason alone comes into man from without and is alone divine.

Compare also i. 408b, 12-30, where it is affirmed that the *νοῦς* is implanted (in the body) and is not destroyed (with the body), and that it is of a diviner character (*θειότερον*) than the combination of soul and body and is not susceptible (to impressions from without).

It appears, therefore, that on the one hand Aristotle ascribes existence to the *ψυχή* only in relation to the body, and on the other makes the *νοῦς* eternal, yet identifies them in the sense that the *νοῦς* is *ἡ νοητικὴ ψυχή*. The explanation of this seeming contrariety of thought may be found (with Grote) in the view that the power of discursive thought, the *νοῦς*, in each individual is the result of the universal *νοῦς* acting upon the noetic receptivity in each individual, the former perishing with the individual, but the latter being eternal. A different view, together with some account of the various ancient and modern interpretations, is given by Wallace, pp. ciii ff.¹ For our present purpose it must suffice to observe that while *ψυχή* is an entelechy of the body, and in the conscious experience of the individual *νοῦς* is *ψυχή* in the higher intellectual activities of which it is capable, on the other hand *νοῦς* is coeval with the existence of the universe, coming to man from without, and yet these two—the *νοῦς ἀπαθής*, the *νοῦς παθητικός*—are not two but one.

¹ See also Arnold, *Roman Stoicism*, p. 61, "What God is to the universe, that the soul is to the body, which is a little universe. But the reasoning part of the soul only is entirely distinct; this is of divine nature, and has entered the body from without; it is at once its formative principle, its plan, and its end. The lower parts of the soul are knit up with the body and must perish with it. So far Aristotle's teaching differs little from that of Plato." But it may be questioned whether this interpretation does not take too little account both of the inconsistencies in Aristotle's thought and of the differences between his theory of the soul and Plato's, while also directly ascribing to Aristotle an opinion which he rejected—that the *νοῦς* is part of the *ψυχή*.

The most notable differences between Plato and Aristotle are: (1) Plato begins with ideas as real existences, Aristotle with the fact of life as observed in animal and plant; (2) with Plato the *ψυχή* is an entity, with Aristotle it is an *έντελέχεια* of the body; (3) with Plato the *ψυχή* is pre-existent, with Aristotle it comes into being with the body, without which the soul could no more exist than form without matter; (4) to Plato the body is a drag upon the *ψυχή*, which is immortal, and freedom from the body is desirable, for Aristotle the *ψυχή* has its chief, indeed its only, existence in relation to the body, and dies with the body. There is, indeed, according to Aristotle, a *νοῦς* universal, which is immortal, and with this the *νοῦς* of the individual is in a sense identical, yet the latter is but the *ψυχή* in certain aspects and activities and in its individuality perishes when the body perishes.

III. ΣΑΡΞ

Σάρξ is used by Greek writers from Homer down. In writers of the classical period it is always employed in a purely physical sense. It signifies:

I. The soft muscular portion or portions of the body of man or beast. Homer uses it in the singular in *Od.* xix. 450 only; elsewhere in the plural, for the muscles, the soft portion of the body. The same use appears in Hesiod, Pindar, Euripides, and Plato; but the singular is also used collectively for the muscular part of the body in general by Sophocles, Euripides, Plato, and Aristotle¹

Hom. *Od.* ix. 293: ἥσθιε δ' ὥς τε λέων ὀρεσίτροφος, οὐδ' ἀπέλειπεν, | ἔγκατά τε σάρκας τε καὶ ὀστέα μυελόμεντα.

So he ate even as a lion of the hills, nor ceased; entrails and flesh and bones full of marrow.

Eurip. *Med.* 1217: εἰ δὲ πρὸς βίαν ἄγοι | σάρκας γεραίας ἐσπάρρασσ' ἀπ' ὀστέων. | χρόνῳ δ' ἀπέσβη καὶ μεθῆχ' ὁ δῦσμορος | ψυχὴν.

And if by force he drew himself away, he tore his aged flesh from his bones. And so at length the wretched man swooned away and died.

¹ Empedocles (Diels, *Vorsokrat.*, p. 257, l. 22, B 98, 5) uses the term to include the blood: ἐκ τῶν αἱμάτων τε γέντο καὶ ἀλλης εἶδεα σαρκός.

Plat. *Tim.* 61C: σαρκὸς δὲ καὶ τῶν περὶ σάρκα γένεσιν, ψυχῆς τε ὅσον θνητόν, οὕτω διεληλύθαμεν.

But the origin of flesh and of the things that pertain to the flesh, and what of soul is mortal, we have not yet considered.

Plat. *Sympr.* 207D: οὗτος μέντοι οὐδέποτε τὰ αὐτὰ ἔχων ἐν αὐτῷ ὅμως ὁ αὐτὸς καλεῖται, ἀλλὰ νέος ἀεὶ γιγνόμενος, τὰ δὲ ἀπολλύς, καὶ κατὰ τὰς τρίχας καὶ σάρκα καὶ ὀστᾶ καὶ αἷμα καὶ σύμπαν τὸ σῶμα.

And though man never has the same things in him yet he is called the same, but is always becoming new, and losing something, in respect to hair and flesh and bones and blood and the whole body.

Arist. i. 519b. 26 ff.: σὰρξ δὲ καὶ τὸ παραπλησίαν ἔχον τὴν φύσιν τῇ σαρκὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐναίμοις πᾶσιν ἐστὶ μεταξὺ τοῦ δέρματος καὶ τοῦ ὀστοῦ καὶ τῶν ἀνάλογον τοῖς ὀστοῖς.

Flesh and that which is of like nature with flesh in all the animals that have blood is between the skin and the bone and the parts that are similar to bone.

See also Hom. *Il.* viii. 380; xiii. 832; *Od.* xi. 219; xviii. 77; xix. 450; Hes. *Th.* 538; *Sc.* 461; Pind. *Fr.* 150; Aeschyl. *Choeph.* 280; *Theb.* 1035; *Agam.* 1097; Soph. *Philoct.* 1157; *Trach.* 1054; Eurip. *Med.* 1189, 1200, 1217; *Phoen.* 1571; *Bacch.* 746, 1130, 1136; *Hec.* 1071; *Hipp.* 1239, 1343; *Suppl.* 56; *Troiad.* 770; *Cycl.* 344, 380, 403; Plat. *Tim.* 60B, 74 freq., 82-85, freq.; *Phaedo* 96D, 98D; *Gorg.* 518D; *Rep.* 556D; *Legg.* 782C, 797E.

Aristotle sometimes distinguishes the σὰρξ from the fat and the skin as above and in i. 487a. 4, but elsewhere includes the skin in the σὰρξ, i. 486b. 9; in Plato also the skin seems sometimes to be included under the term σὰρξ; *Tim.* 67D.

By metonymy σὰρξ is used of the pulpy part of fruit:

Theophr. *De causis Plant.* vi. 8. 5: ὦν δὲ ἡ σὰρξ πολλή ὁ δὲ πυρὴν μικρὸς ὀλιγοέλαιοι.

And those olives whose pulp is abundant but the stone small are not rich in oil.

See also preceding and following sentences.

2. By synecdoche σὰρξ (also in the plural) denotes the body: Eurip. *Hipp.* 1031: καὶ μήτε πόντος μήτε γῆ δέξαιτό μου | σάρκας θανόντος, εἰ κακὸς πέφυκ' ἀνὴρ.

May neither sea nor land receive my body when I die, if I am a wicked man.

See also Aesch. *Theb.* 622; *Agam.* 72; Eurip. *Her. Fur.* 1151; *Bacch.* 607.

In other passages it is difficult to say whether the term refers to the flesh only or to the body as a whole. See, e.g., Eurip. *Phoen.* 1286; *Her. Fur.* 1269; *Troiad.* 440.

Plat. *Symph.* 211D, E: τί δῆτα, ἔφη, οἰόμεθα, εἴ τῳ γένοιτο αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν ἰδεῖν εἰλικρινές, καθαρὸν, ἄμεικτον, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀνάπλεων σαρκῶν τε ἀνθρωπίνων καὶ χρωμάτων καὶ ἄλλης πολλῆς φλυναρίας θνητῆς, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τὸ θεῖον καλὸν δύναιτο μονοειδὲς κατιδεῖν;

But what if man should acquire the power to see the beautiful, pure and clear and unmixed, and not infected with human flesh and color and many another mortal folly, but could see divine beauty itself unmixed?

The word apparently does not occur in Herodotus, Thucydides, or Xenophon.

IV. SUMMARY AND COMPARISON

It thus appears that in the classical period πνεῦμα is predominantly a physical term. Yet, signifying always an extremely refined kind of material, it is employed also for that of which souls are composed. Its range of meaning includes wind, breath, air, breath of life; rarely also life or soul-substance, yet never with a definitely individual or psychical or religious sense.

Ψυχή, on the other hand, is from earliest recorded times employed as a vital term denoting life, or the seat of life, but in the latter case implying in many cases capacity for intellectual, emotional, and volitional experience, or even for moral character. The constant element of its meaning is its designation of that in a living being by virtue of which it is (or was) living; the meaning varies according (1) as it is applied to plants, animals, or men, and as concerns men, to those living in the body or to those dead (i.e. existing in the underworld); (2) as its reference is limited to life or includes the intellect, emotions, will, or character of the person spoken of, and (3) as the theory of the particular writer using it varies as to its objective reality, its pre-existence and its capability of future existence apart from the body. In Homer it is already a shade. In the tragic poets, though the belief in the existence of the soul after death continues, the use of ψυχή for the shade occurs

rarely, being largely displaced by the vital and psychical use. In Xenophon we meet the distinct affirmation that the $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$ survives death though without the doctrine of transmigration which Herodotus tells us the Egyptians were the first to hold.³ In Plato, who holds also to a $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$ of the universe, the human $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$ is both pre-existent and immortal. In Aristotle it is an entelechy of the body, superior to it, as form is to matter, but having no existence apart from it. From Pindar down it is ascribed, in the sense of life, to the lower animals, and is used occasionally, but perhaps by conscious metonymy, in the sense of disposition. In Aristotle it belongs, as an entelechy of the physical organism, but with the function of nutrition only, to the plants as well.

$\Sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\acute{\xi}$ is throughout the classical period a purely physical term, adding to the original sense of flesh, only and by easy synecdoche, the meaning "body." It is applied to men and the lower animals, but most commonly the former. It has no psychical or ethical meaning.

It is not surprising, therefore, that no instance of $\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$ and $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\acute{\xi}$ in antithesis has been observed in the classical writers, or indeed of $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$ and $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\acute{\xi}$; for though these latter terms occasionally occur in juxtaposition (as in Eurip. *Med.* 1217, 1219, and in Plato *Tim.* 61C, cited above under I), yet it is with no intentional antithesis. Similarly when $\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$ and $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$ occur together, as in Plato *Phaedo* 70A, where it is said that men are apt to fear that when the soul ($\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$) goes forth from the body ($\sigma\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha$) it will be dispersed like smoke or air ($\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$), and vanish away into nothingness, there is no direct antithesis between $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$ and $\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$. When $\sigma\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha$ and $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\acute{\xi}$ occur together, as in Plato *Symp.* 207D, where it is said that the hair, flesh, bones, blood, and the whole body are continually changing, the $\sigma\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha$ is related to $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\acute{\xi}$ as the whole to the part. See also Aristot. i. 423a. On the other hand the two terms $\sigma\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha$ and $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$ frequently stand in antithesis, instances occurring at least from Herodotus down, and very frequently in Plato. See Herod. 2. 123 cited above under $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$; Xen. *Mem.* 1. 3. 5; 3. 2. 20; 3. 11. 10; Plato *Phaedo* 64C; 76C; *Symp.* 207D. Plato suggests that the $\sigma\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha$ is injurious to the $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$, but he holds no consistent doctrine of the intrinsic evil of matter or of the body as the cause of sin. What

he implies is rather that the body by its sensations and appetites breaks in upon the tranquility of the soul and interferes with its clear vision of truth, and causing it excessive pain or excessive pleasure tends to corrupt it against its will. In Aristotle, while the two terms frequently stand in antithesis, they are in his thought, as already indicated, rather correlates than antitheses. See, e.g., i. 403, 6-9; but especially the *Περὶ Ψυχῆς*, Book ii. chap. i. (i. 412-13), from which passages have already been quoted above.

CHAPTER II

רוּחַ, נֶפֶשׁ, AND בָּשָׂר IN THE OLD TESTAMENT

It would be highly desirable, if it were also practicable, to show the development of the meaning of the three Hebrew words named above chronologically and genetically, and to this end to exhibit in succession the usage of the several great periods of Old Testament literature. But aside from the fact that such an exhibit would demand more space than can be given to it here, the problem itself is complicated by several facts which place a solution of it worthy of the attention of scholars beyond the powers of the present writer. For example, in the oldest extant literature it is evident that we have not the beginnings of Hebrew usage, but a stage of development in which it is already difficult to distinguish primitive from derived meanings, and in the later stages there are many questions of relative antiquity of different portions of the Old Testament, and of the interpretation of obscure passages which still further obscure the solution. On the other hand, the broad facts respecting relationship of meanings seem to be fairly clear, and wholly to ignore genetic relationships is to risk a resulting degree of misrepresentation of relations of meanings which might affect unfavorably our judgment even respecting the New Testament usage. The following analyses, accordingly, are an endeavor to represent the usage of the Old Testament as a whole, rather than by successive periods, but with the various meanings so arranged as to avoid any serious misrepresentation of genetic relations.

I. רוּחַ

I. Wind.—This was apparently the earliest meaning of רוּחַ. It occurs in all periods of the literature.

1. *Proprie.*—

Ps. 1:4: לֹא-כֵן הָרְשָׁעִים כִּי אִם-כֶּמֶץ אֲשֶׁר-תִּדְפֶנֶּה רוּחַ:

The wicked are not so; But are like the chaff which the wind driveth away.

Other examples of רוּחַ meaning "wind" are found in II Sam. 22:11; II Kings 3:17; Job 8:2; Ps. 18:11, 43; 83:14; 103:16; 104:3, 4; 147:18; Isa. 7:2; 17:13; 27:8; 32:2; 41:16; 57:13; 64:5; Jer. 2:24; 10:13; 13:24; 18:17; 51:16; Ezek. 5:2, 10; Dan. 2:35; Hos. 4:19; Zech. 5:9; 6:5; Jon. 1:4; 4:8.

It is sometimes spoken of as proceeding from God, yet not in such way as to change the meaning of the word.

Hos. 13:15: יְבוֹא קָדִים רוּחַ יְהוָה מִמִּדְבָּר עֲלֶיהָ

An east wind shall come, the wind of the Lord coming up from the wilderness.

See other examples in Gen. 8:1; Exod. 10:13, 19; 14:21; 15:10 (?); Num. 11:31; Ps. 107:25; 135:7; Isa. 40:7; Am. 4:13.

Sometimes the writer has in mind the destructive force of the wind, but this also involves no change of meaning.

I Kings 19:11: וַהֲפֹה יְהוָה עָבַר וְרוּחַ גְּדוֹלָה וְחֶזֶק מַפָּרֵק הָרִים וּמִשְׁבֵּר סֻלְעִים לִפְנֵי יְהוָה

And behold, the Lord passed by, and a great and strong wind rent the mountains, and brake in pieces the rocks before the Lord.

See other examples in Ps. 11:6; 55:9; 148:8; Isa. 11:15; Jer. 4:11, 12; 22:22; 51:1; Ezek. 1:4; 17:10; 27:26.

Because of its illusiveness, רוּחַ, meaning "wind," perhaps sometimes breath, is the symbol of nothingness, emptiness, vanity.

Isa. 41:29: הֵן כָּלֶם אֲנִן אַפָּס מַעֲשֵׂיהֶם רוּחַ וְתַהוֹ נִסְכֵּיהֶם:

Behold all of them, their works are vanity and nought: their molten images are wind and confusion.

See also Job 7:7; 15:2; 16:3; 30:15 (perhaps, however, to be taken literally); Ps. 78:39; Prov. 11:29; Isa. 26:18; Jer. 5:13; Hos. 12:2.

2. By metonymy it is used for the points of the compass, or, in general, for direction in space.

Jer. 52:23: וַיְהִי הָרַמְנִים תְּשָׁעִים וּשְׁשָׁה רוּחָהּ

And there were ninety-six pomegranates on the sides.

See also I Chron. 9:24; Jer. 49:32, 36; Ezek. 5:10, 12; 17:21; 42:16, 20; Dan. 8:8; 11:4.

II. Spirit.—One might naturally conjecture that רוּחַ denoting spirit was a later development from its use to denote the breath,

and that its application to the spirit of God was an outgrowth of its use with reference to the spirit of man. Unless, however, the order of development of meanings was widely different from the order of appearance in extant literature, or the judgment of modern scholars as to the order of the literature is wide of the mark, the meaning "spirit" came before "breath," and the application to God earlier than to man.

1. Spirit of God. From the conception of the wind as controlled by, or proceeding from, God and operative in nature, apparently arose the conception of the spirit of God, signifying the unseen but powerful influence or influences by which God affected or controlled men. The change of English translation from "wind" to "spirit" doubtless somewhat exaggerates the change of meaning in the mind of Hebrew writer or speaker. It was still for them the **רוּחַ אֱלֹהִים**, only operative in a different sphere.

a) The spirit of God is spoken of as operating in ways more or less analogous to those in which the wind might operate; yet in almost all the instances it is man who is affected thereby.

II Kings 2:16: **פָּרַחַתְיוּ רֹחַ יְהוָה וַיִּשְׁלַכְהוּ בְּאַחַר הַהָרִים אֹו בְּאַחַת הַנִּיּוֹת**

Lest peradventure the spirit of the Lord hath taken him up, and cast him upon some mountain, or into some valley.

For other examples see Gen. 1:2; I Kings 18:12; Ezek. 2:2; 3:12, 14, 24; 8:3; 11:1, 24; 43:5 [cf. below under b)].

In Isa. 31:3 **רוּחַ** is used qualitatively with special reference to its powerfulness in contrast with the flesh as weak:

וּמִצָּרֵיהֶם אָדָם וְלֹא-אֵל וְסוּסֵיהֶם בָּשָׂר וְלֹא רוּחַ

The Egyptians are men and not God, and their horses flesh and not spirit.

While the term does not refer specifically to the spirit of God, the idea of power associated with it is probably derived from the use of **רוּחַ** in reference to the divine spirit. Cf. II Kings 2:16; Judg. 14:6. This generic or qualitative use of **רוּחַ** to express the idea of power is quite isolated and at the opposite pole of development from **רוּחַ** as the symbol of weakness or emptiness derived from the more primitive use of **רוּחַ** meaning wind. In Job 26:13 also **רוּחַ** is apparently used by metonymy for power.

b) The spirit of God (אֱלֹהִים or יְהוָה) is spoken of as operating upon or within men, producing various psychical and psychophysical effects, such as physical strength, courage, prophetic frenzy, a prophetic message. The range of usage is very wide, from those in which the effect is purely physical to those in which the spirit is represented as giving to the prophet his message.

Judg. 3:10: וַתְּהִי עָלָיו רוּחַ־יְהוָה וַיִּשְׁפֹּט אֶת־יִשְׂרָאֵל

And the spirit of the Lord came upon him, and he judged Israel.

Isa. 61:1: רִיחַ אֲדָמִי יְהוָה עָלַי גִּיעַן מָשַׁח יְהוָה אֹתִי לְבָשָׁר עֲנִיִּים שְׁלַחְתִּי לְחַבֵּשׁ לְנִשְׁבְּרֵי־לֵב לְקַרְא לְשָׁבוּיִם דְּרוּר וְלֹא־אֲסוּרִים פִּקְחֵי־קוֹחַ:

The spirit of the Lord God is upon me; because the Lord hath anointed me to preach good tidings unto the meek; he hath sent me to bind up the broken-hearted, to proclaim liberty to the captives, and the opening of the prison to them that are bound.

Other examples of רִיחַ used in similar way are found in Gen. 41:38; Exod. 31:3; 35:31; Num. 11:17, 25, 29; 24:2; 27:18(?); Judg. 6:34; 11:29; 13:25; 14:6, 19; 15:14; I Sam. 10:6, 10; 11:6; 16:14a; 19:20, 23; II Sam. 23:2; I Chron. 12:19; II Chron. 15:1; 20:14; 24:20; Job 32:8 (by *implication* the spirit of Jehovah); Ps. 106:33; Ezek. 1:12, 20, 21; 11:5a; 37:1 [cf. the examples from Ezek. under a), as illustrating the close relationship of the two usages]; Hos. 9:7; Mic. 2:7; 3:8.

Volz¹ interprets the expression "evil spirit from [or of] God," in I Sam. 16:14b, 15, 16, 23a, b; 18:10; 19:9; and Judg. 9:23, "God sent a spirit of evil between Abimelech and the men of Shechem," as referring to a demon, which originally had nothing to do with Yahweh, the phrases "from God," "of God," etc., being the product of a subsequent desire to make every extraordinary phenomenon subordinate to God. The expression as it stands would not in that case exactly reflect the thought of any period, but would be the result of the blending of ideas due to different periods and not wholly assimilated. For the purposes of the present paper it is not essential to determine the accuracy of this judgment. It is probable in any case that the idea of a demonic spirit arose in the Hebrew mind within the Old Testament period (see 3 below)

¹ Volz, *Der Geist Gottes*, Tübingen, 1910, pp. 4 ff.

and that within that period the conception of the supremacy of God prevailed to such an extent that Hebrew writers did not shrink from designating the source from which evil came as a spirit of God. Whether in the latter case those who framed or those who read such passages as Judg. 9:23; I Sam. 16:14-23 had in mind the spirit of God, and understood the epithet "evil" as describing simply the result of the divine action, or conceived that the evil spirits (demonic) were God's in the sense that they were ultimately under divine control, is not wholly clear. The decision of the question depends mainly upon the date at which the idea of the demonic spirit became current in Israel.

The question also arises, though on different grounds, whether in Exod. 28:3; Deut. 34:9 the expression "spirit of wisdom" refers to the spirit of God, called a spirit of wisdom because of the effect produced, or to the spirit of man, to which God imparts wisdom, or is simply a pleonastic phrase for wisdom. See also Isa. 28:6, "spirit of judgment." These passages are in themselves capable of either interpretation. But such passages as Gen. 41:38 (cf. vs. 39); Mic. 3:8, in which similar results are ascribed to the spirit of God, expressly so called, favor the first interpretation. This probably applies also to Num. 27:18 and Zech. 12:10. In II Kings 2:9, 15 the conception may be that the very spirit of Elijah was to come upon Elisha, but vs. 16 again suggests a reference to the spirit of God. So in Num. 11:17, 25, 26, the spirit (with the article) that is upon Moses, though not defined as the spirit either of Moses or of God, is put upon the young men by God, and is most probably thought of as the spirit of God. But both here and in II Kings 2:9, the conception is quantitative rather than purely individual; and all the other passages are perhaps somewhat influenced in thought and expression by the fact of the quantitative idea of the spirit.

c) Under the influence of an increasingly ethical conception of God, the spirit of God, called also the spirit of holiness, is spoken of as operative in the life of the community of the chosen people and of individuals, guiding, instructing, redeeming, ethically purifying.

Isa. 44:3: אֶצְקֵה רוּחִי עַל-זֶרְעֶךָ וּבְרֵכְתִי עַל-צִמְצָמֶיךָ:

I will pour my spirit upon thy seed, and my blessing upon thine offspring.

Ps. 51:11 (13): אֶל-תִּשְׁלִיכֵנִי מִלִּפְנֵיךָ יְיָ וְרִיחַ קֹדֶשְׁךָ אֶל-תִּקַּח מִמֶּנִּי

Cast me not away from thy presence; And take not thy holy spirit from me.

For other examples see Neh. 9:20, 30; Ezek. 39:29; Isa. 11:2; 42:1; 48:16; 59:21; 63:10, 11, 14; Ps. 139:7; 143:10; Hag. 2:5; Zech. 4:6; 12:10; Joel 3:12 (2:28, 29).

The line of demarcation between this class and that which immediately precedes manifestly cannot be sharply drawn, many cases being on the border line.

d) Rarely, and probably in part under the influence of the conception of רִיחַ as the breath of life, the spirit of God is spoken of as the source of physical life. Here, also, as under b) the spirit is sometimes, at least, thought of quantitatively. Cf. II, 2, d).

Job 33:4: רִיחַ-אֵל עָשָׂתִנִּי וְנִשְׁמַת שָׁדַי תַּחֲיֵנִי

The spirit of God hath made me, And the breath of the Almighty giveth me life.

See also Gen. 6:3; Job 27:3; 34:14; Ps. 104:30.

As against the view of Wendt, *Fleisch und Geist*, pp. 19-22, that the wind, which forms the basis for the idea of the Spirit, is conceived of by the Hebrews as immaterial, Gunkel, *Wirkungen des Heiligen Geistes*, pp. 48 f., holds that the Hebrews thought of both wind and spirit as material, but as an extremely refined air-like substance. The possibility that spirit was a substance, but immaterial, is ignored by both of them; probably with reason in view of the lack of evidence that the Hebrews ever thought of immaterial substance. As between Wendt and Gunkel, the latter seems correct. Beyond this and the fact that the Hebrews denied to spirit the ordinary attributes of matter, it is difficult to go with certainty.

2. The spirit of man.

a) As the seat of, or as identical with (the latter apparently the earlier of the two ideas) strength, courage, anger, distress, or the like [cf. examples under 1, b) above].

Judg. 8:3: אִזּוּ רָפְתָה רִיחָם מֵעָלָיו בְּדַבְּרוֹ הַזֶּה

Then their anger was abated toward him, when he had said that.

Job 7:11: אֲדַבְּרָה בְּצַר רִיחִי

I will speak in the anguish of my spirit.

Prov. 18:14: רוּחַ אִישׁ יְכַלֵּל מַחֲלָהוּ וְרוּחַ נִכְאָה מִי יִשְׁאַפֶּה

The spirit of man will sustain his infirmity; but a broken spirit who can bear?

See other examples as found in Gen. 26:35; 41:8; 45:27; Exod. 6:9; 35:21; Num. 27:18 (?); Deut. 2:30; Judg. 8:3; 15:19; Josh. 2:11; 5:1; I Sam. 1:15; 30:12; I Kings 10:5; 21:5; Job 6:4; 15:13; 21:4; 32:18; I Chron. 5:26; II Chron. 9:4; 21:16; 36:22; Ezra 1:1, 5; Job 6:4; 15:13; 21:4; 32:18; Ps. 32:2; 76:13; 77:4; 142:4; 143:4, 7; Prov. 14:29; 15:4, 13; 16:18, 19, 32; 17:22; 29:11, 23; Isa. 19:3, 14; 38:16; 54:6; 61:3; 65:14; Jer. 51:11; Ezek. 3:14b; 21:7; Dan. 2:1, 3; 5:20; 7:15; Zech. 6:8.

b) With kindred meaning but with special reference to the moral and religious life, the seat of humility and other good qualities.

Isa. 57:15: מְרוֹם וְקָדוֹשׁ אֶשְׁכֵּן וְאַת־דַּבָּא וְשֶׁפֶל־רוּחַ לְהַחְיֹת רֹחַ שְׁפִלִים וְלַהֲחַיֹּת לֵב נִדְפָּאִים:

I dwell in the high and holy place, with him also that is of a contrite and humble spirit, to revive the spirit of the humble, and to revive the heart of the contrite ones.

Other examples of this use of רוּחַ are found in Ps. 34:19; 51:12, 19; Hag. 1:14; Ps. 78:8; Prov. 11:13; Isa. 26:9; 57:16; 66:2; Ezek. 11:19; 18:31; 36:26.

c) Rarely, and only in late writers, רוּחַ is used of the seat of mentality.

Job 20:3: מוֹסֵר פִּלְמָתִי אֲשַׁמֶּעַ וְרוּחַ מִבִּינָתִי יַעֲנֵנִי:

I have heard the reproof which putteth me to shame, and the spirit of my understanding answereth me.

See also I Chron. 28:12; Isa. 29:24; Ezek. 11:5b; 20:32.

Mal. 2:15b (see also 16): נִשְׁמְרֶתֶם בְּרוּחֵכֶם probably belongs here, the meaning being, "Be on your guard in [or with] your minds, and deal not thou treacherously with the wife of thy youth." Wellhausen and Nowack suggest the possibility that בְּרוּחֵכֶם means "on peril of your lives" (BDB, *s.v.*); this is possible for the preposition but a difficult if not impossible meaning for the noun. Smith (*Int. Crit. Com.*) takes רוּחַ in the sense, character, purpose, or will, which is, however, neither strictly suitable to the context nor a well-authenticated usage of the word, the passages cited scarcely vouching for it. The more general meaning "spirit,"

as the seat of emotion and will, is less open to objection. The sentence in that case would mean, Guard yourselves in [the sphere of] your spirits, i.e., against those feelings which might lead one of you to deal treacherously with the wife of his youth.

d) With approximation to the sense of רִיחַ נֶפֶשׁ denotes the spirit of man as the seat or cause of life, often with accompanying reference to God as its source. Cf. II, 1, d).

Num. 16:22: אֵל אֱלֹהֵי הָרוּחֹת לְכֹל בָּשָׂר

O God, the God of the spirits of all flesh.

Zech. 12:1: נְאֻם־יְהוָה נִשְׁתָּה שָׁמַיִם וְיִסַּד אֶרֶץ וַיֵּצֵר רוּחַ־אָדָם בְּקִרְבּוֹ:

Thus saith the Lord, which stretcheth forth the heavens, and layeth the foundations of the earth, and formeth the spirit of man within him.

See also Num. 27:16; Job 10:12; 12:10; 17:1; Ps. 31:5; Isa. 42:5; Ezek. 10:17 (?).

The passages in Eccl. (3:19, 21; 12:7), which must doubtless be taken all together, are peculiar in that the term רִיחַ is applied to the lower animals along with man, while at the same time God is represented as its source. The conception seems to be that there proceeds from God רִיחַ, quantitatively not individually thought of, which is the source and cause of life for both man and beast, and that at death this רִיחַ returns from both man and beast to the source from which it came. Cf. II, 1, d), above, and III, 1, below. There is possibly to be discerned here an influence of the idea ascribed to Epicharmus: *συνεκρίθη καὶ διεκρίθη ἀπ᾽ ἡλθεν, ὅθεν ἦλθεν, πάλιν, γὰρ μὲν εἰς γὰρ, πνεῦμα δ' ἄνω*. See p. 19.

3. The idea of a demon, a personal spirit neither human nor divine, which was undoubtedly current in the ancient world, and is unquestionably found in late Jewish writings, is nowhere in the Old Testament expressed with that clearness which it acquires later. It is probable, however, that it is present in such passages as II Kings 19:7; Zech. 13:2; Job 4:15.

Job 4:15: רוּחַ עַל־פָּנַי יִחַלָּה תְּסִמָּר שְׂעִירַת בָּשָׂרִי

A spirit passed before my face and the hair of my flesh stood up.

It is perhaps also to be found in I Kings 22:21-23 and the parallel passage, II Chron. 18:20-22, in which Zedekiah describes

the spirit by which Zedekiah and others have spoken as a lying spirit sent forth from God. But in view of the highly dramatic character of the passage it may be doubted whether the language is not simply a dramatic way of saying that Zedekiah is lying. The answer depends in this case, as in those mentioned under 2, *a*), mainly on the period at which the idea of the demon can be shown to have been current in Israel. The same considerations apply to Num. 5:14, 30, with its reference to a spirit of jealousy; to Hos. 4:12; 5:4, spirit of whoredom; Mic. 2:11, spirit of falsehood; Isa. 19:14, spirit of perverseness; Isa. 29:10, spirit of deep sleep.

III. Breath, which is the sign of life, and the cessation of which is death.

1. *Proprie.*—The breath. Instances of this meaning are found first in the exilic period, and Ezek. 37:5-14 suggests a close connection between the older meanings, "wind" and "spirit," and the apparently later meaning, "breath."

Ezek. 37:9, 10: וַיֹּאמֶר אֵלַי הַנְּבִיא אֱלֹהֵי הָרוּחַ הַנְּבִיא בֶן־אָדָם וַאֲמַרְתָּ אֱלֹהֵי הָרוּחַ כֹּה־אָמַר אֲדֹנָי יְהוִה מֵאַרְבַּע רוּחֹת בָּאִי הָרוּחַ וּשְׁפִי בְּהַרוּגִים הָאֵלֶּה וַיְחִי: וְהַנְּבִיאָתִי פֶּאֶשֶׁר צִוֵּנִי וְתָבוֹא בָהֶם הָרוּחַ וַיְחִי: וַיַּעֲמֵדוּ עַל־רַגְלֵיהֶם חֵל גדול מֵאֵד מֵאֵד:

Then said he unto me, Prophecy unto the wind, prophecy, son of man, and say to the wind, thus saith the Lord God: Come from the four winds, O breath, and breathe upon these slain, that they may live. So I prophesied as he commanded me, and the breath came into them, and they stood upon their feet, an exceeding great army.

See also Gen. 6:17; 7:15, 22; Job 9:18; 15:30; 19:17; Ps. 104:29; 135:17; 146:4; Jer. 10:14; 14:6 (?); 51:17; Lam. 4:20; Hab. 2:19.

In all of these instances, except those in Job, the breath is definitely thought of as the breath of life. On Eccl. 3:19, 20; 12:7, see 2, *d*), above.

2. As the symbol of anger or of power; of man (Isa. 25:4; 33:11 [?]); of the Messiah (Isa. 11:4); but usually of God (Exod. 15:8; II Sam. 22:16; Job 4:9; Ps. 18:15; 33:6; Isa. 30:28;

59:19; sometimes apparently with a blending of the idea of wind.

Isa. 11:4: וְהָכָה אֶרֶץ בְּשֵׁבֶט פִּי וּבְרוּחַ שְׁפָתָיו יָמִית רָשָׁע:

He shall smite the earth with the rod of his mouth, and with the breath of his lips shall he slay the wicked.

Whether by רוּחַ מְשַׁפֵּט and רוּחַ בָּעַר in Isa. 4:4 the prophet means the breath of God as the expression of his anger, or the spirit of God with an idea similar to that expressed by רוּחַ קָדֵשׁ in Ps. 51:11, is not easy to decide. In any case the expression might easily be taken in the latter sense in later times.

II. נֶפֶשׁ

The order of development of meanings is difficult to determine. The idea commonly held formerly that the fundamental idea is breath is now generally given up, there being no certain or probable instance of the use of the word in that sense. (On Job 41:21 [13]; Prov. 27:9; Isa. 13:20, see BDB,¹ *s.v. ad fn.*) The following analysis, though based on repeated personal study of all the Old Testament passages, is largely influenced by BDB, especially in respect to I, and the order of arrangement.

I. Soul, that entity which, residing in a living being, makes it alive, and the departure of which is death—sometimes distinguished from בָּשָׂר, flesh.

I Kings 17:21: וַיִּתְמַד עַל-הַיֶּלֶד שְׁלֹשׁ פְּעָמִים וַיִּקְרָא אֱלֹהֵיהָ וַיֹּאמֶר יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵי הַשָּׁבִינָא נֶפֶשׁ-הַיֶּלֶד הַזֶּה עַל-קִרְבּוֹ:

And he stretched himself upon the child three times, and called unto the Lord, and said, O Lord my God, I pray thee let this child's soul come into him again.

See other examples in Gen. 35:18; I Kings 17:21, 22; Job 11:20; 31:39; 33:18, 22, 28, 30; Ps. 16:10; 30:4; 31:10; 49:16; 86:13; 89:49; 131:2; Prov. 11:17; 23:14; Isa. 10:18; 38:17; Jer. 15:9; Lam. 3:20; cf. also Job 14:22; 30:16; Ps. 42:5, 7 which BDB assign to this class.

¹Brown, Driver, and Briggs, *Hebrew and English Lexicon of the Old Testament*, Boston, 1906.

The soul, as a living entity, is sometimes said to be in the blood or even identified with it, and on this is based a prohibition of the eating of blood.

Lev. 17:14^b: דָּם כָּל-בָּשָׂר לֹא תֹאכְלוּ כִּי נֶפֶשׁ כָּל-בָּשָׂר דָּמוֹ

Ye shall eat the blood of no manner of flesh: for the life of all flesh is the blood thereof.

See also Gen. 9:4, 5; Deut. 12:23^a, ^b.

II. Soul, the seat of appetite, emotion, and the like, with no implication of a separate entity, or of the possibility of separate existence.

1. The seat of physical appetites, health, and vigor.

Deut. 12:20: כִּי-יִרְחֹב יְהוָה אֶתְּךָ אֶת-גְּבֻלְךָ כַּאֲשֶׁר דִּבֶּר-
לְךָ וְאָמַרְתָּ אֲכָלָה בָּשָׂר כִּי-תֹאמְרָה נֶפֶשְׁךָ לֵאמֹל בָּשָׂר בְּכָל-אֹתוֹת נֶפֶשְׁךָ
תֹאכַל בָּשָׂר:

When the Lord thy God shall enlarge thy border, as he hath promised thee, and thou shalt say, I will eat flesh, because thy soul desireth to eat flesh; thou mayest eat flesh after all the desire of thy soul.

For other examples see Num. 11:6; 21:5; Deut. 12:15, 21; 23:25; Job 33:20; Ps. 78:18; 106:15; 107:5, 9, 18; Prov. 6:30; 10:3; 13:25; 16:24, 26; 23:2; 25:25; 27:7 *bis*; Eccl. 2:24; 4:8; 6:2, 7; Isa. 29:8^a, ^b; 32:6; 55:2;[†] 56:11; 58:11;[†] Jer. 31:14;[†] 50:19;[†] Lam. 1:11, 19; Ezek. 7:19; Hos. 9:4; Mic. 7:1.

2. The seat of emotion of all kinds—desire, courage, hope, fear, love, hate, sorrow, discouragement, vengeance, or, by metonymy, the emotions themselves; frequently but by no means constantly as the seat of religious experience.

Job 30:25: אִם-לֹא בִכְתִּי לְקֹשְׁתֵי-יָוָם עֲגָמָה נֶפְשִׁי לְאַבְיוֹן

Did not I weep for him that was in trouble? Was not my soul grieved for the needy?

Ps. 86:4: שִׂמְחַ נֶפֶשׁ עַבְדְּךָ כִּי-אֶלֶךָ אֲדֹנָי נֶפְשִׁי אֲשָׂא:

Rejoice the soul of thy servant, for unto thee O Lord do I lift up my soul.

Cant. 1:7: הַגִּידָה לִּי שָׂאֲהָבָה נֶפְשִׁי אֵיכָה תִרְעָה:

Tell me, O thou whom my soul loveth, where thou feedest thy flock.

Isa. 61:10: שׂוֹשׁ אֲשִׁישׁ בִּיהוָה תִּגֵּל נֶפְשִׁי בְּאֱלֹהֵי

I will rejoice greatly in the Lord; my soul shall be joyful in my God.

[†] But the whole expression is used figuratively for a religious experience.

See other examples in Gen. 23:8; 34:3, 8; 42:22; Exod. 15:9; 23:9; Lev. 23:27, 32; 26:11, 15, 16, 30, 43; Num. 21:4; 29:7; Deut. 14:26 *bis*; 18:6; 21:14; 24:15; 28:65; Josh. 23:11; Judg. 5:21; 10:16; 16:16; 18:25; Ruth 4:15 (?); I Sam. 1:10, 15; 2:16, 33; 18:1*b*, *c*; 20:4; 22:2; 23:20; 30:6; II Sam. 3:21; 5:8; 17:8; I Kings 11:37; II Kings 4:27; 9:15; Job 3:20; 6:11; 7:11; 10:1 *bis*; 14:22; 16:4*a*, *b*; 18:4; 19:2; 21:25; 23:13; 24:12; 27:2; 30:16, 25; 41:13, 21;¹ Ps. 6:4; 10:3; 11:5; 19:8; 23:3; 25:13; 27:12; 31:8; 33:20; 34:3; 35:9, 12, 13, 25; 41:3, 5; 42:2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 12; 43:5; 44:26; 57:7; 62:2, 6; 63:1, 6, 9; 69:11; 77:3; 84:3; 86:4 *bis*; 88:4; 94:19; 103:1, 2, 22; 104:1, 35; 105:22; 107:26; 116:7; 119:20, 25, 28, 81; 123:4; 130:5, 6; 138:3; 143:6, 8, 11, 12; 146:1; Prov. 6:16; 13:2, 4 *bis*, 19; 14:10; 19:18; 21:10, 23; 25:13; 28:25; 29:17; 31:6; Eccl. 6:3, 9; 7:28; Cant. 1:7; 3:1, 2, 3, 4; 5:6; 6:12; Isa. 1:14; 3:20 (?); 5:14; 15:4; 19:10; 26:8, 9; 38:15; 42:1; 53:11; 58:3, 5, 10 *bis*; 61:10; 66:3; Jer. 2:24; 4:31; 5:9, 29; 6:8; 9:8; 12:7; 13:17; 14:19; 15:1; 22:27; 31:12, 25 *bis*; 34:16; 44:14; Lam. 1:16; 2:12; 3:17, 20, 51; Ezek. 16:27; 23:17, 18 *bis*, 22, 28; 24:21, 25; 25:6, 15; 27:31; 36:5; Hos. 4:8; Mic. 7:3; Hab. 2:5; Zech. 11:8 *bis*.

3. The seat of will and moral action, especially when joined with לִבָּב, but occasionally alone; not of course sharply distinguished from the preceding class.

Deut. 30:2: וּשְׁבַת עַד־יְהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ וּשְׁמַעַת בְּקוֹל כָּל אֲשֶׁר-
אֶנְכִי מִצְוֶה הַיּוֹם אֹתָהּ וּבְנֶיךָ בְּכָל-לִבָּבְךָ וּבְכָל-נַפְשְׁךָ:

And shalt return unto the Lord thy God, and shalt obey his voice according to all that I command thee this day, thou and thy children, with all thine heart and with all thy soul.

See other examples in Gen. 49:6; Deut. 4:29; 6:5; 10:12; 11:13, 18; 13:4; 26:16; 30:6, 10; Josh. 22:5; I Kings 2:4; 8:48; II Kings 23:3, 25; I Chron. 22:19; 28:9; II Chron. 6:38; 15:12; 34:31; Job 6:7; 7:15; Ps. 24:4; 25:1; 119:129, 167; Jer. 32:41; Ezek. 4:14; Mic. 6:7; Hab. 2:4.

Here also instead of under 2 might be classified Ps. 27:12; 41:2; 105:22; Deut. 23:25; Josh. 23:11.

¹ Briggs, *Jour. Bib. Lit.*, XVI (1897), 30.

4. Rarely of the seat of mentality.

Esth. 4:13: אֶל־תִּדְמִי בְנַפְשְׁךָ לְהִמָּלֵט בֵּית־הַמֶּלֶךְ

Think not in thy soul that thou shalt escape in the king's house.

See other examples in Deut. 49:15; Josh. 23:14; I Sam. 2:35; Esth. 4:13; Ps. 13:3; 35:3; 139:14; Prov. 2:10; 19:2; 23:7; 24:14; 27:9; Jer. 42:20. But in most cases the meaning may be more general, "self"; it is doubtful, moreover, whether in any case the Hebrew mind made the distinction indicated by the subdivisions under the main division II.

III. Life, that element or characteristic which distinguishes a living being from inanimate objects.

Job 2:4: עוֹר בְּעַד־עוֹר וְכָל אֲשֶׁר לְאִישׁ יָתֵן בְּעַד נַפְשׁוֹ

Skin for skin, yea all that a man hath, will he give for his life.

Jer. 51:6: נָסוּ מִתּוֹךְ בָּבֶל וּמִלְטוּ אִישׁ נַפְשׁוֹ

Flee out of the midst of Babylon, and save every man his life.

See other examples in Gen. 9:4, 5a, b; 19:17, 19; 32:31; 44:30a, b; Exod. 4:19; 21:23, 30; 30:12, 15, 16; Lev. 24:18b, c; Num. 17:3; 25:31; 31:50; Deut. 13:7; 19:21; 24:6; Josh. 2:13, 14; 9:24; Judg. 5:18; 9:17; 12:3; 18:25a, b; I Sam. 18:1c, 3; 19:5, 11; 21:1, 17; 22:23a, b; 23:15; 24:12; 25:19a, b, c; I Sam. 26:21, 24a, b; 28:9, 21; II Sam. 1:9; 4:8, 9; 14:7, 14; 16:11; 18:13; 19:6a, b, c, d; 23:17; perhaps also Lev. 17:11b; I Kings 1:12a, b; 1:29; 2:23; 3:11; 19:2a, b, 3, 4a, b, 10, 14; 20:31, 32, 39a, b, 42a, b; II Kings 1:13a, b, 14; 7:7; 10:24a, b; I Chron. 11:19a, b; II Chron. 1:11; Esth. 7:3, 7; 8:11; 9:16; Job 2:4, 6; 12:10; 13:14; 27:3, 8; 31:30; Ps. 6:5; 7:6; 17:9; 22:21; 25:20; 26:9; 31:14; 33:19; 34:23; 35:4, 17; 38:13; 40:15; 49:9; 54:5, 6; 55:19; 56:7, 14; 59:4; 63:10; 66:9; 69:2, 19; 70:3; 71:10, 13, 23; 72:13, 14; 74:19; 78:50; 86:2, 14; 94:21; 97:10; 116:4, 8; 119:109; 120:2; 121:7; 124:4, 5; 143:3; Prov. 1:18, 19; 3:22; 6:26; 7:23; 11:30(?); 14:25(?); 12:10; 13:3, 8; 16:17; 19:8, 16; 20:2; 22:23; 24:12(?); 29:10, 24; Isa. 43:4; 44:20; 53:10, 12; Jer. 2:34; 4:10, 30; 11:21; 19:7a, b; 20:13; 21:7, 9; 22:25; 26:19; 34:20, 21; 38:2, 16a, b; 39:18; 40:14, 15; 44:30a, b; 45:5; 46:26; 48:6; 49:37; 51:6, 45; Lam. 2:19; 5:9; Ezek. 3:19, 21; 13:18a, b,

20a, b, c; 14:14, 20; 16:5; 17:17; 22:25, 27; 32:10; 33:5, 9; Amos 2:14, 15; Jon. 1:14; 2:6, 8; 4:3.

In various idiomatic phrases, such as "my life shall live," "as thy life liveth," "to smite a life," or "to stay a life," "the life dies," נֶפֶשׁ seems, despite the unusual character of the expression, to retain the meaning "life."

Gen. 12:13: אֲמַרְיָנָא אֶחָתִי אֵתָּ לְמַעַן יִשָּׁב־לִי בְּעִבְרֵתָּ וְהָיְתָה נַפְשִׁי בְּגִלְלָהּ:

Say, I pray thee, thou art my sister: that it may be well with me and that I may live because of thee.

Lev. 24:17: וְאִישׁ כִּי יַכֶּה כָּל-נֶפֶשׁ אָדָם מוֹת יוּמָת:

And he that smiteth any man to death shall surely be put to death.

See other examples in Gen. 19:20; 37:21; Lev. 24:18a; Num. 23:10; 31:19; 35:11, 15, 30; Deut. 19:6, 11; 22:26; 27:25; Josh. 20:3, 9; Judg. 16:30; I Sam. 1:26; 17:55; 20:3; 25:26; II Sam. 11:11; 14:19; II Kings 2:2, 4, 6, 30; Job 31:39; 36:14; Ps. 22:30; 119:75; Isa. 55:3; Jer. 38:17, 20; Ezek. 13:18c, 19a, b; 18:27; Jon. 4:8(?).

IV. A living being, a being that possesses life, as distinguished from an inanimate object.

1. In the phrase נֶפֶשׁ חַיָּה, as a general term for any being that has animal life, whether man or beast.

Gen. 1:24: וַיֹּאמֶר אֱלֹהִים תּוֹצֵא הָאָרֶץ נֶפֶשׁ חַיָּה

And God said, let the earth bring forth the living creature after its kind.

See also Gen. 1:20, 21, 30; 2:7, 19; 9:10, 12, 15, 16; Lev. 11:10, 46a; Ezek. 47:9.

Occasionally נֶפֶשׁ without חַיָּה is used in this inclusive sense. So Lev. 10:46b; Num. 31:28.

2. Much more frequently נֶפֶשׁ without the addition of חַיָּה is applied to man only:

a) Meaning person, individual man.

Lev. 17:12: עַל-כֵּן אָמַרְתִּי לְבְנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל כָּל-נֶפֶשׁ מִכֶּם לֹא-חֹאכֶל דָּם

Therefore I said unto the children of Israel, no soul of you shall eat blood.

See other examples in Gen. 14:21; 17:14; 36:6; Exod. 12:15, 16, 19; 31:14; Lev. 2:1; 4:2, 27; 5:1, 2, 4, 15, 17, 21; 7:18, 20a, b, 21a, b, 25, 27a, b; 17:10, 15; 18:29; 19:8; 20:6a, b; 22:3, 6, 11; 23:29, 30a, b; 27:2; Num. 5:6; 9:13; 15:27, 28, 30a, b, 31; 19:13b, 18, 20, 22; Deut. 24:7; Josh. 10:28, 30, 32, 35, 37a, b, 39; 11:11; I Sam. 22:22; II Kings 12:5; Prov. 11:25; 19:15; 28:17; Isa. 49:7; Jer. 43:6; Lam. 3:25; Ezek. 18:4a, b, c, d, 20; 27:13; 33:6.

b) In enumerations.

Exod. 1:5: **וַיְהִי כָּל-נֶפֶשׁ יִצְחָק יִהְיֶה-יַעֲקֹב שְׁבַעִים נֶפֶשׁ**

And all the souls that came out of the loins of Jacob were seventy souls.

Other examples occur in Gen. 46:15, 18, 22, 25, 26a, b, 27a, b; Exod. 12:4; 16:16; Num. 31:35a, b, 40a, b, 46; Deut. 10:22; I Chron. 5:21; Jer. 52:29, 30a, b.

c) With pronominal suffix it has the force of a reflexive or personal pronoun.

Ps. 11:1: **אֵיךְ תֹּאמְרוּ לְנַפְשִׁי נָדְרוּ הָרָכָם צְפוּרִי**

How say ye to my soul, Flee as a bird to your mountain?

See other examples in Gen. 27:4, 19, 25, 31; Lev. 11:43, 44; 16:29, 31; 20:25; Num. 30:3, 5a, b, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12; Job 9:21(?); 32:2; Ps. 3:3; 7:3; 17:13; 35:7; 49:19; 57:2, 5; 66:16; 88:15; 94:17; 105:18; 109:20, 31; 120:6; 141:8; 142:5, 8; Prov. 11:17; 18:7; 22:25; Isa. 3:9; 46:2; 47:14; 51:23; Jer. 3:11; 6:16; 17:21; 18:20; 37:9; 44:7; 51:14; Lam. 3:24, 58; Amos 6:8 (of Jehovah); Hab. 2:10.

In a few passages it stands for the self as the whole complex of opportunities and possibilities that belong to a man while he lives. Prov. 6:32; 8:36; cf. 15:32; 22:25.

d) Occasionally (in Lev., Num., and Hag., only) it is used to denote a person once living, but now dead.

Num. 5:2: **וְכֹל טָמֵא לְנֶפֶשׁ**

Whosoever is unclean by the dead.

So also in Lev. 19:28; 21:1, 11; 22:4; Num. 6:6, 11; 9:6, 7, 10; 19:11, 13a; Hag. 2:13.

The occurrence of this usage compared with the use of **נֶפֶשׁ חַיָּה** to denote a living creature suggests the possibility that **נֶפֶשׁ** alone

properly means a creature (it could hardly be person) whether alive or dead. But the whole body of facts (note, e.g., the rarity of its use for the dead, and the limited number of instances of **הָיָה** compared with the large number of cases in which **נֶפֶשׁ** alone expresses the idea of life) seems best accounted for by the supposition that **הָיָה** when it occurs is pleonastic and that the use of **נֶפֶשׁ** in reference to a dead body is an offshoot from its use to signify person [IV, 2, a)]. Cf. the use of the English word "person" (the Latin *persona* originally meaning a mask covering the body) to denote the body as in the phrase "exposure of the person"; or the use of the word "soul" to mean a person, as in the expression "a thousand souls perished."

III. בָּשָׂר

Whatever the primitive Semitic sense of this term (see Gesenius-Buhl, which on the basis of the Arabic regards "skin" as the original meaning and assigns this to Ps. 102:6), the meaning which, with the possible exception of Ps. 102:6, is basal to all others in the Old Testament, is clearly "flesh." Usage is as follows:

I. Flesh, the soft, muscular portions of a body living or once living; used both of man and beast.

Job 2:5: **אֹלָם שָׁלַח־נָא יָדְךָ וְגַע אֶל־עַצְמוֹ וְאֶל־בְּשָׂרוֹ אִם־לֹא אֶל־פָּנֶיךָ יִבְרַכְךָ**

But put forth thine hand now, and touch his bone and his flesh, and he will renounce thee to thy face.

Isa. 22:13: **הָרַג בָּקָר וְשָׁחַט צֹאן אָכַל בָּשָׂר וְשָׁתוּת יַיִן**

Slaying oxen and killing sheep, eating flesh and drinking wine.

See other examples in Gen. 2:21, 23a, b (?); 9:4; 17:11, 13, 14, 23, 24, 25; 40:19; 41:2, 3, 4, 18, 19 (of animals); Exod. 4:7; 12:8, 46; 16:3, 8, 12; 21:28; 22:30, 31 (?); 28:42; 29:14, 31, 32, 34; Lev. 4:11; 6:20 (27); 7:15, 17, 18, 19 *bis*, 20, 21; 8:17, 31, 32; 9:11; 11:8, 11; 12:3; 13:10, 14, 15a, b, 16; 15:2, 3a, b, 7, 19; 16:27; 18:18; 26:29a, b; Num. 11:4, 13, 18a, b, 21, 33; 12:12; 19:5; Deut. 12:15, 20a, b, c, 23, 27a, b; 14:8; 16:4; 28:53, 55; 32:42; Judg. 6:19, 20, 21a, b; 8:7; I Sam. 2:13, 15a, b; 17:44; I Kings 17:6a, b; 19:21; II Kings 5:10, 14a, b; 9:36; Job 2:5; 6:12; 10:11; 13:14 (?); 14:22; 19:20, 26; 31:31; 33:21, 25;

41:15 (23); Ps. 27:2; 38:4, 8; 50:13; 79:2; 102:6; 109:24; Prov. 5:11(?); 23:20; Eccles. 4:5; Isa. 44:16, 19; 49:26; 65:4; 66:17; Jer. 7:21; 11:15; 19:9a, b, c; Lam. 3:4; Ezek. 4:14; 11:3, 7, 11, 19; 16:26(?); 23:20a, b; 24:10; 32:5; 36:26b; 37:6, 8; 39:17, 18; 40:43; 44:7, 9; Dan. 1:15; 10:3; Hos. 8:13; Mic. 3:3; Hag. 2:12; Zech. 11:9, 16; 14:12.

In Gen. 17:11 ff. it is used (in its proper sense) in the expression **בֶּשֶׂר עָרְלָה**, "flesh of the foreskin" (cf. also Exod. 28:42). According to Gesenius-Buhl and BDB, in Lev. 15:2, 3, 7 the term itself denotes the male organ, and in Lev. 15:19 the female organ; but it is not clear that there is here any strict metonymy, but rather perhaps only the use of a general term when a specific might have been used. In Ezek. 16:26; 23:20; 44:7, 9, it is even less certain that the term is specific.

II. By synecdoche for the body.

I Kings 21:27: **וַיֵּדֵי כְשָׁמַע אֲחָאָב אֶת־הַדְּבָרִים הָאֵלֶּה וַיִּקְרַע בְּגָדָיו וַיִּשְׁם־שָׁק עַל־בְּשָׁרוֹ וַיִּצְוֹם**

And it came to pass, when Ahab heard those words, that he rent his clothes, and put sackcloth upon his flesh, and fasted.

Prov. 14:30: **חַיֵּי בָשָׂרִים לֵב מִרְפָּא וִרְקָב עֲצָמוֹת קִנְאָה**;

A sound heart is the life of the flesh, but envy is the rottenness of the bones.

See other examples in Exod. 30:32; Lev. 6:3 (10); 13:2, 3a, b, 4, 11, 13, 18, 24, 38, 39, 43; 14:9; 15:13, 16; 16:4, 24, 26, 28; 17:16; 19:28; 21:5; 22:6; Num. 8:7; 19:7, 8; II Kings 4:34; 6:30; Neh. 5:5a, b; Job 4:15; 7:5; 21:6(?); Ps. 16:9; 119:120; Prov. 4:22; Eccles. 2:3; 5:5; 11:10; 12:12; Isa. 17:4; Ezek. 10:12; 11:19a; 36:26a.

In poetic passages **בָּשָׂר** is coupled with **נֶפֶשׁ** or **לֵב** or both to denote the whole person even when the things affirmed are strictly true only of the inner man (Ps. 63:2 (1); 84:3).

Somewhat similarly the expression **מִנֶּפֶשׁ וְעַד בָּשָׂר** is used to denote the totality of a thing which strictly speaking has neither flesh nor soul (Isa. 10:18).

III. By metonymy for one's kindred, the basis of this usage being doubtless in the fact that it is the body which is primarily

thought of as produced and producing by natural generation; most commonly coupled with עֵצָם, bone.

Gen. 29:14: וַיֹּאמֶר לוֹ לָבָן אִךְ עֲצָמִי וּבִשָּׁרִי אִתָּהּ

And Laban said to him, Surely thou art my bone and my flesh.

See also Gen. 37:27; Lev. 18:6; 25:49; Judg. 9:2; II Sam. 5:1; 19:13, 14; I Chron. 11:1; Isa. 9:19; 58:7.

IV. By further synecdoche, בָּשָׂר denotes a corporeal living creature; sometimes with reference to men only, sometimes of men and beasts.

1. Of men and beasts in common.

Gen. 7:21: וַיָּגוּעַ כָּל-בָּשָׂר הָרֹמֵשׁ עַל-הָאָרֶץ בְּעוֹף הַבְּהֵמָה וּבַחַיָּה . . . וּכְלֵי הָאָדָם; וּבְחַיָּה

And all flesh died that moved upon the earth, both fowl and cattle and beast . . . and every man.

See other examples in Gen. 6:17, 19; 7:16, 21; 8:17; 9:11, 15a, b, 16, 17; Lev. 17:11, 14a, b, c; Num. 18:15; Job 34:15; Ps. 136:25; Jer. 32:27.

2. Of men only.

Isa. 40:5: וְנִגְלָה כְּבוֹד יְהוָה וְרָאוּ כָל-בָּשָׂר יַחְדָּו

And the glory of the Lord shall be revealed, and all flesh shall see it together.

Joel 3:1 (2:28): אֲשַׁפּוֹךְ אֶת-רוּחִי עַל-כָּל-בָּשָׂר וְנִבְּאוּ בְּנֵיכֶם וּבְנוֹתֵיכֶם

And I will pour out my spirit upon all flesh, and your sons and your daughters shall prophesy.

Other examples are found in Gen. 2:24; 6:12, 13; Num. 16:22; 27:16; Deut. 5:26; Job 12:10; 19:22; Isa. 40:6; 49:26b; 66:16; Jer. 12:12; 25:31; 45:5; Ezek. 21:4 (20:48); 21:9 (4), 10 (5); Zech. 2:17 (13).

3. Sometimes, especially in predicate, with emphasis on the frailty which is characteristic of the corporeal being in contrast with spirit or God as powerful.

Ps. 78:39: וַיִּזְכֹּר כִּי-בָשָׂר הֵמָּה רֵיחַ הוֹלֵךְ וְלֹא יָשׁוּב׃

And he remembered that they were but flesh, a wind that passeth away and cometh not again.

See also Gen. 6:3; II Chron. 32:8; Job 10:4; Ps. 56:5; Isa. 31:3; Jer. 17:5.

IV. SUMMARY AND COMPARISON

Respecting the three terms in the Old Testament, it is to be noted that רִיחַ, beginning undoubtedly as a term of physical or dynamic meaning, denoting wind, was already early in the literary period a religious term in the sense that it was used in connection with the idea of God to denote the invisible power by which he operated in the world, or for God himself as operative, but not for a hypostasis distinct from God. Relatively late it became a religious term in the sense also that it signified the power of God working to produce ethical and religious effects in men. As applied to men, probably under the influence of the thought that it was the spirit of the god that produced extraordinary effects in men, such as strength, courage, anger, ecstatic frenzy, etc., it denoted the seat of all such emotions and experiences, and then advanced to denote the seat of the ethical and religious in general. Its use with reference to the breath is probably relatively late and subsequent in general to the previously named uses.

נֶפֶשׁ, on the other hand, was from the earliest period of the literature preserved in the Old Testament a psychological and vital term, denoting the soul, or life, as that in a living, corporeal being which constitutes him living as distinguished from the inanimate, and then the being himself as living. Its use with reference to God is very rare and probably a conscious anthropomorphism.

As used to denote a corporeal living being, the נֶפֶשׁ is, of course, hypostatized; and this is also the case in respect to some of the instances in which it denotes the soul, since this is supposed to depart from the body and exist apart from it. The latter usage may also be very early and certainly persists very late. But in the majority of cases, the נֶפֶשׁ (meaning life or soul) is not a hypostasis, but a quality or characteristic of a living being. As the seat of appetite, emotion, mentality, and moral and religious experience, the usage of נֶפֶשׁ is closely parallel to that of רִיחַ. But while נֶפֶשׁ is often used for life, רִיחַ is only rarely so used and then chiefly with reference to God as the source of life.

בָּשָׂר is fundamentally and prevailingly a physical term. Its only departure from this physical sense is in its employment by metonymy for kindred and for a corporeal living being. At the

latter point, it becomes a synonym of נִפְשׁ, the one extending its psychical sense to include the physical and the other its physical to include the psychical. It never acquires a mental, moral, or religious sense. Its nearest approach to such meaning—and this still very remote—is its use with the suggestion of weakness and frailty.

Broadly speaking, therefore, רוּחַ is physical-religious-psychical; נִפְשׁ is psychical-vital; בָּשָׂר is physical.

But an instructive parallel may also be drawn between the usage of each of the three Hebrew terms and the corresponding Greek words, viz., between רוּחַ and πνεῦμα; between נִפְשׁ and ψυχή; between בָּשָׂר and σὰρξ.

The fundamental meaning of רוּחַ and πνεῦμα is the same, viz., wind. The first extant instances of this meaning of πνεῦμα date from the fifth century B.C. רוּחַ appears in this sense in the oldest Old Testament literature, and is therefore at least as old as the eighth century B.C. But in the same period also we find רוּחַ meaning spirit, and used of the spirit of God. The application to the demonic spirit may perhaps be the earliest, but the application to the spirit of God seems to arise out of its use meaning wind, rather than from the idea of the demon, and the use to denote the spirit of man is apparently later than with reference to the spirit of God. Both these latter ideas retain a quantitative feeling, even after the terms have come to be used personally and individually. The meaning "breath" is apparently the latest of all to appear.

The development of the usage of πνεῦμα is somewhat different. From the primitive meaning "wind" arises the meaning "breath," and from this in a purely physical sense come the meanings "breath of life," "life." On this basis apparently is developed the conception of a soul-stuff, out of which individual souls come and to which they return. At the close of the classical period there is the suggestion of an extension of this idea by which πνεῦμα becomes the basis of all existence. In the post-classical period we shall see this developing into the conception of divine spirit, πνεῦμα θεῖον, at first at least quantitatively thought of. But of the deification of the πνεῦμα there are no discoverable traces in the classical period.

Alike, therefore, in the starting-point and in the general range of usage there is a large measure of parallelism between the Hebrew and Greek terms, רִיחַ and πνεῦμα. But the order in which meanings are developed is not the same, and the Hebrews were far in advance of the Greeks in developing the idea of the divine spirit.

נֶפֶשׁ apparently begins with the notion of a living being resident in a living animal or man—the ghost, so to speak, within an embodied living being. The earliest extant usage of ψυχή is to denote the shade of a once-living being, the ghost that escapes from the body when it dies. From these kindred starting-points both the Hebrew and the Greek terms develop with no marked difference in order, the meanings “life,” that quality or element of a living being which constitutes it living, and “soul” as the seat of various emotions, capacities, etc. The Hebrew writers ascribe a נֶפֶשׁ only to man and the lower animals (except as it is by anthropomorphism used of God), and this is also the use of ψυχή in most of the Greek writers, but Plato believes in a ψυχή of the universe, and Aristotle ascribes ψυχή (in a limited sense of the term) to plants. As to the capacity of the soul for existence apart from the body and after death, both Hebrew and Greek writers differ among themselves. Some of the Psalms affirm it, some seem to deny, Ecclesiastes is skeptical. So Homer and the tragic poets presuppose a shadowy existence after death; Socrates is agnostic about the future of the soul; Xenophon is hopeful; Plato affirms; and Aristotle denies.

Both בָּשָׂר and σὰρξ are primarily physical terms, both pass from the meaning “flesh” in the strict sense to the more general meaning “body.” The Hebrew term is used by metonymy to denote one’s kindred, and as a general term for man and animals, or for humanity as such. Neither term has any ethical significance. Plato regards the body as a drag upon the soul, conceiving that the latter can achieve its full freedom and highest development only when freed from the former, but he apparently never uses σὰρξ in this connection, and does not ascribe to the σῶμα a distinctly ethical significance. Of any corrupting power of either body or flesh to drag down the soul there is no trace in the Old Testament. The בָּשָׂר is sometimes spoken of as weak, but never as a power for evil.

CHAPTER III

ΠΝΕΥΜΑ, ΨΥΧΗ, AND ΣΑΡΞ IN GREEK WRITERS FROM EPICURUS TO ARIUS DIDYMUS

Before presenting the testimony of the post-Aristotelian witnesses to the use of πνεῦμα, ψυχή, and σάρξ, it will be expedient to examine the views of some of their predecessors by whom they were in all probability largely influenced, and to present in addition to the material bearing upon their use of the words under consideration some further evidence concerning their fundamental philosophical notions.

Anaximenes, who wrote about the middle of the sixth century B.C., declared that just as our soul which is air controls us (or holds us together), so πνεῦμα καὶ ἀήρ encompass the whole world. According to Diogenes Laertius,¹ Anaximenes made air and the infinite (space) the first principle of things. Plutarch and Stobaeus,² commenting in almost identical words on the fact that Anaximenes uses the words πνεῦμα and ἀήρ synonymously, declare that he is in error in ascribing all things to one source, since it is necessary to assume an active cause as well as a substance, just as we must have both silver and a silversmith.

Cicero³ says that Anaximenes made air God. If so, then, since Anaximenes used πνεῦμα and ἀήρ synonymously, we are very near, even at this early period, to an identification of πνεῦμα and God. Anaximenes, however, is a monist and his one substance is material,

¹ Diog. Laert. ii. 3 (Diels, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, I, 22): Οὗτος [Ἀναξίμενης] ἀρχὴν ἀέρα εἶπε καὶ τὸ ἀπειρον.

² Stob. *Ecl.* i. 10. 12 (Diels, *Doxographi Graeci*, p. 278): Ἀναξίμενης Εὐρυστράτου Μιλήσιος ἀρχὴν τῶν ὄντων ἀέρα ἀπεφάνετο, ἐκ γὰρ τούτου πάντα γίνεσθαι καὶ εἰς αὐτὸν πάλιν ἀναλύεσθαι. οἷον ἡ ψυχὴ, φησὶν, ἡ ἡμετέρα ἀήρ οὐσα συγκαταεῖ ἡμᾶς, καὶ ὅλον τὸν κόσμον πνεῦμα καὶ ἀήρ περιέχει. λέγεται δὲ συνωνύμως ἀήρ καὶ πνεῦμα. ἁμαρτάνει δὲ ἐξ ἀπλοῦ καὶ μονοειδούς ἀέρος καὶ πνεύματος δοκῶν συνεστάναι τὰ ζῷα· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἀρχὴν μίαν [ἦ] τὴν ὅλην τῶν ὄντων ὑποστῆναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν αἴτιον χρὴ ὑποτιθέναι· οἷον ἀργυρὸς οὐκ ἀρκεῖ πρὸς τὸ ἐκπιωμα γενέσθαι, ἐὰν μὴ τὸ ποιοῦν ᾖ, τουτέστιν ὁ ἀργυροκόπος.

³ Cicero *De nat. deor.* i. 10. 26: post Anaximenes aëra deum statuit eumque gigni esseque immensum et infinitum, etc.

and Cicero's testimony, unconfirmed by that of any earlier writer, is perhaps an interpretation rather than a quotation. Moreover, from a lexicographical point of view it is important to observe that we have no testimony that Anaximenes used the predicate God of πνεῦμα or πνεῦμα of God. It is the air which Cicero says he called God.¹

Empedocles, writing nearly a century later than Anaximenes, rejected the monistic interpretation of the universe and referred all existence to four "roots," fire, water, earth, and air (ἤερ), the latter of endless height. These are continually uniting and separating again, love being the force that brings them together, and strife or hate that which separates them.² For air he frequently uses the term "aether" (Adam, *Religious Teachers of Greece*, pp. 244 ff.), but not, so far as appears, πνεῦμα. The six elements, fire, water, earth, air, love, and hate, are all eternal, yet also all corporeal. Empedocles believes in God or in gods (he sometimes uses the singular, sometimes the plural); but as he deifies the four material elements, as well as love and hate, it is evident that his belief in God does not significantly modify the general materialism of his view of the world. He does not seem to have employed the word πνεῦμα in reference to the air or to either of the active powers love and hate.

Heraclitus, a contemporary of Empedocles, was, like Anaximenes, a monist, but found the origin of all things in fire, of which all other things are variant forms and to which all return after the Conflagration. All things become what they are according to fate or necessity (Diog. Laert. ix. 7). According to Aristotle (*De an.* i. 405a, 25), Heraclitus also said that the origin of all things is soul (ψυχή), from which it may be inferred that the primitive fire had in itself the principle of intelligence; and with this in turn agrees the doctrine ascribed to him by Diogenes Laertius that all things are full of souls and demons and that no one can possibly find out the limits of the soul (cf. Pfeleiderer, *Philosophie des Heraclit*, pp. 192-98).

¹ Stob. *Ecl.* i. 10. 12 (Diels, *Dox.*, p. 284), says that Xenophanes made earth the first principle of all things, quoting him as follows: ἐκ γῆς γὰρ τὰ πάντα καὶ εἰς γῆν τὰ πάντα τελευτᾷ. But the τὰ πάντα is possibly to be taken with considerable reservation.

² Diels, *Vorsokrat.*, I, 229, B 17.

Anaxagoras, born before Empedocles, but writing a little later (about 450), found the creative power in the universe in νοῦς, and the passive element in an infinite number of original particles or seeds. He thus agreed with Empedocles in rejecting the monistic theory, but presented a simpler and more self-consistent view of things than his. The term πνεῦμα apparently played no part in his theories.¹

Diogenes of Apollonia, a contemporary of Anaxagoras and Empedocles, returned to the monism of Anaximenes, maintaining that the phenomena of birth and interaction of things cannot be explained except on the hypothesis of their ultimate unity.

In my opinion all things are produced from the same source [by change] and are the same. And this is manifest. For of the things that are now in this world earth and air [ἀήρ] and water, and whatever else is visible in the world, if of these any one were different from another, that is, different in its own nature, instead of undergoing numerous transformations and changes while still remaining really the same, they could not be mixed together, nor could one either help or harm another, nor could any plant spring out of the earth, nor could an animal or anything else be born, if these were not so constituted as to be the same. But all these things arising by change from the same [substance] become now one thing, now another, and return again to the same [Diels, *Vorsokrat.*, I, 423, B 2].

This one substance he maintains is intelligent.

For without intelligence such a division of things would not be possible as to have proper measures of all things, of winter and summer, night and day, rain and wind and pleasant weather [Diels, *Vorsokrat.*, I, 424, B 3].

Besides these things, then, are these strong proofs. For men and the other animals, breathing, live by the air [ἀήρ]. And this is to them soul [ψυχή] and intelligence [νόησις], as will be shown clearly in this writing, and if this be taken, they die and intelligence ceases [Diels, *Vorsokrat.*, I, 425, B 4].

And it seems to me that that which has the intelligence is that which is called by men the air [ὁ ἀήρ], and that by it all men are governed and control all things. For to me it seems itself to be God, and to go everywhere and to dispose all things and to be in everything. And there is nothing whatever that does not share in it, and yet nothing that is different from another thing shares in it in the same way as that other, but there are many forms both of the air itself and of its intelligence. For it has many modes of existence, being both warmer and colder, drier and wetter, more stable and with swifter motion, and many other differences there are, and boundless variations of taste and

¹ Diels, *Vorsokrat.*, I, 375-410.

color. But of all animals the soul [$\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$] is the same, air warmer than that outside in which we are, yet far colder than that which is near the sun [Diels, *Vorsokrat.*, I, 425, B 5].

In the view of Diogenes, therefore, the ultimate principle of existence is a substance, air, which we, with our modern definitions of things, would consider material, and which he himself so defined, describing it as warmer or colder, wetter or drier, and comparing it in temperature with the air outside of us; yet, on the other hand, he ascribed to this substance intelligence, omnipresence, and omnipotence. The human soul he regarded as a portion of the total universal substance. His name for it was $\acute{\alpha}\eta\rho$, and apparently he never called it $\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$.

Democritus, a younger contemporary of Diogenes, was an atomist, who affirmed that soul and mind, $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ and $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$, were identical, and consisted of material atoms, resembling the atoms of fire. His doctrine of God is not easy to discover. Cicero says that he called the atoms of mind (*principia mentis*) God, and Stobaeus that he found mind, which is God, in the sphere-shaped fire. Probably, therefore, as Zeller maintains, he meant by God neither a personal being nor a single being at all, but simply the ultimate soul-stuff out of which reason eventually arises.¹

¹ See Adam, *Religious Teachers*, p. 268; Aristotle i. 405a. 9 ff., quoted in Diels, *Vorsokrat.*, II, 35; Cicero *De nat. deor.* i. 43. 120. We should scarcely need to refer to Democritus, but for the passage ascribed to him by Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.* vi. 168, quoted in Diels, *Vorsokrat.*, II, 66: $\kappa\alpha\iota\ \delta\ \Delta\eta\mu\acute{o}\kappa\rho\iota\tau\omicron\varsigma\ \acute{o}\mu\omicron\iota\omega\varsigma\ \pi\omicron\iota\eta\tau\eta\varsigma\ \delta\acute{\epsilon}\ \acute{\alpha}\sigma\sigma\alpha\ \mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \acute{\alpha}\nu\ \gamma\rho\acute{\alpha}\phi\eta\ \mu\epsilon\tau'\ \acute{\epsilon}\nu\theta\omicron\upsilon\sigma\iota\alpha\sigma\mu\omicron\upsilon\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \iota\epsilon\rho\acute{o}\upsilon\ \pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha\tau\omicron\varsigma\ \kappa\alpha\lambda\acute{\alpha}\ \kappa\acute{\alpha}\rho\tau\alpha\ \acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\iota\nu$: "And Democritus likewise says that whatever things a poet writes with inspiration and sacred spirit, are sure to be beautiful." If Clement is not in error in ascribing the words to him, one would have to suppose that Democritus is here employing for the moment language out of harmony with his general scheme of things, and using the word in a popular sense. Even thus, however, the passage would vouch for a use of $\iota\epsilon\rho\acute{o}\nu\ \pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$ in the time of Democritus. But the absence of any other evidence for such a conception or usage in this period and the fact that the language comes to us through a Christian author writing centuries later make another explanation more probable. A comparison of the language which Plutarch quotes from Epicharmus with that which Clement ascribes to him (see p. 19), strongly suggests that Clement and Plutarch are quoting the same passage and that Clement's phraseology is in part a Christianizing paraphrase of Epicharmus. It is not improbable that a similar thing has happened in his quotation from Democritus. In Dio Chrysostom 36. 1 (*Περὶ Ὀμήρου*) occurs the statement: $\text{'Ο μὲν Δημόκριτος περὶ Ὀμήρου φησὶν οὕτως: "Ὀμηρος φύσεως λαχὼν θεαζούσης ἐπέων κόσμον ἐτεκτέηνατο παντοίων· ὥς$

So far, then, as the evidence which we have been able to uncover shows, in the fifth and sixth centuries B.C., before the days of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, the idea had already been advanced that the ultimate source of all things is air, which was conceived on the one side as a material something, yet to which, on the other, was ascribed intelligence and power. By some this was said to be God, and of this the human soul was said to be composed.

On the other hand, it is to be noted that πνεῦμα was also often used in the sense of air, and Xenophanes had said even in the sixth century that the ψυχή was πνεῦμα (pp. 19, 20); yet none of the pre-Socratic writers seems, taking the next step, to have used πνεῦμα for the ultimate basis of things or to have said distinctly that God was πνεῦμα or πνεῦμα God.

Aristotle adopted from the Ionic philosophers the doctrine of the four elements (στοιχεῖα), earth, water, air, and fire, corresponding to the dry and the wet, the cold and the hot. He added, however, a fifth, the aether, which fills celestial spheres.¹ But the elements were not in Aristotle's view sufficient to account for the universe. They, the four at least, are matter, ὕλη, and inert, and constitute the passive element. The active power is God, the Creator, who acts upon matter according to his own plan and for the achievement of his own purpose. It is from Aristotle that the conception of the inertness, deadness of matter, received its chief impulse.

But Aristotle also had much to say concerning πνεῦμα, by which he meant, in general, air (ἀήρ) in motion, or breath. But, as we have seen (p. 22) in one notable passage he says that πνεῦμα is used of the substance, vital and generative (ἐμφυχος καὶ γόνιμος), which is in all plants and animals, and permeates all things. Just how

οὐκ ἐνὸν ἀνεν θεας καὶ δαιμονίας φύσεως οὕτω καλὰ καὶ σοφὰ ἔπη ἐργάσασθαι. It is possible, not to say highly probable, that Dio and Clement (*Strom.* vi. 168) are quoting from the same passage and that Dio, uninfluenced by Christian ideas, reflects the terminology of Democritus more accurately than Clement, and in particular that the words καὶ ἱεροῦ πνεύματος are paraphrastic rather than literal. On the basis of this passage alone it would be unsafe to conclude that the expression ἱερὸν πνεῦμα was used by Democritus or that it was current in his day. The expression θεῶν πνεῦμα in the pseudo-Platonic dialogue, *Axiochus*, will be discussed later.

¹ Arnold, *Roman Stoicism*, p. 60, who, however, cites no evidence from Aristotle.

this statement is to be adjusted to his doctrine that the *ψυχή* is an entelechy, or, as we may very freely translate it, a function, of the body, having no existence apart from it, and, on the other hand, to his doctrine of the four or five elements, is not clear. Remembering the previous use of *ἄήρ* and *πνεῦμα* as synonymous terms, and recalling Plato's apparent distinction between *ἄήρ* and *πνεῦμα*, the latter denoting the former in motion, we might be disposed to think that Aristotle meant by *πνεῦμα* one of the four elements, *ἄήρ*, but *ἄήρ* in a special form or condition. And recalling that Aristotle ascribed soul, *ψυχή*, to plants and animals, as he here does *πνεῦμα*, we should be disposed to think that he would assent to Xenophanes' assertion that the *ψυχή* is *πνεῦμα*, meaning by *πνεῦμα*, however, not mere transitory breath, but vital soul-stuff. Nor in view of the irreconcilable differences in Aristotle's doctrine of the *νοῦς* and the *ψυχή* are these discrepancies in his idea of the *ψυχή* and the *πνεῦμα* too great to be ascribed to him. Yet we must also reckon with the possibility that in speaking of *πνεῦμα*, the universal vital and generative substance, he was describing the doctrine of some contemporary rather than his own. What we clearly know, then, is that in Aristotle's day *πνεῦμα* was used by someone of vital and generative soul-stuff; or perhaps we should say life-stuff, since it is in all plants and animals, a sort of soul-protoplasm.

But it must not be overlooked that Aristotle speaks of this *πνεῦμα* as permeating all things. If this language be taken at its face value, then he or the writers whose doctrine he is here reporting made *πνεῦμα*—vital and generative—the informing principle of all things. This is pan-pneumatism, though not, perhaps, pantheism. For neither do those whom Aristotle is quoting, if quoting he is, nor Aristotle himself say either that *πνεῦμα* is God or that God is *πνεῦμα*.

With this rapid survey of pre-Aristotelian theories of the ultimate substance of things before us, and recalling the exhibit of the usage in classical writers of *πνεῦμα*, *ψυχή*, and *σάρξ* given in chapter i, we may proceed to a general classification of the usage of these words in the post-Aristotelian Greek writers to the beginning of the first century A.D.

I. ΠΝΕΥΜΑ

1. Wind, whether a gentle breeze or blast.

Polyb. *Hist.* i. 44. 4: μὴ σὺν τοῖς πολεμίοις ὑπὸ τῆς βίας τοῦ πνεύματος συγκατενέχθωσιν.

Lest they should be carried along with the enemy by the force of the wind.

See also Epicurus² *Epist.* ii. 100 (occurring several times), 105, 106, 115; Polyb. *Hist.* i. 48. 5, 8; 60. 6; x. 10. 4; Dion. Hal. *Antiq.* i. 15, 52, 72.

2. Air, tenuity rather than motion being the chief characteristic thought of.

Polyb. *Hist.* xxiv. 8 d: Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ κομίσαντες αὐτὸν εἰς τὸν καλούμενον θησαυρόν, οἴκημα κατάγειον οὔτε πνεῦμα λαμβάνον οὔτε φῶς ἔξωθεν, οὔτε θύρας ἔχον . . . ἐνταῦθα κατέθεντο.

Bringing him into the so-called treasury, which was a subterranean chamber which received neither air nor light from without and which had no doors . . . there they set him down. [See also Epicur. *Epist.* i. 63, cited below under Epicurus.]

Kindred with this sense, being rather an extension of application than a change of meaning, is the use of πνεῦμα inclusively to denote gas, air, aether in pseudo-Hippocrates, *Περὶ Φυσῶν* (ed. Littré, Vol. VI, p. 94), which perhaps belongs to this period: Πνεύματα δὲ τὰ μὲν ἐν τοῖσι σώμασι φύσαι καλέονται, τὰ δὲ ἔξω τῶν σωμάτων ἀήρ. . . . ἅπαν γὰρ τὸ μεταξὺ γῆς τε καὶ οὐρανοῦ πνεύματος ἔμπλεόν ἐστιν. . . . Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡλίου τε καὶ σελήνης καὶ ἀστρων ὁδὸς διὰ τοῦ πνεύματός ἐστιν.

3. In a distinctly vital sense, signifying breath of life (loss of which is death), or life, or, even more generally, the primeval principle or basis of life, soul-stuff.

Polyb. *Hist.* xiii. 1a. 2: ἄτοπον γὰρ εἶναι πολεμοῦντας μὲν καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα προΐσθαι χάριν τῆς τῶν τέκνων ἀσφαλείας, βουλευομένους δὲ μηδὲνα ποιέισθαι λόγον τοῦ μετὰ ταῦτα χρόνου.

He said it was absurd to wage war and to yield up their very life-breath for the sake of their children's safety, and yet when taking counsel to take no account of the future.

² Usener, *Epicurea*, pp. 44 ff.

On a similar passage in pseudo-Demos. *Declam. fun.*, see under *ψυχή*, 1, below. Cf. also Plut. *De primo frig.* 2. 5: οἱ δὲ Στωικοὶ καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα λέγουσιν ἐν τοῖς σώμασι τῶν βρεφῶν τῇ περιψύξει στομοῦσθαι, καὶ μεταβάλλον ἐκ φύσεως γίνεσθαι *ψυχήν* (cited in Zeller, *Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics*, p. 213).

By metonymy, energy, vigor, forcefulness.

Dion. Hal. (Usener et Radermacher, *Dionysii Hal. Opuscula, Dem.* 20): ἄψυχός ἐστιν ἡ διάλεκτος αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐ παθητικὴ πνεύματος τε, οὗ μάλιστα δεῖ τοῖς ἐναγωνίοις λόγοις, ἐλαχίστην ἔχουσα μοῖραν.

Lifeless is his speech and both unimpassioned and almost devoid of energy, which is pre-eminently necessary to forensic discourse.

The parallelism of the two expressions *ἄψυχος* and *πνεύματος* *ἐλαχίστην ἔχουσα μοῖραν* seems to imply that in the latter part of the first century B.C. *ψυχή* and *πνεῦμα*, both having the meaning life, could both be used by metonymy for energy (of speech). It does not follow, nor is there evidence to show that *πνεῦμα* was at this time used as an individualizing name for the human soul.

4. Closely related to its use to denote "soul-stuff," but apparently associated also with the meaning "air," is the use of *πνεῦμα* in reference to the medium or bearer of psychic energy and the energizing power of the organs of sense. See Galen, p. 251 M (p. 101 below), and Diog. Laert. vii. 1. 85 (p. 102 below); Plut. *Epil.* iv. 8.

5. A demon.

Dion. Hal. *Antiq.* i. 31: τὰς μὲν γὰρ ὥδ' αὖς καλοῦσι Ῥωμαῖοι κάρμενα, τὴν δὲ γυναῖκα ταύτην ὁμολογοῦσι δαιμονίῳ πνεύματι κατὰσχετον γενομένην τὰ μέλλοντα συμβαίνειν τῷ πλήθει δι' ὥδης προλέγειν.

The Romans call the odes *carmina*, and confess that this woman being possessed by a demonic spirit foretells to the multitudes by an ode the things that are to happen.

This usage is attested by the LXX (I Sam. 16: 23; I Kings 22: 21, etc.) for an earlier period than Dion. Hal., and it is quite possible that it was current among non-Jewish as well as among Jewish Greek writers; but the example quoted above is the earliest instance that the present investigation has discovered in non-Jewish Greek literature.

II. ΨΥΧΗ

1. Life, loss of which is death.

Polyb. *Hist.* v. 34. 10: ὁ δὲ προειρημένος βασιλεὺς ὀλιγώρως ἕκαστα τούτων χειρίζων διὰ τοὺς ἀπρεπεῖς ἔρωτας καὶ τὰς ἀλόγους καὶ συνεχεῖς μέθας, εἰκότως ἐν πάννυ βραχεὶ χρόνῳ καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἅμα καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐπιβούλους εὗρε καὶ πλείους.

The afore-mentioned king, managing each of these neglectfully on account of indecent amours and senseless and continual debauches, naturally found in a very short time many plots both against his life and against his throne.

See also Tebt. Pap. i, 56. 11.

By a double metonymy *ψυχή* is used to denote the source of the joy of life, or of what is good in life.

Ps.-Dem.¹ *Declam. fun.* 24: δοκεῖ δὲ μοί τις ἂν εἰπὼν ὡς ἡ τῶνδε τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀρετὴ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἦν ψυχὴ τάληθές εἰπεῖν. ἅμα γὰρ τά τε τούτων πνεύματ' ἀπῆλλάγη τῶν οἰκείων σωμάτων, καὶ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀξίωμ' ἀνῆρηται.

It seems to me, indeed, that if one should say that the valor of such men was the soul of Greece one would speak truly, for at the same time that the breaths of these men departed from their bodies the reputation of Greece was destroyed.

2. A shade, the soul of man existing after death or departing from the body in death.

Ar. Did. *Fr. phys.* 39 (cf. Eus. *P.E.* xv. 20, Diels, *Dox.*, p. 471): Εἶναι δὲ ψυχὴν ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ φασίν, ὃ καλοῦσιν αἰθέρα καὶ ἀέρα κύκλῳ περὶ τὴν γῆν καὶ θάλασσαν καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἀναθυμιάσεις· τὰς δὲ λοιπὰς ψυχὰς προσπεφυκέναι ταύτῃ, ὅσαι τε ἐν ζώοις εἰσὶ καὶ ὅσαι ἐν τῷ περιέχοντι· διαμένειν γὰρ ἐκεῖ τὰς τῶν ἀποθανόντων ψυχὰς. ἔνιοι δὲ τὴν μὲν τοῦ ὅλου αἰδίων τὰς δὲ λοιπὰς συμμίγνυσθαι ἐπὶ τελευτῇ εἰς ἐκείνην. ἔχειν δὲ πᾶσαν ψυχὴν ἡγεμονικόν τι ἐν αὐτῇ, ὃ δὴ ζωὴ καὶ αἴσθησις ἐστι καὶ ὁρμή.

They say there is a soul in the universe, which [universe] they call aether and air in a circle² round about the earth and the sea, and there are exhalations from these. And the other [individual] souls cling to this [universal soul], both such as are in living creatures and such as are in the surrounding region. For there the souls of the dead live on. Some hold that the soul of the universe is eternal and that the others are finally united to it. And every soul they hold, has a ruling part in itself, which is life and perception and impulse.

¹ *Scrip. Gr. Bib.*

² The text is corrupt here.

Cf. also Diog. Laert. vii. 79.

3. Soul, as a constituent element of man's nature; the human mind in the larger sense of the word as the seat of emotion, will, thought, and character. Sometimes applied with similar force to living animals in general, and even to the universe.

a) Applied to men.

Epicur. *Epist.* fr. 200: ἀφυσιολόγητον μηδὲν ἡγοῦ βρώσεως τῆς σαρκὸς βοᾶν τὴν ψυχὴν. σαρκὸς δὲ φωνή· μὴ πεινῆν, μὴ διψῆν, μὴ ῥιγοῦν. καὶ ταῦτα τῇ ψυχῇ χαλεπὸν μὲν κωλῦσαι, ἐπισφαλὲς δὲ παρακοῦσαι τῆς παραγγειλάσης φύσεως αὐτῇ διὰ τῆς προσφνοῦς αὐτῇ αὐταρκείας καθ' ἡμέραν.

Regard it as nothing inexplicable that the soul cries out when the flesh cries. And the voice of the flesh is not to be hungry, not to be thirsty, not to be cold. And it is difficult for the soul to prevent these things [i.e., hunger, thirst, and cold], and it is perilous for it day after day to disregard the commands of nature through the exercise of that autonomy which is inherent in it [the soul].

Note the intimate relation of soul and flesh (= body), but also the autonomy ascribed to the soul.

Theocr. xvi. 24: ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ψυχᾶ, τὸ δὲ καὶ τιμὴ δοῦναι ἀόζων.

But a part [of your money] to your own desire and a part to one of the servants give.

Polyb. *Hist.* iii. 81. 3: οὕτω χρή καὶ τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῶν ὅλων προεστώτας σκοπεῖν, οὐχ ὅπου τι τοῦ σώματος γυμνόν, ἀλλὰ ποῦ τῆς ψυχῆς εὐχέριωτόν τι παραφαίνεται τοῦ τῶν ἐναντίων ἡγεμόνος.

It behooves commanders to notice, not where some part of the body is exposed, but where some part of the mind of the leader of the opposing forces appears easy to overcome.

Polyb. *Hist.* iii. 87. 3: ἀνεκτέσαστο δὲ τὰ τε σώματα καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν ἀνδρῶν.

He revived both the bodies and the souls of the men.

Polyb. *Hist.* xx. 4. 7: ἀλλ' ὁρμήσαντες πρὸς εὐωχίαν καὶ μέθας, οὐ μόνον τοῖς σώμασιν ἐξελύθησαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς.

But being eager for feasting and carousals they became enfeebled not only in body but also in mind.

See also Epicur. *Phys.* 314; *Sent.* 69, 81 (Wotke, *Wiener Studien*, X); *Epist.* iii. 122, 128 (*passim*), 132 (*bis*); *Ethica* 417,

425 (Usener, pp. 59, 62, 161); Theocr. viii. 35; Polyb. *Hist.* i. 15. 7; 32. 8; 35. 5; 75. 3; 81. 6, 7; 87. 1; ii. 20. 5; 23. 7; 30. 7; 53. 3; iii. 9. 7; 12. 5; 63. 1; 81. 3; 87. 3; 90. 4; iv. 21. 4; 54. 3; vi. 24. 9; vii. 16. 4; viii. 5. 3; 9. 7; ix. 22. 1, 6; x. 7. 2; 14. 12; 19. 5; 22. 6; xii. 12b. 2; 23. 2, 5; xiii. 2. 1, 2; 3. 3; 5. 5; xiv. 6. 8; 8. 8; xv. 4. 12; 16. 4; xvi. 5. 7; xx. 4. 6; 7. 4; 10. 9; xxii. 8. 8; xxv. 9. 2; xxvi. 3. 11; xxvii. 10. 2; xxviii. 17a. 2; xxix. 6. 9, 13, 14, 15; *Fr. Gram.* 91. Cf. Plut. *Non posse suav.* 3, p. 1088 (Usener, p. 281); Stob. *Ecl.* iii. 6. 57 (Usener, p. 284); Dion. Hal. i. 1. 13, 33; 38. 34; ii. 20. 45; 28. 47; 68. 50; iii. 12. 28; 13. 27; 19. 34; 21. 44; 21. 8 (p. 145); Tebt. Pap. i. 1. 13.

b) Soul is ascribed to the lower animals.

Ar. Did. *Fr. phys.* 39 (cited in Eus. *P.E.* xv. 20; see Diels, *Dox.*, p. 471): τὰς δὲ τῶν ἀφρόνων καὶ ἀλόγων ζώων ψυχὰς συναπόλλυσθαι τοῖς σώμασιν.

But the souls of the senseless and irrational animals perish with their bodies.

c) Soul is also ascribed to the universe. See Ar. Did. *Fr. phys.* 39, cited under 2 above.

4. By metonymy, the vital or conscious element in man standing for the man himself, ψυχή is used with the meaning "person."

Polyb. *Hist.* vi. 48. 4: ἐκατέρων δὲ τούτων ὁμοῦ συνδραμόντων εἰς μίαν ψυχὴν ἢ πόλιν.

Each of these [virtues] being combined in one person or one city.

So also perhaps Epicurus *Eth.* 488 (Usener, p. 306); Dion. Hal. *Antiq.* iii. 30.

III. ΣΑΡΞ

1. The soft muscular portion of the body. Instances doubtless occurred in this period, though the present study has not discovered one.

2. By synecdoche σάρξ (also in the plural) denotes the body, or is qualitatively applied to any part of the body, without distinction of flesh, skin, and bones.

Epicur. *Sent.* iv: οὐ χρονίζει τὸ ἀλγοῦν συνεχῶς ἐν τῇ σαρκί, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἄκρον τὸν ἐλάχιστον χρόνον παρέστι, τὸ δὲ μόνον ὑπερτείνειν

τὸ ἡδόμενον κατὰ σάρκα οὐ πολλὰς ἡμέρας συμβαίνει. αἱ δὲ πολυχρόνιοι τῶν ἀρρωστιῶν πλεονάζον ἔχουσι τὸ ἡδόμενον ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ ἢ περ τὸ ἀλγοῦν.

Pain does not last continuously in the flesh; but its climax continues a very short time, and that degree which only just outweighs the pleasure in the flesh exists not many days, and in long-continued illnesses the pleasure is more than the pain.

See also Epicur. *Sent.* xviii, xx (*bis*);¹ li;² *Eth.* 408.

With this general exhibit of the usage of this period before us, we may now pass to consider the views of particular schools of thought.

IV. EPICURUS AND THE EPICUREANS

Epicurus was born in 341 B.C., and entered upon his work as a teacher of philosophy while Aristotle was still living. But he was far from being a disciple of Aristotle, or of his great predecessors, Socrates and Plato. In the fundamental features of his philosophy he was rather a follower of Democritus.

The following passages will suffice to show those elements of his thought with which we are most concerned:

Epirist. i. 39-41: ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἐστὶ <σώματα καὶ τόπος>. σώματα μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἔστιν, αὕτη ἡ αἴσθησις ἐπὶ πάντων μαρτυρεῖ, καθ' ἣν ἀναγκαῖον τὸ ἄδηλον τῷ λογισμῷ τεκμαίρεσθαι, ὥσπερ προεῖπον. τόπος δὲ εἰ μὴ ἦν, ὃν κενὸν καὶ χώραν καὶ ἀναφῇ φύσιν ὀνομάζομεν, οὐκ ἂν εἶχε τὰ σώματα ὅπου ἦν οὐδὲ δι' οὗ ἐκινεῖτο, καθάπερ φαίνεται κινούμενα. παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐθὲν οὐδ' ἐπινοηθῆναι δύναται οὔτε περιληπτικῶς οὔτε ἀναλόγως τοῖς περιληπτοῖς, ὅσα καθ' ὅλας φύσεις λαμβάνομεν καὶ μὴ ὡς τὰ τούτων συμπτώματα ἢ συμβεβηκότα λέγομεν. καὶ μὴν καὶ τῶν σωμάτων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ συγκρίσεις, τὰ δ' ἐξ ὧν αἱ συγκρίσεις πεποίηται· ταῦτα δὲ ἐστὶν ἄτομα καὶ ἀμετάβλητα, εἴπερ μὴ μέλλει πάντα εἰς τὸ μὴ ὂν φθαρῆσθαι ἀλλ' ἰσχύειν τι ὑπομένειν ἐν τοῖς διαλύσεσι τῶν συγκρίσεων, πλήρη τὴν φύσιν ὄντα, οὐκ ἔχοντα ὅπῃ ἢ ὅπως διαλυθήσεται. ὥστε τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀτόμους ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι σωμάτων φύσεις [Usener, p. 6].

But the universe consists of bodies and place. For that it is bodies common-sense itself testifies, and by this it is necessary that whatever is obscure should be attested to the reason, as I have said before. But if there were no space, which we call also empty, and place and intangible existence, bodies

¹ Usener, *Epicurea*, p. 75.

² Wotke, *Wiener Studien*, X.

would not have where to be, or through which to move, whereas it is evident that they do move. And aside from these nothing can be known either by apprehension or by analogy with things that can be apprehended. We are speaking of things that we receive according to their whole natures and not of the essential attributes or accidental qualities of these. And indeed of the bodies, some are compounds and some are the things of which the compounds are made. And the latter are atoms and are unchangeable, if so be all things are not to be turned by destruction into non-existence but have strength to continue to be something in the dissolution of the compounds, being full in respect to their nature, there being no means or method by which they can be dissolved. So that the first beginnings must be indivisible, corporeal entities.¹

Epist. i. 63-65: Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα δεῖ συνορᾶν ἀναφέροντα ἐπὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὰ πάθη (οὕτω γὰρ ἡ βεβαιότης πίστις ἔσται), ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ σῶμά ἐστι λεπτομερὲς παρ' ὅλον τὸ ἄθροισμα παρεσπαρμένον, προσεμφερέστατον δὲ πνεύματι θερμοῦ τινα κράσιν ἔχοντι καὶ πῇ μὲν τούτῳ προσεμφερές, πῇ δὲ τούτῳ, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ [read: δέ του] μέρους πολλὴν παραλλαγὴν εἰληφὸς τῇ λεπτομερείᾳ καὶ αὐτῶν τούτων, συμπαθὲς δὲ τούτῳ μᾶλλον καὶ τῷ λοιπῷ ἄθροίσματι· τοῦτο δὲ πᾶν αἱ δυνάμεις τῆς ψυχῆς διήγον καὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ αἱ εὐκίνησιαι καὶ αἱ διανοήσεις καὶ ὧν στερόμενοι θνήσκομεν. καὶ μὴν καὶ ὅτι ἔχει ἡ ψυχὴ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τὴν πλείστην αἰτίαν, δεῖ κατέχειν· οὐ μὴν εἰλήφει ἂν ταύτην, εἰ μὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ λοιποῦ ἄθροισματος ἐστεγάζεται πως. τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἄθροισμα παρασκευάσαν ἐκείνη τὴν αἰτίαν ταύτην μετέληφε καὶ αὐτὸ τοιοῦτου συμπτώματος παρ' ἐκείνης, οὐ μέντοι πάντων ὧν ἐκείνη κέκετται· διὸ ἀπαλλαγείσης τῆς ψυχῆς οὐκ ἔχει τὴν αἴσθησιν. οὐ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ταύτην ἐκέκτητο τὴν δύναμιν, ἀλλ' ἕτερον ἅμα συγγεγεννημένον αὐτῷ παρεσκεύαζεν, ὃ διὰ τῆς συντελεσθείσης περὶ αὐτὸ δυνάμεως κατὰ τὴν κίνησιν σύμπτωμα αἰσθητικὸν εὐθὺς ἀποτελοῦν ἑαυτῷ ἀπεδίδου κατὰ τὴν ὁμούρησιν καὶ συμπάθειαν καὶ ἐκείνῳ, καθά περ εἶπον. διὸ δὴ καὶ ἐνυπάρχουσα ἡ ψυχὴ οὐδέποτε ἄλλου τινὸς μέρους ἀπηλλαγμένου ἀναισθητήσεται· ἀλλ' ἂν αὖ καὶ ταύτης ξυναπόληται τοῦ στεγάζοντος λυθέντος εἰ θ' ὅλου εἰ τε καὶ μέρους τινός, ἕαν περ διαμένη ἔξει τὴν αἴσθησιν· [Usener, p. 19].

And it is necessary after these things to take a comprehensive view of things that refer to the sensations and the feelings (for thus will the firmest confidence arise), because the soul is a body composed of fine particles, scattered through the whole organism, most like to air [πνεύματι], having a certain mixture of heat, in some ways resembling this and in some ways that, and in

¹ Cf. Hicks, *Stoics and Epicureans*, p. 220.

one part endowed with extreme mobility by reason of the fineness of the particles of which it is composed, and responsive especially to this part, but also to the remainder of the organism. And the powers of the soul pervade all this organism and so also do the feelings and the emotions and the thoughts, and all those things being deprived of which we die. And that it is the soul that chiefly has the power of sensation, it is necessary also to hold. Yet it would not have obtained this power if it had not been somehow protected by the remainder of the organism. But the remainder of the organism having given to it [the soul] this power received also itself from it [the soul] a share of such property, yet not of all of which it [the soul] is possessed. Therefore when the soul departs the organism has no power of sensation. For it did not itself possess the power in itself, but another born with it imparted it to it, for this other [the soul] through the power that is generated in its environment immediately producing a capacity for sensation by motion, imparted it also to the other, as was possible because of their coterminousness and sympathy, as I have said. Therefore while the soul exists it will never cease to be sensitive, because some other part is taken away. But whatever of it perishes along with the destruction of that which covers it, whether it be the whole or some part that is destroyed, if it but remain it will have the power of sensation.¹

Plut. *Epit.* i. 3 (Diels, *Dox.*, p. 285): 'Ἐπίκουρος ἀρχὰς εἶναι τῶν ὄντων σώματα λόγῳ θεωρητά, ἀμέτοχα κενού, ἀγένητα, ἀδι-ἀφθαρτα, [τὰ] οὔτε θραυσθῆναι δυνάμενα οὔτε ἀλλοιωθῆναι.

Epicurus said that the principles of things are bodies perceptible to reason non-spatial, unoriginated, indestructible, incapable either of being broken down or of being altered.

Hippolyt. *Phil.* 22 (Diels, *Dox.*, p. 571): 'Ἐπίκουρος δὲ σχεδὸν ἐναντίαν πᾶσι δόξαν ἔθετο. ἀρχὰς μὲν τῶν ὅλων ὑπέθετο ἀτόμους καὶ κενόν, κενὸν μὲν οἷον τόπον τῶν ἐσομένων, ἀτόμους δὲ τὴν ὕλην, ἐξ ἧς τὰ πάντα. ἐκ δὲ τῶν ἀτόμων συνελθουσῶν γενέσθαι καὶ τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς πάντα καὶ ζῶα καὶ ἄλλα, ὥς μηδὲν μῆτε συνεστάναι, εἰ μὴ ἐκ τῶν ἀτόμων εἶη. . . . τὰς δὲ ψυχὰς τῶν ἀνθρώπων λύεσθαι ἅμα τοῖς σώμασιν, ὥσπερ καὶ συγγενᾶσθαι αὐτοῖς τίθεται. αἶμα γὰρ αὐτὰς εἶναι, οὐ ἐξελθόντος ἢ τραπέντος ἀπόλλυσθαι ὅλον τὸν ἄνθρωπον.

Epicurus, however, lays down an opinion opposed to nearly all others. He assumes the principles of all things to be atoms and space; space is the place of things that are to exist, and atoms are the matter from which all things [are made]. And from the concurrence of the atoms come into existence

¹ Cf. Hicks, *Stoics and Epicureans*, p. 264.

both God and the principles, and all the things in them, both living and otherwise, so that nothing either comes into existence or continues to exist unless it be from the atoms. . . . And the souls of men perish along with their bodies just as, he holds, they were also born with them. For they are themselves blood, which if it departs or is changed the whole man is destroyed.

These passages bring out the central elements of Epicurus' system of thought. The ultimate realities of existence are atoms, space, and motion. Bodies are either these atoms, themselves unchangeable and indestructible, or the compounds of these. Other than bodies and space there are no existences. And the only incorporeal thing is space.

Epicurus makes frequent mention of the *ψυχή*, often in association with, and in distinction from, *σῶμα*; *ψυχή* and *σῶμα* together constituting man. But *ψυχή* is no exception to the general principle that everything but space is corporeal; for it also is a body composed of fine particles, dispersed all over the organism, most closely resembling wind (or air) having a certain admixture of heat.¹ Those, therefore, that say that the soul is incorporeal talk foolishly.² What he meant by the predicate *σῶμα* is apparently expressed with essential correctness in the statement of Plutarch that Epicurus ascribed to body not only size and shape, as Democritus did, but also weight.³ According to Aëtius, the Epicureans did not ascribe souls to the plants.⁴

Πνεῦμα Epicurus seems commonly to have used in the sense of "air," "breath," or "wind."⁵ Nor does he use the term in any specifically different sense when he says that the soul resembles breath (or wind) with a certain admixture of heat (*πνεύματι*

¹ Cf. also Aëtius iv. 4. 6, p. 390 D (Plut. *Epist.* iv. 4. 3), cited by Usener, p. 217: 'Ἐπίκουρος διμερῇ τὴν ψυχὴν, τὸ μὲν λογικὸν ἔχουσαν ἐν τῷ θώρακι καθιδρυμένον, τὸ δὲ δλογον καθ' ὅλην τὴν σύγκρισιν τοῦ σώματος διεσπαρμένον.

² *Epist.* i. 67.

³ Usener, p. 196, ll. 1 ff.; cf. *Epist.* i. 54. where Epicurus says expressly that the atoms have none of the qualities of visible things except shape and weight and size. See also *Gram. Byz.*, cited by Usener, p. 222.

⁴ Plut., cited by Usener, p. 216: οἱ Στωικοὶ δὲ καὶ Ἐπικούρειοι οὐκ ἔμψυχα (τὰ φυτὰ). τινὰ γὰρ ψυχῆς ὀρμητικῆς εἶναι καὶ ἐπιθυμητικῆς, τινὰ δὲ καὶ λογικῆς· τὰ δὲ φυτὰ αὐτομάτως πως κινεῖσθαι, οὐ διὰ ψυχῆς. But the latter part of the statement is probably Stoic rather than Epicurean.

⁵ Usener, pp. 44-49, *passim*.

θερμοῦ τινα κράσιν ἔχοντι),¹ or when, according to Aëtius, quoted by Plutarch and Stobaeus,² he says that "the soul is a mixture of four things, one that is of fire-like quality, and one air-like, and one wind-like (πνευματικός), and the fourth a certain unnamable something, in which is the power of sensation, and of these four the πνεῦμα produces motion, and the ἀήρ quiet, and the θερμόν the apparent heat of the body, and the unnamable element, the power of sensation that is in us, for in none of the unnamed elements is there sensation."³ By its mention of the fourth unnamed element in which is contained the power of perception, this statement might seem at first sight to ascribe to the soul an element of immateriality. But the unequivocal and repeated assertion that nothing except space is incorporeal and that all bodies are atoms or composed of atoms compels the conclusion that even the fourth element is corporeal, though, no doubt, of the finest and most impalpable matter. And this in turn emphasizes the materiality of the element πνεῦμα, for while to the unnamed element, itself corporeal, is ascribed perception, to the πνεῦμα motion only is imputed.

The soul, composed of the most impalpable elements, is held together by the coarser elements that make up the body, and at death perishes as completely as the body, indeed, by its nature is more quickly dissipated.

Σῶμα is, as indicated above, used in a broader and a narrower sense. As a general philosophic term it signifies that which has extension and weight, and is applicable as a predicate to all existences except space. See Epic. *Epist.* i. 39-41, in Usener, pp. 6 f.; Hicks, p. 220; also *Epist.* i. 68, in Usener, p. 22. In the narrower sense it is a complementary term to ψυχή, denoting the tangible and visible element of man. See *Epist.* iii. 127-31, in Usener, pp. 62 ff.; Hicks, p. 170.

¹ Usener, p. 19, ll. 18 f.

² Usener, p. 218, ll. 20 ff.; Stob. *Ecl.* i. 49. 1.

³ Brieger, *Epicurs Lehre von der Seele*, contends (pp. 9 ff.) that Epicurus' fourth element was "Geist." But he seems to mean by this only that to this element Epicurus ascribes the attributes of "spirit." He adduces, at any rate, no linguistic evidence that Epicurus called the fourth element πνεῦμα. In fact, as shown above, Epicurus expressly distinguished the fourth element, which furnishes the power of sensation, from the πνεῦμα.

Σάρξ is with Epicurus most commonly a synonym for σῶμα in the narrower sense, viz., as complementary to the ψυχή; though for some reason he seemed to prefer to use σάρξ with διάνοια and σῶμα with ψυχή.¹ The σάρξ has no ethical significance; for, in the first place, the line between good and bad runs, not between the σάρξ and the ψυχή, but across the experiences of both, and between pain and pleasure; and secondly, this distinction itself is not ethical but hedonistic. It is true that Epicurus assigned a higher value to the pleasures of the mind than to those of the body,² but this was not an antithesis but a gradation, and even thus not of things ethical but of pleasures. If the usage of Epicurus contributed in any way to the development of an ethical sense of the word σάρξ, it must have been, not because he himself or his followers made σάρξ the root of evil, but in part because he, first apparently of Greek writers, used it as a familiar substitute for σῶμα, and in part because his opponents, recoiling from his hedonism and ascribing to him not wholly unjustly the doctrine that ultimately all pleasure is a thing of the flesh, recoiled also from this term, flesh, as an evil thing.

Ψυχή differs therefore from σάρξ and σῶμα in two respects. First, as in Greek writers generally, σῶμα and σάρξ are phenomenal terms, ψυχή primarily a functional term. The σῶμα is a visible, tangible, ponderable entity. The ψυχή is the name, inherited by Epicurus from his predecessors and more or less foreign to his philosophy, but too convenient to be altogether dispensed with, for that in man by virtue of which he feels, perceives, acts. It is true that by ascribing to the body also feeling, and by making the ψυχή also corporeal, the distinction between ψυχή and σῶμα is made less sharp than in previous writers. Yet it remains that ψυχή carries with itself, as a part of its definition, the power of perception—the affirmation of corporeality not being reached by analysis of the meaning of the word, but affirmed as a dogma by the Epicureans—while, on the other hand, σῶμα by definition has size, shape, and weight, and the ascription of psychical functions to it is a synthetic, not an analytic, judgment. The two terms differ,

¹ *Sent.* iv, xviii, xx, Usener, pp. 72 ff.; Hicks, pp. 185 ff.

² See especially *Sent.* xx.

in the second place, in that, while the $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$ is $\sigma\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha$, in the sense that it is composed of atoms, and has the essential qualities of a $\sigma\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha$, yet it is composed of finer particles than those that compose the $\sigma\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha$ in the narrower sense, i.e., the $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\acute{\xi}$.

We find no trace in Epicurus of $\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$ as a predicate of God, though such an affirmation would really have been less inconsistent with the fundamentals of his philosophy than his assertion that the gods are imperishable. For while as an atomist he might have found room for gods composed of pneumatic atoms, he could not consistently explain why they should not, like men, eventually perish by dissolution.

Among the influential followers of Epicurus was Metrodorus (330-277 B.C.). He was perhaps even more unequivocal than Epicurus in his assertions that the seat of pleasure was in the flesh, and perhaps used $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\acute{\xi}$ as the synonym of $\sigma\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha$ more freely. But the quotations which we have from his writings are so brief as to indicate with certainty no more than that he was in essential agreement in doctrine and use of words with Epicurus. Thus while Plutarch (*Non posse suav.* 4, 6, pp. 1089 D, 1090 f.) ascribes to Epicurus the doctrine that the healthy condition of the flesh ($\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\acute{\xi}$) and the firm expectation of this give the highest and surest joy to those who are able to reason, Clement of Alexandria (*Strom.* ii. 131) imputes to Metrodorus the question: What good of the soul ($\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$) is there other than a healthy condition of the flesh and the firm expectation of it? But Plutarch also says (*Adv. Colot.* 30, p. 1125 B) that Metrodorus says that all the good and wise and excellent devices of the soul ($\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$) exist for the sake of the pleasure that is according to the flesh ($\tau\eta\varsigma \kappa\alpha\tau\grave{\alpha} \sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\kappa\alpha \eta\delta\omicron\nu\eta\varsigma \acute{\epsilon}\nu\epsilon\kappa\alpha$) and the hope of the same, and every work is vain which does not contribute to this end.

In another passage (*Non posse suav.* 3, p. 1087 D) Plutarch ascribes the same words to Metrodorus but substitutes belly ($\gamma\alpha\sigma\tau\acute{\eta}\rho$) for flesh ($\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\acute{\xi}$). These differences warn us not too confidently to deduce from later writers exact conclusions as to the vocabulary and verbal usage of either Epicurus or Metrodorus. See Koerte, "Metrodori Epicurei Fragmenta," in *Jahrbücher für Philologie*, Suppl. Band 17 (Leipzig, 1890), pp. 531-97; especially pp. 540 ff.

That the Epicureans did not differ widely among themselves in usage may be inferred with some degree of confidence from the fact that in the first century B.C. Lucretius is still in essential agreement with his master Epicurus. His chief peculiarity is that he introduces a distinction between *animus* and *anima*, covering by these terms what Epicurus expressed by $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$ alone. The following extracts from the third book of his great poem will sufficiently illustrate his view (*De rerum natura* iii):

Now I say that mind [*animus*] and soul [*anima*] are held in union one with the other, and form of themselves a single nature, but that the head, as it were, and lord in the whole body is the reason [*consilium*], which we call mind [*animus*] or understanding [*mens*], and it is firmly seated in the middle region of the breast. For here it is that fear and terror throb, around these parts are soothing joys; here then is the understanding [*mens*] and the mind [*animus*]. The rest of the soul [*anima*], spread abroad throughout the body, obeys and is moved at the will and inclination of the understanding [*mens*]. . . .

This same reasoning shows that the nature of mind and soul is bodily. For when it is seen to push on the limbs, to pluck the body from sleep, to change the countenance, and to guide and turn the whole man—none of which things we see can come to pass without touch, nor touch in its turn without body—must we not allow that mind and soul are formed of bodily nature? Moreover, you see that our mind suffers along with the body, and shares its feelings together in the body. If the shuddering shock of a weapon, driven within and laying bare bones and sinews, does not reach the life, yet faintness follows, and a pleasant swooning to the ground, and a turmoil of mind which comes to pass on the ground, and from time to time, as it were, a hesitating will to rise. Therefore it must needs be that the nature of the mind is bodily, since it is distressed by the blow of bodily weapons.

Now of what kind of body this mind is, and of what parts it is formed, I will go on to give account to you in my discourse. First of all I say that it is very fine in texture, and is made and formed of very tiny particles. That this is so, if you give attention, you may be able to learn from this. Nothing is seen to come to pass so swiftly as what the mind pictures to itself coming to pass and starts to do itself. Therefore the mind bestirs itself more quickly than any of the things whose nature is manifest for all to see. But because it is so very nimble, it is bound to be formed of exceeding round and exceeding tiny seeds, so that its particles may be able to move when smitten by a little impulse. For so water moves and oscillates at the slightest impulse, seeing it is formed of little particles, quick to roll. . . .

This fact, too, declares the nature of the mind, of how thin a texture it is formed, and in how small a place it might be contained, could it be gathered in a mass; that as soon as the unruffled peace of death has laid hold on a man,

and the nature of mind and soul has passed away, you could discern nothing there, that sight or weight can test, stolen from the entire body; death preserves all save the feeling of life, and some warm heat. And so it must needs be that the whole soul is made of very tiny seeds, and is linked on throughout veins, flesh, and sinews; inasmuch as, when it is all already gone from the whole body, yet the outer contour of the limbs is preserved unbroken, nor is a jot of weight wanting. . . .

Nevertheless we must not think that this nature is simple. For it is a certain thin breath that deserts the dying, mingled with heat, and heat moreover draws air with it; nor indeed is there any heat that has not air too mixed with it. For because its nature is rare, it must needs be that many first-beginnings of air move about in it. Already then we have found the nature of the soul to be triple; and yet all these things are not enough to create sensation, since the mind does not admit that any of these can create the motions that bring sensation [or the thoughts of the mind]. It must needs be then that some fourth nature, too, be added to these. But it is altogether without name; than it there exists nothing more nimble, nothing more fine, nor made of smaller or smoother particles. It first sends abroad the motions that bring sensation among the limbs: for it is first stirred, being made up of small shapes; then heat receives the motions and the hidden power of wind, and then air; then all things are set moving, the blood receives the shock and all the flesh feels the thrill; last of all it passes to the bones and marrow, be it pleasure or the heat of opposite kind. Yet not for naught can pain pierce thus far within, nor any biting ill pass through, but that all things are so disordered that there is no more place for life, and the parts of the soul scatter abroad through all pores of the body. But for the most part a limit is set to these motions, as it were, on the surface of the body: and by this means we avail to keep our life [Bailey's translation, pp. 110-114, *passim*].

V. THE EARLY PRE-CHRISTIAN STOICS

For the views of the early Stoics, such as Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus, we are dependent upon the quotations from their writings and the statements about their views made by later authors. The most important of these are Cicero (60 B.C.), Plutarch (100 A.D.), Galen (163 A.D.), Diogenes Laertius (200 A.D.). The last-named, although writing some four centuries after these early Stoics, seems to have had their works before him as he wrote. Other testimonies are to be found in Stobaeus (500 A.D.), the resemblance of whose statements to those of Plutarch shows that both were quoting from an earlier writer. The latter is believed by Diels to be a certain Aëtius who was a contemporary of

Plutarch. The following passages will suffice to set forth the principal elements of the thought of the early Stoics, especially Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus, as reflected mainly in the statements of later writers. Not all of the passages contain the words under discussion, but all of them furnish direct or indirect testimony to the conceptions which they represented. Incidentally there is frequent mention of later Stoics, especially of Posidonius. Use will be made of this information at a later point.

Diog. Laert. vii. 1. 68 ff. (134 ff.):

68. They [the Stoics] think that there are two general principles [ἀρχαί] in the universe, the active and the passive, that the passive is matter [ὑλη], an existence without any distinctive quality, that the other is the reason [λόγος] which exists in matter, viz., God. For he, being eternal, and existing throughout all matter, makes everything. And Zeno the Citiean lays down this doctrine in his *Concerning Substance* and so does Cleanthes in his *Concerning Atoms* and Chrysippus in the first book of his *Physics*, toward the end, Archedemus in his *Concerning Elements*, and Posidonius in the second book of his *Physics*. But they say that principles [ἀρχαί] and elements [στοιχεῖα] differ one from another. For the former are ungenerated and indestructible, but the elements are destroyed by the action of fire; yet the principles also are bodies [σώματα] and without form. Now a body, says Apollodorus in his *Physics*, is that which has threefold extension, length, breadth, and thickness. And this is also called a solid body. But surface is the limit of a body and has length and breadth only, but not depth. But Posidonius in the third book of his *Celestial Phenomena* rejects this [surface] as possible neither in thought nor in fact. And a line is the boundary of a surface, having length without breadth, or length only. And a point is the limit of a line, which is the least thing that can be thought of. And they hold that God is one and mind [νοῦς] and fate and Zeus, and that he is called besides by various other names, and that being in the beginning by himself he turned into water the whole substance which pervaded the air. And as the seed is contained in the produce, so, too, he, being the seminal principle of the world, remained behind in moisture, making matter fit to be employed by himself for the production of those things which were to come after; and then first of all he brought into being [ἀπογεννάω] the four elements, fire, water, air, earth. And Zeno speaks of these in his *On the Universe* and Chrysippus in the first book of his *Physics* and Archedemus in his *Concerning Elements*.

69. And an element is that from which originally the things which become proceed, and into which at last they are dissolved. And the four elements are all a like substance [οὐσία], without distinctive quality, i.e., matter [ὑλη]. And fire is the warm and water is the wet and air [ἀήρ] is the cold, and earth is the dry, though not so but that in the air also is there the same part [i.e., the

quality of dryness]. Highest is fire, which is also called aether, in which was brought into being first of all the sphere in which the fixed stars are set, then that in which the planets are, after that the air, then the water, and the sediment of all is the earth which is placed in the center of the world.

70. They also speak of the world [κόσμος] in a threefold sense, at one time meaning God himself, who, in distinction from the totality of substance, is of distinctive quality, being imperishable and unbegotten, being the maker [δημιουργός] of the orderly arrangement, and after certain periods of time he absorbs into himself the totality of substance and then produces [ἀπογγενάω] it again from himself. And the orderly arrangement of the stars itself they call the world [κόσμος]. And the third sense is the combination of both the preceding. . . . And the world is administered according to intelligence and providence [νοῦς καὶ πρόνοια], as says Chrysippus in his *Concerning the Gods*, the νοῦς permeating every part of the world, just as the soul [ψυχή] does in us, but through some parts more and other parts less. For through some it is present as cohesion [ἔξις] as through the bones and tendons, through some as mind [νοῦς], as through the ruling part. So also the whole world, they say, being a living being [ζῶον], possessed of a soul [ἐμφυχός], and of reason [λογικός], has the aether as the ruling part, as says Antipater the Tyrian in the eighth book of his *Concerning the World*. But Chrysippus in the first book of his *Concerning Providence* and Posidonius in his *Concerning the Gods* says that the heaven is the ruling part of the world. But Cleanthes says that the sun is. Chrysippus even more differently again says it is the purer part of the aether in itself, which they call the first God, which is spread abroad throughout all the things in the air and through all the living creatures and plants. It also extends through the earth itself as cohesion. And the world [they say] is one, and it is limited, having a spherical shape. For thus it is most fitted for motion, as says Posidonius in the fifteenth book of his *Physics*, and the followers of Antipater in their *Concerning the World*. And surrounding it outside is the boundless void [infinite space], which is incorporeal. And it is incorporeal because it is such that it can be contained by bodies, but is not so contained. But in the world there is no void, but the world is unified. For this it is that secures the harmony and concord of the heavens in relation to the things of earth. (And Chrysippus speaks about the void in his *Concerning Space*, and in the first book of his *Physical Arts*, and Apollophanes in his *Physics* and Apollodorus, and Posidonius in the second book of his *Physics*.) And [they say] these things are incorporeal, being alike; further, that time is incorporeal, being the measure of the movement of the world. And the past and the future are infinite, but the present is finite. And they are of the opinion also that the world is destructible, being brought into being after the manner of the things that are perceptible by the senses, of which the parts are destructible and the whole. And the parts of the world are destructible (for they are convertible into one another); therefore the world is destructible. Now concerning the genesis and destruction of the world, Zeno speaks in his *Concerning the Universe*,

and Chrysippus in the first book of his *Physics*, and Posidonius in the first book of his *Concerning the World*, and Cleanthes, and Antipater in Book Ten of his *Concerning the World*. But Panaetius says that the world is indestructible, and that the world is a living being [ζῶον] and endowed with reason [λογικός] and soul [ἐμψυχος] and with power of perception [νοερός] both Chrysippus says in the first book of his *Concerning Providence*, and Apollodorus in his *Physics*; and Posidonius that, being thus a living being, it is a substance possessed of soul [ἐμψυχος], and with perception [αἰσθητικός]. For the living is better than the non-living. But nothing is better than the world, therefore the world is a living being. And it is possessed of soul, as is plain from our soul [ψυχή] being a fragment broken off from it [the world]. And Boëthus says that the world is a living thing; and that it is one, Zeno says in his *Concerning the Whole*, and Chrysippus, and Apollodorus in his *Physics*, and Posidonius in Book One of his *Physics*. And the whole is called, as Apollodorus says, the world [κόσμος], or, according to another way of speaking, the system that consists of the world and the outside void. The world, therefore, is limited, but the void [space] is infinite.

72. They say also that God is a living being, immortal, rational, perfect, and intelligent in his happiness, being insusceptible to evil of any kind, having forethought for the world and for the things that are in the world. Yet he is not like man; but he is the maker of all things and as it were father of all. . . . And Zeno says that the whole world and the heaven is the substance [οὐσία] of God, and likewise Chrysippus . . . and Posidonius. And Antipater . . . that his substance is air-like [ἀεροειδής] and Boëthus . . . that the sphere of the fixed stars is the substance of God.

76. And they say that the primitive matter [ἡ πρώτη ὕλη] is the substance of all things, as Chrysippus says in the first book of his *Physics*, and Zeno. And matter is that out of which everything whatever comes. And it is called by two names, substance [οὐσία] and matter [ὕλη], the first as it applies to all things and the second to these taken severally. The substance of all things becomes neither greater nor less, but that which relates to things taken severally [ὕλη, matter] both increases and diminishes.

77. And substance is according to them body [σῶμα], and finite, as says Antipater, and Apollodorus. And it [i.e., οὐσία] is subject to change, as the same author says. For if it were immutable the things which have been produced from it could not have been produced. And they say that there are deities [δαίμονες] that have sympathy with man and demigods [ἡρώες] which are the departed souls of the good.

84. Another of their doctrines is that nature [φύσις]¹ is a constructive fire, which follows a regular course to production, which is air [πνεῦμα], fire-

¹ But Plutarch and Stobaeus quote the statement with θεόν instead of φύσιν. The whole passage in Plutarch (*Epit.* i. 7, Diels, *Dox.*, pp. 305 f.) reads as follows: οἱ Στωικοὶ νοερὸν θεὸν ἀποφαίνονται, πῦρ τεχνικόν, ὃδ' βαδίζον ἐπὶ γένεσιν κόσμου,

like and endowed with skill, and the soul [*ψυχή*] is endowed with perception and is the breath [air?] that is congenital to us [*τὸ συμφυὲς ἡμῖν πνεῦμα*].¹ Therefore also it is body [*σῶμα*] and continues after death, but is perishable. But the soul of the universe [*ἡ δὲ τῶν ὅλων (ψυχή)*] is imperishable, of which the souls which are in living beings are parts. And Zeno the Citiean, and Antipater in their treatises on the soul, and Posidonius say that the soul is warm air [*πνεῦμα ἔνθερμον*], for by this we are able to breathe and by it we are moved. And Cleanthes says that all souls will continue to exist till the Conflagration, but Chrysippus that only the souls of the wise will do so. And the parts of the soul, they say, are eight: the five senses, and the reproductive power which is in us, and the power of speech and the power of reason.

86. And they say that the supreme part of the soul is dominant, in which the imaginations and the impulses arise, whence also the reason proceeds, which is in the breast.

Stob. *Ecl.* i. 17. 4 (Ar. Did. *Fr. phys.* 28, Diels, *Dox.*, p. 463; Arnim, *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*, II, 471): Χρύσιππος δὲ τοιοῦτόν τι διεβεβαίουτο· εἶναι τὸ ὄν πνεῦμα κινεῖν ἑαυτὸ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ καὶ ἔξ αὐτοῦ, ἢ πνεῦμα ἑαυτὸ κινεῖν πρόσω καὶ ὀπίσω· πνεῦμα δὲ εἴληπται διὰ τὸ λέγεσθαι αὐτὸ ἀέρα εἶναι κινούμενον· ἀνάλογον δὲ γίνεσθαι καπλὶ τοῦ αἰθέρος, ὥστε καὶ εἰς κοινὸν λόγον πεσεῖν αὐτά.

Chrysippus argued somewhat as follows: that that which is is πνεῦμα moving itself toward itself and from itself, or πνεῦμα moving itself forward and backward; and it has been taken to be πνεῦμα because it is said to be air moving itself; and it is similar to the aether, so that they fall into a common category.

Plut. *Epit.* i. 4 (Diels, *Dox.*, p. 289; cf. Stob. *Ecl.* i. 10. 14. *ibid.*): Ζήνων Μνασέου Κιτιεὺς ἀρχὰς μὲν τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὴν ὕλην, ὧν ὁ μὲν ἐστὶ τοῦ ποιεῖν αἴτιος, ἡ δὲ τοῦ πάσχειν, στοιχεῖα δὲ τέσσαρα.

Zeno, the Citiean, son of Mnaseas, says that God and matter are the ultimate principles, of which the first is the cause of action, and the second of passivity, and the elements are four.

Cicero *De nat. deor.* i. 14. 36 (Diels, *Dox.*, p. 542): Atque hic [Zeno] idem alio loco aethera deum dicit, si intelligi potest nihil

ἐμπεριεληφὸς πάντας τοὺς σπερματικούς λόγους, καθ' οὓς ἕκαστα καθ' εἰμαρμένην γίνονται· καὶ πνεῦμα μὲν διήκον δι' ὅλου τοῦ κόσμου, τὰς δὲ προσηγορίας μεταλαμβάνον δι' ὅλης τῆς ὕλης, δι' ἧς κεχώρηκε, παραλλάξεις. θεοὺς δὲ καὶ τὸν κόσμον καὶ τοὺς ἀστέρας καὶ τὴν γῆν, τὸν δ' ἀνωτάτω πάντων νοῦν ἐν αἰθέρι. [See p. 117; cf. Stob. *Ecl.* i. 1. 29.]

¹ Cf. τὸ σύμφυτον πνεῦμα, Arist. i. 659b, quoted p. 21.

sentiens deus, qui numquam nobis occurrit neque in precibus, neque in optatis, neque in votis.

And this same philosopher [Zeno] in another place says that God is aether, if it is possible to conceive of a God who feels nothing, and who never meets with us in prayers or wishes or vows.

Cicero *De nat. deor.* i. 37 (Diels, *Dox.*, p. 543; Arnim, I, 530): Cleanthes autem qui Zenonem audivit tum ipsum mundum deum dicit esse, tum totius naturae menti atque animo tribuit hoc nomen, tum ultimum et altissimum atque undique circumfusum et extremum omnia cingentem atque complexum ardorem, qui aether nominetur, certissimum deum iudicat.

Cleanthes, however, who was a disciple of Zeno, at one time says that the world itself is God, at another attributes this name to the mind and soul of all nature, at another concludes that the last and highest fire, everywhere dispersed, surrounding and enfolding all things to the uttermost, which is also called aether, is that which is most surely God.

See also i. 15. 39 for similar opinions ascribed to Chrysippus (Diels, *Dox.*, p. 545).

Tertull. *Apol.* 21 (Arnim, I, 160): Apud vestros quoque sapientes λόγον, id est sermonem atque rationem, constat artificem videri universitatis. Hunc enim Zeno determinat factitorem, qui cuncta indispositione formaverit; eundem et fatum vocari, et deum et animum Iovis, et necessitatem omnium rerum. Haec Cleanthes in spiritum congerit, quem permeatorem universitatis adfirmat.

Among your wise men, too, it is plain, λόγος, that is, word and reason, is regarded as the creator of the world. This [λόγος] Zeno says is the creator who formed all things in regular order, and that the same is to be called fate and God, and the mind of Jove and the necessity of all things. These Cleanthes brought together in the word spirit, which, he affirms, is something which permeates the whole world.

Ar. Did. *Fr. phys.* 21 (Diels, *Dox.*, p. 458), cited Arnold, *Roman Stoicism*, p. 181: τὸ δὲ [πῦρ] κατ' ἐξοχὴν στοιχείον λέγεσθαι διὰ τὸ ἐξ αὐτοῦ πρώτου τὰ λοιπὰ συνίστασθαι κατὰ μεταβολὴν καὶ εἰς αὐτὸ ἔσχατον πάντα χέμενα διαλβεσθαι.

But fire is called the chief element because by means of it from the very first the other things were compounded through change, and into the same at last all things, being melted, are dissolved.

Cic. *Tusc.* i. 9. 19: Zenoni stoico animus ignis videtur.

Zeno held that the soul is fire.

Cic. *Ac.* i. 11. 39: De naturis autem sic [Zeno] sentiebat, ut primum [in] quattuor initiis [στοιχεῖα] rerum illis quintam hanc naturam, ex qua superiores sensus et mentem effici rebantur, non adhiberet: statuebat enim ignem esse ipsam naturam quae quidque gigneret, et mentem atque sensus.

Zeno's doctrine of the elements, however, was such that in the first place he did not connect this fifth element, from which his predecessors thought sense and intellect were produced, with the four original constituents of things: for he postulated fire as that element which produces everything, both intellect and sense [cf. *De fin.* iv. 5. 12; *De nat. deor.* ii. 22. 57, cited in Arnold, p. 180].

Cic. *Ac.* ii. 126: Zenoni et reliquis fere Stoicis aether videtur summus deus, mente praeditus, qua omnia regantur. Cleanthes . . . Zenonis auditor solem dominari et rerum potiri putet.

Zeno and almost all of the Stoics regard the supreme God as aether endowed with mind, by which all things are ruled. Cleanthes, a disciple of Zeno, thinks that the sun rules and governs affairs.

Nemesius, *Nat. hom.*, p. 96 (Arnim, I, 143): Zeno the Stoic says that the soul [ψυχή] has eight parts, dividing it into the governing part and the five senses, the power of speech and the generative power [cf. Diog. Laert. vii. 1. 84, above].

Epiphanius *Prooem. et Anacephal.* (1) (Diels, *Dox.*, p. 587): Στωικοὶ σῶμα τὸ πᾶν δογματίζοντες καὶ τὸν αἰσθητὸν τοῦτον κόσμον θεὸν νομίζοντες. τινὲς δὲ ἐκ τῆς τοῦ πυρὸς οὐσίας τὴν φύσιν ἔχειν αὐτὸν ἀπεφάναντο. καὶ τὸν μὲν θεὸν νοῦν ὀρίζουσι καὶ ὡς ψυχὴν παντὸς τοῦ ὄντος κύτους οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς, σῶμα δὲ αὐτοῦ τὸ πᾶν, ὡς ἔφην, καὶ ὀφθαλμοὺς τοὺς φωστῆρας. τὴν δὲ σάρκα πάντων ἀπόλλυσθαι καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν πάντων μεταγγίζεσθαι ἀπὸ σώματος εἰς σῶμα.

The Stoics lay down the opinion that the universe is body and think this perceptible world is God. Some declare that its nature [φύσις] is of the substance of fire. And they define God as mind [νοῦς] and as the soul of all that is, container of heaven and earth, and that the universe is his body, as I said, and that the stars are eyes. But the flesh of all things, they say, perishes and the soul of all is poured out from one body into another.

Eusebius *Prep. Evang.* xv. 20 (Diels, *Dox.*, pp. 470 f.): Now concerning the soul Cleanthes, quoting the opinion of Zeno in comparison with the other physicists, says that Zeno says that the soul is an exhalation endowed with

power of perception, as Heraclitus says. For wishing to prove that souls, being exhaled always become perceptive, he compares them to the rivers, saying, "Other things enter the rivers themselves, and other waters flow in besides." And souls are exhaled from the moist [things]. Therefore Zeno, like Heraclitus, calls the soul an exhalation, but says that it is endowed with perception on this account, because the ruling part of the soul can be impressed through the senses by the things that are and exist, and can receive the impressions of them. For these are the peculiarities of a soul.

Stob. *Ecl.* i. 25. 5 (Ar. Did. *Fr. phys.* 33; Arnim, I, 120; Diels, *Dox.*, p. 467): Zeno says that the sun, moon, and each of the other stars has the power of perception and thought [νοερός καὶ φρόνιμος], being composed of constructive [τεχνικός, workmanlike] fire. For there are two kinds of fire, that which is destructive [ἀτεχνος], and converts its fuel into itself, and the constructive, which has the power of growth and preservation, such as is in the plants and animals [ζῶα], which is nature and soul [φύσις καὶ ψυχή]. And of this kind of fire is the substance of the stars.

Galen *Hist. Phil.* 16 (Diels, *Dox.*, p. 608): Plato, then, and Zeno the Stoic, having discussed the substance of God, were not of the same opinion on this point. Plato said that God was incorporeal, but Zeno that he was body [σῶμα], neither of them saying anything about his form. And Epicurus says that God is anthropomorphous. But the Stoics say that he does not always maintain the same form, but is fiery air [πνεῦμα πυρῶδες], being easily assimilated to all things with which it comes in contact.

Hippolytus, *Phil.* 21. 1 (Diels, *Dox.*, p. 571): Chrysippus and Zeno who themselves lay it down as a principle that God is the origin [ἀρχή] of all things, being the purest body [σῶμα], and that his providence pervades all things.

Nemesius, *Nat. hom.*, p. 33 (cited in Zeller, *Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics*, p. 210) ascribes the following argument to Cleanthes: οὐδὲν ἀσώματον συμπάσχει σώματι, οὐδὲ ἀσωμάτῳ σῶμα, ἀλλὰ σῶμα σώματι· συμπάσχει δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ σώματι νοσοῦντι καὶ τεμνομένῳ, καὶ τὸ σῶμα τῇ ψυχῇ· αἰσχυνομένης γοῦν, ἐρυθρόν γίνεται, καὶ φοβουμένης, ὠχρόν· σῶμα ἄρα ἡ ψυχὴ.

Neither can the incorporeal suffer with the corporeal, nor the corporeal with the incorporeal. But the soul does suffer with the body when it is sick or when it is cut, and the body with the soul. Thus when the soul is ashamed the body blushes, and when the soul is afraid it is pale. The soul, therefore, is body.

Ibid., p. 32 (also ascribed to Cleanthes): οὐ μόνον, φησὶν, ὅμοιοι τοῖς γονέεσι γινόμεθα, κατὰ τὸ σῶμα, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν,

τοῖς πάθεσι, τοῖς ἡθεσι, ταῖς διαθέσεσι· σώματος δέ, τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ ἀνόμοιον, οὐχὶ δὲ ἀσωμάτου· σῶμα ἄρα ἢ ψυχή.

Not only, he says, are we born like our parents as to body but also as to soul, in passions, habits, and dispositions. Now likeness and unlikeness are matters of body, not of an incorporeal thing. Therefore the soul is body.

Nemesius, *Nat. hom.*, p. 34, ascribes the following to Chrysippus: ὁ θάνατός ἐστι χωρισμός ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος· οὐδὲν δὲ ἀσώματον ἀπὸ σώματος χωρίζεται· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐφάπτεται σώματος ἀσώματον· ἢ δὲ ψυχὴ καὶ ἐφάπτεται καὶ χωρίζεται τοῦ σώματος· σῶμα ἄρα ἢ ψυχή.

Death is the separation of soul from body. But nothing incorporeal is separated from a body; for neither is anything incorporeal joined to a body. But the soul is joined to and is separated from the body. Therefore the soul is body.

Tertull. *De anima*, chap. 5 (Arnim, I, 137): denique Zeno "consitum spiritum"² definiens animam hoc modo instruit: "quo," inquit, "digresso animal emoritur, corpus est: consito autem spiritu digresso animal emoritur; ergo consitus spiritus corpus est; consitus autem spiritus anima est; ergo corpus est anima."

Accordingly, Zeno defining the soul as inborn air teaches as follows: that which, by its departure, causes the animal to die is body. But when the inborn air departs the animal dies. Therefore the inborn air is body. But the inborn air is the soul, therefore the soul is body.

Stobaeus, *Ecl.* i. 19. 4 (Arnim, I, 99; Ar. Did. *Fr. phys.* 23, Diels, *Dox.*, p. 459): But a body does not always have weight. But air [ἀήρ] and fire are without weight.

Galen *De plac. Hippoc. et Plat.* ii. 8 (p. 248 M): But if he [Diogenes the Babylonian] should follow Cleanthes and Chrysippus and Zeno in saying that the soul is nourished by blood, and that the breath [air?] is its substance [οὐσίαν δ' αὐτῆς ὑπάρχειν τὸ πνεῦμα] . . .

Galen *De plac. Hippoc. et Plat.* iii. 1 (p. 251 M, cited by Zeller, *op. cit.*, p. 211): λέγω δὴ, ὅτι ὁ Χρύσιππος κατὰ τὸν πρῶτον αὐτοῦ περὶ ψυχῆς λόγον τῶν μερῶν αὐτῆς τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ μνημονεύειν ἀρχόμενος, ἐνθα δεικνύναι πειρᾶται τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ μόνῃ περιέχεσθαι, οὕτωςί λέγει· ἢ ψυχὴ πνεῦμά ἐστι σύμφυτον ἡμῖν συνεχές

² *Consitus spiritus* probably is Aristotle's σύμφυτον πνεῦμα.

παντὶ τῷ σώματι διήκον ἔστε ἂν ἡ τῆς ζωῆς συμμετρία παρῇ ἐν τῷ σώματι. ταύτης οὖν τῶν μερῶν ἐκάστῳ διατεταγμένων μορίῳ τὸ διήκον αὐτῆς εἰς τὴν τραχεῖαν ἀρτηρίαν φωνὴν φαμεν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ εἰς ὀφθαλμοὺς ὄψιν, τὸ δὲ εἰς ὠτα ἀκοήν, τὸ δὲ εἰς ῥίνας ὄσφρησιν, τὸ δὲ εἰς γλῶτταν γεῦσιν, τὸ δὲ εἰς ὄλην τὴν σάρκα ἀφήν καὶ τὸ εἰς ὄρχεις ἑτερόν τινα ἔχον τοιοῦτον λόγον σπερματικόν, εἰς δὲ συμβαίνει πάντα ταῦτα, ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ εἶναι μέρος ὃν αὐτῆς τὸ ἡγεμονικόν.

Now I say that Chrysippus in his first essay on the soul, beginning with the mention of the dominant one of the parts of the soul, then endeavors to show that the origin of the soul is in the heart alone, and says as follows: The soul is air congenital in us, extending to all the body continuously as long as the due proportion of the life remains in the body. The parts of this being distributed to each portion, that portion of it which extends to the windpipe we call voice; that to the eyes, vision; that to the ears, hearing; that to the nostrils, smell; that to the tongue, taste; that to all the body, touch; also that to the testicles having such a special function, we call the spermatoc [part]; and that which goes where all these come together, viz., in the heart, we say is the ruling part of it.

Galen *Hist. Phil.* 24 (Diels, *Dox.*, p. 613; Arnim, I, 136): τὴν δὲ οὐσίαν αὐτῆς [sc. τῆς ψυχῆς] οἱ μὲν ἀσώματον ἔφασαν, ὡς Πλάτων, οἱ δὲ σώματα κινεῖν, ὡς Ζήνων καὶ οἱ ἐξ αὐτοῦ. πνεῦμα γὰρ εἶναι ταύτην ὑπενόησαν καὶ οὔτοι.

And some, like Plato, say that the substance of the soul is incorporeal; but others that it moves bodies, as Zeno and his followers; for these also suppose that the soul is air.

Plut. *Epit.* v. 4 (Diels, *Dox.*, p. 417): Λεύκιππος καὶ Ζήνων σῶμα ψυχῆς γὰρ εἶναι ἀπόσπασμα.

Leucippus and Zeno [say that seed is] body; for it is a fragment broken off the soul. Cf. also Euseb. *Prep. evang.* xv. 20; Ar. *Did. Fr. phys.* 39 (Diels, *Dox.*, p. 470).

Diog. Laert. vii. 1. 85: And the seed of man which the man emits is together with moisture mixed with the parts of the soul according to the kind of mixture which was that of the parents. And Chrysippus says in the second book of his *Physics* that it [the seed] is according to its substance air [πνεῦμα], as is plain from the seeds which are cast into the earth, which if they have become old no longer germinate, as is plain, their virtue having evaporated [διαπεπνευκίας].¹

¹ The argument here is that because by evaporation seeds lose their virtue, so the semen (i.e., the vital part of it) is πνεῦμα—moisture or air.

Plut. *De primo frig.* 2. 5 (cited by Zeller, *Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics*, p. 213): οἱ δὲ Στωικοὶ καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα λέγουσιν ἐν τοῖς σώμασι τῶν βρεφῶν τῇ περιψύξει στομοῦσθαι καὶ μεταβάλλον ἐκ φύσεως γίγνεσθαι ψυχὴν.

The Stoics say that the πνεῦμα in the bodies of infants is hardened by the cooling and being changed by the process of generation becomes soul.

Hippolyt. *Phil.* 21 (Diels, *Dox.*, p. 571): τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν λέγουσιν ἀθάνατον εἶναι, σῶμα δέ, καὶ γενέσθαι ἐκ τῆς περιψύξεως τοῦ ἀέρος τοῦ περιέχοντος, διὸ καὶ καλεῖσθαι ψυχὴν· ὁμολογοῦσι δὲ καὶ μετενσωμάτων γίνεσθαι ὠρισμένων οὐσῶν τῶν ψυχῶν.

And they [the Stoics] say that the soul is immortal, and is body, and that it comes into being from the cooling of the air that surrounds it, therefore also it is called soul. And they hold also that a transmigration takes place when the souls reach the appointed number.

Plut. *Epit.* iv. 20 (Diels, *Dox.*, p. 410): Οἱ δὲ Στωικοὶ σῶμα τὴν φωνὴν· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ δρῶν ἢ καὶ ποιοῦν σῶμα· ἢ δὲ φωνὴ ποιεῖ καὶ δρᾶ· ἀκούομεν γὰρ αὐτῆς καὶ αἰσθανόμεθα προσπίπτουσης τῇ ἀκοῇ καὶ ἐκτυπούσης καθάπερ δακτυλίου εἰς κηρόν. ἔτι πᾶν τὸ κινοῦν καὶ ἐνοχλοῦν σῶμά ἐστι· κινεῖ δὲ ἡμᾶς ἡ εὐμουσία, ἐνοχλεῖ δὲ ἡ ἀμουσία. ἔτι πᾶν τὸ κινούμενον σῶμά ἐστι· κινεῖται δὲ ἡ φωνὴ καὶ προσπίπτει εἰς τοὺς λείους τόπους καὶ ἀνταναικλᾶται καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῆς σφαίρας τῆς βαλλομένης εἰς τοίχον· ἐν γοῦν ταῖς κατ' Αἴγυπτον πυραμίσιν ἔνδον μία φωνὴ ῥηγνυμένη τέτταρας ἢ καὶ πέντε ἤχους ἀπεργάζεται.

And the Stoics say that the voice is body. For everything that does or makes is body. But the voice makes and does. For we hear it and we understand when it falls upon the sense of hearing and makes an impression like that of the finger on wax. Also that which moves or annoys is body. But refinement moves us and rudeness annoys us. Again everything which is moved is body. But the voice is moved and falls into the hollow places and is reflected just as in the case of a ball being thrown against a wall. Indeed inside the pyramids of Egypt when one voice breaks forth it produces four or five echoes.

Plut. *Epit.* i. 6 (Diels, *Dox.*, p. 292): ὀρίζονται δὲ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ οὐσίαν οἱ Στωικοὶ οὕτως· πνεῦμα νοερὸν καὶ πυρῶδες οὐκ ἔχον μὲν μορφήν, μεταβάλλον δὲ εἰς ὃ βούλεται καὶ συνεξομοιούμενον πᾶσιν.

The Stoics define the substance of God as follows: air, intelligent and fiery, not having indeed form but changing into what it will and assimilating itself to all things.

Stob. *Ecl.* i. 1. 29 (Diels, *Dox.*, p. 302): Ποσειδώνιος πνεῦμα νοερόν καὶ πυρῶδες, οὐκ ἔχον μὲν μορφήν μεταβάλλον δὲ εἰς ὃ βούλεται καὶ συνεξομοιούμενον πᾶσιν.

Posidonius says that [God is] air intelligent and fiery, not having indeed form, but changing into what it will and assimilating itself to all things.

Stob. *Ecl.* i. 1. 29 (Diels, *Dox.*, p. 302): Διογένης καὶ Κλεάνθης καὶ Οἰνοπίδης [τὸν θεόν] τὴν τοῦ κόσμου ψυχὴν.

Diogenes and Cleanthes and Oinopides say that God is the soul of the world.

Galen *Hist. Phil.* 35 (Diels, *Dox.*, pp. 618 f.): οἱ Στωικοὶ δὲ τὸν θεόν πῦρ ἔντεχρον ἢ πνεῦμα νομίζουσιν, ὁδῶ βαδίζον ἐπὶ κόσμους γένεσιν, ἐμπεριεληφὸς πάντας τοὺς σπερματικούς λόγους, καθ' οὓς ἕκαστα καθ' εἰμαρμένην γίνεσθαι, καὶ διῆκειν δι' ὅλου τοῦ κόσμου τὰς προσηγορίας μεταλαμβάνον [τὲ] κατὰ τὰς τῆς ὕλης δι' ἧς κεχώρηκε παραλλάξεις. θεοὺς δὲ καὶ τὸν κόσμον καὶ τοὺς ἀστέρας καὶ τὴν γῆν εἶναι νομίζουσιν, τὸ δὲ ἀνώτατον πάντων τὸν νοῦν εἶναι, τὸν θεόν.

The Stoics think that God is a constructive fire or air proceeding methodically to the creation of a world, embracing all the principles of generation, according to which everything comes into being in its allotted way, and it extends, they think, throughout all the world, receiving names according to the different forms of matter through which it spreads. And they think that the world and the stars and the earth are gods, but that the highest of all is mind, that is, God [cf. also Plut. *Epii.* i. 7 and Stob. *Ecl.* i. 1, Diels, *Dox.*, pp. 305-6, where, with minor variations, the same passage occurs].

Plut. *Epii.* iv. 21 (Diels, *Dox.*, pp. 410 f.): οἱ Στωικοὶ φασιν εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς ἀνώτατον μέρος τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, τὸ ποιοῦν τὰς φαντασίας καὶ συγκαταθέσεις καὶ αἰσθήσεις καὶ ὁρμάς· καὶ τοῦτο λογισμὸν καλοῦσιν.

Ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ ἑπτὰ μέρη ἐστὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐκπεφυκῶτα καὶ ἐκτεινόμενα εἰς τὸ σῶμα καθάπερ αἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ πολὺποδος πλεκτάναι· τῶν δὲ ἑπτὰ μερῶν τῆς ψυχῆς πέντε μὲν εἰσι τὰ αἰσθητήρια, ὅρασις ὁσφρησις ἀκοή γεῦσις καὶ ἀφή.

Ὡν ἡ μὲν ὅρασις ἐστὶ πνεῦμα διατεῖνον ἀπὸ ἡγεμονικοῦ μέχρις ὀφθαλμῶν, ἀκοή δὲ πνεῦμα διατεῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ μέχρις ὠτων, ὁσφρησις δὲ πνεῦμα διατεῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ μέχρι μυκτῆρων [λεπτύνων], γεῦσις δὲ πνεῦμα διατεῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ μέχρι γλώττης, ἀφή δὲ πνεῦμα διατεῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ μέχρι ἐπιφανείας εἰς θίξιν εὐαίσθητον τῶν προσπιπτόντων.

Τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν τὸ μὲν λέγεται σπέρμα, ὅπερ καὶ αὐτὸ πνεῦμά ἐστι διατείνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ μέχρι τῶν παραστατῶν· τὸ δὲ 'φωνᾶεν' ὑπὸ τοῦ Ζήνωνος εἰρημένον, ὃ καὶ φωνὴν καλοῦσιν, ἔστι πνεῦμα διατείνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ μέχρι φάρυγγος καὶ γλῶττης καὶ τῶν οἰκείων ὀργάνων. αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν ὥσπερ ἐν κόσμῳ κατοικεῖ ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ σφαιροειδεῖ κεφαλῇ.

The Stoics say that the ruling part of the soul is highest. It is that which produces imaginations and sanctions and perceptions and impulses; and this they call the logical part. And there are seven parts of the soul generated from the ruling part and extending into the body like the arms from the polypus. Of the seven parts of the soul five are the senses, sight, smell, hearing, taste, and touch. Of these, sight is πνεῦμα [air?] extending from the ruling part to the eyes; hearing is πνεῦμα extending from the ruling part to the ears; smell is πνεῦμα, extending from the ruling part to the nostrils; taste is πνεῦμα, extending from the ruling part to the tongue; feeling is πνεῦμα, extending from the ruling part to surfaces, sensitive to the touch of things coming in contact with them. Of the others the seed is mentioned, which is itself also πνεῦμα, extending from the ruling part to the testicles; and the utterance, mentioned by Zeno, which also they call voice, is πνεῦμα, extending from the ruling part to the throat and tongue and the neighboring organs. But the ruling part itself, as in a κόσμος, dwells in our sphere-shaped head. Cf. also iv. 8, 15.

Varro *De lingua lat.* v. 59: sive ut Zenon Citieus animalium semen ignis est, qui anima ac mens.

According to Zeno the Citiean, the semen of animals is a fire which is life and intelligence.


Rufus Ephes. *De part. hom.*, p. 44 C: θερμασίαν δὲ καὶ πνεῦμα Ζήνων τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι φησιν.

Zeno says that heat and πνεῦμα are the same.

Theodoret, *Gr. aff. cur.* v. 25 (Arnim, I, 128): Ζήνων δὲ ὁ Κιτιεὺς ὁ τῆσδε τῆς αἰρέσεως ἡγησάμενος τοιάδε περὶ ψυχῆς δοξάζειν τοὺς οἰκείους ἐδίδαξε φοιτητάς· τὸν γάρ τοι ἀνθρώπινον θορόν, ὕγρον ὄντα καὶ μετέχοντα πνεύματος, τῆς ψυχῆς ἔφησεν εἶναι μέρος τε καὶ ἀπόσπασμα καὶ τοῦ τῶν προγόνων σπέρματος κέρασμά τε καὶ μίγμα ἐξ ἀπάντων τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μορίων ξυναθροισθέν.

Zeno the Citiean, the founder of this sect, taught his own disciples to hold these opinions about the soul. For he said that the human semen, being moist, and composed in part of πνεῦμα, is a part of the soul and a fragment and mixture of the seed of the parents, being compounded of all the parts of the soul.

Quotations might be multiplied almost indefinitely, but these will suffice to set forth the main features of the doctrine of the early Stoics in respect to the matter we are considering. A diagram, though necessarily imperfect, will perhaps make the relationship of the various terms and conceptions more clear.



According to Stobaeus (*Ecl.* i. 17. 4, Diels, *Dox.*, p. 463; Arnim, II, 471), Chrysippus affirmed that the ultimate reality was $\pi\nu\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\mu\alpha$ moving itself, i.e., self-moving air ($\acute{\alpha}\eta\rho$).¹ This ultimate reality is also called $\sigma\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha$ as over against infinite space, which, together with time, falls into the category of the $\acute{\alpha}\sigma\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha\tau\omicron\nu$ (Diog. Laert. vii. 1. 70 [140]). This ultimate reality consists of two principles ($\delta\rho\chi\alpha\acute{\iota}$), or rather perhaps has two fundamental characteristics or aspects, viz.: (1) the active, $\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$, reason (also called $\theta\epsilon\acute{o}\varsigma$); and (2) the passive, $\delta\rho\chi\alpha\acute{\iota}$, matter (Diog. Laert. vii. 1. 68; Plut. *Epit.* i. 4, Diels, *Dox.*, p. 289). To each of these various other predicates are attached. Thus the first, $\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$, is said to be $\theta\epsilon\acute{o}\varsigma$, and $\theta\epsilon\acute{o}\varsigma$ in turn is said to be $\alpha\iota\theta\acute{\eta}\rho$ (Cic. *De nat. deor.* i. 36; *Ac.* ii. 126), $\pi\acute{\upsilon}\rho$ (Cic. *De nat. deor.* i. 37; Arnim, I, 530; Galen *Hist. Phil.* 35), $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ (Diog. Laert. vii. 1. 68), and an immortal being, $\zeta\acute{\omega}\nu$ ἀθάνατον (Diog. Laert. vii. 1. 72), but also $\sigma\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha$ (Galen *Hist. Phil.* 16, Diels, *Dox.*, p. 608; Hippol. *Phil.* 21. 1, Diels, *Dox.*, p. 571). Tertullian

¹ Arnold, *Roman Stoicism*, p. 89.

says (*Apol.* 21) that Cleanthes summed up all the predicates of God in the word *spiritus* (= πνεῦμα), but the accuracy of his statement, unsupported by other testimony, is perhaps not beyond question. The second principle, called, as it consists of parts, ὕλη, is, conceived as a whole, οὐσία. The ὕλη permeated and controlled by λόγος, which is God, becomes a σύστημα ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς καὶ τῶν ἐν τούτοις φύσεων (*Ar. Did. Fr. phys.* 31, Diels, *Dox.*, p. 465), or more briefly stated, ἡ διακόσμησις τῶν ἀστέρων (*Diog. Laert.* vii. 1. 70 [138]), and is called ἡ διακόσμησις or κόσμος. This κόσμος is a living being, ζῶον, endowed with reason, soul, and perception, but is destructible (*ibid.*). To it also is applied the predicate σῶμα (*Diog. Laert.* vii. 1. 68; cf. also 70). God also is said to be κόσμος (*ibid.* 70, 72) and in the largest sense of the term the κόσμος includes God and the universe (*Diog. Laert.* vii. 1. 70 [138]; *Ar. Did. Fr. phys.* 31; *Stob. Ecl.* 1. 21, Diels, *Dox.*, p. 465). God is said to be the seminal principle of the world (*Diog. Laert.* 68) and the δημιουργός of the orderly arrangement. The νοῦς permeates every part of the world just as ψυχή permeates us. Moreover, God periodically absorbs the totality of substance into himself, then gives it forth again (*ibid.* 70; cf. 68).

"Ἕλη consists of four elements (στοιχεῖα), viz.: πῦρ, ἀήρ, ὕδωρ, γῆ (*ibid.* 69). The four elements are interconvertible (*ibid.* 70). They are not, therefore, four substances or kinds of matter, but four forms of one substance. The first of them, πῦρ, is supreme and is also called aether (*ibid.* 69). The second, ἀήρ, is nearly identical with πνεῦμα in its primary sense of wind (*Stob. Ecl.* i. 17).

The Stoics distinguish two kinds of fire, the πῦρ ἄτεχνον and the πῦρ τεχνικόν, meaning fire that destroys and fire that preserves and contributes to growth. It is the former, apparently, which is said to destroy the elements (*Diog. Laert.* vii. 1. 68). From the latter spring the plants and animals. It is called also φύσις (in respect to plants) and ψυχή (in respect to animals); and of it is the substance of the stars (*Stob. Ecl.* i. 25. 5; *Ar. Did. Fr. phys.* 33, Diels, *Dox.*, p. 467).

By the ψυχή the Stoics commonly mean the seat of life, feeling, thought, and will. The definition of the word is found in its

functions.¹ Of the soul, so defined, Zeno says that it is πνεῦμα ἔνθερμον (Diog. Laert. vii. 1. 84) or πῦρ (Cic. *Tusc.* i. 9. 19). Since Cicero says expressly that Zeno did not add a fifth element to the four, but that the Stoics regard fire as that which produces all things, even mind and perception (Cic. *Ac.* i. 11. 39; cf. *De nat. deor.* ii. 22. 57), it is probable that by πνεῦμα ἔνθερμον Zeno means a combination of fire and air, or fire on the way to become air, or air on the way to become fire. Galen also ascribes to Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and Zeno the opinion that the soul is nourished by blood and that the breath [air?] is its substance (Galen *De plac. Hippoc. et Plat.*, p. 248 M; cf. also Galen *Hist. Phil.* 24, Diels, *Dox.*, p. 613).

Galen p. 251 M ascribes to Chrysippus the statement: ἡ ψυχὴ πνεῦμά ἐστι σύμφυτον ἡμῖν συνεχές παντὶ τῷ σώματι διήκον (see above, p. 101). The expression at once recalls Aristotle's σύμφυτον πνεῦμα (i. 659b. 17 ff.; i. 669a. 1; 743b. 39; quoted on p. 21 above).² It is doubtless the same doctrine and probably the same

¹ This is of course true, not of Stoic writers only, but of Greek writers generally. Cf. p. 91. Less clearly so when it means "life" or "shade," but obviously so when meaning "soul," ψυχὴ is by definition a functional term, while πνεῦμα on the other hand is substantial. The relation between the two, through a large part at least of their contemporary use, corresponds to that, e.g., of the terms "knife" and "steel." The definition of the one lies in that which it does, that of the other—in its elements or qualities. The second may be predicated of the first; the first cannot be of the second. One may say ἡ ψυχὴ πνεῦμά ἐστι, but not τὸ πνεῦμα ψυχὴ ἐστι. Ψυχὴ never denotes a substance; only in a relatively late period does πνεῦμα acquire a functional meaning.

² The expression σύμφυτον πνεῦμα occurs also in the *Περὶ Πνεύματος*, probably written about the first century A.D. and erroneously ascribed to Aristotle (see Christ, *Handbuch der klassischen Altertums-Wissenschaft*, VII, 736; Neustadt in *Hermes*, XLIV [1909], 60 ff.):

τὸ δὲ σύμφυτον πνεῦμα δι' ὅλου, καὶ ἀρχὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ πνεύματος [chap. iv].

Ἐπεὶ δὲ τρεῖς αἱ κινήσεις τοῦ ἐν τῇ ἀρτηρίᾳ πνεύματος, ἀναπνοή, σφυγμός, τρίτη δ' ἡ τὴν τροφὴν ἐπάγουσα καὶ κατεργαζομένη, λεκτέον ὑπὲρ ἐκάστης καὶ ποῦ, καὶ πῶς, καὶ τίνος χάριν [chap. iv].

καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ὡς περὶ τὴν αὔξησιν καὶ τροφὴν τοῦ πνεύματος [chap. ii, fin.].

τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα, τὸ ἐκ τῆς ἀναπνοῆς φέρεσθαι μὲν εἰς τὴν κοιλίαν, οὐ διὰ τοῦ στομάχου (τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ἀδύνατον), ἀλλὰ πόρον εἶναι παρὰ τὴν ὀσφύν, δι' οὗ τὸ πνεῦμα τῇ ἀναπνοῇ φέρεσθαι ἐκ τοῦ βρογχίου εἰς τὴν κοιλίαν καὶ πάλιν ἔξω· τοῦτο δὲ τῇ αἰσθήσει φανερόν [chap. v, *init.*].

According to Neustadt (*Hermes*, XLIV, 60 ff.) the *Περὶ Πνεύματος* is the product of a school known as the πνευματικοί, concerning whom we derive a certain amount of information from Galen, having been perhaps written by Athenaeus, the

passage which Diogenes Laertius has in mind when in vii. 1. 84 he says that the Stoics say that the soul is τὸ συμφυὲς ἡμῖν πνεῦμα.

The soul is also said to be σῶμα (Galen *Hist. Phil.* 24, Diels, *Dox.*, p. 613; Diog. Laert. vii. 1. 84; cf. the doctrine of Democritus, Stob. *Ecl.* i. 49. 1, Diels, *Dox.*, p. 388; Nem., *Nat. hom.*, pp. 32, 33, 34; Tertull. *De anima*, chap. v).

The soul has various parts or functions, sometimes four, as shown in the diagram, sometimes increased to eight by analyzing τὸ αἰσθητικόν into the five senses and counting these instead of that.

Plut., *Epit.* iv. 15, ascribes to Chrysippus the view that we perceive darkness by the impact of the intermediate air, adding that the air is pierced by the visual πνεῦμα, which proceeds from the principal part of the soul even to the eyeball. In iv. 21 (see above, p. 104) this latter view is expanded into the statement that, according to the Stoics, there extend from the ruling part of the soul, located in the head, seven parts or senses—sight, hearing, etc. Each of these is said to be πνεῦμα, though the soul itself is not here called πνεῦμα.

founder of the school. He draws this conclusion from the parallels which he discovers between the treatise and the statements of Galen about the views of the school. From these it appears that the men of this school recognized the four elements, the hot and the cold, the wet and the dry; but also four qualities to which they applied the same names. From the four substances and qualities they derived what they called the *δμοιομέρη* or homogeneous bodies, among which they included bones, flesh, and arteries, in each of which one of the four qualities predominated and determined the character. Thus the flesh is wet, the gristle is cold, the bones dry and cold, the fat wet and warm.

But that which is of special interest for us is their doctrine of the πνεῦμα and ψυχή. Galen says that Athenaeus, following the Stoics, introduced, as a fifth element, the πνεῦμα which pervades all things (Neustadt, p. 68). Yet this element does not seem to have been deified for him. For in the *Περὶ Πνεύματος*, defending the proposition that there are not, as some maintain, two kinds of fire, one in the organic and another in the inorganic world, but in the inorganic world different effects of fire according to the quality of the thing affected by it, and in the organic world, not fire proper, but warmth, he adds: "But the arts use the warmth only as a tool, but nature both as a tool and as material. Accordingly this difference offers no obstacle to the view that nature, which uses the warm and which at the same time produces with the visible appearances harmonious movement, possesses intelligence. For fire and breath (πνεῦμα) do not indeed do it [i.e., do not possess or do not impart intelligence]. Yet the same capacity meets us also in the soul (ψυχή). It is well, therefore, to ascribe

In iv. 8 he ascribes to the Stoics the view that the media of sense-perception are πνεύματα νοερά extending from the governing part of the soul to the organs of the body. These πνεύματα νοερά are manifestly identical with the πνεῦμα of iv. 15 and 21, and with the πνεῦμα σύμφυτον παντὶ τῷ σώματι διήκον of Galen, p. 251 M, being pluralized only as parts of that which quantitatively and generically considered is called πνεῦμα.

What, then, did the early Stoics mean by σῶμα and πνεῦμα as predicates of ψυχή? It is to be noted that the two terms are not sharply antithetical. Not only are they both predicated of ψυχή, but the soul is said to be σῶμα because it is πνεῦμα (Diog. Laert. vii. 1. 84). Σῶμα clearly has two distinct uses. First, in the common unphilosophical sense, it denotes that which contains the soul, and is distinct from it, the two being frequently spoken of in antithesis (Diog. Laert. vii. 1. 65; Nem., *Nat. hom.*, pp. 32, 33, 34). It is doubtless composed of the elements, perhaps the four (Galen *Const. art. med.* i. p. 251, K; Arnim, II, 405), or possibly the two lower (Arnold, *Rom. Stoicism*, p. 257). On the other hand, as shown above, the soul is said to be body (Nem., *Nat. hom.*, *loc.*

both to the same source (either in general or specifically in part), which brings it about that the like movement is always present, for it is nature from which becoming springs."

Apparently, therefore, the πνευματικοί, while finding one source of intelligence both in the soul and in the universe, and while postulating πνεῦμα additional to the four elements or the four qualities, yet did not identify the πνεῦμα with the all-pervading intelligence.

In this respect they remind us of what Sextus says of the Stoics, having in mind perhaps Chrysippus, who, Galen says, was the great-grandfather of the pneumatic sect (Arnim, II, 311; Neustadt, p. 64): "The substance of things that are, they say, being of itself incapable of motion and formless, must be moved by and given form by some cause. Therefore, as when we see a beautiful piece of metal work we wish to know who was the artist, believing that the material is itself without power of motion, so also when we contemplate the matter of the universe moving and taking form and order we should reasonably inquire for the cause that moves it and gives it diverse forms. And it is probable that this is nothing else than a certain power that permeates it as soul (ψυχή) permeates us . . . so that this would be God."

Here also the order and motion which the universe shows are ascribed to a power in itself analogous to the soul in the human person. But this power is not called πνεῦμα, though it is not as in the *Περὶ Πνεύματος* expressly said that it is not πνεῦμα.

From all this it appears that, for whatever reason the πνευματικοί were called such, it was not because they affirmed that God was πνεῦμα or because they held any notion of immaterial spirit.

cit.), and God is said to be body (Galen *Hist. Phil.* 16, Diels, *Dox.*, p. 608; Hippol. *Phil.* 21. 1, Diels, *Dox.*, p. 571). Moreover, the whole universe is divided into body and not-body, the former term being applied to the two ἀρχαί and the latter to things that have no real existence, such as time and space (Diog. Laert. vii. 1. 70 [140]).

It might seem, therefore, that σῶμα was simply the Stoic term for a real existence. And this may be thought to be confirmed by the statement quoted by Arius Didymus from Zeno that the cause is body (Stob. *Ecl.* i. 13. 1, Diels, *Dox.*, p. 457).¹ But, on the other hand, it is to be noticed that the two senses of σῶμα are closely related to one another, so that one may argue from the one to the other, as in the argument concerning the separation of soul and body (Nem. *Nat. hom.*, *loc. cit.*). Moreover, in immediate connection with the passage from Ar. Did. in which he says that the cause is body, body is defined as that which has extension in three dimensions; cf. Galen *Hist. Phil.* 23, Diels, *Dox.*, p. 612. Diogenes Laertius ascribes the same opinion to Apollodorus (vii. 1. 68).

It is true, indeed, that the Stoic categories, somatic and asomatic, do not exactly correspond to the modern categories, material and immaterial. Zeno said, e.g., that bodies do not necessarily have weight (Stob. *Ecl.* i. 19. 4, Diels, *Dox.*, p. 459), referring especially to fire and air (and it is of these, of course, that the soul is composed). It is true also that the Stoic would probably not have said, "Whatever is σῶμα is ὕλη." Yet he excluded from the somatic only such things as space and time, and neither formed a third category of immaterial entities nor denied to any part of the somatic the essentially material qualities.

It seems necessary to conclude, therefore, that while the Stoics applied σῶμα as a philosophic term to a much larger class of existences than that of which modern thinkers use it, and while the emphatic element of its meaning is objective or real existence, yet it also carried with it the implication of materiality. It could be applied to things extremely tenuous and not subject to most of the laws of physics, indeed was the most inclusive

¹ Cf. also the statement in Plut. *Eph.* i. 11, Diels, *Dox.*, p. 310: οἱ Στωικοὶ πάντα τὰ αἴτια σωματικά· πνεύματα γάρ.

term they could use for real existences (being more inclusive, for example, than substance, οὐσία), yet affirmed of all such existences materiality.¹

Concerning πνεῦμα it is important to notice that the early Stoics still employed the term in its primitive sense of wind² (see analysis of meanings). We have seen that Stobaeus says that Chrysippus defines the ultimate reality as πνεῦμα or air endowed with the power of self-motion, being in the same category with aether, the upper air (Stob. *Ecl.* i. 17. 4, Diels, *Dox.*, p. 463). If it is πνεῦμα in this sense that is predicated of the human soul, the soul is thereby made fundamentally a physical entity. Or if πνεῦμα as applied to the soul is fire, or air on the way to become fire, or, as the expression σὺμφυτον πνεῦμα suggests, breath or inborn air, it is in that case one of the στοιχεῖα, being interconvertible with water and earth, and falling under the category ὕλη, and so still more clearly physical. Nor is this conclusion invalidated by the fact that the early Stoics probably, as their successors certainly, said that God was πνεῦμα. For they also said that he was aether and body, and identified him with the κόσμος. In short, if to predicate mental qualities and powers of a subject having material qualities is to be a materialist, this is apparently precisely what the Stoics were. They were, indeed, less pronouncedly materialistic than the Epicureans, in contrast with whom it might almost be said that they were non-materialists. Yet it seems impossible to escape the conclusion that their ultimate reality had a material quality.

But it is even more clear that they ascribed material qualities to the soul,³ than that they used σῶμα in a material sense. Paradoxical as it may seem, of the two predicates of the soul, σῶμα and πνεῦμα, the latter affirms its materiality more explicitly than the former.

¹ Cf. Hicks in art. "Stoics" in *Encyc. Brit.*, Ed. IX, vol. xxii, p. 592, and Ed. XI, vol. xxv, pp. 943-4.

² With this usage may be compared the use of the word by pseud.-Hippoc., *Περὶ Φυσῶν* (Ed. Littré, VI, 94), as a common term, to use modern phraseology, for gas, air, and aether. See p. 80.

³ It is instructive to observe that Tertullian not only interprets the Stoics in this way, but himself adopts their view in a sense more obviously material than their own (*Apol.*, chap. 21).

For while $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$ can be applied to anything having real existence, being a predicate of both the two $\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\alpha\acute{\iota}$, $\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$ as applied to the soul seems quite clearly to belong to the $\psi\lambda\eta$. Even the most spiritual reality had its material aspect.

On the other hand, it is equally important to observe that, if we may trust the testimony of Plutarch, Galen, and Stobaeus concerning the views of Chrysippus and the other early Stoics, the $\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$, of which, according to these early writers, the soul was composed, was not perishable breath, as Xenophanes held, or inert matter—the passive $\psi\lambda\eta$ of Aristotle—but, while material, also, by virtue of its permeation by $\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$, active. The $\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$ in which, according to Stobaeus, Chrysippus found the ultimate basis of all things is not simply air in motion, as was the $\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$ of earlier writers, but self-moving. It is true, indeed, and important to note, that self-motion does not thereby become a quality of $\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$ as such. It is predicated, not of all $\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$ by an analytic judgment, but of the $\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$ which is identified with $\tau\acute{o}\ \delta\upsilon\nu$, and of this by a synthetic judgment. Nor is it wholly clear, by virtue of direct statement or evidence, that $\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$ in itself implies activity. Yet the soul, which is said to be $\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha\ \acute{\epsilon}\nu\theta\epsilon\rho\mu\omicron\nu$, is active, and it seems probable that the fact of activity is associated in Stoic thought with the fact that it is $\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$, if not also with the self-activity of the $\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$ which constitutes the $\tau\acute{o}\ \delta\upsilon\nu$. For before the Stoics $\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$ signified air *in motion*; the Stoics say that the individual soul is a part of the universal soul (Diog. Laert. vii. i. 84), and, according to Galen, Chrysippus, affirming that the soul is $\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha\ \sigma\acute{\upsilon}\mu\phi\nu\tau\omicron\nu\ \eta\mu\acute{\iota}\nu$, says also that it extends to all parts of the body, becoming voice, vision, hearing, etc., and in the testicles having a special function. Plutarch, perhaps quoting less literally, says that the Stoics say that there are seven parts of the soul, each of which proceeds from the ruling part and is $\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$. Thus sight, hearing, smell, taste, feeling, and voice are each said to be $\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$, and the semen (reproductive power) is also said to be $\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$, “extending from the ruling part to the testicles.” $\Pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$, therefore, of which the soul consists, though physical, is endowed with vitality—is soul-stuff; or, as it extends from the soul to the organs of sense and reproduction, a vital nervous fluid.

Of the ultimate reality, accordingly, of God, and of the soul, it is affirmed that each is *σῶμα* and each is *πνεῦμα*. As the first affirms materiality without affirming passivity, so the second suggests, or perhaps even affirms, activity without denying, but indeed implying, materiality.

To this evidence derived from quotations from the Stoics themselves there are two pieces of interesting evidence which come to us from outside sources. Menander, a comic poet, a contemporary of Zeno, born later, and dying earlier (342-292), has left us the following lines:

παύσασθε νοῦν λέγοντες· οὐδὲν γὰρ πλέον
 ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ὁ τῆς τύχης
 (εἴτ' ἐστὶ τοῦτο πνεῦμα θεῖον εἴτε νοῦς)
 τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸ κυβερνῶν ἅπαντα καὶ στρέφον
 καὶ σῶζων, ἡ πρόνοια δ' ἡ θνητῇ καπνὸς
 καὶ φλήναφος. πείσθητε κ' οὐ μέμψεσθέ με·
 πανθ' ὅσα νοοῦμεν ἢ λέγομεν ἢ πράττομεν
 τύχῃ 'στίν, ἡμεῖς δ' ἐσμὲν ἐπιγεγραμμένοι.

 τύχῃ κυβερνᾷ πάντα, ταύτην καὶ φρένας
 δεῖ καὶ πρόνοιαν τὴν θεὸν καλεῖν μόνην,
 εἰ μὴ τις ἄλλως ὀνόμασιν χαίρει κενόϊς.

[Kock, *Com. Att. Frag.*, III, p. 139.]

Cease talking about νοῦς. For no other human νοῦς is there except that of Fortune (be it divine πνεῦμα or νοῦς). This it is that controls and guides and preserves all things, and human foresight is smoke and nonsense. Be persuaded and you will not blame me. All that we think, or say, or do is Fortune, and we are conscripts. . . . Fortune controls everything, and we ought to call it mind and foresight, the only goddess, unless one likes to use mere empty words.

The doctrine of the poet is that men have no control of their lives. The god whom he calls τύχῃ controls everything; human foresight is all nonsense. Of human νοῦς as controlling anything it is absurd to speak. Parenthetically he remarks, "You may if you like call it [i.e., τύχῃ] πνεῦμα θεῖον¹ or νοῦς; it matters not;

¹ On the meaning of θεῖον in this connection, compare also Stob. *Ecl.* i. 24, Diels, *Dox.*, p. 466: "Ἀστρον δὲ εἶναι φησιν ὁ Ποσειδώνιος σῶμα θεῖον ἐξ αἰθέρος συνεστηκός, λαμπρὸν καὶ πυρῶδες.

fortune, *τύχη*, governs everything." The parenthetical remark seems to indicate that some of his contemporaries employed these terms to designate the supreme power that controls all things, and that though these are not the words that he prefers, he will not quarrel with them about words; the fact is that *τύχη* rules everything.

In the pseudo-Platonic dialogue *Axiochus*, 370 B, C, occurs the following sentence: οὐ γὰρ δὴ γε θνητὴ γε φύσις τόσον δύουσι' ἂν ἤρατο μεγαθουργίας, ὥστε καταφρονῆσαι μὲν ὑπερβαλλόντων θηρίων βίας, διαπεραιώσασθαι δὲ πελάγη, δείμασθαι δὲ ἄστη, καταστήσασθαι δὲ πολιτείας, ἀναβλέψαι δὲ εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ ἰδεῖν περιφορὰς ἄστρον καὶ δρόμους ἡλίου τε καὶ σελήνης ἀνατολὰς τε καὶ δύσεις ἐκλείψεις τε καὶ ταχείας ἀποκαταστάσεις ἰσημερίας τε καὶ τροπὰς διττάς, καὶ Πλειάδων χειμῶνας καὶ θέρους ἀνέμους, καὶ τὰ τοῦ κόσμου παθήματα παραπήξασθαι πρὸς τὸν αἰῶνα, εἰ μὴ τι θεῖον ὄντως ἐνῆν πνεῦμα τῇ ψυχῇ, δι' οὗ τῶν τηλικῶνδε περίνοιαν καὶ γινώσιν ἔσχεν.

For mortal nature at least would not have acquired and maintained so great effectiveness as to despise the violence of overpowering wild beasts, to cross seas, to build cities, to found commonwealths, to look into the heavens and discern orbits and courses of stars and the summer winds, and to chart out for the future the risings and settings and eclipses of sun and moon, and the swift return of the equinox, and the two solstices, and the autumn storms and the summer winds, and the cosmic events, if there were not really in the soul some divine breath, through which it possessed intelligence and knowledge of so great things.

There is much difference of opinion respecting the date and authorship of this dialogue, some assigning it to the third, others to the first century B.C. See especially Susemihl, *Geschichte der gr. Lit. in der Alexandrinerzeit*, I, 21 ff., who inclines to the early date, and Heidel, *Pseudo-Platonica*, pp. 15-17, who ascribes the dialogue to the first century. The meaning of the expression is evidently similar to that which it bears in the passage from Menander. But while in Menander θεῖον πνεῦμα controls all things, specifically human destiny, in the *Axiochus* it gives intelligence and knowledge and is directly associated with the human ψυχή. Both passages testify in a most interesting way to the presence, in Greek thought of the pre-Christian period, of the idea of divine power or influence affecting the mind or destiny of men, but the *Axiochus*

passage much more clearly implies the presence of this power *in* the human soul.

Though the precise expression *θεῖον πνεῦμα* has not been observed in any pre-Christian Stoic writer,¹ we shall see presently that Posidonius, writing about 100 B.C., said that God is *πνεῦμα*. This fact raises the question whether he or some of his fellow-Stoics not only made this affirmation, but employed the phrase *θεῖον πνεῦμα* for the expression of the same thought. But if the expression does come from a Stoic source, then, since Menander at least was a contemporary of Zeno, these passages would seem to prove that the phrase did not arise with Posidonius, but with a Stoic of a much earlier period. On the other hand, the absence of this expression from the vocabulary of the early Stoics, so far as transmitted to us, suggests that it may not have originated with them, but was either coined by others to express the Stoic idea or belonged to the terminology of some other school of thinkers. We are apparently without sufficient data to decide between these several possibilities. We must be content with the evidence, slight, but seemingly decisive, that the phrase *θεῖον πνεῦμα* was already in use about 300 B.C.

It is a separate question precisely how far the term had advanced on the road toward immateriality in the days of Menander. It is not at all impossible that it represents a further movement in that direction than is to be found even in Posidonius, and that not only the Epicurean but the Stoic thought marks a return from the "spiritual" tendency of Plato. Whether so or not it is to be noticed that even in the *Axiochus* it expresses a quantitative rather than a personalized conception. The phrase *θεῖον πνεῦμα* is still without the article and accompanied by *τι* (contrast *τῇ ψυχῇ*) and denotes neither the human spirit nor apparently personal divine spirit, but breath (or spirit?) proceeding from God or having divine quality.

VI. THE LATER PRE-CHRISTIAN STOICS

From Panaetius and Posidonius we trace the introduction of certain modifications of the conceptions of the earlier Stoics. Thus

¹ In Euripides, *Hipp.* 1391, occurs the expression *ὦ θεῖον ὀσμῆς πνεῦμα*, "O divinely odorous breath." Cf. p. 17. But there is no apparent connection between this phrase and that in Menander or the *Axiochus*.

Panaetius maintained against his predecessors that the world was imperishable (Diog. Laert. vii. 1. 70; Stob. *Ecl.* i. 20.1), but on the other hand denied even the limited post-mortem existence of the soul which had been held by his predecessors (Cic. *Tusc.* i. 32. 79). Posidonius, though a pupil of Panaetius, assumed an eclectic attitude both toward his teacher and toward the earlier Stoicism. Of the statements expressly ascribed to him by later writers, there is none perhaps more important for our purpose than Stobaeus' (*Ecl.* i. 1. 29, Diels, *Dox.*, p. 302) testimony that he spoke of God as *πνεῦμα νοερὸν καὶ πυρῶδες* (cf. Galen *Hist. Phil.* 16, Diels, *Dox.*, p. 609). Though it is probable that this expression was derived from the earlier conception that the ultimate basis of existence was *πνεῦμα* or *πῦρ*, yet it is important to observe that this is the earliest extant express statement by a Greek writer that God is *πνεῦμα*.

Plutarch, indeed, ascribes to the Stoics, without mention of individual names, the doctrine that the substance (*οὐσία*) of God is *πνεῦμα νοερὸν καὶ πυρῶδες* (*Epit.* i. 6, Diels, *Dox.*, p. 292). But the context of the two passages shows that Stobaeus and Plutarch are both quoting from the same passage of Aëtius. There can be no doubt that Stobaeus has preserved in the name Posidonius the correct reading of Aëtius, for which Plutarch has substituted the more general expression "the Stoics." We cannot, therefore, from *this passage* ascribe the doctrine that God is *πνεῦμα* to any writer earlier than Posidonius.

In another passage Aëtius, as attested by both Plutarch and Stobaeus, ascribes to the Stoics the doctrine that God is *νοερὸν . . . πῦρ τεχνικόν, ὁδῶ βαδίζον ἐπὶ γενέσει κόσμου . . . καὶ πνεῦμα μὲν διήκον δι' ὅλου τοῦ κόσμου* (Diels, *Dox.*, p. 306). Diogenes Laertius makes the same statement with so much of the same context as to show that he is drawing from the same source, substituting, however, according to our present text at least, *φύσιν* for *θεόν*. Diog. Laert. vii. 1. 84: *Δοκεῖ δὲ αὐτοῖς τὴν μὲν φύσιν εἶναι πῦρ τεχνικόν, ὁδῶ βαδίζον, εἰς γένεσιν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ πνεῦμα πυροειδὲς καὶ τεχνοειδές*.

On the important question thus raised whether, on the basis of this latter thrice-quoted passage, the use of *πνεῦμα* as a predicate of God can be carried back to the Stoics earlier than Posidonius, the evidence is conflicting. On the one side the examination of

the passages in which Diogenes Laertius speaks of "the Stoics" suggests that he does not use the phrase when quoting the view of one author only, but means by it the Stoic writers from Zeno to Posidonius inclusive, or a number of them. On the other hand, though it is probable that *φύσιν* in the Diogenes Laertius passage is a substitute for *θεόν*, we are scarcely justified in making this probability the basis of an argument, and it is possible that by "the Stoics" Aëtius (Diels, *Dox.*, p. 305) means Posidonius in particular, as Plutarch does in the passage above mentioned (Diels, *Dox.*, p. 292). While, therefore, there is a possibility that the older Stoics called God *πνεῦμα*, it remains that we cannot by definite evidence attest this usage for a writer earlier than Posidonius (135-51 B.C.).

The statement that the *ψυχή* is *πνεῦμα ἐνθερμόν*, which Diogenes Laertius ascribes to Zeno, Antipater, and Posidonius (vii. 1. 84), is paralleled in Stobaeus by the statement that the Stoics call the soul *πνεῦμα νοερόν θερμόν*. Plutarch, however, in his parallel citation from Aëtius omits *νοερόν* (Diels, *Dox.*, p. 388). While, therefore, the doctrine that the soul is *νοερός* is familiar enough, this passage cannot be used as evidence that the Stoics employed the phrase *πνεῦμα νοερόν* of the soul. Stobaeus apparently took it over from the predicates of God.

It is an interesting variation from the statement that the soul is *πνεῦμα ἐνθερμόν*, when we find in Plutarch the affirmation that the Stoics say that *πνεῦμα* in the bodies of infants becomes *ψυχή* by cooling; and in Hippolytus, apparently quoting the same passage, that they say that the soul arises by the cooling of the air (*ἀήρ*) that surrounds it. Though by reason of the difference between the statements we are left in doubt whether the Stoics conceived of the soul as produced from *πνεῦμα* or *ἀήρ*, it is clear in either case that they held the notion of an airlike soul-stuff.

While the argument from silence is always precarious, it is worthy of notice that neither Diogenes Laertius, Arius Didymus, nor Aëtius expressly ascribes to the Stoics of the middle or later period (Panaetius or later) the statement that God is *σῶμα* or that the soul is *σῶμα*.¹

¹ Galen (Diels, *Dox.*, p. 608) says that Zeno says that God is *σῶμα*; Hippolytus (Diels, *Dox.*, p. 571) ascribes the same to Chrysippus and Zeno; Galen (Diels,

Of somewhat similar character is the argument by which Schmekel, *Die Philosophie der mittleren Stoa*, endeavors to show that the views of Posidonius are extensively reflected in the writings of later Stoics, especially Cicero and Sextus Empiricus, even when these writers make no mention of him, and on this basis ascribes to Posidonius the doctrine that without the soul the body is matter, useless and defiling flesh. The soul is the bearer of life, it is the indwelling divinity; as a part of divinity it has autonomy. This power, as it cannot have originated in conception, so also cannot perish with death. The soul is therefore both pre-existent and immortal; the body is a drag upon it, limiting but unable wholly to destroy its freedom of action (pp. 247 ff.). Whether these ideas were held by Posidonius or not, some of them at least are well attested as belonging to some of the middle and late Stoics, and evidently represent a considerable departure from the views of the early Stoics and a partial return to Platonism. It is probable that with this revival of Platonic ideas which made the soul less material and set it over against the material body, $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$, is connected the disappearance of $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$ as a predicate of the soul. Though the two senses of $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$ were not identical, the sharp antithesis between $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ and $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$ in one of these senses made it difficult to affirm $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$ of $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ in the other sense of the former. With this change, in turn, is associated a reversal of the relationship between $\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$ and $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$ as predicates of $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$. $\Pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$ has become less material; the use of $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$ to denote reality with materiality only implied (because whatever is real is material; cf. p. 111) has disappeared,

Dox., p. 613) ascribes the view that the soul is $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$ to Zeno and his followers; Nemesius, *Nat. hom.*, pp. 32, 33, 34, says Cleanthes and Chrysippus held this; Tertullian *De anima*, chap. v. ascribes to Zeno the doctrine that the $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ is $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$.

Diog. Laert. vii. 1. 84 says that they (the Stoics) hold that the soul is body; but in 68, without mentioning particular philosophers, he says that they hold that the elements are bodies but that the principles are not bodies. From this one might draw the inference that God is not body, since $\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$, which is identified with $\theta\epsilon\acute{o}\varsigma$, is one of the principles. But the inference is evidently unwarranted; for on the one hand it would equally prove that $\psi\lambda\eta$ is not body, and on the other, it contradicts the explicit testimony of Galen and Hippolytus as concerns the Stoic teaching about God.

Hippolytus (Diels, *Dox.*, p. 571) says that "they" say that the soul is body, leaving it uncertain whether he means the Stoics in general or Chrysippus and Zeno in particular.

leaving only the use of *σῶμα* in a strictly material sense. The soul, now considered pre-existent and immortal, is no longer called *σῶμα*, nor is God *σῶμα*.

What, then, did the later pre-Christian Stoics do for the word *πνεῦμα*? So far as concerns its use in respect to the human *ψυχή*, they made little advance upon their predecessors, except perhaps to associate the two terms more closely together. Xenophanes had said nearly three centuries before that the *ψυχή* was *πνεῦμα*, thereby emphasizing its perishableness and suggesting that it ceased to exist at the death of the body. The early Stoics denied, indeed, that the soul perished with the separation from the body, giving it a limited existence after death, and Posidonius made the soul immortal. But in neither case is this view based upon the doctrine that the *ψυχή* is *πνεῦμα*, for *πνεῦμα* itself is a material term. Panaetius denied any after-death existence of the soul without denying that the soul was *πνεῦμα*; and Diogenes Laertius (vii. 1. 84) ascribes to the Stoics (without mentioning individual names) the argument that because the soul is *πνεῦμα*, therefore it is body and not immortal (*διὸ καὶ σῶμα εἶναι καὶ μετὰ θάνατον ἐπιμένειν φθαρτὴν δὲ εἶναι*).

Anaximenes in the same century with Xenophanes (the sixth B.C.) had said that the soul was *ἀήρ*. A century later Epicharmus, though not directly predicating *πνεῦμα* of *ψυχή*, employed the former of the soul-stuff, and said that at death the *πνεῦμα* returned whence it came. Aristotle also used the term to describe the vital (*ἐμψυχος*) and generative material which in his opinion, or in that of some contemporary of his, pervades all plants and animals. The Stoic doctrine of the four elements had been anticipated by Empedocles in the fifth century and by Aristotle in the fourth, and both had made air one of them and fire another. When, therefore, the early Stoics described the soul as *πνεῦμα ἔνθερμον*, and then insisted with emphasis that, being *πνεῦμα*, it was also *σῶμα*, they probably meant by the former term to deny that it was mere passive *ὕλη*, while by the latter they affirmed that it was material. That they used *ἀήρ* when enumerating the elements, and *πνεῦμα* when predicating this same element of the soul was perhaps because of the usage which we find in Epicharmus, perhaps

because of some association with *πνεῦμα* meaning breath, or with the phrases for death in which *πνεῦμα*, and not *ἀήρ*, was used, perhaps especially because *πνεῦμα* conveyed, or suggested, as *ἀήρ* did not, the idea of activity, which they ascribed to the soul.

Πνεῦμα does indeed less distinctly express transitoriness than when Xenophanes said that the soul was *πνεῦμα*, meaning that it was as perishable as breath; but it is no less material when used by the Stoics of the soul than it is in Epicharmus. It is the Stoics who say that the soul is an exhalation or vapor (Euseb. *P.E.* xv. 20, 2, Diels, *Dox.*, p. 470) and that it is nourished by the blood (Galen, p. 248 M), joining with the latter statement the assertion that it is *πνεῦμα*. If in any respect the Stoics have spiritualized the conception of the soul, it is mainly or only by affirming the same things both of the soul and of God, viz., that both were both *πνεῦμα* and *σῶμα*, and by the fact that this term *πνεῦμα* suggested activity more definitely than it had done at an earlier time.

On the other hand, Posidonius was the first whom we definitely know to have used the word *πνεῦμα* as a predicate of God. And in this perhaps he contributed indirectly to the ultimate development of the idea that God is immaterial spirit. Yet that he had not himself arrived at this thought is made probable by his coupling with *πνεῦμα* the adjective *πυρῶδες*. What he has done by predicating *πνεῦμα* of God is what Xenophanes did in applying *πνεῦμα* to the soul, viz., joined two terms together ready for the time when the predicate *πνεῦμα* should acquire a more distinctly non-material sense. *Πνεῦμα* as applied both to the soul and to God was still stuff, not God, and ultimately, though not emphatically, material.

Σάρξ is not a frequent term in either the early or later pre-Christian Stoic writers. When it occurs, it is used in a purely physical sense, signifying, as shown in the analysis of meanings, the soft part of the body or the body as a whole. *Σῶμα* is the common term for the body, but neither *σῶμα* nor *σάρξ* in any passage definitely referable to the pre-Christian period bears an ethical sense. For though, according to Seneca (*Epist.* 92. 10), Posidonius

says *inutilis caro et fluida receptandis tantum cibus habilis*, such a statement involves only ordinary anti-Epicureanism, not a philosophic doctrine of the evil of the flesh. Whether the argument of Schmekel that the conception of the body as a drag upon the soul, as found in Seneca and Sextus Empiricus, is derived by them from Posidonius is conclusive or not is immaterial at this point, for the doctrine of even these later writers does not, in any instance, amount to an ascription of ethical quality either to the *σῶμα* or to the *σάρξ*.

CHAPTER IV

ΠΝΕŪMA, ΨΥΧΗ, AND ΣΑΡΞ IN GREEK WRITERS OF THE EARLY CHRISTIAN PERIOD

The present chapter deals with the usage of Greek writers, others than Jews and Christians, of the first two Christian centuries. The authors here discussed are historians, geographers, orators, and philosophers, and include Strabo (24), Musonius Rufus (66), Cornutus (68), Epictetus (90), Plutarch (100), Dio Chrysostom (100), Arrian (124), Maximus Tyrius (150), Lucian (150), Marcus Aurelius (160), Hermogenes (170), Pausanias (180). Of the types of philosophic thought current in the Greco-Roman world in this period two are of especial importance for the purposes of this study. These are neo-Pythagoreanism and late Stoicism.

As in the preceding chapters, a general classification of the usage of the words in the two centuries named will precede the discussion of the doctrines of the particular groups of writers.

I. ΠΝΕŪMA

1. Wind, whether a gentle breeze or blast.

Dio Chrys. ii. 115. 23: πολλοῦ γενομένου πνεύματος, λίθον εἰς τοὺς πόδας ἐκάστη λαβοῦσα ὥσπερ ἔρμα οὕτω πέτονται, ὅπως μὴ ἀρενεχθῶσιν ὑπὸ τοῦ πνεύματος μηδὲ τοῦ σμήνου διαμάρτωσιν.

A great wind arising, each [bee] taking a stone in its feet as ballast, thus they fly, that they may not be carried along by the wind nor miss the swarm.

See also Plut. *Timol.* xix. 2. 5; *C. Grac.* xi. 1; *De virt. mor.* 12; Dio Chrys. i. 92. 1; 399. 22; 408. 7; ii. 33. 31; 208. 21; 219. 8; 263. 12; Luc. ii. 105. 20; 13. 19; 346. 10 (of gas in the bowels); M. Aurel. iv. 3; v. 33; cf. Diog. Laert. vii. 8 (153, 154); Paus. ii. 34. 2; iii. 3. 6; 22. 11; vii. 24. 8; viii. 27. 14; x. 17. 10.

2. Air, or vaporous substance, tenuity rather than motion being the chief characteristic thought of.

Corn. 42. 6: στενοχωρούμενα γὰρ τὰ ἐν αὐτῇ (γῇ) πνεύματα καὶ ἔξοδον ζητοῦντα κλονεῖσθαι καὶ ῥήχυσθαι αὐτὴν ποιεῖ.

For the gases being compressed in it [the earth] and seeking outlet cause it to be agitated and rent asunder.

See also Plut. *Non posse suav.* 27; Dio Chrys. i. 334. 15; ii. 2. 31 (cf. ps.-Hippoc., passage cited p. 80); Luc. iii. 648. 62; M. Aurel. ix. 2; x. 7 (*bis*); xi. 20; xii. 30 (plural).

3. Breath of a living being, man or lower animal.

M. Aurel. iv. 3: ἐννοήσας ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιμίγνυται λείως ἢ τραχέως κινουμένῳ πνεύματι ἢ διάνοια.

Considering that the mind does not mingle with the breath, whether the latter be moving gently or violently.

See also Plut. *Dem.* vi. 4; xi. 1; Dio Chrys. ii. 205. 4; M. Aurel. ii. 2; Hermog. 158. 11.

In M. Aurelius πνεύματιον is also used for breath (as σάρκιον and σαρκίδιον are for flesh). See v. 33; viii. 25, 56; xii. 3, 14. Man is composed of τὰ σάρκια, τὸ πνεύματιον, and τὸ ἡγεμονικόν (νοῦς). Cf. under M. Aurelius, p. 138.

In Hermogenes, who wrote on rhetoric in the time of Marcus Aurelius, πνεῦμα is used as a rhetorical term, the exact meaning of which is obscure, but evidently derived from πνεῦμα, meaning breath. See 148, 158 f.

See also Luc. iii. 81. 8; Paus. iv. 8. 5; vii. 24. 11.

4. The medium or bearer of psychic energy or power, sometimes said to proceed from God, sometimes from the ruling faculty of the mind.

Epict. *Diss.* ii. 23, 3: εἰκὴ οὖν σοι ὁ θεὸς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἔδωκεν, εἰκὴ πνεῦμα ἐνεκέρασεν αὐτοῖς οὕτως ἰσχυρὸν καὶ φιλότεχνον, ὥστε μακρὰν ἐξικνούμενον ἀναμάσσεσθαι τοὺς τύπους τῶν ὀρωμένων.

Did then God give you eyes to no purpose? and to no purpose did he infuse into them spirit so strong and of such skilful contrivance as to reach a long way and to fashion the forms of things which are seen?

See also Dio Chrys. ii. 66. 5. Cf. Plut. *Epit.* iv. 21 (Diels, *Dox.*, pp. 410-11, cited on p. 104); Galen *De plac. Hippoc. et Plat.* iii. 1 (cited on p. 101); Diog. Laert. vii. 1. 85 (cited on p. 102); Plut. *Epit.* iv. 8. 15.

The roots of this usage lie in the remote past and the process of its development is gradual. When Xenophanes said that the soul was πνεῦμα, he meant that it was perishable breath. When Zeno said that it was πνεῦμα ἔνθερμον, he apparently meant that it was one of the four elements, or a mixture of two, air on the way to become fire, or fire on the way to become air. When Chrysippus, according to Galen, affirmed that it was πνεῦμα σύμφυτον ἡμῖν and that it extended from the principal part of the soul to the various organs, where it was called voice, vision, hearing, etc., and when, according to Diogenes Laertius, he made πνεῦμα the vitalizing element of human semen (see p. 102), it is clear that, on the one hand, this πνεῦμα was air or moisture, but, on the other, that it was now air or moisture endowed with vitality. By the post-Christian writers also πνεῦμα, meaning soul-stuff, was conceived of as endowed with vital and vitalizing power. If the statements of Plutarch, Galen, and Diogenes Laertius left this in question, the passages from Epictetus and Dio Chrysostom would remove all doubt.

5. The informing principle of all existence, including the cohesive power of inanimate things.

Galen *Introd. s. med.* 9 (Arnim, II, 716): τοῦ δὲ ἐμφύτου πνεύματος διττὸν εἶδος, τὸ μὲν φυσικόν, τὸ δὲ ψυχικόν. εἰς δὲ οἱ καὶ τρίτον εἰσάγουσι, τὸ ἐκτικόν· ἐκτικόν μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ πνεῦμα τὸ συνέχον τοὺς λίθους, φυσικόν δὲ τὸ τρέφον τὰ ζῶα καὶ τὰ φυτά, ψυχικόν δὲ τὸ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμψύχων αἰσθητικά τε ποιοῦν τὰ ζῶα καὶ κινούμενα πᾶσαν κίνησιν.

Of the inborn πνεῦμα there is a twofold form—the physical and the psychical. There are those, however, who introduce a third—the cohesive; cohesive then is the πνεῦμα which holds together the stones, physical that which nourishes the animals and the plants, and psychical that which is found in animate beings and imparts to the animals powers of perception, and every kind of motion.

See also another instance in the same passage. Cf. *Oxyr. Pap.* II. 213, l. 7. For fuller discussion of this usage see pp. 139 f.

6. Spirit, a sentient, intelligent, willing being, or the element by virtue of which such a being is sentient, etc.

a) The human soul.

Epict. *Diss.* iii. 2. 22: οἶδον ἔστιν ἡ λεκάνη τοῦ ὕδατος, τοιοῦτον ἡ ψυχὴ, οἶον ἡ αὐγὴ ἡ προσπίπτουσα τῷ ὕδατι, τοιοῦτον αἱ φαντασίαι. ὅταν οὖν τὸ ὕδωρ κινηθῇ, δοκεῖ μὲν καὶ ἡ αὐγὴ κινεῖσθαι, οὐ μέντοι κινεῖται. καὶ ὅταν τοίνυν σκοτωθῇ τις, οὐχ αἱ τέχναι καὶ ἀρεταὶ συγχέονται, ἀλλὰ τὸ πνεῦμα ἐφ' οὗ εἰσι· καταστάντος δὲ καθίσταται κάκεινα.

For the soul is like the dish of water and the appearances (events, phenomena) are like the ray that falls upon the water. When, therefore, the water is moved, the ray seems to be moved, but is not moved. And when anyone becomes blind (or has vertigo), it is not the arts and virtues that are thrown into confusion, but the spirit upon which they are (projected); and when this is restored, they also are restored.

Epictetus is here deprecating the tendency to confuse things that are indifferent with those that are good or evil, maintaining that men should look at things as they are (according to nature). "The spirit" is apparently equivalent to "the soul." Yet it may be that even here as in ii. 22. 3 "the spirit" is the nervous fluid which, proceeding from the soul, imparts the power of vision.

See also M. Aurel. ix. 24.

b) A demon.

The existence of this meaning in Dionysius Halicarnassensis and Josephus would suggest that it belonged to the usage of the Greek writers of this period though this investigation has not chanced to discover an instance.

II. ΨΥΧΗ

1. Life, loss of which is death, sometimes of lower animals, but usually of men.

Dio Chrys. i. 365. 19: μυρίοι δ' εἰσὶν οἱ τὰς ψυχὰς προειμένοι ἑαυτῶν ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως.

Countless are those who have given up their own lives in behalf of the city.

See also Plut. *Dem.* xxix. 4; Dio Chrys. i. 99. 20; ii. 209. 7; M. Aurel. iv. 48; xii. 24; cf. also v. 16 (ἄψυχος, ἐμψυχος); Paus. i. 30. 1; ii. 5. 8; iv. 10. 3; 21. 11; v. 11. 6; 20. 5; 27. 11; vii. 9. 5; 12. 4, 5; 13. 8; 16. 5;¹ 19. 5; viii. 2. 3;¹ 11. 7; 40. 2, 5; 44. 7; 51. 8; ix. 33. 1; x. 2. 4; 21. 3; 22. 4 (*bis*); 23. 12; 32. 17.

¹ Used of animal as well as human life.

2. A shade, the soul of man existing after death, or departing from the body at death.

Corn. 5. 6: *εἰς τοῦτον γὰρ χωρεῖν ἡμῖν κατὰ τὸν θάνατον αἱ ψυχαὶ δοκοῦσιν.*

For our souls seem to depart from us to this [Hades] at death.

See also Corn. 74. 5; Hermog. 436. 11; Luc. i. 405. 1; 407. 3, 5; 457. 2; 483. 9; 519. 7; Paus. viii. 32. 4; 48. 6; ix. 30. 6; x. 28. 1.

3. Soul as a constituent element of a rational or sentient being; the seat of vitality, thought, and emotion; especially with reference to man, the human mind in the larger sense of the word; sometimes used with special reference to the lower powers and capacities of the soul, such as life and motion, sometimes to the higher powers, such as thought and emotion, but most frequently inclusively or without clear discrimination.

a) Applied to man.

Muson. Ruf. 87. 14-16: *οὐ γὰρ χειρὶ ἢ ποδὶ φιλοσοφοῦμεν οὐδὲ τῷ ἄλλῳ σώματι, ψυχῇ δὲ καὶ ταύτης ὀλίγῳ μέρει, ὃ δὴ διάνοιαν καλοῦμεν.*

For we do not philosophize with hand or foot or the rest of the body but with soul, and with but a small part of this, which we call understanding.

See also Muson. Ruf. 3. 14; 8. 1; 12. 15-19; 24. 9-11; 25. 5, 12, 14; 26. 9, 10; 38. 1; 44. 14; 58. 13, 17, 19; 69. 13; 74. 8; 95. 14; 96. 7; 113. 8, 9; 124. 3; 134. 5; Corn. 3. 3, 8, 15; 21. 3; 35. 11; 38. 18; 47. 11; 58. 6; 63. 6; 64. 7; Plut. *Timol.* prologue 3; *Dem.* i. 2; xxii. 1, 2; *Sylla* xiii. 1; *De lib. et aeg.*¹ i. 1. 5, 8; 2. 14, 15, 19; *Non posse suav.* 4. B. 369. 6, 12, 30; 370. 12, 21; 371. 14; 5. B. 372. 1; 373. 5, 9; 7. B. 376. 22; 8. B. 378. 12; 9. B. 380. 12; *De ira cohib.* 462. F. 5, 9; Epict. *Diss.* ii. 10. 21; 12. 21, 22; 15. 4, 20; 17. 20; 18. 11; 19. 26; 22. 34; 23. 42; 26. 3, 7; iii. 3. 2, 3, 4, 20; 7. 2, 4, 5, 6, 9; 15. 6; 22. 87; iv. 5. 26; 9. 16; 11. 5, 6, 8 (*quinquies*); 12. 15; *Frag.* xiv. 5; Dio Chrys. i. 5. 9; 7. 31; 12. 32; 14. 5; 39. 4; 41. 2; 45. 4; 51. 4, 6, 9, 12, 16; 58. 31; 61. 19; 62. 30; 63. 6; 64. 26; 68. 5; 69. 18, 23, 28; 75. 32; 78. 1, 6; 81. 29; 82. 18; 83. 15; 85. 7, 20; 87. 9, 26; 89. 31; 90. 5; 91. 28; 92. 13; 97. 28; 99. 20; 133. 14, 30; 145. 13; 146. 25; 148. 32; 149. 23; 154. 25; 223. 7, 11; 225. 18; 229. 30; 233. 29; 235. 19; 236. 1, 9; 244. 12; 250. 17, 23; 256. 15; 270. 7; 280. 1;

¹ Bernardakis' edition of the *Moralia* has been used.

281. 12; 290. 3; 292. 2, 11, 28, 30; 293. 26; 295. 31; 296. 19; 325. 28; 334. 7; 335. 7, 22; 365. 19; 417. 17, 22; 419. 25, 29; 420. 9; 422. 26; 427. 24; 431. 18; ii. 17. 14; 58. 9; 65. 10; 66. 7; 86. 23; 91. 27; 98. 24; 116. 27; 137. 4; 147. 21; 151. 31; 152. 4; 183. 8; 200. 20; 204. 1; 209. 7; 215. 32; 231. 16; 235. 23; 240. 21; 241. 12, 18; 291. 4, 9; 293. 23; 305. 30; 328. 29; 330. 16, 23; 335. 14; 336. 21; 338. 4; 342. 24, 31; 344. 11; 351. 5; 356. 22; Max. Tyr. freq. especially in vii and x; Luc. i. 14. 10; 15. 2; 42. 7; 43. 2; 54. 9; 55. 10; 57. 10; 59. 10; 64. 3; 67. 11; 68. 2; 73. 9; 77. 15, 17; 78. 5; 79. 10; 80. 1; 81. 3; 141. 16; 181. 19; 404. 17; 542. 16; 555. 16; 556. 4; 557. 14; 566. 15; 607. 9; 637. 1; 671. 9; 674. 18; 682. 3; 729. 10; 758. 9;¹ M. Aurel. ii. 6 (*bis*), 8 (*bis*), 16, 17 (*bis*); iii. 4, 6, 7, 16 (*bis*; cf. ii. 2); iv. 3, 21, 29, 31, 41 (*ψυχάριον*); v. 5, 11 (*bis*), 16, 19 (*ter*), 26, 27, 33, 36; vi. 14 (*quater*), 25, 29, 32, 52, 53; vii. 16, 63; viii. 28, 29, 45; ix. 3, 8 (*bis*), 9, 27, 34; x. 1, 36 (*ψυχάριον*); xi. 1 (*bis*), 3, 12, 16, 18 (*bis*), 39; xii. 7, 26, 28, 29, 30 (*bis*); Hermog. 20. 15; 26. 18, 21; 47. 19; 135. 15; 221. 17; 229. 5; 340. 9; 343. 19; 345. 1; 393. 8; 444. 14; Paus. iv. 11. 2; 32. 4; vii. 17. 3; viii. 49. 3.

b) Applied to animals:

Dio Chrys. i. 422. 26: ὥστε τὴν μητέρα αὐτοῦ Καλλιόπην διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸν υἱὸν εὖνοιαν καὶ φιλίαν αἰτησαμένην παρὰ Διὸς τὰ σώματα αὐτῶν μεταβαλεῖν εἰς τὸν ἀνθρώπων τύπον, τὰς μέντοι ψυχὰς διαμένειν, οἷαι πρότερον ἦσαν.

So that his [Orpheus'] mother, Calliope, on account of their [birds and sheep] good will and love toward her son begged Zeus that their bodies be changed into human form but their souls remain such as they formerly were.

See also Dio Chrys. ii. 293. 23; Luc. i. 567. 4.

c) Ascribed to the universe.

Corn. 32. 2: παραδεδομένου τοίνυν ἄνωθεν ὅτι ὁ Προμηθεὺς ἐπλασεν ἐκ τῆς γῆς τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος, ὑπονοητέον Προμηθεῖα εἰρῆσθαι τὴν προμήθειαν τῆς ἐν τοῖς ὅλοις ψυχῆς, ἣν ἐκάλεσαν οἱ νεώτεροι πρόνοιαν.

Since tradition has handed down that Prometheus formed the race of men from the earth, it is to be supposed that the forethought of the soul which is in all things, which moderns call providence, is called Prometheus.

¹ The second and third volumes furnish some 85 further instances, but it has not been thought best to burden the list by citing them.

See also Corn. 3. 4, 14(?); Dio Chrys. ii. 58. 9; M. Aurel. iv. 40; xii. 30, 32.

Concerning the quantitative use of "soul" see under Marcus Aurelius, p. 139.

d) Ascribed to God.

M. Aurel. v. 34: *δύο ταῦτα κοινὰ τῇ τε τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τῇ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ παντὸς λογικοῦ ζώου ψυχῇ.*

These two things are common both to the soul of God and of man and of every rational animal.

In Dio Chrys. ii. 66. 7 occurs the statement that Zeus may not inappropriately be said to consist of soul and body.

4. By natural metonymy, the vital or conscious element in man standing for the man himself, *ψυχή*, is used with the meaning person.

Dio Chrys. i. 85. 20: *πλανῶνται κατὰ τὸν βίον ὅσαι ψυχαὶ πρὸς μὲν πόρους δειλαὶ καὶ ἀδύνατοι, δεδουλωμένοι δὲ ἡδοναῖς, φιλήδονοι καὶ φιλοσώματοι.*

There wander through life souls that are timorous in respect to labor and incapable, slaves of pleasure, lovers of pleasure, and lovers of the body.

See also Dio Chrys. i. 417. 17; 419. 29; M. Aurel. v. 32 (*bis*); Hermog. 166. 4; 198. 21.

5. Characterized as "irrational" it apparently denotes the informing principle of inanimate things (cf. *πνεῦμα* 5), yet perhaps only the soul of the irrational animal (3*b*, above). See M. Aurel. x. 33, p. 139.

III. ΣΑΡΞ

1. The soft muscular portion or portions of the body of man or beast.

Epict. *Diss.* ii. 9. 18: *τὸ βρωθὲν ἐπέφθη, ἀνεδόθη, νεῦρα ἐγένετο, σάρκες, ὀστέα, αἷμα, εὐχροια, εὐπνοια.*

That which has been eaten is digested, assimilated, becomes tendons, muscles, bones, blood, good complexion, good respiration.

See also Epict. iv. 7. 32; Dio Chrys. i. 334. 19; Luc. i. 408. 12; Paus. x. 22. 3.

2. By synecdoche *σὰρξ* (also in the plural) denotes the body, or is qualitatively applied to any part of the body without distinction of flesh, skin, and bones.

Muson. Ruf. 106. 11, 12: οἱ μὲν οὖν λειότητά τε καὶ ἀπλότητα σαρκὸς διὰ τῶν σκεπασμάτων μηχανώμενοι χείρω τὰ σώματα ποιοῦσιν.

Some therefore contriving smoothness and softness of flesh by means of the coverings render their bodies worse.

See also Plut. *Non posse suav.* 2. B. 364. 19; 3. B. 365. 18; 366. 17; 367. 8; 368. 1; 4. B. 369. 22; 371. 17; 5. B. 373. 3, 4, 14, 19; 374. 1; 6. B. 375. 9, 13, 14; 7. B. 376. 22 (*bis*); 8. B. 377. 24; 9. B. 380. 3; Epict. *Diss.* i. 3. 5 (σαρκίδιον, "body"); 20. 17, 18; ii. 8. 2; 22. 19; 23. 20, 22; iii. 7. 3-10, 24; Luc. iii. 907. 13; M. Aurel. v. 26; vi. 28 (σαρκίδιον); vii. 66; viii. 56; x. 8, 24; ii. 2 (σάρκια). In all the passages from Epictetus cited above the word is used in a depreciatory sense.

IV. NEO-PYTHAGOREAN USAGE

The literature of neo-Pythagoreanism consists of about ninety writings ascribed to some fifty different authors. It is largely pseudonymous, its ostensible authors being outstanding representatives of the ancient school, as, e.g., Philolaus, Archytas, and Timaeus of Locris. Zeller believes that it arose chiefly at Alexandria and in the two centuries 100 B.C. to 100 A.D. Cicero says that P. Nigidius Figulus (died 45 B.C.) undertook to revive Pythagoreanism at Rome. The material is collected in Mullach's *Fragmenta Philosophorum Graecorum*, Vols. I and II.

The neo-Pythagoreans apparently did not employ πνεῦμα as a prominent term of their philosophic vocabulary. In the Similitudes "of the Pythagoreans and others" it occurs once, meaning "wind," in a passage ascribed to Aristonymus (Mullach, *op. cit.*, I, 489. 19; Stob. *Ecl.* iii. 1. 97). In the *Pythag. Fragg. Varia* (Mullach, II, 66. 2, 5) it occurs in an ascription to the Stoics of their familiar doctrine that the soul is πνεῦμα ἐνθερμον. Sextus Empiricus (225 A.D.) ascribes to the followers of Pythagoras and Empedocles the doctrine, akin to that which Aristotle says was held in his day (see pp. 139 f. and cf. p. 22), that there is one πνεῦμα which permeates the whole world like a soul and unites us to the irrational animals. But his failure to indicate precisely to what writers or period he means to ascribe this doctrine makes it impossible to affirm

that it was held by the neo-Pythagoreans of the period of which we are speaking.

Ψυχὴ is commonly used in the sense of "soul," as the seat of intellectual and moral life. A typical example is the Pythagorean similitude,

κοσμητέον ἱερὸν μὲν ἀναθήμασιν τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν μαθήμασιν.

A temple should be adorned with votive offerings, but the soul with knowledge [Mullach, *op. cit.*, I, 493. 96].

According to Alex. Polyhistor (Diog. Laert. vii. 19 ff. [28]), they held that the soul is a fragment of the aether, both warm and cold, distinguishable from life (ζωή), and immortal because that from which it is detached is immortal. It is divided into three parts, νοῦς, φρήν, and θυμός (§30), the first and last being found in other animals, but the second only in man; the reasoning power is immortal and the soul is nourished by the blood, and reasons are the winds (ἄνεμοι) of the soul.

Σάρεξ seems to have played no special part in neo-Pythagoreanism. In a passage ascribed to Pythagoras (Stobaeus, *op. cit.*, iv. 37. 13; Mullach, *op. cit.*, I, 500. 20) it apparently means the body without ethical implication. No other instances have been noted in neo-Pythagorean writers. In the neo-Platonic writers of the fourth century (Iamblichus *Adhort. ad Phil.* 21; Mullach, *op. cit.*, I, 506. 28) the body is regarded as the prison of the soul, and, since even Plato taught this, it would not be surprising to find the idea in the neo-Pythagoreans of the first century. Definite evidence of it has not, however, been discovered. In the writings of Didymus, a Pythagorean of the first century A.D. (Mullach, *op. cit.*), body and soul are often spoken of together but without characterization of the former as evil. To the Peripatetics he ascribes the view that the goods of the body are inferior to those of the soul, but they are still goods, and the body is definitely said to be friendly to us. These views Didymus does not oppose, and indeed in one passage in which he is apparently expressing his own opinion he says:

For if man is desirable for his own sake so also the parts would be desirable for their own sake. But the parts of a man, completely considered, are body and soul; so that the body, too, would be desirable [Mullach, *op. cit.*, II, 88. i, *fin.*].

The earliest testimony we possess as to the views of the neo-Pythagoreans concerning the ultimate elements of the universe is from Alexander Polyhistor, 80-40 B.C. (cf. Zeller, *Philosophie der Griechen*, III, 2, p. 108), quoted by Diogenes Laertius (viii. 19. [24]):

Alexander says in the *Successions of the Philosophers* also that he found these things in Pythagorean commentaries; the monad is the beginning of all things. And from the monad the indefinite duad arises, so that matter is made subject to the monad which is cause. And from the monad and the indefinite duad the numbers arise and from the numbers the signs. . . .

In this passage nothing is said about the origin of evil. In pseudo-Archytas, however, quoted by Stobaeus, *Ecl.* i. 41. 2, it is affirmed that the most general principles are form and substance, the former corresponding to the ordered and definite, the latter to the unordered and undefined; the former being of beneficent, and the latter of destructive, nature. A similar doctrine is in pseudo-Plutarch ascribed to Pythagoras:

Placita i. 3. 8: Pythagoras says that the numbers are elements; and again that the monad and the undefined duad are in the elements. And of the elements the one is according to him directed toward the active and formative cause, which is mind and God, and the other to the passive and material, which is the visible world.

Ibid. i. 7. 18: Pythagoras says that of the principles the monad is God and the good, which is the nature of the one, the mind [*ᾧ νοῦς*] itself. And the undefined duad is a demon and the evil, belonging to which is the material mass, and it is the visible world.

Vita Hom. 145: He [Pythagoras] held the ultimate principles to be two, calling them the defined monad and the undefined duad, the one being the cause (or principle) of good things, the other of evil things.

Here we seem clearly to find the doctrine that there are two principles, the one beneficent and the other maleficent, and the latter identified or associated with matter. On the other hand, these statements manifestly apply, not to Pythagoras himself, but to the neo-Pythagorean school, and this in turn raises the question in what period this doctrine, that the origin of evil is in matter, was held. Its absence from the earliest testimony concerning the views of the school, and apparently, indeed, from such writers as Sextus Empiricus, Simplicius, and Hippolytus, makes it doubtful when it became a part of the teaching of the school. It is noticeable,

moreover, that the testimony which we have from pseudo-Archytas, pseudo-Plutarch, and Epiphanius does not enter into details, nor define whether physical or moral evil is meant.

V. STOICS AND WRITERS INFLUENCED BY STOICISM

Among post-Christian writers more or less strongly influenced by Stoicism, none is more important than Seneca, whose life was almost conterminous with that of the apostle Paul. Although writing in Latin, he is an important source of information concerning the thought of the period. According to Arnold he was the last Roman who made a systematic study of Stoicism in the original authorities.

Seneca's term *animus*, like the $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$ of the earlier Stoics, is a functional term denoting the seat of feeling, thought, and will. With the question of its substance he was apparently less concerned than some of his predecessors. This investigation has at least discovered no passage in which he predicates of it either *spiritus* or *corpus*. The body is for him a temporary, decadent affair, a burden on the soul, a check on ambition (*Ep.* 120. 17), but he goes no farther than this into the philosophy of the matter. There is no suggestion that it is, by virtue of a corrupting quality in matter, a positive source of moral evil. He stops short even of Plato (see p. 40), in his approach to a suggestion of an ultimate dualism of mind and matter, the former good, the latter evil (*Dial.* xii. 11. 6, 7; *Ep.* 65. 16; 92. 10, 33; 120. 17; *N.Q.* vii. 31. 3, cited by Arnold, p. 258). Indeed, Seneca speaks strongly of the dignity of the body as a dwelling-place, even though temporary, of the soul (*Ep.* 92. 13; 95. 33; 120. 14; cf. Cic. *De nat. deor.* ii. 54-58, cited by Arnold, p. 259).

Death is followed, as with Vergil (*Aeneid* vi. 724-51), by a period of purgation, after which the soul finds its way to the higher regions, eventually being absorbed into the primal elements (*Dial.* vi. 23. 1; 25. 1; 26. 7; *Ep.* 57. 8; cited by Arnold, p. 259). The necessity of purgation evidently arises from the experiences of the soul in the period of its residence in the body, but Seneca does not say that that from which the soul requires purgation is a pollution derived from the matter of which the body is composed. There

is nothing in his language to show that he goes beyond the fact of common experience that men in the period of bodily life commit sin; while against the view that he ascribes moral evil to the corrupting influence of the body is a passage in *Ep.* 65. 16, where, if *poena* be taken in its usual and proper sense, he definitely expresses the old Orphic theory that the body is a punishment of the soul,¹ the sequel to sin, not the cause of it.

Musonius Rufus, a Stoic philosopher of the time of Nero, does not use the term *πνεῦμα*. He employs soul and body as complementary terms, and once (24. 9-11) says expressly that man is a composite of soul and body. That *ψυχή* was for him a term inclusive of all the vital and psychical elements of man is suggested in 87. 14-16:

For we do not philosophize with hand or foot or the rest of the body, but with soul, and with but a small part of this, which we call understanding [*διάνοια*].

When, accordingly, he makes the soul the organ through which man knows God, saying (134. 5),

Why dost thou tarry, or what art thou waiting for? Cut out the dead part of thy soul and thou shalt know God!

the soul must doubtless be understood as possessing this power by virtue of the understanding, *διάνοια*. Musonius uses *σάρξ* only once, and then it denotes flesh in the physical sense.

Cornutus, a Stoic contemporary of Musonius Rufus, uses *πνεῦμα* in the sense of gas or vapor. It has no ethical, vital, or theological meaning. He employs *ψυχή* sixteen times in senses already familiar. He holds that the soul is composed of fire and located in the head. Zeus is the all-permeating world-soul. Cornutus also furnishes examples of the usage, as old as Homer, of *ψυχαί* used of the spirits of the dead in Hades. *Σάρξ* does not occur.

Plutarch, one of the most voluminous and best-known writers of the first century A.D., who wrote about a generation later than

¹ The impression that Seneca ascribes morally corrupting power to the body by virtue of its materiality seems to have arisen from what is clearly shown by the context to be a misinterpretation of *putre* in *Ep.* 120. 17 and of *inficitur* in *Dial.* vi. 24. 5. In the former case he is clearly contrasting the body, as a ruinous, ramshackle, and hence temporary, dwelling of the soul, with its aspirations after eternal things. In the latter, the words that precede *inficitur* and those that follow, referring to the soul as imprisoned and restrained, naturally require, not the derived meaning "stained," but the proper sense "submerged."

Seneca and Paul, is somewhat difficult to classify. Though undoubtedly much influenced by the Stoics and Academics, he was himself an eclectic rather than an adherent of any one school.¹ In the progress of this study hundreds of passages which illustrate his use of the terms under discussion have been collected and examined. In *De defectu oraculorum* 50, 51 he uses πνεῦμα in connection with the exhalation that arose out of the ground at Delphi and was the cause of the inspiration of the prophetess. When this exhalation instead of inspiring the Pythia produces disastrous effects he calls it a "dumb and evil πνεῦμα." Yet he also affirms that the power of the "spirit" is divine and celestial or demonic, but not perpetual or incorruptible or capable of enduring forever. The whole passage illustrates the ascription of supernatural and psychical effects to a subject itself substantially defined and materially conceived; πνεῦμα is throughout vapor, but, as vapor, is according to circumstances "inspiring" or "dumb" and "evil."

The passages quoted on pp. 101 f (cf. p. 81), in which πνεῦμα denotes the substance of the soul and a nervous fluid extending from the ruling part of man to the various organs, though affirmations about the views of the Stoics, doubtless reflect a usage still current in Plutarch's own day. It is still for him a term of substance, soul-stuff. He apparently never uses it in an individualizing or functional sense as a synonym for ψυχή.

Ψυχή occurs with great frequency in Plutarch. Prevailing, at least, in the *Non posse suaviter, Epit.*, and *De virtute et vitio*, it means the soul of man as the seat of emotion, thought, and will. His usage calls for no special discussion.

Σάρξ occurs more frequently in Plutarch than in any previous philosophic writer. It usually has the meaning "body." It might be expected that in opposing Epicureanism, which he interpreted as essentially sensualism, he would have been led to ascribe moral evil to the flesh. But though he constantly disparages the pleasures of the flesh or body as compared with those of the soul, not even in his polemic against Epicurus (*Non posse suaviter*), nor in his

¹ R. M. Jones, *The Platonism of Plutarch*, 1916, maintains that he is really a Platonist.

essay concerning virtue and vice, does he find in the flesh the root of moral evil or give to the term an ethical sense.¹

In the *Consolatio ad Apollonium*, indeed, comforting Apollonius over the death of his son and quoting from Socrates the statement that death is either like a very deep sleep or a long journey or is the utter extinction of soul and body, and that, whichever it is, it is not an evil, he says: "For to live in freedom from the flesh and its passions by which the mind is distracted and filled with mortal folly is a happy and blessed thing." Writing for such a purpose he naturally, like many a Christian writer of later days, emphasizes the evils of the present life and the advantage of being freed from them.² But not even this passage furnishes evidence of being rooted in an ethical dualism of mind and matter. That this is not his view is made more clear by the extended quotation from Plato's *Phaedo* (64-68), in which the latter as already pointed out makes the body a hindrance to the soul's development, but not intrinsically evil.

The teachings of Epictetus, a Stoic contemporary of Plutarch, though perhaps a little younger, are preserved to us by his pupil Arrian. He regards man as dichotomous, consisting of body and soul. The substance of the soul is *πνεῦμα*, which is also one of the four elements (iii. 13. 15); death is the separation of the body from the *πνεῦμα* (iii. 24. 93, 94); vision is made possible by the *πνεῦμα* infused into the eyes (ii. 23. 3), a statement which reminds us of Plutarch *Epit.* iv. 15. *Πνεῦμα* is then to Epictetus a term of substance, "a vital spirit . . . a nervous fluid," as Schweighäuser calls it.

Ψυχή is for Epictetus the seat of life (iii. 22. 87) and thought, but especially of will. It is the supreme and best element in man. Thus, in vii. 3. 10:

For that there are three things that relate to man, soul, body, and things external, scarcely any man denies. It remains then for you philosophers to

¹ According to Zeller, *Philosophie der Griechen*, III, 2, pp. 186 ff., Plutarch, unwilling to ascribe the origin of evil to God, and unable to deny its existence—to both of which expedients the Stoics had resorted—found the source in a world-soul, distinct alike from matter, itself self-existent, and God. Matter is the sphere of operation both of good and of evil, in its lowest parts subject to the power of evil, but according to its true nature yearning after the good and the divine.

² It is a noteworthy fact that alike in Plato, Seneca, and Plutarch the passages which seem to come nearest to characterizing the body as evil are of this consolatory character.

answer which is best. What shall we say to men? Is the flesh the best? What, then, do we possess better than the flesh? The soul, he replied. (See also i. 3. 5, 6; 20. 17-18; ii. 1. 17; 23. 3, 20-22; iii. 13-15; iv. 7. 32.)

Epictetus, indeed, uses *αἵρεσις*, *προαίρεσις*, and *τὸ κυριεῖον* for the soul even more frequently perhaps than *ψυχή* itself.

Σάρξ is sometimes used by Epictetus of the soft part of the body, more commonly of the body as a whole. Epictetus continually depreciates the body or the flesh as compared with the soul; but on the other hand he does not find in the body or the flesh, by virtue of its character as matter, the source of moral evil. He is an anti-Epicurean moralist, not a philosophic dualist. Both soul and body go back at length to the four elements, which are not sharply distinguished from one another as regards their relation to soul and body respectively, and not distinguished at all ethically. There are, indeed, in both Plutarch and Epictetus indications of a movement in the direction of an ethical dualism, especially in the fact that flesh, which may be described as a middle term between body and matter (*ὕλη*), tends to take the place of body in ethical discussions. But neither of them actually arrives at an ethical dualism. In particular it is to be noted that *πνεῦμα* and *σάρξ* are not set in antithesis, and that neither of them is an ethical term.

The writings of Dio Chrysostom (50-125 A.D.), an orator with Stoic tendencies, are extensive and deal with a large variety of subjects, historical, biographical, literary, political, and ethical. They probably reflect the ordinary literary usage of the times, save as this may have been affected by his conscious efforts to follow the earlier classical models. *Πνεῦμα* occurs twelve times, mostly in its usual senses of wind, air, breath. In a striking passage (ii. 66. 5) the formative and active element in generation is said to be *πνεῦμα*. *Ψυχή* occurs over one hundred times meaning life and soul. It frequently stands in antithesis to *σῶμα*, with the implication that the *σῶμα* is inferior. *Σάρξ* occurs but once, and with the meaning flesh. *Πνεῦμα* and *ψυχή* are never set in antithesis to *σάρξ*, and moral evil is never traced either to *σάρξ* or to *σῶμα*. In the *Charidemus* two theories are advanced to account for the ills of human life: one that men are descended from the Titans, and, because the latter were enemies of the gods, the gods take

vengeance on men; the other that men are descended, not from the Titans, but from the gods, and are loved by the gods, the world having been made for their pleasure, but that evil arises when men choose to follow intemperance rather than reason (*νοῦς*). In the first instance it is not at all, and in the second not emphatically, moral evil that is spoken of.

These facts, taken in connection with the relative frequency and wide range of meaning of *ψυχή*, the entire absence of the use of *πνεῦμα* as a psychological term or as a predicate of God, and the absence of any ethical use of the word *σάρξ*,¹ tend to indicate that the New Testament usage of these words has been developed under influences quite different from those which affected the common Greek usage of the century, if the latter is adequately represented by Dio Chrysostom.

In Marcus Aurelius we have not a philosopher, strictly speaking, but a thoughtful man of affairs, a man of deep moral earnestness, who wrote down his meditations for his own benefit. Though much influenced by Stoicism, he is not to be classed as a Stoic philosopher, nor can there be found in his writings an altogether consistent psychology. He wrote a full century after the apostle Paul, but may legitimately be included in the present study because he furnishes to a certain extent an indication of the rate of movement of philosophic and ethical thought.

Πνεῦμα in Marcus Aurelius sometimes means simply air, but also (and this applies to *πνευμάτιον*) breath, breath of life; yet this is defined as wind (*ἄνεμος*) and is associated with the *σάρξ* (*σαρκίδιον*, or *κρεάδιον*) as in ii. 2. This investigation has discovered no clear instance of *πνεῦμα* or *πνευμάτιον* as an individualized term meaning (intelligent) spirit. Apparently Marcus Aurelius is not a trichotomist, although he employs various trichotomous series, as, e.g., *σάρκια*, *πνεῦμα* (or *πνευμάτιον*), *τὸ ἡγεμονικόν* (ii. 2); *σῶμα*, *ψυχή*, *νοῦς* (iii. 16); *σώματιον*, *πνευμάτιον*, *νοῦς* (xii. 3); cf. also *σώματιον*, *ψυχή* (vi. 32). He regards man as composed of body and soul; but soul is endowed with life and intelligence, or the soul is identified with the self and distinguished as such from the body (iv. 41; x. 1). As the second term of a trichotomous series,

¹ Nor is evil, so far as observed, in any way traced to matter.

πνεῦμα may approach or equal ψυχή, including life and the power of motion.

Ψυχή denotes all in man that is not body, including both the life-principle and the element of intelligence, choice, etc. (vi. 32; cf. v. 26); the life-principle only (rare, iii. 16); the element of intelligence, etc., equivalent to the "ruling part" (v. 11, and frequently by implication). Soul is ascribed to God (v. 34) and the universe (iv. 40; cf. viii. 54). Ψυχή is also used quantitatively (ix. 8), as πνεῦμα is in other writers. Man's soul is a part of the universal soul, as are all the souls of beings that have souls (xii. 1, 26, 30, 32). Incarnated in a lower animal it becomes a ψυχή ἄλογος (x. 33); in man and other rational beings (v. 34), a ψυχή νοερά. Though distinguished from the body, the soul is liable to extinction or dispersion at death, being only an exhalation from the blood (v. 33). Three possibilities await it: extinction, dispersion, and continued existence (viii. 25; xii. 3); but he has no expectation of the last.

Σάρξ, usually represented by its equivalents σάρκια, σωματίον, σῶμα, denotes one element of man's nature and this in itself inert. There is no trace in Marcus Aurelius of the thought that the flesh is the source of moral evil. Like Epictetus, he is an anti-Epicurean moralist, not a philosophic dualist. Equally absent is any assertion of the superiority of πνεῦμα over ψυχή. God has a ψυχή, but is never said to be πνεῦμα, and if there is any difference between the terms as applied to man, πνεῦμα is the more material and ψυχή the more psychical.

VI. THE ALL-PERMEATIVE ΠΝΕΪΜΑ

A few words may be added concerning πνεῦμα conceived of as permeating all things, whether animate or inanimate. Hints of this doctrine are found in Plutarch *De virt. mor.* 12; Galen *Introd. s. med.* 9., p. 726K (Arnim, II, 716); and *De Hipp. et Plat.* vi, p. 561K (Arnim, II, 710); Diog. Laert. vii. 84 (156), and earliest of all in Varro (26 B.C.) as quoted by Augustine *Civ. Dei* vii. 23, cited by Arnold, *Roman Stoicism*, p. 190, where, however, *anima* is more probably the equivalent of ψυχή than πνεῦμα. Finally, in Sextus Empiricus (225 A.D.) we find a fully developed doctrine of

πνεῦμα as permeating all things. In *Ad phýsicos* 126-31 he refutes the Pythagorean objection to the eating of the flesh of animals because "there is one *πνεῦμα* which extends like a soul throughout the world, which also unites us to them" by the reply that the argument proves too much. By the same token we could not cut plants and stones, he says, because there is a *πνεῦμα* that runs through us and all these. As early as the days of Aristotle there were those who conceived of *πνεῦμα* as the vital and generative substance that permeated all living things; Chrysippus, as Arius Didymus testifies, made the world-stuff self-moving *πνεῦμα*; by Seneca's time the suggestion had been made that the universe was the work of a divine spirit (*divinus spiritus*) diffused through all things great and small; a little later Plutarch and Epictetus, as did also Galen in the second century, conceive of *πνεῦμα* as a vital and nervous fluid, flowing from the soul to the eyes and other organs of sense; Galen applies the term *πνεῦμα ἐκτικόν* to what Plutarch had already called *ἔξις* ("cohesion"), and finally Sextus Empiricus in the third century definitely identifies the *πνεῦμα* which is in man with that which permeates also the plants and the rocks. Whenever this doctrine arose, both it and the doctrine of Chrysippus have this in common, viz., that to both there lies close at hand the identification of the *πνεῦμα* with God. Yet there seems to have been a singular reluctance to take the next step and say that God is *πνεῦμα*. Posidonius is the only Greek writer earlier than the author of the Fourth Gospel whom we definitely know to have made this statement.

CHAPTER V

ΠΝΕΥΜΑ, ΨΥΧΗ, AND ΣΑΡΞ IN JEWISH-GREEK LITERATURE

This literature ranges from the middle of the fourth century B.C., if we accept the earliest date assigned to the Book of Tobit, to the early part of the first century A.D. In bulk it is three or four times as great as the Old and New Testaments. Quasi-historical works written with a moral purpose, books of wisdom, exegesis, and apocalyptic, psalms, legends, and additions to canonical writings are among the types represented. For the explication of terms in the New Testament this closely related literature is of the utmost value. The following is an exhibit of the meanings of our terms in this literature.

I. ΠΝΕΥΜΑ

I. Wind, whether a gentle wind or blast.

Jos. *Bell.* iv. 477:¹ ἀφικόμενος γοῦν καθ' ἱστορίαν ἐπ' αὐτὴν Οὐεσπασιανὸς ἐκέλευσέ τινας τῶν νεῖν οὐκ ἐπισταμένων δεθέντας ὀπίσω τὰς χεῖρας ῥιφῆναι κατὰ τοῦ βυθοῦ, καὶ συνέβη πάντας ἐπινῆξασθαι καθάπερ ὑπὸ πνεύματος ἄνω βιαζομένους.

When Vespasian reached it [Lake Asphaltitis], as the story goes, he commanded certain of those who did not know how to swim to have their hands bound behind and to be thrown down into the deep, and it came to pass they all came up as if they were forced upward by a wind.

See also Sir. 39:28; 43:17; Dan. 3:50, 65; Sib. Or. iii. 102.

Wisd. 5:11, 23; 7:20; 13:2; 17:17. Schoemaker² lists about forty-five instances of this usage in Philo, some of which (marked

¹ In the supplementary lists of citations references to translated works are given first. Josephus is counted among original Greek works, despite the fact that the *War* was originally written in Aramaic, because the translation is by the author himself. Citations usually refer to the edition of Niese, *Flavii Josephi Opera* (Berlin, 1887). Only occasional examples are cited from the Greek version of the canonical books of the Old Testament, as these would be largely repetitions of the long lists given in the chapter on the usage of the Hebrew words.

² "The Use of פרוח in the Old Testament and of Πνεῦμα in the New Testament," by William Ross Schoemaker, in the *Journal of Biblical Literature*, 1904, Part I, pp. 13-67; also issued separately.

below with a *), however, appear to refer to air rather than wind. The following is his list, slightly amended:¹ *Op. mund.* 29. 4*; 30. 1*, 2*; 58. 6; 131. 15; *Leg. alleg.* iii. 53. 6; *Cherub.* 37. 8; 38. 2; 111. 6; *Post. Caini* 22. 4; *Gigant.* 9. 4*; 10. 5*; *Quod deus immut.* 60. 4; *Agric.* 174. 4; *Ebriet.* 106. 2*; *Migrat. Abr.* 148. 6; 217. 4; *Quis rer. div.* 208. 3; *Congr. erud. gr.* 133. 5; *Somn.* ii. 13. 4; 67. 8; 85. 4; 86. 4; 166. 4; *Abr.* 43. 2; 92. 4; 160. 4; *Josepho.* 33. 1; *Vita Mos.* i. 41. 2; 179. 4; iii. 104. 3; *Spec. leg.* i. 26. 2; 92. 1; 301. 2; ii. 71. 6; iv. 28. 1; 217. 4(?); *Praem. et poen.* 41. 7; *Incor. mund.* 11. 3; 139. 4; *Lib. in Flacc.* 155. 5; *Leg. ad Gai.* 177. 2; *Mund.* 20 (Richter); *Frag. (quater)*. Examples also occur in *Jos. Ant.* i. 27; ii. 343, 349; iv. 55; viii. 346; ix. 36, 210; x. 279; xii. 75; xiv. 28; xvi. 17, 20, 62.

II. Breath, or breath of life.

Jos. Ant. iii. 291: μήκος μὲν ἔχει πηχυαῖον ὀλίγῳ λείπον, στενὴ δ' ἐστὶ σύριγξ αὐλοῦ βραχεῖ παχυτέρα, παρέχουσα δὲ εὖρος ἄρκοῦν ἐπὶ τῷ στόματι πρὸς ὑποδοχὴν πνεύματος κτλ.

It [the trumpet] has a length a little less than a cubit, and the narrow mouthpiece is thicker in size than a flute, but has a breadth sufficient for receiving breath at the mouth.

See also *Jer.* 10:14; *Enoch* 14:2; *Bel* 36.

Wisd. 11:20 (*bis*); 15:11; *Ep. Jer.* 25 (24); *Letters of Heraclitus*² vii. 63; *Philo*³ *Leg. alleg.* i:91. 6; *Somn.* i:30. 3; *Vita Mos.* i:93. 2; *Exsecrat.* 144. 2; *Quod deus immut.* 84. 2; *Incor. mund.* 128. 5; *Leg. ad Gai.* 63. 6; 125. 6; 188. 2; *Frag.*; *Jos. Ant.* xvii. 169. So apparently figuratively in *Philo Spec. leg.* iv. 217. 4.

By metonymy, πνεῦμα ζωῆς, breath of life, is used for a living person. *Jth.* 10:13; cf. *Gen.* 6:17, etc.

III. Spirit: that of which sentient, conscious beings are composed or by virtue of which they are sentient and conscious.

¹ Schoemaker employs the notation of the edition of Richter, to which also the sections of the English translation by Yonge correspond. In these lists, however, the edition used is that of Cohn and Wendland, the notation referring to sections and lines of their edition. In the discussion on pp. 157 ff. the notation of the English translation of Yonge is added in parenthesis instead of the line-number.

² In Bernays, *Die heraklitischen Briefe*, Berlin, 1869.

³ After Schoemaker.

1. Spirit of God, as the source of power, wisdom, and, rarely, of life.

Wisd. 1:7: ὅτι πνεῦμα κυρίου πεπλήρωκε τὴν οἰκουμένην, καὶ τὸ συνέχον τὰ πάντα γινώσιν ἔχει φωνῆς.

Because the spirit of the Lord fills the world and that which holds together all things has knowledge of (every) voice.

See also Sir. 39:6; 48:12, 24; Jth. 16:14; Sus. 42 (45), 64 (62); Test. XII., Sim. 4:4; Lev. 2:3; 18:7, 11; Jud. 20:5; 24:2; Gad. 4:7; Ben 8:2; Ps. Sol. 17:42; 18:8(?).

Wisd. 1:5, 6; 7:7, 22; 9:17; 12:1; ps.-Phoc., l. 106 (cf. p. 19); Philo¹ *Op. mund.* 144. 6;² *Leg. alleg.* i. 33. 2,² 4, 5, 6; 37. 4, 5; 42. 2, 5; *Gigant.* 19. 2, 3; 22. 1, 3; 23. 3,² 4;² 24. 2, 4, 5; 27. 1;² 28. 1;² 29. 3;² 47. 6;² 53. 2;² 55. 1;² *Quod deus immut.* i. 5;² 2. 3; *Plant.* 18. 5;² 24. 6;² 44. 4; *Quis rer. div.* 57. 2;² 265. 3;² *Fuga* 186. 5;² *Somn.* ii. 252. 2; *Josepho.* 116. 6; *Vita Mos.* i. 175. 3; ii. 40. 7; iii. 265. 3;² *Decalog.* 175. 6; *Spec. leg.* iv. 49. 5;² *Human.* 135. 8; *Nobil.* 217. 7; *Frag.*; *Jos. Ant.* iv. 108, 118,² 119; vi. 166,² 222,² 223; viii. 114, 408;² x. 239.

In Wisd. 1:5, 6; 7:7, 22, the term spirit predicated of wisdom personified might seem to mean a (good) spirit and so to fall under 4; but in view of the connection between 1:5, 6 and 1:7 and of 9:17 (cf. also Deut. 34:9 and comment on p. 57), it is better to interpret it as referring to the Spirit of God.

2. Spirit, as the substance of which the human soul, or its dominant part, is composed,³ usually characterized as divine.

Philo *Quis rer. div.* 55. 5: ἔδοξε τῷ νομοθέτῃ διττὴν καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι ψυχῆς, αἷμα μὲν τῆς ὅλης, τοῦ δ' ἡγεμονικωτάτου πνεύμα θεῖον.

It is the opinion of the lawgiver that the substance of the soul is two-fold—blood that of the whole soul and divine spirit that of the dominant part of it.

See also Philo *Op. mund.* 135. 3; *Spec. leg.* iv. 123. 4,² 9, 10.

Similarly of the substance which extends from the dominant part of the soul to the organs of sense. Philo *Fuga* 182. 6. Cf. Test. XII., Reub. 2:3 ff.

¹ After Schoemaker.

² πνεῦμα θεῖον.

³ Cf. meaning 3. p. 80, and meaning 4. p. 81; also p. 135.

3. The spirit of man.

a) As the seat of various passions, qualities, and emotions.

Jth. 7:19: καὶ οἱ υἱοὶ Ἰσραὴλ ἀνεβόησαν πρὸς κύριον θεὸν αὐτῶν, ὅτι ὀλιγοψύχησεν τὸ πνεῦμα αὐτῶν.

And the children of Israel cried unto the Lord their God because their spirit was faint.

See also Sir. 31 (34):13 (14); I Macc. 13:7; I Esd. 2:2, 7(8); Bar. 3:1; Tob. 4:3(N); Jth. 14:6; Wisd. 5:3; Test. XII. Sim. 5:1; Jos. 7:2; IV Macc. 11:11.

Sometimes seemingly but probably not in reality, by metonymy for an emotion or quality itself.

Jos. Bell. iii. 92: καὶ τινος ἀρτίου πνεύματος ὑποπιμπλάμενοι τῇ βοῇ συνεξαίρουσιν τὰς δεξιὰς.

And being filled with a certain warlike spirit, they raise up their right hands with the battle-shout.

See also Sus. 42 (45) (Th.); Isa. 19:14; Ps. Sol. 8:15. On Wisd. 1:5, 6; 7:7, 22, see under III. 1.

b) With kindred meaning, but with special reference to the moral and religious life; sometimes associated with ψυχή.

Sir. 9:9 (13): μὴ ποτε ἐκκλίνη ἡ ψυχὴ σου ἐπ' αὐτήν, καὶ τῷ πνεύματί σου ὀλισθήσῃς εἰς ἀπώλειαν.¹

Lest thy soul incline unto her and with thy spirit thou slide into destruction.

See also Ps. 34:18 (19); 50 (51) 19; Isa. 26:9; Hag. 1:14; Dan. 3:39, 86; 5:4; Song of three, chap. 16; Wisd. 7:23.

c) As the seat of mentality.

I Chron. 28:12: τὸ παράδειγμα ὃ εἶχεν ἐν πνεύματι αὐτοῦ τῶν αὐλῶν οἶκον κυρίου.

The pattern which he had in his mind of the courts of the house of the Lord.

See also Job 20:3; Isa. 29:24; Ezek. 11:5b; 20:31; Test. XII. Jud. 20:2; IV Macc. 7:14.

d) As the seat or cause of life: apparently not always, but frequently, thought of as an entity capable of separate existence; sometimes spoken of as pre-existing, sometimes as the cause of life in the embodied person, sometimes as departing in death, or capable

¹ But see the variant reading αἵματι for πνεύματι, vouched for by Clem. Alex. and adopted by Box and Oesterley in Charles, *Apoc. and Pseudepigr. of the O. T.*, I, 347.

of returning, sometimes as existing after death in a more or less conscious state of misery or happiness.¹ Cf. *ψύχη*, I.

Jos. *Bell.* vii. 185: τὰ γὰρ καλούμενα δαιμόνια, ταῦτα δὲ πονηρῶν ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπων πνεύματα τοῖς ζῶσιν εἰσδύμενα καὶ κτείνοντα τοὺς βοηθείας μὴ τυγχάνοντας κτλ.

For the so-called demons, these are the spirits of evil men which, entering into living men, slay them unless help comes.

See also Job 10:12; 12:10; Ps. 30 (31):5; Isa. 42:5; Zech. 12:1; Tob. 3:6; Bar. 2:17; Dan. 5:4; Enoch 9:3, 10; 13:6; 20:3; 22:3-13; Sir. 38:23.

Wisd. 2:3; 15:11, 16; 16:14; II Macc. 7:22, 23; 14:46; III Macc. 6:24; IV Macc. 12:20 (N.); Test. XII. Gad. 5:9.

4. A superhuman, incorporeal being, but not divine.

a) An incorporeal heavenly being; frequent in Enoch I, and probably used in the title "Lord of Spirits" applied to God in the Similitudes, though the Greek text of this portion is not extant.

Enoch 15:4: καὶ ὑμεῖς ἦτε ἅγιοι καὶ πνεύμα(τα) ζῶντα αἰώνια.

And ye were holy and spirits endowed with eternal life.

See also Jub. 2:2a; Enoch 13:6; 15:6, 7, 8a, 10a; 20:6 (*bis*).

b) An evil spirit, which tempts or torments men; a demon; sometimes conceived of as identical with the souls of the wicked dead, including the giants above named.

Tob. 6:7 (8): ἡ καρδία καὶ τὸ ἥπαρ, ἐάν τινα ὀχλῇ δαιμόνιον ἢ πνεῦμα πονηρόν, ταῦτα δεῖ καπνίσαι ἐνώπιον ἀνθρώπου ἢ γυναικός, καὶ μηκέτι ὀχληθῇ.

The heart and the liver, if a demon or evil spirit trouble anyone, are to be smoked in the presence of a man or woman, and he will be troubled no longer.

¹ The range of usage here included is very wide, but it is impossible to divide the examples into clearly distinguished subclasses. Nor is it easy to distinguish with certainty the instances properly falling under this head from those which belong under II, breath of life, for the reason that neither Hebrew nor Greek writers themselves make a sharp distinction. רִיחַ and πνεῦμα were to them not strictly immaterial terms, and the "spirit" that departed at death or that came in life was closely associated with the breath for which they often employed the same term. The passages that are assigned to this head are so placed because it seems evident on the whole that the writer is thinking of something else and more vital and sentient than the breath.

See also I Kings 22:21-23; II Chron. 18:20-22; Enoch 15:9a, 11, 12; 16:1; 19:1; Test. XII. Reub. 2:1; 3:3 ff.; Jud. 16:1 et freq. Jos. *Ant.* vi. 211; cf. *Bell.* vii. 185 under 3 (d).

c) Without reference to the distinction between good and evil spirits, or mode or place of existence; an incorporeal being in general.

Num. 16:22: Θεὸς τῶν πνευμάτων καὶ πάσης σαρκός.

God of the spirits and of every corporeal being.

See also Jub. 2:2 *fin.*; Test. XII. Jud. 20:1. Cf. II Chron. 18:23.

Philo *Post Caini* 67 (19); *Agric.* 44 (10).

II. ΨΥΧΗ

1. Life, loss of which is death.

Jos. *Bell.* iv. 164: καὶ καθάπερ ἐν ἐρημίᾳ τὴν ἑμαυτοῦ ψυχὴν ἐπιδώσω μόνην ὑπὲρ τοῦ θεοῦ.

And, as it were, alone in a desert I will give up my life for God's sake.

See also I Esd. 4:21; Jth. 7:27; 10:15; 12:4; 13:20; Tob. 12:10(8); 14:11(?); Sir. 51:3(6), 6(8); Sus. 55 (*bis*); I Macc. 2:40, 50; 3:21; 9:9, 44; 12:51; 13:5.

Wisd. 14:5; 16:9; II Macc. 14:38; III Macc. 2:32; 6:6; IV Macc. 9:7, 25; 12:20 (So V; A omits; 8 reads πνεῦμα); Philo *Op. mund.* 65. 3; *Leg. alleg.* iii. 70. 2; 71. 2(?); *Quod det. pot.* 80. 1, 2; 84. 2; 91. 3; 115. 1; Jos. *Ant.* i. 102;¹ 144 (*bis*), 148, 159; iv. 278 (*bis*); v. 147; vi. 215, 240, 287, 317; vii. 325; viii. 225, 300, 325, 326; ix. 119, 137, 240; x. 26, 53, 203; xi. 52, 255, 278; xii. 431; xiii. 13, 193, 199, 381; xiv. 67, 369; xvi. 330; xvii. 134, 178, 278; xviii. 358; xix. 107, 141, 150, 314; xx. 84; *Bell.* i. 376, 493; ii. 153, 201, 450; iv. 164, 191; v. 456; vi. 66, 183, 194, 309, 349; *Vita* 355; *Contra Ap.* 2. 202, 203.

Figuratively, in *Letters of Heraclitus* v. 5.

2. By metonymy, a living being, any being who possesses ψυχή, without exclusive reference to men. As in the LXX, following the Hebrew, so in Philo the word ζωῆς is sometimes added, emphasizing by separate expression the idea of life.

¹ For the meaning of the passage of the Hebrew Bible here referred to see 𐤒𐤓𐤁 I, p. 63. But Josephus probably used the word in the sense of life. If he retained the Hebrew idea, these and other similar passages should be placed under 2.

Jth. 11:7; Sir. 16:30; Philo *Leg. alleg.* i. 18. 2, 3; 31. 3; 32. 5, 6; 34. 10 (?); ii. 9. 5; *Quod det. pot.* 80. 6; *Sac. Ab. et Cai.* v. 5. For the similar use with exclusive reference to men, see 5 below.

3. Soul, that entity which, residing in a living being, makes it alive and gives it sentiency, which departs from it in death, and after death is capable of a more or less conscious existence of misery or happiness.¹

Jos. *Bell.* ii. 156: ταῖς δὲ τῶν πονηρῶν ψυχαῖς καθ' ἑδου τὸν ἀσεβῶν χώρον, κτλ.

But to the souls of the wicked [is fated] the region of the ungodly in Hades.

See also Ps. 49:16; Enoch 9:3, 10; Tob. 14:11 (?).

Wisd. 2:22; 3:1; 15:8, 11;² 16:14; IV Macc. 13:21; 18:23; Alex. Polyhistor³ 139. 107 (*bis*), 113, 122; Hermippus⁴ 10 (last line); 21. 8; Hecataeus of Abdera⁵ 7. 15; pseudo-Phocylides 105, 112, 115; *Letters of Heraclitus* v. 15; Sib. Or. iii. 724. Jos. *Ant.* i. 231; vi. 329 (*bis*), 330 (*bis*), 332, 334; *Bell.* iii. 374, 375; vii. 354.

In Wisd. 8:19 ψυχή is used of a pre-existent soul. So also IV Macc. 13:13, 21; 18:23.

4. Soul as a constituent element of a rational or sentient being: the seat of vitality, thought, and emotion, not usually at least with the idea of the possibility of separate existence; especially with reference to man, the human mind in the larger sense of the word.

a) Applied to man.

Wisd. 1:4: ὅτι εἰς κακότεχνον ψυχὴν οὐκ εἰσελεύσεται σοφία.

Because wisdom will not enter a soul that does evil.

See also Tob. 1:11; 3:1, 10; 6:17; 8:20; 13:6, 7, 15; Jth. 4:9; 8:24; 11:8, 16; 14:19; 16:9; Sir. 1:30; 2:1, 17; 4:2, 6, 17,

¹ In this usage there is a blending or union of the idea of the shade found in the old Greek writers and of the Hebrew נֶפֶשׁ as a living creature. Cf. נֶפֶשׁ, I, p. 62. It is difficult to be certain precisely what thought the word represented in the mind of the Greek translator of a Hebrew passage, in particular to distinguish between examples of this usage and the meaning self, but the passages cited above seem with reasonable certainty to belong here. Cf. the similar use of πνεῦμα, III. 2. d), p. 144.

² Notice in this passage (Wisd. 15:11, 12) the occurrence of the four words ψυχή, πνεῦμα, ζωή, βίος. The whole chapter is instructive on the relation of these terms.

³ In Müller, *Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum*, III, 206-44.

⁴ *Ibid.*, III, 35-54.

⁵ *Ibid.*, II, 384-96.

20, 22; 5:2; 6:2, 4 (?), 26, 32; 7:11, 17, 20, 21, 26, 29; 9:2, 6, 9; 10:28, 29; 12:11; 14:2, 4, 8, 9, 16; 16:17; 18:31; 19:3, 4, 16; 20:22; 21:2, 27, 28; 23:6, 16, 18; 24:1; 25:2; 26:14, 15; 27:16; 29:15; 30:7, 21, 23; 37:6, 8, 12, 14, 19, 22, 27, 28; 40:29; 45:23; 47:15; 50:25; 51:6, 19, 20, 24, 26, 29; Bar. 3:1 (?); Ep. Jer. 7; I Macc. 1:48; 3:31; 8:27.

Wisdom. 1:11; 3:13; 4:11; 7:27; 9:3, 15; 10:16; 14:11, 26; 15:14; 17:8, 15; II Macc. 1:3; 3:16; 5:11; 6:30; 7:12, 37; 11:9; 15:17, 30; III Macc. 2:20; 4:4; 5:42; IV Macc. 1:20, 26, 28; 2:1; 3:3, 15; 5:26; 6:29; 7:4; 8:29; 10:4; 13:15; 14:6a; 15:4, 25; Alex. Polyhistor 9, line 5 from bottom; 139. 65-68, 77, 92, 95, 100, 102; Hecataeus of Abdera 7. 15; 12. xlviii. 11; xlix. 11; 14. 26; 14. 97; pseudo-Phocylides,¹ line 50, 228; *Letters of Heraclitus*² iii. 2; iv. 39; v. 24; viii. 37; ix. 54-55; Theodotus (Euseb. *P.E.*) ix. 22 (=Alex. Pol. 9. 5); Sib. Or. iii. 230; Philo *Op. mund.* 18. 2; 20. 2; 30. 5; 53. 5; 54. 6; 66. 8; 67. 11; 69. 6; 78. 15; 79. 7; 81. 5; 117. 4; 119. 5; 128. 10; 136. 2; 139. 2; 140. 2; 141. 12; 145. 2; 151. 5; 154. 4, 6; 155. 1, 6; 164. 5; 172. 2. *Leg. alleg.* i. 11. 1; 16. 5; 24. 6, 9; 38. 1; 40. 3; 41. 6; 45. 5; 46. 5; 48. 7; 49. 3; 50. 4; 51. 1, 9; 56. 4; 66. 5, 9; 70. 4; 71. 3, 5; 72. 4; 76. 3, 7; 80. 8; 82. 9; 91. 8; 97. 3, 5; 100. 7; 104. 7; 105. 4, 5, 6; 106. 3, 6, 8; 107. 3, 4; 108. 3, 5; ii. 2. 6; 5. 5, 6; 6. 5; 8. 3, 7; 9. 7; 11. 7; 13. 2; 23. 1, 3; 24. 2, 7; 32. 7; 34. 3, 4; 53. 5, 7, 9; 55. 1, 6; 56. 3; 60. 3; 61. 2, 4; 62. 2, 5; 63. 2, 6; 67. 8; 73. 5; 75. 2; 77. 3, 4, 7; 84. 6; 85. 9; 86. 4; 89. 4; 90. 3, 5; 91. 6; 93. 4; 95. 2, 4; 97. 2, 5; 100. 2; 101. 5; 102. 7; iii. 8. 2 (*bis*), 4; 11. 1; 12. 6; 18. 10; 19. 2, 4; 20. 7; 21. 5; 22. 6; 27. 3, 7; 28. 5; 31. 1; 36. 8; 37. 5; 38. 5; 40. 2, 8; 43. 1, 5; 44. 1, 6; 52. 2; 53. 4; 62. 5; 69. 4, 6; 70. 2; 71. 2; 72. 1, 2, 4, 6; 74. 1; 75. 4; 80. 2; 81. 2; 82. 2; 84. 2; 86. 5; 87. 7, 8; 88. 6; 89. 3; 91. 2; 93. 3; 95. 4, 6; 106. 3; 107. 4, 7; 110. 3; 113. 2; 115. 2; 117. 2; 120. 5; 124. 4, 7; 128. 4, 9; 129. 4; 130. 2; 131. 5; 136. 5; 137. 3; 140. 3; 141. 3; 148. 2, 4; 149. 4; 150. 2, 7; 151. 6; 152. 2; 158. 2; 160. 4; 161. 3, 6, 9; 162. 2, 6; 163. 2; 165. 1; 166. 4; 167. 3 (*bis*); 168. 2; 172. 2; 173. 8; 174. 6; 176. 2, 6;

¹ In Bergk, *Poetae lyriici graeci*, II, 450-75.

² In Bernays, *Die heraklitischen Briefe*, Berlin, 1869.

178. 6; 179. 6; 180. 5; 186. 11; 187. 4; 190. 2; 191. 4, 7; 193. 2; 200. 8; 203. 2; 212. 2, 7; 215. 3; 219. 7; 224. 1; 234. 6; 235. 5, 6; 236. 9; 238. 2, 4; 239. 2, 4; 242. 8; 243. 3; 246. 5; 247. 6, 7; 248. 2; 249. 6; 251. 5. *Cherub.* 4. 3; 9. 8; 12. 4; 17. 2, 8; 27. 1; 32. 2; 48. 2; 50. 4; 51. 1; 52. 4; 57. 7; 59. 2; 60. 3; 63. 6; 68. 2; 69. 2, 6; 70. 6; 73. 1; 74. 6; 75. 7; 77. 2; 78. 6; 82. 1; 84. 8; 93. 4; 95. 2; 96. 4; 98. 2; 100. 6; 101. 2; 103. 4; 104. 3; 106. 6; 114. 6; 117. 6; 128. 6. *Sac. Ab. et Cai.* 1. 3; 3. 2, 4; 5. 2, 5; 6. 2; 9. 4; 10. 3; 16. 4; 20. 1; 36. 6; 37. 8; 39. 1, 2; 44. 3; 48. 2; 59. 6; 60. 2; 61. 1; 64. 1, 5; 69. 2; 70. 7; 72. 5, 10; 73. 3; 78. 7; 79. 8; 80. 2, 8; 84. 4; 85. 2; 86. 6; 87. 5; 94. 4; 101. 7; 102. 4; 103. 3; 111. 4; 112. 2; 114. 7; 117. 3; 119. 3; 121. 2; 122. 3; 126. 3; 127. 3; 130. 3; 134. 7; *Quod. det. pot.* 7. 3; 8. 4; 9. 3 (*bis*); 15. 5; 16. 6; 19. 7; 21. 4; 22. 5; 23. 2, 7; 29. 8; 30. 4; 33. 2, 4; 34. 8; 35. 4; 42. 2; 43. 8; 44. 3; 48. 1; 50. 2; 58. 6; 59. 5; 65. 2; 74. 3, 8; 81. 1, 3; 82. 3; 83. 6; 84. 3; 86. 3, 7; 91. 1; 95. 2, 10; 97. 4; 103. 5; 105. 5; 109. 3; 110. 4; 111. 4; 115. 1; 132. 5; 137. 2; 139. 6; 141. 10 (*bis*); 149. 3; 159. 6; 168. 2; 169. 1; 170. 2, 5; sometimes in Philo the soul is set in contrast with the body and its divine origin is affirmed, either directly or contextually: *Op. mund.* 134. 6, 12; 137. 5; 139. 6; *Leg. alleg.* iii. 161. 4; *Cherub.* 101. 2; *Sac. Ab. et Cai.* 136. 2; 139. 6; *Quod det. pot.* 3. 2; 4. 5; 5. 2; 88. 5; 90. 4 (important); *Jos. Ant.* i. 34, 46; ii. 9; iii. 208, 260; iv. 153, 210 (*bis*), 219, 291, 294, 298, 329; vi. 3, 21, 160 (*bis*), 211, 230, 375; vii. 39, 275; viii. 256, 282, 419; x. 42, 119, 132, 194; xi. 3, 40, 165, 240; xii. 255, 281, 304; xiii. 176; 198, 201, 362; xv. 60, 147, 158, 191, 194, 212, 257; xvi. 75, 93, 211, 260, 301, 380, 392, 403; xvii. 177, 238, 354; xviii. 14, 16, 18, 117, 144, 333; xix. 56, 325; xx. 83; *Bell.* i. 81, 84, 95, 429, 524, 610, 647, 650; ii. 31, 60, 136, 141, 154, 156, 158, 163, 165, 357, 377, 476, 580 (*bis*), 588; iii. 2, 3, 102, 212, 268, 296, 354, 356, 362, 372, 378; iv. 34, 50, 175, 193, 208, 308; v. 126, 222, 368, 525, 526; vi. 11, 13, 19, 38, 46, 47, 55 (*bis*), 63, 81, 233, 288, 332; vii. 241, 339, 340, 344, 345, 348, 349, 352, 355, 418, 451; *Vita* 209; 323; 420; *Contra Ap.* 1. 164, 187, 201; 2. 178; figuratively, ascribed to religion, *IV Macc.* 14:6b.

b) As the cosmic principle of the universe. Philo *Leg. alleg.* i. 91. 9, 10.

5. By metonymy, for "person," or with a possessive limitation, "self."

Bar. 2:18: ἀλλὰ ἡ ψυχὴ ἡ λυπομένη ἐπὶ τὸ μέγεθος . . . καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ἡ πεινώσα δώσουσί σοι δόξαν καὶ δικαιοσύνην, κύριε.

But the soul that grieveth greatly . . . and the soul that hungereth will give to thee glory and righteousness, Lord.

See also Bar. 3:1 (?); I Macc. 2:38; 9:2; 10:33; Sir. 19:3; Jos. *Ant.* ii. 144; iv. 179; *Bell.* vii. 398.

Wisd. 10:7; 12:6; 17:1; Enoch 16:1 and the passages cited p. 67, c) *ad fin.*

A number of what may be called transitional cases, where the meaning approaches, but has not clearly passed into, that of "person," have been observed. E.g., Philo *Op. mund.* 144. 9; *Leg. alleg.* i. 34. 10; ii. 83. 2; 86. 7; iii. 27. 3, 7; 82. 3; 88. 6; 173. 2, 6 (60); 213. 3; 215. 5; *Cherub.* 106. 6; *Letters of Heraclitus* iii. 5; Sib. Or. iii. 458, 558, 678.

By further metonymy, for the power, possibilities, and interests of the self, the human person. See Prov. 6:32; 8:36; Sir. 4:20, 22; 10:28, 29; 14:14; 19:4; 20:22; I Macc. 2:50.

6. Soul-substance, which, existing in different grades and qualities, is partaken of by both men and the lower animals.¹

Philo *Op. mund.* 65.3 ff.: For of soul the most sluggish and least formed has been allotted to the race of fishes, and the keenest and in all respects best to the race of men. . . . Therefore, of the things that have soul he created the fishes first, which partake more of bodily than of soul-substance (ψυχικὴ οὐσία). But after all, as has been said, he produced man, to whom he gave an excellent endowment, viz., mind (νοῦς), soul of soul, as it were, like the pupil of the eye. [Cf. 73.]

Closely akin to this usage and perhaps identical with it is ψυχὴ as defined in *Leg. alleg.* ii. 22-23. Here Philo, enumerating the climactic series ἔξις, φύσις, ψυχὴ, νοῦς, διάνοια, says that ἔξις, "cohesion," is common to stocks and stones as well as to animate beings and is shared by men in their bones; φύσις is ἔξις plus the power of motion and is found in plants and in us in our nails and hair; ψυχὴ is φύσις plus the power of mentality and (impulse or will) effort, and is common to men and the lower animals.

¹ Cf. πνεῦμα, pp. 80, 124, 135, 143.

III. ΣΑΡΞ

1. The soft muscular portion of the body of men or animals.

Alex. Polyhistor 9, line 35 from bottom: αὐτὸς ἀπ' οὐρανόθεν κέλετ' ἀνέρα παντὶ σὺν οἴκῳ σάρκ' ἀποσυλῆσαι πόσθης ἄπο. . . .

He himself from heaven commanded a man with all his house to strip off the flesh of the foreskin.

See also Jth. 14:10; 16:17; Sir. 19:12; 23:16 (cf. Enoch 15:9); 34 (31): 1; 38:28; I Macc. 7:17; Ps. Sol. 4:21; 13:3; Enoch 8:4 (Syn.); 7:5 (Giz.).

Wisdom. 12:5; 19:21; II Macc. 9:9; IV Macc. 6:6; 9:17, 20, 28; 10:8, 15 (*bis*), 20. Alex. Polyhistor 139. 75; *Letters of Heraclitus* v. 28. Philo *Ebriet.* 87. 2; *Domn.* ii. 216, 3, 6; *Josepho* 96. 4; *Spec. leg.* iii. 115. 3; iv. 103. 1; 122. 5. Jos. *Bell.* iii. 274; v. 4; vi. 55.

2. By synecdoche, for the body as a whole, without distinction of flesh, skin, or bones. Often used in the plural.

Sib. Or. iii. 697: πῖεται δέ τε γαῖα καὶ αὐτὴ αἵματος ὀλλυμένων. κορέσονται θηρία σαρκῶν.

And earth shall also herself drink of the blood of those that are slain. Wild beasts shall satiate themselves with flesh.

See also Ex. 30:32; Sir. 25: 26; 44: 20; Ps. Sol. 4:7; 16:14; Enoch 16:1 (Syn.); 16:1 (Giz.).

Wisdom. 7:2; IV Macc. 7:13, 18; Philo *Leg. alleg.* i. 76. 4, 8; iii. 152. 5; 158. 4; *Gigant.* 19. 4; 29. 1, 2; 30. 2; 31. 4; 32. 5 (*bis*); 34. 2, 5; 40. 3, 4; 45. 4; *Quod deus sit*, i. 6; 56. 3; 140. 3; 141. 2, 3; 142. 5; 143. 5; 144. 1; *Ebriet.* 69. 3; *Migr. Abra.* 14. 8; 29. 3; *Quis rer. div.* 57. 2; 71. 3; *Mutat. nom.* 32. 4; 174. 5; *Vita Mos.* i. 54. 4; *Spec. leg.* i. 176. 6; iv. 114. 6. Jos. *Ant.* xix. 325; *Bell.* ii. 155; vi. 47.

In Sir. 23:16; Enoch 15:9 (Syn.): τὸ σῶμα τῆς σαρκὸς is used pleonastically for τὸ σῶμα.

3. By metonymy, for kindred or the basis of kinship.

II Sam. 5:1: καὶ παραγίνονται πᾶσαι αἱ φυλαὶ Ἰσραὴλ πρὸς Δαυεὶδ εἰς Χεβρων καὶ εἶπαν αὐτῷ Ἰδοὺ ὅστᾳ σου καὶ σάρκες σου ἡμεῖς.

Then came all the tribes of Israel to David unto Hebron, and spake, saying, Behold, we are thy bone and thy flesh.

See also Lev. 18:6; II Sam. 19:12, 13.

4. A corporeal living creature.

a) Not applied to man exclusively.

Philo *Post. Caini* 67. 5: παρὸ καὶ Μωυσῆς εὐχόμενός φησιν· ἐπισκεψάσθω κύριος ὁ θεὸς τῶν πνευμάτων καὶ πάσης σαρκὸς ἄνθρωπον ἐπὶ τῆς συναγωγῆς ταύτης.

Wherefore also Moses praying says, Let the Lord God of the spirits and of all flesh appoint a man over this congregation.

See also Gen. 7:21; Num. 18:15 (p. 70), etc; Sir. 14:18; 17:4, 31; 18:13; 28:5; 30:29 (33:20); 30:38 (33:29); 39:19; 40:8; 41:3; 44:18; Bel 5; Enoch 1:9 (Giz.); 14:21 (Giz.); 15:4 (Giz.); 15:8 (Syn. and Giz.); 17:6 (Giz.)

With emphasis on the frailty of a corporeal being, Gen. 6:3.

b) Man as a corporeal being.

Jth. 10:13: καὶ οὐ διαφωνήσει τῶν ἀνδρῶν αὐτοῦ σὰρξ μία οὐδὲ πνεῦμα ζωῆς.

And there shall not perish of his men one person, nor one living being.

See also Jth. 2:3; Sir. 1:10; 13:16; 14:17; 44:27; 45:4; 46:19.

5. Allegorically used, σὰρξ sometimes denotes in Philo the physical senses.

Philo *Leg. alleg.* ii. 38. 1: ἀνεπλήρου δὲ σάρκα ἀντ' αὐτῆς (Gen. 2:21), τουτέστι συνεπλήρου τὴν καθ' ἑξὶν αἴσθησιν.

And he filled up with flesh instead of it, that is he filled up the sensation which acts according to habit.

See also *Leg. alleg.* ii. 20. 5, 7; 37. 5; 38. 3; 40. 2 (*bis*); 41. 4 (*bis*).

6. The literal sense disappearing, σὰρξ is allegorically interpreted by Philo as signifying a being living the life of the senses or such a mode of life.

Philo *Leg. alleg.* ii. 49. 7: ἔνεκα τῆς αἰσθήσεως ὁ νοῦς, ὅταν αὐτῇ δουλωθῇ . . . προσκολλᾶται καὶ ἐνοῦται τῇ αἰσθήσει καὶ ἀναλύεται εἰς αἴσθησιν, ἵνα γένωνται μία σὰρξ καὶ ἐν πάθος οἱ δύο.

For the sake of sensation the mind, when it is enslaved to it, is joined to, and united with, and dissolved into, sensation, in order that the two may become one flesh and one passion.

See also *Leg. alleg.* ii. 49. 3; 50. 4, 6.

We are now prepared for a fuller discussion of the facts exhibited in the foregoing tabulation of meanings, observing the usage of the various literary groups.

IV. TRANSLATED WORKS

In the canonical books of the LXX translation רִיחַ is regularly rendered by πνεῦμα, the translators availing themselves of certain relatively late meanings of that term which are attested by very few examples in Greek authors. For the LXX phrases πνεῦμα θεοῦ, πνεῦμα κυρίου, πνεῦμα ἁγίου, no earlier Greek vouchers have been discovered. A probable point of connection appears, however, in Menander's expression, θεῶν πνεῦμα.¹ The LXX translators, familiar with this probably current expression, apparently coined by analogy the expression πνεῦμα ἁγίου as a translation of רִיחַ קֹדֶשׁ, which, literally rendered, would have been πνεῦμα ἀγίωσύνης. The expressions πνεῦμα θεοῦ and πνεῦμα κυρίου are literal translations of the Hebrew.

Πνεῦμα as denoting the seat of emotion and mentality in the individual occurs frequently in the LXX, translating רִיחַ in the same sense; but πνοή and compounds of θυμός, ψυχή, and φρήν are also used. For this individualized sense of πνεῦμα a basis may have been found in the usage illustrated in the *Funeral Oration* of pseudo-Demosthenes.²

The LXX use of πνεῦμα to denote an unembodied being neither human nor divine finds no parallel in earlier Greek writers.³ It originated perhaps in the difficulty the translators felt with the idea of the Spirit of God working evil in one affected by it, there being joined to this the influence of such passages as I Kings 22:21; II Kings 19:7; Zech. 13:2; Job 4:15, etc. (see רִיחַ ii. 3, pp. 60 f.). The omission of the phrase "of God" in such passages as I Sam. 16:16, 23 (though it is inconsistently retained in vss. 14, 15) gave to πνεῦμα the definite objective meaning, "a spirit of evil."

Ψυχή is the standard equivalent of נֶפֶשׁ, though it occasionally represents other Hebrew words and other Greek words occasionally

¹ Kock, *Com. Att. Frag.*, III, 139; cf. p. 114.

² Pseudo-Demosthenes *Declam. fun.* 24; p. 82.

³ The earliest instance in non-Jewish Greek is perhaps Dion. Hal. *Antiq.* i. 31; cf. p. 81.

represent it. It covers all the senses in which the Hebrew term is used. On the other hand, certain classical meanings of *ψυχή* disappear in the LXX and certain non-classical meanings emerge. Thus, while still denoting the soul, capable of departure from and of return to the body (I Kings 17:21, etc.), it is never used in the LXX strictly for the shade, the disembodied spirit, this idea being otherwise expressed (I Sam. 28:12, 13), the tendency being, as appears in the Enoch literature, to transfer this meaning to *πνεῦμα*. For the LXX use of *ψυχή* to denote a deceased person or a dead body (a transfer to Greek of a Hebrew usage of נֶפֶשׁ) there is apparently no parallel in Greek writers.

Σάρξ represents all the Old Testament senses of בָּשָׂר (see pp. 68 f.), though the LXX usually prefer *κρέας* for בָּשָׂר when the latter refers to the flesh of sacrifices or to flesh used for food, and *σῶμα* for בָּשָׂר denoting the body as such. Σάρξ sometimes denotes a kinsman; in the plural, kinsmen (II Sam. 5:1; 19:12, 13). Occasionally it denotes a living being, usually in the phrase *πάσα σάρξ*, which generally signifies every living being, but in Gen. 6:19; 7:15, 16, every *kind* of living being.

The usage of *πνεῦμα* in the Apocrypha and other Jewish religious writings which were translated from the Hebrew is substantially that of the canonical books. Some notable passages illustrate the persistence, if not the increase, of the tendency to blur the distinction between the spirit of God and that of man conceived of as responsive to God's will;² cf. Sir. 39:6; 48:24; Ps. Sol. 17:42; 18:42. Examples of *πνεῦμα* as the seat of moral action are found in Dan. 3:39, 86; Sir. 9:9. In Sir. 38:23 *πνεῦμα* is used of that which departs from man in death (as in Eccles. 3:21; 12:7) but without implication of its power to exist apart from the body, for "the son of man is not immortal" (Sir. 17:30). In Tob. 6:8 *πνεῦμα* is used of an evil spirit. In the Testaments of

² Thus in Dan. Sus. 45 (LXX) we read, *καὶ ἔδωκεν ὁ ἄγγελος, καθὼς προσετάγη, πνεῦμα συνέσεως νεωτέρῳ ὄντι Δανιήλ* (cf. vs. 62 b), while Theodotion reads, *ἐξήγειρεν ὁ θεὸς τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον παιδαρίου νεωτέρου ᾧ ὄνομα Δανιήλ*. The expression *πνεῦμα συνέσεως*, entirely similar to those which in Exod. 28:3; 31:3; Deut. 34:9 denote a spirit proceeding from God, is, in the LXX version of the Daniel passage, used of that which the angel bestows by divine command; while Theodotion, using a phrase which in Ps. 51:13 seems clearly to refer to the Spirit of God, applies it to the spirit of man which God stirs up.

the Twelve Patriarchs sixteen spirits that incite men to evil are specifically named. Opposed to the spirit of deceit (either a generic term for the class or a title of Beliar or Satan) is the spirit of truth (Jud. 20:1, 5), evidently identical with the Spirit of God (Sim. 4:4; Ben. 8:2), called also a spirit of understanding, love, holiness, and grace (Lev. 2:3; 18:7, 11; Jud. 24:2; Gad. 4:7). In the Ethiopic text of the Book of Jubilees there is frequent mention of spirits, good and evil, paralleling practically all the LXX usages. In 2:2 (Greek text) it is said that on the first day God created the spirits (*πνεύματα*) that serve him, which are angels before (his) presence, and angels of the glory, and angels of blowing winds (*πνεύματα*), and angels of . . . winter and autumn and spring and summer, and of all the spirits (*πνεύματα*) of his creatures that are in heaven and earth. In the Greek text of Enoch I *πνεῦμα* occurs most frequently in the plural, denoting (a) incorporeal beings called *τὰ πνεύματα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ* (15:7) who had their dwelling in heaven and were immortal, but who left the high heaven and defiled themselves with women (15:3); (b) the offspring born of these spirits and women, called *πνεύματα πονηρά* (15:9, 11); (c) the spirits of dead men called *τὰ πνεύματα τῶν ψυχῶν τῶν νεκρῶν* (in 22:5, 6 in the singular also), and immediately afterward *αἱ ψυχαὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων* (22:3). It is to be noted that the spirits here spoken of are not so immaterial but that they are visible and have audible voices.

There are no marked differences between the uses of *ψυχή* in the LXX version of the canonical books and in the other books translated from Hebrew into Greek. The leading meanings are life, and soul as the seat of emotion, etc.—the mind in the larger, especially the religious, sense. In Jth. 11:7 it is a general term for a living creature, and in Sir. 16:30 *ψυχὴ παντὸς ζώου* is a pleonastic expression for every living creature. In Sir. 4:20, 22 (cf. vs. 27); 10:28, 29; 14:4; 19:4; 20:22, *ψυχή* seems clearly to be used for the self as the totality of powers, possibilities, and interests that belong to a human personality, as it is in Sir. 16:17 for the self in a more general sense, and in 19:3 for a person. Of soul as an entity capable of existence after death or before birth, there are no quite certain instances, though this is probably the meaning

of the Greek in Sir. 6:4 (not of the underlying Hebrew) and in Tob. 14:11S (cf. the Homeric *ἐλιπε ψυχή*). Of the meaning "shade," a being in the underworld, there are no examples.

Σάρξ in this literature follows closely the usage of the canonical books, except that there are apparently no instances of the meaning "kindred," or of special emphasis on the frailty of corporeal beings. The word is especially frequent in Sirach, where it occurs in all the various usages, but most frequently in the sense of a corporeal being, either inclusively or with reference to men only. Of especial interest are 13:5, 6; 14:17, 18. In Enoch σάρξ is used of the women from whom the giants were born, yet designates them simply as corporeal beings in distinction from the spirits as incorporeal.

V. WORKS WRITTEN ORIGINALLY IN GREEK

The Jewish works written originally in Greek show in the main the same usages as the translated books.

In the Alexandrian book of the Wisdom of Solomon πνεῦμα continues to be used occasionally for wind (5:11, 23; 17:18) and breath (11:20), but most commonly bears the meaning "spirit." The Spirit of God (πνεῦμα κυρίου) permeates all things (1:7; 12:1; cf. Jth. 16:14, where the Spirit of God is the source of life); the spirit of man is breathed into him by God (15:11), is the seat of life (16:14), and is from God and capable of immortality (15:11), though the ungodly believe it to vanish at death (2:3); wisdom is spirit (1:6); but it is also said that in it is a spirit (7:22 ff.). A spirit of wisdom comes from God to man (7:7), and God sends his holy spirit to give wisdom to men (9:17), and a holy spirit of discipline, itself identified with wisdom, dwells in men (1:4-5). There are evident traces of the Stoic materializing conception of spirit, especially in 7:22 f., and nowhere a strict hypostatizing of the divine spirit, any more than of wisdom, with which the spirit is identified. The spirit of man is sometimes given objectivity, as capable of separate existence after death, but it is more commonly spoken of simply as the seat of life, wisdom, etc., with no sharp distinction between the spirit of God and that of man. Its use as denoting the seat of emotion is rare (but see 5:3), corresponding to the rarity of its use in non-Jewish Greek.

Ψυχὴ is used meaning life, Wisd. of Sol. 16:9; human soul, 2:22; 3:1; 15:8, 11; 16:14; person, 10:7; 12:6; 17:1.

Σὰρξ means flesh in Wisd. of Sol. 12:5; 19:21, and body in 7:2.

In Philo we have an attempt to express ideas of Hebrew origin in forms derived from and congenial to Greek philosophic thought, a process which modified both their form and substance. His writings show a thorough familiarity with the Old Testament and a general acquaintance with Greek philosophy, especially Platonism, Stoicism, and neo-Pythagoreanism. His system of thought is fundamentally dualistic. His ultimate principles are God and matter. Though rejecting the doctrine of the eternity and independence of the world as an organized system, he makes matter eternal, and distinguishes between God as the active principle and the passive principle on which and with which he works.¹ He takes from Plato the doctrine of ideas and from the Stoics the four elements, earth, water, air, and fire, and affirms that God formed first the ideal world (the world composed of ideas), in order that, using a pattern incorporeal and as like to God as possible, he might produce the corporeal world, a younger likeness of the older one.²

Philo's use of πνεῦμα is derived in part, through the medium of the LXX, from the Hebrew use of רִיחַ, in part from the Greek philosophers, but fundamentally from the former. In about forty instances it means wind. In several (see p. 142) he employs it for air. His most characteristic use of the term is, in the Hebrew fashion, with reference to the Spirit of God. In this sense it occurs nearly fifty times, often in the phrase πνεῦμα θεῖον, and not infrequently with quantitative implication. *Op. mund.* 144 (50).

Philo interprets Gen. 1:26 as referring to the prototypal, ideal man, who is incorporeal. Gen. 2:7, on the other hand, he refers to the creation of Adam, or, as he says, of the first man. In *Op. mund.* 135 ff. (46 f.) he interprets this passage literally, making the clay refer to the body of Adam and the breathing of the divine spirit into him to the impartation of the soul. This soul, which he also calls mind (νοῦς), is said to be a copy of the reason (λόγος) of God. Because of his double nature man is both mortal and

¹ *Op. mund.* 8(2).

² *Ibid.* 146(51); 16(4).

immortal—mortal as to his body, but immortal as to his mind (*διάνοια*). From the state of perfection which the first man enjoyed the race has since constantly degenerated, both in soul and in body. Yet all his descendants retain some traces of their relationship to their ancestor. Every man is in respect to his mind (*διάνοια*) akin to the divine reason, but in respect to his body, which is composed of the four elements, to the universal world. (Cf. *Op. mund.* 146 [51].) In this interpretation of the Genesis passage Philo approximates to the Greek conception that the *ψυχή* is *πνεῦμα*. But the resemblance is more formal than real, for while with the Stoics the *πνεῦμα* which is predicated of the soul is either one of the four elements which constitute matter, or that ultimate something which, though it may be predicated of God, is itself material, with Philo the soul is incorporeal and divine spirit in distinction from the body, which is matter.

In *Leg. alleg.* i. 33 f. (13) he interprets the same passage allegorically, making the clay, of which man is formed, signify the soul and the mind, which is the dominant part of the soul. Into this mind God breathes his spirit, as a result of which the mind, which would otherwise be earthly and corruptible, acquires true life and becomes a *living* soul.¹ With this latter interpretation agrees the view set forth in the very instructive passage, *Quod det. pot.* 79 (22) ff., in which two parts of the soul are mentioned, only the higher being designated as spirit, and this described as coming from God. Cf. also *Quis rer. div.* 55 (11), where the substance of the dominant part of the soul is said to be *πνεῦμα θεῶν*. See also *Spec. leg.* iv. 123 (11) and *Fuga* 134 (24), where he used *πνεῦμα ἔνθερμον*, but not in the Stoic sense.

In these passages, which are undoubtedly more representative of Philo's habit of thought than the *Op. mund.* 125 ff. (46 f.), the transcendental character of the *πνεῦμα* possessed by man comes out more strongly than in the latter. Whether the *ψυχή* itself in the

¹ In *Leg. alleg.* i. 33 (13), Philo uses both *πνοή* and *πνεῦμα*, making them synonymous. His explanation of the fact that the LXX uses *πνοή* at this point is labored and obscure. He apparently means that, since God is spoken of as breathing into the face, it would be unsuitable to use with this physical term the more dignified and refined *πνεῦμα*, and this although he had already used the face as signifying the mind.

inclusive sense be thought of as *πνεῦμα* or the latter be distinguished from the former as a *donum superadditum*, *πνεῦμα* is in either case and always divine.

In view of this evidence *Op. mund.* 29, 30 (7, 8), in which God is said to have created seven incorporeal substances—the incorporeal heaven, the invisible earth, the image of air and space, the incorporeal substance of water and of *πνεῦμα* and of light—and in which the sixth is called *θεοῦ τὸ πνεῦμα* because it is most life-giving and God is the cause of life, *πνεῦμα* must be understood to be the prototypal life-giving spirit of God; but, since the objective reality must correspond to the idea, the former, whether thought of as the substance of which the human soul is composed (as in 136 ff.) or as the *donum superadditum*, is a quantitative rather than an individualized conception. Cf. *Op. mund.* 144 (50).

Of exceptional interest is Philo's assertion that the Spirit of God cannot continuously dwell with men, though all men have it at times. See *Gigant.* 19–31, 53 (5–7, 12). On the other hand he affirms that the Spirit may remain with us, as with Moses, for a very long time (*Gigant.* 47 [11]). Akin to this distinction is the thought expressed in *Quis rer. div.* 57 (12) that there are two classes of men, those who live by the divine Spirit, which is reason (*λογισμός*), and those who live according to blood and the pleasure of the flesh.

It is to be observed that with the exception of *Post. Caini*, 67 (19), *Agric.* 44 (10), which are simply quotations from the LXX, and possibly *Gigant.* 26 a (6), *πνεῦμα* is not a functional term used as a synonym for *ψυχή* or *νοῦς*, but a substantial term denoting the divine Spirit, wise, indivisible, undistributable, good, everywhere diffused—see *Gigant.* 26 b (6)—as that of which the soul, or the dominant portion of it, is composed. In one passage, *Fuga* 182 (32), following the familiar doctrine of the Stoics, he uses *πνεῦμα* of the vital nervous fluid which extends from the ruling part of the soul to the various organs of sense. The *πνεῦμα* of Philo is much less materialized than that of the Stoics, but is still quantitative rather than individualized. With the exception of a single passage twice quoted from the LXX, and one other passage of doubtful interpretation, he nowhere uses *τὸ πνεῦμα* in the sense, common in the LXX, of the individual spirit of man.

In one exceptional passage, *Quod deus immut.* 35 (7), Philo says that God has endowed some bodies with cohesion, others with soul, and others also with rational soul, and that stones and pieces of wood are bound together by cohesion, "which is $\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$ returning to itself." The first part of the statement is quite consistent with his prevalent doctrine; but in the latter part, in which, like Sextus Empiricus later, he employs $\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$ of the informing principle of all things, including the cohesive power in inanimate things, he takes over from the Greeks an entirely un-Hebraic idea of spirit, which is, moreover, inconsistent with his more common doctrine, according to which $\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$ is possessed by man only, as an addition to the irrational soul which he shares with the animals.¹

$\Psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ in Philo, as in ancient writers generally, is a functional term denoting the seat of life, feeling, thought, and will. Following the Hebrew (Lev. 17:14), he affirms that the substance of the soul is blood (*Quod det. pot.* 79 [22]). Elsewhere he agrees with the Stoics in saying that the soul is made of aether (*Leg. alleg.* iii. 161 [55]), adding that it is a fragment of God. These two theories he confirms and harmonizes in *Quod det. pot.* 79 (22) ff., in the doctrine that the irrational soul which men have in common with the irrational animals is blood, but that the rational soul is spirit. In *Quis rer. div.* 55 (11), cited above, he says that blood is the substance of the entire soul, divine spirit of the most dominant part.² In *Somn.* i. 30 (6), he denies the Stoic assertion that the soul is body, affirming that it is incorporeal.

¹ In *Leg. alleg.* ii. 22 (7) Philo practically parallels the statement which Plutarch (*de virt. mor.* 12) ascribes to the Stoics respecting the graded series, cohesion, growth, irrational soul, and rationality, only, carelessly perhaps, he uses "mind" as the subject to which these powers belong, with the result that he ascribes cohesion even to the mind. Neither in this passage nor in *Quod deus immut.* 35 (7) can Philo be credited either with originality or with thorough assimilation of his sources.

² In *Leg. alleg.* i. 33 (13) he affirms that the lower parts of the soul are given life by the mind, the latter being made both by God and through God, the former by God but not through God. The mind is to the soul what the eyes are to the body (*Op. mund.* 53 [17]); it is the soul of the soul (*ibid.* 66 [21]), created in the image of God, being, as it were, the God and guide of the soul (*ibid.* 69 [23]; *Leg. alleg.* i. 40 [13]; iii. 84 [27]). Thus, though formally similar to the Stoic doctrine that the $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ is $\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$, Philo's doctrine differs in its definition both of subject and of predicate, and, even

Soul being an inclusive term for both that which is rational and that which is irrational, both that which man derives from God and that which he shares with the animals, the term may be and frequently is used to denote the seat of the ethical and religious life (*Op mund.* 79 [26]; 81 [26]; 128 [43]; 154 [54]; *Quod det. pot.* 170 [46]; *Leg. alleg.* i. 38 [13]; 49 [15]; 50 [15]; 51 [15]; 97 [31]; iii. 106 [34]; 107 [35]; 110 [35]). Consistently with this conception of the soul it is said to be dependent on God for its best thoughts (*Leg. alleg.* i. 82 [26]; iii. 27 [8]); the soul is said to be the proper dwelling-place of God (*Cherub.* 98 ff. [29, 30]); and the soul that has fellowship with God is spoken of as divine (*Cherub.* 93 [27]).

The adjective *ψυχικός* seems always to mean "of or affecting the soul," or "pertaining to life," in either case without derogatory sense (*Leg. alleg.* i. 76 [24]; *Ad. Gai.* 63 [9]). Nor is *ψυχή* ever used in antithesis to *πνεῦμα*, ethically or otherwise. Yet it is not impossible that in his doctrine that the *ψυχή* is common to man and animals, while the *πνεῦμα* is a *donum superadditum*, breathed into man by God, Philo lays the basis for the New Testament distinction between the natural (*ψυχικός*) and the spiritual (*πνευματικός*), illustrated in I Cor. 2:14; 15:44, 46; Jas. 3:15. He at least approaches more nearly to such a distinction than either the Hebrew, with its conception that the beasts also derive the *πνεῦμα* from God (Eccles. 3:19, 21; 12:27), or the Greek writers, none of whom before the time of the New Testament associate the *πνεῦμα* which they predicate of the human soul with its higher powers in particular, or put *πνεῦμα* and *ψυχή* in antithesis. It is apparently Philo who first of all, deriving from the Greek philosophers the division of the soul into the rational or governing part

when the characteristic Stoic expression *πνεῦμα ἐνθερμον* is used, the same is true; the subject is not the soul, but *νοῦς* as the dominant element of the soul, and the predicate is not "warm air," but "fervid spirit." See *Fuga* 134 (24).

But in the division of the irrational part of the soul into seven parts, viz., the five senses and the voice and the generative part (*Quod det. pot.* 168 [46]), Philo follows the Stoics. In the ruling or rational part he places the power of reason, *λογισμός*. Exceptionally, in *Leg. alleg.* i. 70, 71 (22); iii. 115 (38), Philo adopts a tripartite division of the soul into reason, passion (or courage), and desire, the first located in the head, the second in the chest, and the third in the stomach. This classification is not easily adjusted to the former, the five senses being associated here with the mind, or dominant part in the head, voice being omitted and courage added.

and the irrational part, and from the Hebrew the idea that the spirit as the supreme element of man comes from God, associates the spirit with the rational part and divides men into two classes—those who live by the divine Spirit, which is reason, and those who live according to blood and the pleasures of the flesh (*Quis rer. div.* 57 [12]). Even he never uses *ψυχικός* in a derogatory sense in antithesis to *πνευματικός*, (cf. *Op. Mund.* 66 [21], 67 [22]) but such an antithesis is but one step beyond his usage.

Philo's doctrine of immortality shows the influence both of Greek and of Hebrew thought. On the one hand, he affirms that for the sake of bodily pleasure men exchanged an immortal and happy life for one that is mortal and miserable (*Op. mund.* 152 [53]). On the other hand, the mind is said to be (potentially) immortal (*Sac. Ab. et Cai.* 8 [3]), and the soul becomes so actually by piety toward God (*Op. mund.* 154 [54] and 155 [55]), or by philosophy (*ibid.* 77 [25]). Death is spoken of in a twofold sense; the death of the man is the separation of his soul from his body, but the death which is inflicted as a punishment for sin is the death of the soul, which is the death of virtue and the incoming of vice. The latter is what is meant by the expression "to die the death" (*Leg. alleg.* i. 76 [24]; 105-8 [33]; ii. 77 [19]; iii. 52 [17]; *Quod. det. pot.* 48, 49 [14, 15]). In antithesis to this stands the true life (*ἀληθινὴ ζωή*). *Leg. alleg.* iii. 52 (17): "And when he offered to you for your enjoyment the tree of life, that is of wisdom by which you can live, were you carried into the enjoyment of ignorance and corruption preferring misery, the death of the soul, to the happiness of true life?"

Philo employs *σάρξ* sometimes literally, sometimes allegorically. Literally it denotes the flesh, or the body, or the material substance of the body generally, without ethical implication. Frequently body and soul are used as complementary terms, signifying the constituent parts of a man, but his general disposition is to treat the body, for which he much more frequently employs *σῶμα* than *σάρξ*, as the seat and organ of the sense-life, and being such, as a force hostile to the highest interest of the soul; see, e.g., *Leg. alleg.* iii. 158 (53) and *Gigant.* 19-45 (5-10) *passim*; also *Quod deus immut.* 140-144 (30); *Ebriet.* 69 (16).

In his representation of the source of evil he is not wholly uniform. On the one side in *Quod det. pot.* 96-99 (26) he interprets the phrase "from the earth" in Gen. 4:11, "cursed art thou from the earth," as meaning the soil of intention out of which the deed sprang, and thus makes the guilt of any action lie in a fulfilled intention. So also in 109 (29) he says that the wicked man never ceases to use his earthy body and the outward senses which are akin to it, and all the external objects of these outward senses, injuring his miserable soul and also, what he fancies he is benefiting, his body. Here the body is depreciated as earthy, but the cause of evil is the man, and the body is injured as well as the soul through the man's abuse of it. Nor is this representation of the matter peculiar to these passages.

On the other hand, in *Quod det. pot.* 98 (26) he closely follows the allegorical with a literal interpretation of the phrase "from the earth," saying that of all the most grievous calamities which happen to the mind the earthy part of us is found to be the cause, illustrating it by the fact that the sexual passions have destroyed cities, countries, and nations. This is not, indeed, to make matter the source of moral evil, for it is misery rather than sin which is traced to the body, as its cause, and it is the body, not matter as such, to which it is traced. The idea that the body is the cause of evils of various kinds finds, however, frequent expression in Philo. It is the greatest cause of ignorance (*Gigant.* 29 [7]); it is a leathern mass, an evil thing that plots against the soul (*Leg. alleg.* iii. 69 [22]); righteousness and every virtue love the soul, but injustice and every evil love the body (*Quis rer. div.* 243 [50]); the philosopher is more praiseworthy than the athlete, because while the latter gives all his attention to the body the former disregards it as dead (*Leg. alleg.* iii. 70, 71 [22]); the pale and emaciated are praised because by the energy of their minds they have become quite disentangled from the body (*De mut. nom.* 33 [4]).

But in none of these passages, nor in any other that this investigation has discovered, does Philo express or distinctly imply that matter (ὕλη) is, as such, the cause or source of moral evil. The nearest approximation to this teaching is perhaps in the passages cited by such modern writers as Dähne, *Jüdisch-Alexandrinische*

Religionsphilosophie (Halle, 1834), p. 196; Zeller, *Philosophie der Griechen*, III, 2, p. 407. It is evident, however, upon examination, that these passages affirm no more than the original chaotic condition of the universe as taught in Gen., chap. 1, the transcendence of God, and his contact with the universe through his "power," rather than immediately.

Even if one should find in these or other passages of Philo the definite doctrine that moral evil has its source in matter, it could not be held that this is *the* consistently maintained doctrine of Philo. He has at least three other explanations. Philo's real doctrine of matter, with which all three explanations are at least consistent, seems to be found in *Op. mund.* 15-23 (4, 5), where he sets forth at length that, just as when a king wishes to build a city the architect first forms a plan in his mind, so God, purposing to make the world, first produced an ideal world and then, on the pattern of this, the objective world out of *substance*, which is in itself without form or order and *capable of becoming anything*. According to this, primeval matter is neither good nor bad. Though Philo goes on to describe the condition of order, harmony, etc., into which it was transformed as opposite to that from which it was changed, this is only to say, not that the previous condition was evil, but that neutrality is the opposite of quality.

In *Quod det. pot.* 96-99 (26), as stated above, he finds the cause of evil in man's fulfilled intention.

In *Op. mund.* 152 (53), having described man as at his creation of dual nature, resembling both the world and God, and having referred to the creation of woman as the beginning of disaster, he continues: "And this desire [the mutual attraction of the sexes] generated bodily pleasure, which is the source of iniquities and transgressions, and for the sake of it men exchange their immortal and happy life for one that is mortal and miserable."

In other passages, on the other hand, he traces it to the agency of the power employed by God in the creation of man.

Op. mund. 74, 5 (24): Now to the God and Father of all it was most appropriate to create through himself alone the good things, because of their kinship with himself. And the things that are neither good nor evil it is not alien to him to create, since these, too, do not partake of the evil which is opposed to

him. And the things that are of mixed character it is partly suitable and partly unsuitable for him to create—suitable because of the more excellent idea which is mingled in them; unsuitable because of the opposite and worse one. It is on this account that in respect to the creation of man only Moses says, "Let us make," which expression indicates that he employs the help of others as assistants in order that to God, the Governor of all things, might be attributed all the blameless purposes and deeds of man, doing right, but to others, his assistants, man's contrary actions.

Conf. linguar. 179 (35): Very appropriately, therefore, has God attributed the making of this being to his lieutenants, saying, "Let us make man," in order that the rectitudes of man may be ascribed to him [God] only, his sins to others. For it did not seem suitable to God, the ruler of all, to make the road to wickedness in a rational soul by his own agency, for which reason he committed to his subordinates [lit. those after him] the making of this part [of the universe].

There is no difficulty in harmonizing this doctrine of the participation of the "powers" in man's creation with the theory that evil springs from the seductiveness of pleasure or from an act of choice on man's part, for this participation is set forth, not as the cause of evil, but as necessitated by the anticipated free choice of evil on man's part. It none the less makes him a mixed creature capable of following either the good or the evil, not one committed by his physical nature to evil. Nor is there any inconsistency between this view and his frequent statements of the inferiority and hostility of the body to the soul, for these do not go beyond the affirmation that the body and bodily pleasure exercise a seductive influence on the soul or cause it suffering and misery. But the theory of ethical dualism, viz., that matter is, as such, the cause of moral evil, cannot be held consistently with the above views, nor is it consistent with Philo's statement in the *Op. mund.* 21 (5) that the primal substance was capable of becoming all things, and, receiving from God a share of his own most excellent nature, was transformed into the things that are best.

Philo is a dualist, but not, apparently, an ethical dualist. His ultimates are God and matter. The former is good; the latter is in itself ethically indifferent. Originally without order, without quality, capable of becoming all things, it acquired by the divine world-creation the qualities that are opposite and best, viz., order, quality, organization, harmony (*Op. mund.* 21 [5]). His solution of

the problem of moral evil does not go beyond the notion that man's body tempts him to sin, but man himself is the captain of his soul and capable of living by the divine Spirit.

In Josephus the earlier meanings of *πνεῦμα* obtain along with those of a later time. In numerous passages it denotes wind, and generally, though not invariably, a strong or violent stormwind. In a few passages it means breath. In other passages there appears to be found a trichotomy of spirit, soul, and flesh or body. In one passage (*Bell.* vii. 185) it is *τὰ πνεύματα* (rather than *αἱ ψυχαί*) which persist after death, and, in the case of evil men, become demons. Occasionally *πνεῦμα* and *ψυχή* are set in juxtaposition, though not in contrast, as in *Ant.* iii. 260, where Josephus mentions that Moses regarded the blood as "soul" and "spirit," and in *Ant.* xi. 240, where Esther tells Artaxerxes that when she appeared before him uninvited her "spirit" recoiled and she was deserted by her "soul."¹ *Πνεῦμα* may also for Josephus denote the seat of emotion or passion, as in *Bell.* iii. 92, where he describes the Romans as "filled with a certain warlike *πνεῦμα*."

Akin to this usage of *πνεῦμα* with respect to human beings is its use to denote superhuman beings. Saul's obsession is traced to an "evil spirit" or demons (*Ant.* vi. 211). A moment later (214) "the demonic spirit" is held to be the cause of his madness. More frequently, however, Josephus, in keeping with LXX usage, employs *πνεῦμα* for the divine spirit that produces prophetic inspiration, the possession of which distinguishes the true from the false prophet. Whether this spirit is regarded as a subtle substance, or as an influence, or divine personality is difficult to determine. In *Ant.* viii. 114, Solomon petitions God to "let some portion of thy spirit come down and inhabit in this thy temple," a passage which shows the persistence of quantitative phraseology and probably of the corresponding thought.²

Two hundred and sixteen occurrences of *ψυχή* have been noted and examined. The usual significations are represented, ranging from the life-principle to the soul as the seat of emotions and moral

¹ Cf. Dion Hal. *Dem.* 20. (p. 81.)

² In this treatment of Josephus I have depended almost wholly upon Dr. W. R. Schoemaker, Professor H. H. Severn, and Dr. A. W. Slaten.

qualities. $\Psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ denoting a departed spirit or shade occurs with relative frequency, being more common, perhaps, in Josephus than in the other writers of this period. As "person" its occurrence is rare. Denoting one of the two (or three) constituent elements of which a human being consists, it occurs with considerable frequency. The meaning "soul," as the seat of emotions and intelligence, is in Josephus, as in the writings of his contemporaries, most common (the familiar coupling of $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ with $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$ occurs frequently, though rarely in contrast). It is chiefly in the speeches of Eleazar in Book vii. of the *War* that Josephus discusses the relationship of soul and body. Ordinarily there is no assertion of the superiority of the soul to the body. There are few traces of the Platonic doctrine of the limitation and punishment of the soul through its connection with the body, these occurring chiefly in the speeches mentioned above. Instead of $\acute{\alpha}\phi\iota\epsilon\nu\alpha\iota\ \tau\omicron\delta\ \pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$ (Matt. 27:50), we find the expression used in the LXX (Gen. 35:18) and in classic writers, $\acute{\alpha}\phi\iota\epsilon\nu\alpha\iota\ \tau\eta\nu\ \psi\upsilon\chi\eta\nu$.

$\Sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\kappa\varsigma$ occurs rarely, only six instances being noted. In three it denotes the human body and refers to the separation (or release) of the soul from the body. In *Bell.* vi. 47, the plural is used, but apparently without difference in meaning. Twice the reference is to the actual flesh of the human body, and once it refers to the flesh of a wild animal. In *Bell.* ii. 155, it is said that the Essenes rejoice upon their release from the bonds of the body. Such depreciation of the body is, however, rare, and insufficient to show an ethical dualism of mind and matter either in the conception of the Essenes or in that of their reporter.

The closest approach to a doctrine of the evil of matter, or of the incompatibility of soul and body, is found in the second speech of Eleazar (*Bell.* vii. 344), where it is said of souls that "while they are in a mortal body ($\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$) they are bound and are filled up with the evils of the same, to speak most truly, they are dead, for fellowship with mortality is unseemly for the divine."

In other Jewish works written in Greek $\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$ follows in general the usage of the writings already discussed. Of its use in the sense of wind, however, no examples have been observed. We have noted no illustration of its use with reference to the Spirit

of God. Of the spirit of man it occurs in the various senses previously noted. In the Greek additions to Esther 5:1 it is used of the spirit of man as the seat of various passions, qualities, and emotions, as also in IV Macc. 11:11. As the seat of mentality it occurs in IV Macc. 7:14, and as the seat of life in II Macc. 7:22, 23; 14:46; III Macc. 6:24; IV Macc. 12:20 (N). There are few examples, so far as noted, of the use of *πνεῦμα* for a superhuman being (other than God), either good or evil, in Jewish-Greek religious literature written originally in Greek. Cf. pp. 145 f. Some obscure uses of the term occur in pseudo-Phocylides ll. 106 ff. (cf. p. 19); Sib. Or. iii. 102; *Letters of Heraclitus* 7:63.

Ψυχή occurs in its common senses of life and soul. Illustrations are given above on p. 146 ff.

Σάρξ carries only its proper meaning of flesh, the soft portion of the body, and its metonymic signification, body. See examples on p. 151. Other meanings are not represented in Jewish writings originally composed in Greek.

VI. SUMMARY AND COMPARISON

We may summarize the results of our investigation of the usages of *πνεῦμα*, *ψυχή*, and *σάρξ* in Jewish-Greek literature as follows: The ordinary classical meanings of all three words to a large extent obtain. *Πνεῦμα*, in the philosophical sense of the contemporary and later philosophical and medical writers, viz., as meaning world-stuff, soul-stuff, occurs but rarely (Philo). In the LXX *πνεῦμα* is the standard equivalent of רִיחַ. Its use to denote a constituent element of a human being, viz., as the seat of intellect, emotion, etc., is somewhat more than occasional. The use of *ψυχή* as the seat of intellect, emotion, and moral qualities far exceeds its employment in any other sense, but its use in the early meaning of a shade is surprisingly frequent. In the LXX it occurs regularly as the rendering of נֶפֶשׁ. In this literature for the first time we observe a distinct tendency to equate *πνεῦμα* and *ψυχή*, giving to the former even the task of denoting the unembodied or disembodied spirit or shade. *Σάρξ* occurs infrequently, with the meanings "flesh" and "body," common in Greek writers, plus the added meaning of

"kinsman" and "living being" in writings translated from the Hebrew.

Toward the problems that have largely inspired this study the investigation of the Jewish-Greek literature makes only a negative contribution. Nowhere does there appear a clearly defined or certainly implied dualistic doctrine attributing to matter an evil quality.¹ The only instances of sharp depreciation of the body as compared with the soul which occur in this literature are in an exhortation to courage in the face of death (Josephus *Bell.* vii. 337 ff.) which repeats if it does not echo the ideas long before expressed by Plato (*Phaedo* 66, 79; *Crat.* 400 C) and almost contemporaneously by Plutarch (*Consolatio ad Apollonium*), and in certain passages of Philo. Cf. p. 163. Nowhere is there any elevation of πνεῦμα above ψυχή, or of πνευματικός above ψυχικός, though there is in Philo a possible starting-point for such a usage. Nowhere is there the clearly expressed antinomy of σὰρξ and πνεῦμα which we shall later find in Paul, or the personification of the former as the principle of evil.

Before passing to the study of the usage of the New Testament and other religious writings of the early Christian period it may be well to summarize the results thus far reached, it being remembered that our study has not yet included the Hermetic literature, the magical papyri, the Gnostics, or any writings influenced by Christianity.

Πνεῦμα is throughout the classical period and with few if any exceptions among non-Jewish Greek writers to the end of the second century A.D. a physical term signifying wind, air, breath, breath of life. It is throughout this whole period a substantial, not a functional or individualizing, term. In the sixth century B.C.

¹ Cf. Bousset, *Die Religion des Judentums* (2d ed.), p. 461. F. C. Porter, "The Yeḡer Hara," in *Biblical and Semitic Studies*, by Members of the Faculty of Yale University, New York, 1901, has shown that the rabbis do not place the evil impulse in the body as distinguished from the soul, still less make the body the seat of the evil and the soul that of the good impulse (pp. 93-111). In their various efforts to account for the evil impulse they sometimes ascribe it to God and sometimes to man, but never explain it as inherent in the matter of which the human body is composed (p. 123). These results of the study of the rabbinic writers are in evident harmony with what we have discovered in the Jewish-Greek writers.

Anaximenes said that *πνεῦμα καὶ ἀήρ* encompassed all things. In the same century Xenophanes said that the soul was *πνεῦμα*, meaning by *πνεῦμα*, however, evanescent breath. In the fifth century Empedocles found the source of all things in four roots—fire, water, earth, and air—and Diogenes made air (*ἀήρ*, not *πνεῦμα*) the ultimate principle of existence. In Aristotle's day there were those who found in *πνεῦμα*, defined as a vital and generative substance, the informing principle of all things, perhaps meaning, however, by "all things" all living things, plants and animals. Zeno and his fellow-Stoics repeat the statement of Xenophanes that the soul is *πνεῦμα*, but add *ἐνθερμον* and use *πνεῦμα* rather in the sense of Aristotle's day than of Xenophanes'. Chrysippus, on the one side following the line of Diogenes' thought, says that the ultimate basis of things is self-moving *πνεῦμα*, and on the other, like Zeno and the contemporaries of Aristotle, makes *πνεῦμα* a sort of nervous and vital fluid or vapor, which, proceeding from the ruling part of the soul to the organs of perception and generation, becomes sight, hearing, etc. Some of the Stoics say that the soul arises from the cooling of the *πνεῦμα* in or surrounding the bodies of infants. Though in the fourth century B.C. Menander used the phrase *θεῖον πνεῦμα*, Posidonius (150 B.C.) was apparently the first to make the assertion that God is *πνεῦμα*, adding, however, *νοερὸν καὶ πυρῶδες*. In the early Christian period Plutarch and Galen repeat the doctrines of Chrysippus with reference to the origin of the soul. Plutarch also discusses the distinction between the soul of man, the irrational soul of animals, the principle of growth in plants, and the power of cohesion in stones, but does not apply the term *πνεῦμα* to either of the latter two. Galen, however, distinctly speaks of the *ἐκτικὸν πνεῦμα*, meaning by this what Plutarch had called *ἐξίς*, and finally Sextus Empiricus groups all these things together under the common term *πνεῦμα*, identifying the *πνεῦμα* which is in man with that which permeates other animals, the plants, and the rocks.

Only in the Greek translated from the Hebrew or written under the influence of Hebrew thought do we find the expression spirit of God, *πνεῦμα θεοῦ*, or holy spirit, *πνεῦμα ἅγιον* (the latter modeled after the *θεῖον πνεῦμα* of the Greeks, but expressing a Hebrew idea).

So also it is in this literature only that we find spirit of man, or spirit meaning a shade, an angel, or a demon.¹ Even in these writers the word often has a certain quantitative force, inherited not only from its Greek, but also from its Hebrew ancestry.

On the other hand, with rare and almost negligible exceptions, $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$ is throughout the whole period of this study a functional and individual, not a substantial term. From the earliest period of the Greek language of which we have remnants the Greeks believed that there was in man a something which, existing in the body in life, departed from it in death. This Homer calls $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$, using it most frequently for the shade as it exists in the underworld after death, but sometimes, also, apparently for the life of which it is the seat while it remains in the body. This early meaning, shade, though somewhat rare after the time of the tragic poets, is found even down to the end of our period. The meaning, life, likewise persists throughout the period.

The far more common use of the word, however, from Pindar and the tragedians on is to denote that in the living man which feels, thinks, wills, and by virtue of which he is alive. The philosophers have their theories as to what it is composed of or the parts into which it is divided, but the constant meaning of the term, that about which these theories are proposed, is the soul as the seat of life, intelligence, and emotion. Aristotle's definition, "The soul is that by which we live and perceive and initiate thought" (i. 414a), would hold for practically all Greek writers. That Aristotle and other writers after him ascribe soul to animals and plants, meaning, however, to impute to them not all the powers of the human soul but only certain lower ones; that some writers ascribe soul to the universe and to God; that by metonymy man, possessing a soul, is called a soul, the word thus becoming equivalent to "person"; that in Jewish-Greek writers, under the influence of the Hebrew נֶפֶשׁ, $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$ means any living being; and that Philo once or twice uses $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$ as other Greek writers use $\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$ for soul-stuff—all these exceptional and more or less consciously tropical usages in no way obscure the fact that the prevailing and all-but-constant use of the term from Pindar to Sextus Empiricus is to denote the human soul

¹ To this statement Dion Hal. *Antiq.* i. 31. is the only observed exception; cf. p. 81.

as that in which reside life, emotion, thought, and will, and that the term is functional and not substantial.

Σάρξ, properly meaning flesh, the soft portion of the body of an animal, living or once living, retains this meaning throughout all the periods we have been studying. In them all it is also used by metonymy for the whole body. In Greek writings translated from the Hebrew it has also two meanings derived from the tropical use of the Hebrew בָּשָׂר, namely, kindred, and a corporeal living creature, a corporeally conditioned living being. Neither in non-Jewish nor in Jewish writers does the term seem to have acquired any ethical significance. Like σῶμα, it is spoken of in terms of disparagement as compared with the soul, and in Philo it is once used in somewhat remote antithesis to πνεῦμα. It is nowhere used to express the notion that matter is the source or cause of moral evil. Plato regarded the body as a burden upon the soul, and later writers, perhaps influenced by him, notably Philo, Seneca, and Plutarch, express similar views. There are traces in Plato, and much later in neo-Pythagoreanism, of the idea that the disorder of the universe is traceable to the matter which enters into its composition. But in the literature we have been examining these two ideas do not seem to have been united in a formal doctrine that the moral evil men do is traceable to the fact that the body is composed of matter.

CHAPTER VI

ΠΝΕΥΜΑ, ΨΥΧΗ, AND ΣΑΡΞ IN ETHNIC RELIGIOUS WRITINGS APPROXIMATELY CONTEMPORARY WITH THE NEW TESTAMENT

The previous chapters have dealt with the usage of Greek writers from Homer down to, and along certain lines a hundred years beyond, the close of the New Testament period, with the usage of the corresponding Hebrew words, and with Jewish-Greek usage of the pre-Christian and early Christian period. Before taking up the New Testament writers themselves, it remains to consider briefly certain non-Christian religious writers who, though of somewhat uncertain date, reflect usages which may be antecedent to, or contemporary with, the New Testament.

I. THE USAGE OF THE MAGICAL TEXTS

In the magical texts, which have been brought to light by the researches of Parthey, Wessely, Kenyon, and others and made the subject of study by Dieterich, Reitzenstein, Cumont, and others, the word *πνεῦμα* is of frequent occurrence, sometimes with *ψυχή* in parallelism or *σάρξ* in antithesis. Probably none of the literature is itself pre-Christian in its present form, and much of it belongs to the third and fourth centuries A.D.,¹ but the possibility that it reflects a usage coming from as early a period as the New Testament writers requires that it be taken into account.

Πνεῦμα is still used in the sense of air. The god is spoken of as *ὁ ἐπὶ κενῷ πνεύματι*.² More frequently, however, it is applied to the god (accompanied by an adjective *θεῖος*, *ιερός*, *ἅγιος*), either as a direct attribute or as a possession or manifestation of the god. So sometimes in connection with the use in the sense of air, or

¹ See Parthey, in *Abh. d. Akad. d. Wiss.* (Berlin, 1865), p. 117; Wessely, in *Denk. d. Akad. d. Wiss.* (Vienna, 1888), Abt. II, 37.

² Wessely, *op. cit.*, II. 54, l. 1026.

with both uses in reference to the god in close connection.¹ In particular πνεῦμα is used of the *paredros* or guardian-spirit by whom the soul of the initiate is cared for.² But πνεῦμα is also applied to the soul of the initiate.³ It is noticeable here that πνεῦμα alone is used as a simple anthropological term, denoting one of the two elements of man, along with σῶμα; but ἀέριον πνεῦμα as applied to the soul when separated from the body, and to the πάρεδρος by whom it is borne into the air. To the former also even the term θεός is applied. The human πνεῦμα is, sometimes at least, thought of as coming from God, and as that by the impartation of which life is created or of which the soul is composed; but, more frequently, perhaps, it is identified with the ψυχή.

It is instructive to find in these writings the two already familiar phrases πνεῦμα θεῶν and πνεῦμα ἁγίων. The former, occurring in Menander in the fourth century B.C., in the *Axiochus*, the LXX, and Philo, and in the magical papyri, has in all cases the same fundamental meaning, "divine Spirit." In the Greek writers it is the power that controls the actions of men or the source of mentality in men; in the Jewish writers, the source of inspiration or of moral uplift, or the substance of which the soul is composed; in the magical texts, the source of religious ecstasy or transformation. Πνεῦμα ἁγίων, first attested by the LXX, occurs also in other Jewish writings, including the New Testament, and in the magical papyri. Its presence in these two apparently unrelated groups may conceivably be due to an oriental idea and phraseology (of which even the "Holy Spirit" of Hebrew scripture may be an early expression) by which the two literatures have been independently affected. In view, however, of the absence of definite testimony to the existence of such an oriental idea and of the syncretistic character of the religions which gave rise to the magical papyri, it is perhaps quite as probable that the latter derived the term from Jewish or Christian writings. There seems at least little reason to deny that Judaism and Christianity may

¹ Cf. passage quoted by Kenyon, *Papyri in the British Museum*, I, 114; Wessely, *op. cit.*, I, 146, l. 243; II, 54, l. 1029; Reitzenstein, *Die hellenistischen Mysterienreligionen*, p. 137; Parthey, I, l. 312.

² Parthey, I, 177, l. 96.

³ Reitzenstein, *op. cit.*, p. 136.

have influenced the contemporary religions as well as have been influenced by them. The chief value, accordingly, of the evidence of the papyri is in showing the wide currency of the word *πνεῦμα*, and especially of the phrases *πνεῦμα θεῖον* and *πνεῦμα ἅγιον*, rather than in throwing any considerable light upon the origin of New Testament usage. *Ψυχή* continues in use and with substantially unchanged meaning, although *πνεῦμα* has become individualized and its practical equivalent. Of any antithesis between the two terms there is but slight evidence. The adjectives *ψυχικός* and *πνευματικός* each occur once. Reitzenstein maintains that, in the religious and magical writers of this period, the man who had received the divine *πνεῦμα* was thought of as *πνευματικός*; he who had not received it was still only *ψυχικός* (*op. cit.*, pp. 42 ff.). This is at least so far true as that the divine being or influence by which man is transformed in nature, reborn, is constantly called *πνεῦμα*, very rarely, it would seem, *ψυχή*, and the man who is by the divine *πνεῦμα* reborn is never as such designated *ψυχή*, but, in the post-mortem state at least, *πνεῦμα (ἀέριον)*. *Σάρξ*, so far as appears, took on in the magical texts no meanings different from those found in the other Greek writings of the period.

II. THE HERMETIC LITERATURE

The so-called Hermetic writings have been known to Christian writers for many centuries. The early church Fathers (Justin Martyr, Tertullian, Clement of Alexandria) quote them in defense of Christianity. Stobaeus collected fragments of them. The Humanists knew and valued them. They were studied in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and in modern times have again been diligently examined by many scholars. Parthey has published the text of the *Corpus Hermeticum* in full and Reitzenstein in part, and G. R. S. Mead has issued a translation of the whole body of extant literature, with extended prolegomena, commentary, etc.¹

There is a wide difference of opinion as to the date at which this literature was produced. Mead believes that some of the

¹ Parthey, *Hermetis Trismegisti Poemander*, Berlin, 1854; Reitzenstein, *Poemandres*, Leipzig, 1904; G. R. S. Mead, *Thrice-Greatest Hermes*, London and Benares, 1906.

extant portions of it are at least as early as the earliest Christian writings, while von Christ assigns them to the third Christian century, and thinks that they show the influence of neo-Platonism. To affirm that they influenced New Testament usage would be hazardous but they perhaps throw some light on the direction in which thought was moving in New Testament times.

In this literature the common division of man into soul and body is retained from the long familiar usage (*Corpus Hermeticum* 1:30; 2:9; 8:1; 9:2; 11:10). In 10:10, it takes the form, mind and body. But the favorite conception is of man as consisting of five elements, arranged in the order of their dignity as follows: νοῦς, λόγος, ψυχή, πνεῦμα, σῶμα, mind, reason, soul, spirit, body (C.H. 10:13).

Mind is that which is most akin to God, for God is mind (C.H. 5:11), or the cause of mind (C.H. 2:14).

Ψυχή is that which has life. From the all-Soul there spring souls of creeping things, and these in ascending scale become by transmigration souls of fishes, land animals, birds, and men, while human souls may eventually become δαίμονες or νοῦς. Ψυχή in man has substantially the same meaning which it bears throughout Greek literature. It is the seat of intellectual and especially of moral life (C.H. 10:8, 19); an eternal intellectual essence, incorporeal, pre-existent and immortal (C.H. 8:1; 10:7, 15; Stob. *Ecl.* i. 41. 6).

The πνεῦμα is distinct from the ψυχή and inferior to it, its garment, an intermediate thing between soul and body, yet also incorporeal (C.H. 2:8; 10:13, 16, 17). Elsewhere it is represented as enveloping the seed (Stob. *Ecl.* i. 41. 7). It is also spoken of as possessing generative power (C.H. 9:9).

It is apparently conceived of as a rarefied substance. In the series of envelopes it is that which lies between body and soul, preventing their contact and the body's consequent destruction (C.H. 10:17). As distinguished from ψυχή it is perhaps thought of as the seat of life, while the latter is the seat of mentality and morality, never apparently occurring in the sense of life.

This literature is permeated with the Platonic idea of the inferiority of the body to the soul and with the notion that the

body is a burden on the soul, yet it is not wholly consistent in its representation. Matter is eternal, yet also has been born, i.e., has been given form; unborn matter was *ἀμορφία* (C.H. 12:8; Stob. *Phys.* 11:2).

Body, as in the Stoics (cf. p. 110), is used in a double sense: (a) that which has extension (C.H. 2:11); and (b) the material portion of man (Stob. *Phys.* 35:9; 9:2; C.H. 8:3). The passions of the body befoul the soul, which in infancy is not fully detached from the cosmic soul, and so is a thing of beauty and purity (C.H. 10:15).

The vice of the soul is ignorance; and ignorance is induced by the body (C.H. 10:8). Its highest good, which is to be achieved by the life of piety, is on being released from the earthly body to become mind (*νοῦς*), which takes to itself a fiery body. According to one passage the fate of the impious soul is its being turned back toward creeping things (C.H. 10:8); according to another, which distinctly repudiates this view, it is to be re-embodied in a human body and to be scourged with its sins, the punishment being inflicted by the mind, which has become a demon (C.H. 10:19-21).

But, on the other hand, the natural bodily impulses are not as such condemned, the begetting of children in particular being pronounced a pious act, while to die without children is an impiety punished after death by incarnation in a sexless body (C.H. 2:17).

It appears, then, that despite the occasional pessimistic assertions that good unmixed with evil is impossible here below (C.H. 6:3), and that the hardest thing of all is that we need evil things and cannot live without them (C.H. 6:6), the real doctrine of this literature is not that the body by virtue of its quality as matter pollutes the soul, but that the body is a hindrance, its passions things to be overcome by piety, itself defined as knowing God and doing men no harm (C.H. 10:19). On the other hand, bodilessness, or rather the possession of a fiery body, is an element of the highest blessedness along with knowledge of God and active benevolence and beneficence.

Σάρξ is of very infrequent occurrence. When used it signifies either the muscular portion of the body (C.H. 6:6) or the body itself (*ibid.*, 3:3, 4).

CHAPTER VII

ΠΝΕΥΜΑ, ΨΥΧΗ, AND ΣΑΡΞ IN THE NEW TESTAMENT

In considering the usage of the New Testament writers, it will be expedient in the interest of brevity to present first an exhibit of New Testament usage in general, and then in a discussion of the usage of the several writers and groups of writers both to explain and justify the conclusions indicated in the general exhibit.

I. ΠΝΕΥΜΑ

I. Wind:

John 3:8a: τὸ πνεῦμα ὅπου θέλει πνεῖ καὶ τὴν φωνὴν αὐτοῦ ἀκούεις, ἀλλ' οὐκ οἶδας πόθεν ἔρχεται, καὶ ποῦ ὑπάγει.

The wind bloweth where it will and thou hearest its voice, but knowest not whence it cometh and whither it goeth.

See also Heb. 1:7.

II. Breath, breath of life:

II Thess. 2:8: καὶ τότε ἀποκαλυφθήσεται ὁ ἄνομος ὃν ὁ κύριος [Ἰησοῦς] ἀνέλεῖ τῷ πνεύματι τοῦ στόματος αὐτοῦ.

And then shall be revealed the lawless one, whom the Lord Jesus will slay with the breath of his mouth.

See also Rev. 11:11; 13:15.

III. Spirit: an incorporeal, sentient, intelligent, willing being, or the element by virtue of which a being is sentient, intelligent, etc.

'A. Embodied, viz., human spirit, that element of a living man by virtue of which he lives, feels, perceives, and wills; variously viewed:

1. As the seat of life, or that in man which constitutes him a living being.

Luke 8:55: καὶ ἐπέστρεψεν τὸ πνεῦμα αὐτῆς, καὶ ἀνέστη παραχρῆμα.

And her spirit returned and she rose up immediately.

See also Matt. 27:50; Luke 23:46; John 19:30; Acts 7:59; Jas. 2:26.

2. As the seat of emotion and will; especially of the moral and religious life, including thought as concerned with religion.

Mark 14:38: *γρηγορεῖτε καὶ προσεύχεσθε, ἵνα μὴ ἔλθητε εἰς πειρασμόν· τὸ μὲν πνεῦμα πρόθυμον ἡ δὲ σὰρξ ἀσθενής.*

Watch and pray that ye enter not into temptation: the spirit indeed is willing but the flesh is weak.

See also Matt. 26:41; Mark 8:12; Luke 1:47; John 4:23, 24b; 11:33; 13:21; Acts 17:16; 18:25; 19:21; 20:22; Rom. 1:9; 2:29; 7:6; 8:16; 12:11; I Cor. 4:21; 7:34; 16:18; II Cor. 2:13; 7:1, 13; Gal. 6:1, 8, 18; Eph. 4:23; Phil. 4:23; II Tim. 4:22; Philem. 25; Jas. 4:5; I Pet. 3:4.

It sometimes seems to denote the human spirit as permeated with or dominated by the divine Spirit, either ethically (John 3:6b), or ecstatically (I Cor. 14:14, 15, 16).

3. As the seat of consciousness and intelligence.

I Cor. 2:11: *τίς γὰρ οἶδεν ἀνθρώπων τὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἰ μὴ τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ;*

For what man knoweth the things of man save the spirit of the man which is in him?

See also Matt. 5:3; Mark 2:8; Luke 1:80.

4. Generically, without reference to these distinctions.

Rom. 8:10: *εἰ δὲ Χριστὸς ἐν ὑμῖν, τὸ μὲν σῶμα νεκρὸν διὰ ἁμαρτίαν, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα ζωὴ διὰ δικαιοσύνην.*

And if Christ is in you the body is dead because of sin; but the spirit is life because of righteousness.

See also I Cor. 5:3, 4; Phil. 1:27; Col. 2:5; I Thess. 5:23; Heb. 4:12; 12:9 (?); Rev. 22:6.

B. Unembodied or disembodied spirit: more exactly, a sentient, intelligent, volitional being whose mode of life is not conditioned by a body in the ordinary sense of the term; used of various beings so conceived, the specific reference being indicated by limitations of the word or by the context; thus of:

1. The Spirit of God, viewed as:

a) The cause of extraordinary phenomena in human experience, such as prophecy, tongues, healings, etc.

I Cor. 12:4: *διαίρέσεις δὲ χαρισμάτων εἰσὶν, τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ πνεῦμα.*

Now there are diversities of gifts, but the same Spirit.

See also Matt. 10:20; 12:18, 28, 31, 32; 22:43; Mark 3:29; 12:36; 13:11; Luke 1:15, 17, 41, 67; 2:25, 26, 27; 4:18; 10:21; 12:10, 12; John 7:39 (*bis*); 20:22; Acts 1:5, 8, 16; 2:4, 17, 18, 33, 38; 4:8, 25, 31; 5:3, 9, 32; 7:51, 55; 8:15, 17, 18, 19, 29; 9:17; 10:19, 44, 45, 47; 11:12, 15, 16, 28; 13:2, 4, 9, 52; 15:8, 28; 16:6; 19:2, 6; 20:23, 28; 21:4, 11; 28:25; Rom. 15:19; I Cor. 2:10, 12^b, 13, 14; 7:40; 12:3, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13; 14:2; Gal. 3:2, 3, 5; Eph. 3:5; I Thess. 5:19; I Tim. 4:1; Heb. 2:4; 3:7; 9:8; 10:15; II Pet. 1:21; I John 4:2a, 6a; Rev. 1:10; 2:7, 11, 17, 29; 3:6, 13, 22; 4:2; 14:13; 17:3; 21:10.

In Acts 16:7; I Pet. 1:11; Rev. 19:10(?), the Spirit in this sense is identified with that of the risen Jesus.

b) Active in an extraordinary way in the conception of a child.

Matt 1:18: *εὐρέθη ἐν γαστρὶ ἔχουσα ἐκ πνεύματος ἁγίου.*

She was found with child of the Holy Spirit.

See also Matt. 1:20; Luke 1:35.

c) Operative in the human spirit for the production of ethical results.

Rom. 8:4: *ἵνα τὸ δικαίωμα τοῦ νόμου πληρωθῇ ἐν ἡμῖν τοῖς μὴ κατὰ σάρκα περιπατοῦσιν ἀλλὰ κατὰ πνεῦμα.*

That the ordinance of the law might be fulfilled in us, who walk not according to flesh but according to Spirit.

See also Matt. 3:11; Mark 1:8; Luke 3:16; John 3:5, 6a, 8b; 14:17, 26; 15:26; 16:13; Acts 9:31; Rom. 5:5; 8:2, 5, 6, 9, 13, 14, 15^b, 16a, 23, 26, 27; 9:1; 14:17; 15:13, 16, 30; I Cor. 2:4; 3:16; 6:11, 19; II Cor. 1:22; 3:3, 6, 8, 17, 18; 4:13; 5:5; 6:6; 13:13; Gal. 4:6; 5:5, 16, 17, 18, 22, 25; Eph. 1:13, 17; 2:18, 22; 3:16; 4:3, 30; 6:17, 18; Phil. 2:1; 3:3; Col. 1:8; I Thess. 1:5, 6; 4:8; II Thess. 2:13; II Tim. 1:14; Titus 3:5; Heb. 10:29; I Pet. 1:2; 4:14; Jude, vss. 19, 20.

In Rom. 8:9c; Phil. 1:19; Heb. 9:14, the Spirit in this sense is identified with that of the risen Jesus.

d) The mind of God.

I Cor. 2:11: οὕτως καὶ τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ οὐδεὶς ἔγνωκεν εἰ μὴ τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ θεοῦ.

Even so the things of God no one knoweth save the Spirit of God.

e) Operative in the external world.

Acts 8:39: ὅτε δὲ ἀνέβησαν ἐκ τοῦ ὕδατος, πνεῦμα κυρίου ἤρπασεν τὸν Φίλιππον.

And when they came up out of the water, the Spirit of the Lord caught away Philip.

f) Generically, without specific reference to the form of activity.

Luke 4:14: καὶ ὑπέστρεψεν ὁ Ἰησοῦς ἐν τῇ δυνάμει τοῦ πνεύματος εἰς τὴν Γαλιλαίαν.

And Jesus returned in the power of the Spirit into Galilee.

See also Matt. 3:16; 4:1; 28:19; Mark 1:10, 12; Luke 3:22; 4:1 (*bis*); 11:13; John 1:32, 33 (*bis*); 3:34; Acts 1:2; 6:3, 5, 10; 10:38; 11:24; Rom. 8:11 (*bis*); Gal. 3:14; 4:29; Eph. 4:4; 5:18; Heb. 6:4; I Pet. 1:12; I John 3:24; 4:13; 5:6, 8; Rev. 22:17.

2. The spirit of man separated from the body after death:

a) In a heavenly mode of existence.

Acts 23:9: οὐδὲν κακὸν εὐρίσκομεν ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τούτῳ. εἰ δὲ πνεῦμα ἐλάλησεν αὐτῷ ἢ ἄγγελος—

We find no evil in this man: and if a spirit hath spoken to him, or an angel—

See also I Cor. 5:5; Heb. 12:23.

b) A ghost, specter, shade, visible on earth.

Luke 24:37: πτοηθέντες δὲ καὶ ἔμβοβοι γενόμενοι ἐδόκουν πνεῦμα θεωρεῖν.

But they were terrified and affrighted, and supposed that they saw a spirit.

See also Luke 24:39.

c) In Sheol.

I Pet. 3:19: ἐν ᾧ καὶ τοῖς ἐν φυλακῇ πνεύμασιν πορευθεὶς ἐκήρυξεν.

In which also he went and preached to the spirits in prison.

3. An angel.

Heb. 1:14: οὐχὶ πάντες εἰσὶν λειτουργικὰ πνεύματα εἰς διακονίαν ἀποστελλόμενα διὰ τοὺς μέλλοντας κληρονομεῖν σωτηρίαν;

Are they not all ministering spirits, sent forth to do service for the sake of them that are to inherit salvation?

4. A demon.

Acts 8:7: πολλοὶ γὰρ τῶν ἐχόντων πνεύματα ἀκάθαρτα βοῶντα φωνῇ μεγάλῃ ἐξήρχοντο.

For from many of those that had unclean spirits, they came out, crying with a loud voice.

See also Matt. 8:16; 10:5; 12:43, 45; Mark 1:23, 26, 27; 3:11, 30; 5:2, 8, 13; 6:7; 7:25; 9:17, 20, 25 (*bis*); Luke 4:33, 36; 6:18; 7:21; 8:2, 29; 9:39, 42; 10:20; 11:24, 26; 13:11; Acts 5:16; 16:16, 18; 19:12, 13, 15, 16; I Tim. 4:1; Rev. 16:13, 14; 18:2.

5. Without reference to these distinctions, referring qualitatively to any being not corporeally conditioned, or to all such, or to a group (other than any of the above), defined by the context; used both of beings conceived of as actually existing, and, especially as a descriptive term in negative expressions, of beings presented merely as objects of thought.

John 4:24a: πνεῦμα ὁ θεός, καὶ τοὺς προσκυνοῦντας αὐτὸν ἐν πνεύματι καὶ ἀληθείᾳ δεῖ προσκυνεῖν.

God is a spirit and they that worship him must worship in spirit and truth. (The first instance only falls under this head.)

Rom. 8:15: οὐ γὰρ ἐλάβετε πνεῦμα δουλείας πάλιν εἰς φόβον, ἀλλὰ ἐλάβετε πνεῦμα υἱοθεσίας.

For ye received not a spirit of bondage again unto fear; but ye received a spirit of adoption.

See also Luke 9:55; Acts 23:8; Rom. 1:4; 11:8; I Cor. 2:12a; 12:10; 14:12, 32; 15:45; II Cor. 11:4; 12:18; Eph. 2:2; II Thess. 2:2; I Tim. 3:16;¹ II Tim. 1:7; I Pet. 3:18; 4:6; I John 4:1 (*bis*), 2b, 3, 6b; Rev. 1:4; 3:1; 4:5; 5:6.

C. Generically, without reference to the distinction between embodied and unembodied spirit.

John 6:63 (*bis*); I Cor. 6:17; Heb. 12:9 (?).

¹ Cf. Enoch 20:6, ἐπὶ τῷ πνεύματι.

II. ΨΥΧΗ

1. Life, the loss of which is death; used only of men.

Mark 3:4: ἐξεστὶν τοῖς σάββασιν ἀγαθοποιῆσαι ἢ κακοποιῆσαι, ψυχὴν σῶσαι ἢ ἀποκτείνειν;

Is it lawful on the sabbath to do good or to do harm? to save a life or to kill?

See also Matt. 2:20; 6:25 (*bis*); Luke 6:9; 12:20, 22, 23; 14:26; 21:19 (?); John 10:11, 15, 17; 13:37, 38; 15:13; Acts 20:10, 24; 27:10, 22; Rom. 11:3; 16:4; II Cor. 1:23; Phil. 2:30; I John 3:16 (*bis*); Rev. 8:9.

2. The soul of man as distinguished from the body and existing separately or capable of so existing.

Matt. 10:28: καὶ μὴ φοβηθῆτε ἀπὸ τῶν ἀποκτεινόντων τὸ σῶμα τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν μὴ δυναμένων ἀποκτείνειν· φοβεῖσθε δὲ μᾶλλον τὸν δυνάμενον καὶ ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα ἀπολέσαι ἐν γέννῃ.

And become not afraid of those that kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul: but rather fear him who is able to destroy both soul and body in hell.

See also Acts 2:27; Rev. 6:9; 20:4. Less clearly so in I Thess. 5:23; Heb. 10:39; Jas. 1:21; 5:20; I Pet. 1:9; 4:19; Rev. 18:13.

3. Soul as a constituent element of man's nature, the seat of vitality, thought, emotion, will; the human mind in the larger sense of the word; most frequently with special reference to its religious capacities and experiences.

Matt. 11:29: καὶ εὐρήσετε ἀνάπαυσιν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὑμῶν.

And ye shall find rest for your souls.

See also Matt 22:37; 26:38; Mark 12:30; 14:34; Luke 2:35; 10:27; John 10:24; 12:27; Acts 4:32; 14:2, 22; 15:24; Eph. 6:6; Phil. 1:27; Col. 3:23; Heb. 4:12; 6:19; 12:3; I Pet. 1:22; 2:11, 25; II Pet. 2:8, 14; III John 2; Rev. 18:14.

4. Following the LXX, ψυχὴ ζωῆς signifies a living being.

Rev. 16:3 only. I Cor. 15:45 uses ψυχὴ ζῶσα in a similar sense.

5. More frequently ψυχὴ alone denotes a human person.

a) A person, an individual man; sometimes in the redundant form, ψυχὴ ἀνθρώπου.

Rom. 13:1: πᾶσα ψυχὴ ἐξουσίαις ὑπερεχούσαις ὑποτασσέσθω.

Let every soul be in subjection to the higher powers.

See also Acts 2:43; 3:23; Rom. 2:9.

b) In enumerations.

Acts 2:41; 7:14; 27:37; I Pet. 3:20.

c) With possessive limitation, for self.

Matt. 12:18; Luke 1:46; 12:19a; Heb. 10:38. In Luke 12:19b without possessive limitation.

d) By further metonymy for the powers, possibilities, and interests of the self, the human person.

Matt. 16:25a: *ὃς γὰρ ἐὰν θέλῃ τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ σῶσαι, ἀπολέσει αὐτήν.*

For whosoever will save his life shall lose it.

See also Matt. 10:39 (*bis*); 16:25b, 26; 20:28; Mark 8:35 (*bis*), 36, 37; 10:45; Luke 9:24 (*bis*); 17:33; John 12:25 (*bis*); Acts 15:26; II Cor. 12:15; I Thess. 2:8; Heb. 13:17; Rev. 12:11.

III. ΣΑΡΞ

1. Flesh: the soft, muscular parts of an animal body, living or once living.

Luke 24:39: *ψηλαφήσατέ με καὶ ἴδετε, ὅτι πνεῦμα σάρκα καὶ ὀστέα οὐκ ἔχει καθὼς ἐμὲ θεωρεῖτε ἔχοντα.*

Handle me and see; for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as ye behold me having.

See also John 6:51 (*bis*), 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 63; I Cor. 15:39 (*quater*), 50; Jas. 5:3; Rev. 17:16; 19:18 (*quinquies*), 21.

2. Body: the whole material part of a living being.

II Cor. 12:7: *διὸ ἵνα μὴ ὑπεραίρωμαι, ἐδόθη μοι σκόλοψ τῇ σαρκί.*

That I should not be exalted overmuch there was given unto me a thorn in the flesh.

See also Matt. 26:41; Mark 14:38; John 1:13 (?); Acts 2:26, 31; Rom. 2:28; I Cor. 5:5; II Cor. 4:11; 7:1; 10:3a; Gal. 2:20; 3:3; 4:13, 14; 6:8 (*bis*), 13; Eph. 2:11b, 15; 5:29; Phil. 1:22, 24; Col. 1:22, 24; 2:1, 5, 13; I Tim. 3:16; Heb. 9:10, 13; 10:20; 12:9; I Pet. 3:18, 21; 4:1 (*bis*), 2, 6; I John 2:16; 4:2; II John, vs. 7; Jude, vss. 7, 8, 23.

By metonymy, for embodiment, incarnation. Heb. 5:7.

With αἶμα, the whole phrase signifying the body. Heb. 2:14.

3. By metonymy: the basis or result of natural generation.

a) The basis of natural generation and of kinship (the body, or the body plus whatever is concerned with generation and kinship).

John 3:6a: τὸ γεγεννημένον ἐκ τῆς σαρκὸς σὰρξ ἐστίν.

That which is born of the flesh is flesh. (Only the first instance falls under this head. Cf. 6 below.)

See also Rom. 4:1; 9:3, 5, 8; I Cor. 10:18; Gal. 4:23, 29; Eph. 2:11a.

b) As a collective term, equivalent to "kindred."

Rom. 11:14: εἰ πως παραζηλώσω μου τὴν σάρκα καὶ σώσω τινὰς ἐξ αὐτῶν.

If by any means I may provoke to jealousy my kinsmen, and may save some of them.

In this use the term passes beyond the limits of the physical and comes to include all the elements of a human being.

4. A corporeally conditioned living being: usually referring exclusively to man, yet sometimes including all corporeal living beings, and in any case designating the beings referred to not as human but as corporeal.

Matt. 16:17: μακάριος εἶ, Σίμων Βαριωνᾶ, ὅτι σὰρξ καὶ αἷμα οὐκ ἀπεκάλυψέν σοι ἀλλ' ὁ πατήρ μου ὁ ἐν [τοῖς] οὐρανοῖς.

Blessed art thou Simon Bar-Jonah: for flesh and blood hath not revealed it unto thee, but my Father who is in heaven.

See also Matt. 19:5, 6; 24:22; Mark 10:8; 13:20; Luke 3:6; John 1:14; 17:2; Acts 2:17; Rom. 1:3; 3:20; 8:3b, c (?); I Cor. 1:29; 6:16; Gal. 1:16; 2:16; Eph. 5:31; 6:12; I Pet. 1:24.

5. By metonymy: for the creature side, the corporeally conditioned aspect of life, the external as distinguished from the internal and real, or the secular as distinguished from the strictly religious.

John 8:15: ὑμεῖς κατὰ τὴν σάρκα κρίνετε, ἐγὼ οὐ κρίνω οὐδένα (cf. 7:24).

Ye judge after the flesh; I judge no man.

See also I Cor. 1:26; 7:28; II Cor. 5:16 (*bis*); 7:5; 10:2; 11:18; Gal. 6:12; Eph. 6:5; Col. 3:22; Philem. 16.

6. The product of natural generation apart from the morally transforming power of the Spirit of God; all that comes to a man by inheritance rather than from the operation of the divine Spirit. The term as thus used does not exclude, may even specifically include, whatever excellent powers, privileges, etc., come by heredity, but whatever is thus derived is regarded as inadequate to enable man to achieve the highest good.

Phil. 3:4: *εἰ τις δοκεῖ ἄλλος πεποιθέναι ἐν σαρκί, ἐγὼ μᾶλλον.*

If any other man thinketh to have confidence in the flesh, I yet more. (Note the context.)

See also John 3:6b; Rom. 6:19; 7:5, 18, 25; 8:3a; II Cor. 1:17; Phil. 3:3.

7. That element in man's nature which is opposed to goodness, that in him which makes for evil; sometimes thought of as an element of himself, sometimes objectified as a force distinct from him, this latter usage being, however, rather rhetorical.

Rom. 8:6: *τὸ γὰρ φρόνημα τῆς σαρκὸς θάνατος.*

For the mind of the flesh is death.

See also Rom. 8:4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 12 (*bis*), 13; 13:14; Gal. 5:13, 16, 17, 19, 24; perhaps Eph. 2:3 (*bis*); Col. 2:11, 18, 23; II Pet. 2:10, 18, though in all these latter cases *σάρξ* may itself mean simply body, and the implication of evil lie in other members of the sentence.

In 6 all the good that comes to man by nature is credited to the *σάρξ*, the evil of it is its moral inadequacy; in 7 the right impulses are credited to the *νοῦς* or the *ἔσω ἄνθρωπος*, and the *σάρξ* becomes a force positively and aggressively evil.

From this exhibit of New Testament usage in general we may pass to consider the usages of particular writers.

IV. THE PAULINE USAGE

One of the marked peculiarities of the New Testament vocabulary which is especially characteristic of Paul is the frequency of the words *πνεῦμα* and *σάρξ*, especially the former. *Ψυχή* is indeed not infrequent, but while the others rise into a prominence which they have in no other literature that we have examined, *ψυχή*, which

almost everywhere has been far more frequent than either of the other words, is now much less frequent than either.

The apostle Paul's use of *πνεῦμα* is plainly kindred with, and beyond doubt directly or indirectly influenced by, the Old Testament usage of רִיחַ. If one turn to the Greek writers contemporary with Paul, he will find the meanings "wind" and "breath" most frequent, the meaning "spirit" rare, and the religious sense of the term as referring to the Spirit of God or the spirit of man as the seat of religious life almost without example. Even in the Jewish-Greek writings other than the LXX, these latter meanings are relatively infrequent. In Paul, on the other hand, *πνεῦμα* never means "wind," the meaning "breath" occurs but once, and that in an epistle not quite certainly his, while its use in reference to the Spirit of God occurs on every page, and the instances in which it denotes the spirit of man are also quite frequent. Both these uses indeed are much more frequent in Paul than in any preceding literature, even the Old Testament, a fact which indicates that in the mind of Paul himself or in a circle of thought by which he was influenced something occurred to exalt the importance of the term in the senses referred to.

If one seek for an author later than the Old Testament by whom Paul may have been influenced, there is none more probable than Philo Judaeus (see pp. 157 ff.). But Paul's idea of spirit is by no means identical with Philo's, being simpler and more self-consistent, and more like that of the Old Testament. It may be doubted, therefore, whether Paul was very strongly influenced by Philo at this point.

The occurrence of the phrase *πνεῦμα ἅγιον* in the magical papyri, in such a way as to indicate that it is a familiar term in the vocabulary of those who wrote these documents, raises the question whether it is under the influence of this literature that Paul and the other New Testament writers employ this phrase and use *πνεῦμα* so frequently of the Spirit of God. It may be that further research will show this to have been the fact. But, as indicated above (p. 174), the existing evidence falls short of establishing more than the possibility of it, and it must for the present remain more probable that the development of which the Pauline writings

give evidence has its chief basis in the Old Testament literature and its chief impulse in the Christian movement. Indeed, in view of the relative infrequency of the idea and the term in contemporary Jewish literature and their much greater prominence in Paul than in most other New Testament writers, with the exception of the Johannine literature, the most probable hypothesis seems to be that the apostle himself is largely responsible for the marked development in the usage of *πνεῦμα* with reference to the Spirit of God and the spirit of man as the seat of religious life.

The secular Greek writers, it will be recalled, very rarely employ *πνεῦμα* of the human spirit, or soul, but almost uniformly *ψυχή*. Paul, on the other hand, like the LXX and the later Jewish-Greek writers, frequently uses *πνεῦμα* in this sense, and, like them, not infrequently with special reference to its religious capacities or experiences. Occasionally by a sort of blending of usages he employs it of the human spirit as permeated or dominated by the divine Spirit—a usage which has a precedent in Greek translations of Hebrew works. Cf. p. 154.

In the consideration of the Pauline use of *πνεῦμα* to denote the Spirit of God, and the differentiation of Pauline from earlier usage, four facts are important to observe. First, the relation of the Spirit of God to God is analogous to that of the spirit of man to man (I Cor. 2:11). In other words, whatever the origin of the phrase, it has become for Paul anthropomorphic, denoting an existence which has, in relation to God, powers or functions analogous to those of the human spirit in relation to man. In this statement of the apostle we seem to approach very closely to the identification of God and the Spirit of God. The Spirit is not here something which proceeds from God, but is the very center of the divine consciousness, and if we suppose that of the two elements of man there is in God none corresponding to the material body, the Spirit of God would seem to be God. Paul, to be sure, does not expressly say, as the Fourth Gospel does, that God is a spirit, or that he has no body. To affirm, therefore, that he definitely identified God and the Spirit of God is doubtless in a measure to substitute inference for evidence. Yet the passage is important as showing how near the apostle approached this affirmation.

The second notable fact is that in Paul the Spirit as a transitive force is operative only in men, and in them as a force either producing extraordinary powers, such as prophecy, tongues, and the like (see especially I Cor., chap. 12), or regenerating moral character (see especially Gal. 5:13-25). On the now familiar distinction between the charismatic expression of the Spirit and his ethical working, or on the apostle's toleration of the former idea and his exaltation of the latter, it is superfluous to dwell.

In the third place, it is significant that from the point of view of religious experience Paul identifies the Spirit of God and the heavenly Christ. Both are alike the indwelling cause, in the soul of man, of the present religious life and of the future resurrection and blessedness. There is but one experience and but one cause of it, which may be spoken of as the Spirit of God or as the Spirit of Christ or as Christ. This appears not only from such passages as Gal. 5:16, 18, 25, compared with 2:20 and 5:6, reinforced as they are by many others, but most strikingly in Rom. 8:3-11, where the interchange of terms with reference to the same experience and without change of meaning is unmistakable, and in II Cor. 3:17, where he seems directly to affirm that Christ is the Spirit.¹ Adequately to discuss the cause of this duality of expression for a single idea would require more space than is here available. But it is evident that the two terminologies have a different historic origin. The Spirit-phraseology has its roots in those usages which we have been examining in previous articles. The Christ-terminology is itself, of course, derived from Jewish thought, but its employment in the description of the Christian experience and expectation has its starting-point in Paul's own interpretation of his Damascus experience as a revelation of the Son of God in him. Unable to discard either phraseology for the other, he uses now one, now the other, now both together.

In the fourth place, it must be noted that the apostle has not altogether left behind those forms of thought and expression which are inherited from a time when the Spirit of God was thought of

¹ If indeed *ὁ κύριος* here means God, we have an explicit affirmation of the identity of God and the Spirit, but this is a less probable interpretation than the one indicated above.

without clear ascription of personality, and even quantitatively. See, e.g., I Thess. 1:5; Rom. 5:5; 8:23; I Cor. 2:4; II Cor. 1:22; Gal. 3:5; Phil. 1:19. This type of expression is not indeed the dominant one in Paul, yet giving due weight to it and to the apparent reluctance of Paul directly to identify God and the Spirit, we may say that in his thought the Spirit of God is the personalized power of God, operative in the spirits of men, not distinguishable, in experience at least, from the heavenly Christ. If this is to us a difficult mid-station between identity with God and personality distinct from God, it is nevertheless apparently about the point which Paul occupied.

It is probably significant of the reflection which had been going on respecting the nature of *πνεῦμα* that in Paul for the first time we find the term used generically to denote the whole class of intelligent beings who are not conditioned by a fleshly body, and less frequently in a still more inclusive sense as embracing intelligent beings whether embodied or unembodied. See III, B, 5, and C in the list of meanings.

The Pauline usage of *ψυχή* is, formally at least, almost identical with that of the LXX, itself largely a reproduction of the Hebrew use of *נֶפֶשׁ*. None of the Hebrew senses is lacking, and none of the senses found in later Greek but not in Hebrew is present. In one notable passage, however, in which the apostle quotes a phrase from the Old Testament, he gives to the terms *πνεῦμα* and *ψυχή* an antithesis of meaning which they bear neither in the Old Testament nor, so far as has been observed, in any writer between the Old Testament and Paul. Discussing the resurrection and the body which is raised, quoting freely from Gen. 2:7, he says: *ἐγένετο ὁ πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος Ἀδὰμ εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν*, and adds *ὁ ἔσχατος Ἀδὰμ εἰς πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν* (I Cor. 15:45). The contrast is twofold. Adam is alive; Christ is able to make alive (the dead). Adam became *ψυχή*, which, according to a common usage of the Hebrew *נֶפֶשׁ* and *ψυχή* in the LXX, is a living corporeal being. Christ became (by resurrection—note the context and Rom. 1:4) *πνεῦμα*, i.e., not a wholly unembodied being, for this very chapter maintains the contrary respecting those who are raised from the dead, but one no longer having a terrestrial body of flesh and blood (vss. 40,

50). Such a contrast between *πνεῦμα* and *ψυχή* is wholly foreign to ordinary Greek thought, to which *πνεῦμα* is the substance of which the soul is composed. Nor have we found in any Greek writer a placing of the *πνεῦμα* above the *ψυχή*. It is still more foreign to the usage of the Hermetic writings, which make the *ψυχή* superior to the *πνεῦμα*. There is a certain approach to it in Philo, in that he makes the *πνεῦμα* superior to the *ψυχή* and, of course, like the LXX, sometimes uses *ψυχή* of a person, not simply the soul. The use of *πνεῦμα* to denote an incorporeal being is also not without precedent. But the distinctive feature of this passage, the use of *πνεῦμα* and *ψυχή* to describe two types of beings, the earthly, embodied, and the heavenly, supercorporeal, and the association with the latter of the idea of life-giving as contrasted with the simple life-possession of the former, has no observed precedent.

The consideration of the Pauline use of *σάρξ* brings us into the heart of one of the most difficult and important aspects of our whole study. That *σάρξ* sometimes has a physical sense is beyond question; that it has in Paul an ethical sense is scarcely less clear. What is important to determine is whether when it takes on its distinctly ethical sense, so as to denote a force that makes for sin in the lives of men, it still retains its physical sense, and whether as a force that makes for unrighteousness, be this physical or non-physical, it is an influence that may be resisted, or a compelling and irresistible force. If the flesh in the physical sense is the latter, then the apostle must, logically at least, hold that the flesh is essentially polluting to the soul, and that there can be no salvation except through the release of the soul from the body. If, however, the *σάρξ* that makes for evil is not a physical thing, or if the *σάρξ* as physical is only an influence, an occasion of temptation, not a compelling force, salvation may be a spiritual, not a physical, process. These questions are of great importance. The answer to them will go far toward determining the whole character of Paul's conception of religion.

It must, of course, be recognized on the one hand that the apostle has nowhere definitely formulated his doctrine, and on the other that there are several passages which at least on superficial reading seem to express a hard-and-fast ethical dualism. Such,

for example, are Gal. 5:16-25 and Rom. 8:1-11. In attempting to decide the question thus raised the following facts must be taken into account:

First, throughout a large part of the whole period covered by our previous study there have appeared here and there evidences of a tendency to regard matter, or the human body, as a material thing, as injurious to the intellectual or moral interests of man. This persistent conception takes various forms. Sometimes, as in Plato, the ultimate cause of disorder in the physical universe is found in the recalcitrancy of the matter of which it is composed. Sometimes, as in Plato again, the body is disparaged as a hindrance to philosophical thought. Sometimes, as in the Orphic teaching, incarnation is regarded as a punishment imposed upon the soul for sins committed by it in a previous state. Sometimes, as in Philo, there is emphasized the ordinary fact of experience, viz., that the bodily passions incite men to immoral acts. Nowhere is this conception expressed in a definitely formulated doctrine of an ultimate ethical dualism of spirit and matter, or of mind and matter, or of flesh and spirit, nor is it anywhere affirmed that sin in the universe is a necessary consequence of the matter in it, or that sin in the individual is caused by embodiment, or that all good comes from the spirit by virtue of its immateriality.

That such a view was held by the Gnostics comparatively early in the Christian period seems to be true. But the evidence does not seem to show that this development had already taken place in the New Testament period itself. Palestinian Judaism, which Paul's use of the word "spirit" suggests had influenced him much more than had non-Jewish thinking, had not developed the thought of the evil of the body or of matter as the cause of evil. In the Old Testament the flesh is weak but not sinful. Weber, indeed, in his *Theologie des Talmud*, maintained that rabbinism held an ethical dualism, finding the evil impulse, the *yezer hara*, in the flesh. But, as mentioned in a previous chapter, Professor F. C. Porter has demonstrated the erroneousness of this view and shown that rabbinic Judaism held no doctrine of the evil of matter.¹ Even

¹ "The Yezer Hara: a Study in the Jewish Doctrine of Sin," in *Biblical and Semitic Studies*, by Members of the Faculty of Yale University. New York, 1901.

Philo, who agrees with Plato that the body is a drag upon the soul, holds no consistent doctrine of the evil of matter or of the body as the cause of sin. Our approach to the study of the New Testament ought therefore to be with open mind on this point. There was an intellectual soil out of which there might easily spring the doctrine that embodied man is *ipso facto* a sinful man. But apparently it had not yet sprung up. If it had, it is not certain that the New Testament writers would have adopted it; nor, if it had not, would it have been impossible for Paul to create it. We should therefore interrogate Paul and the other writers who followed him without prejudice.

Secondly, the New Testament usage of $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi$ is not simple but highly developed. There are found here not only the simple meaning "flesh" and that relatively easy metonymy "body," but those other meanings derived from the Hebrew, "corporeal being," "person," "kindred" (cf. pp. 69-72, with pp. 184 ff. above). Not only so, but in Paul and in writers influenced by him there appears a still further development of usage. The meaning 3, (*a*) (see p. 185) is but a slight departure from the meaning "kindred" which the word had already taken over from the Hebrew. So also 5 is by easy metonymy developed from 4. Nor is the case materially different with 6. When $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi$ has come to mean the basis of natural generation (3, *a*), it is but a short step to using it also for all that comes by heredity, the whole complex of life's relationships into which one enters by being born of whatever parents one is born of. This step Paul seems clearly to have taken in Phil. 3:3-7. By virtue of the flesh he was not only a circumcised son of the race of Israel and of the tribe of Benjamin, but an orthodox Hebrew, a Pharisee, a persecutor of the unorthodox, and, as concerns the righteousness that can be achieved under legalism, above reproach. Thus it denotes the whole of his personality and possessions except that which comes through a distinct personal religious experience. At this point it is important to observe three facts.

a) The word is at this point of the development no longer an exclusively physical term. Indeed, it is not such in any of the preceding meanings, 3, 4, 5, unless possibly in 3, (*a*). But here more clearly than at any preceding point the term has become super-physical.

b) The term as used in Phil. 3:3 ff. carries with it no suggestion of positive evil. All the things that Paul comprehended under the term "flesh" are in themselves good and so regarded by him, except the persecution of the church, and even this he cites as an illustration of his zeal for God. His conversion is not the repudiation of the evil, but the turning from the good to the better. The doctrine that underlies the passage is that true life is achieved only when to all that nature gives, though it has given its best, there is added the gift of the Spirit of God.

c) Thus the idea of the *σάρξ* is here brought into definite relation to the *πνεῦμα*. The *σάρξ* can do much; it is the *πνεῦμα* only that can produce the true, the perfect.

But to this step there is added one more, by which for the first time the term takes on a distinctly ethical sense. Had we only Rom. 8:1-11 to deal with, it would not be clear that this is the case. For this whole passage might perhaps be explained from the point of view of Phil. 3. It is the weakness of the flesh that is emphasized in vs. 3, and the walking according to the flesh might be thought of as the conduct of those who are controlled by those things in life that come by heredity, not by the Spirit, good though the former are. And even when it is said that the mind of the flesh is enmity against God, this might mean only that the love of things that one inherits—the life of the man who follows the current of heredity—inevitably issues in the rejection of the will of God. But it is clear that in any case the apostle has here pushed his thought of the evil consequences of following the flesh much further than he does in the passage from the later letter to the Philippians. And when we turn back to Gal. 5:16-25 we seem to see clearly that the apostle had already come to include in his thought of the flesh, not only the good things that are inadequate, but those impulses to evil which also seem to be born in us; in other words, to let the flesh stand for one aspect of heredity—the inborn tendency to evil. But if so, there are certain additional facts that require to be observed.

a) It is almost beyond question that the meaning which we find in Gal., chap. 5, represents an advance upon that found in Phil., chap. 3, not the reverse. As out of the meaning 3, (a), basis of

natural generation, there arises 6, the total product and outcome of heredity, so out of the thought of the moral inadequacy of the latter there might spring the conception of the hereditary tendency to evil.¹

b) This relation of the several meanings of the term makes it improbable that the *σάρξ* which is hostile to God, and the works of which are evil, is a physical thing, or that it is evil because it is material. The strictly material sense is left behind several steps before we reach the distinctly ethical meaning. To introduce it at this point is superfluous and illogical.²

¹ In Rom. 7:17—8:8 we seem to have as it were an epitome of the working of the apostle's mind. In chap. 7 it is not the flesh that is the evil force, but sin stimulated by law. The flesh is inadequate, unable without God's Spirit to respond to the inner imperative. In 8:3 it is still the weakness, not the power for evil, of the flesh that is spoken of, and only in the latter part of the passage does the idea of weakness and unresponsiveness gradually merge into that of hostility to God.

² Against this interpretation of the apostle's thought there may be urged his phrase *ἐν ὁμοιώματι σαρκὸς ἁμαρτίας* in Rom. 8:3, and the *τοῦ σώματος τοῦ θανάτου* of 7:24. But the former phrase by no means of necessity involves an analytic judgment that the flesh in the likeness of which Christ came is by its nature sinful, intrinsically tainted with sin; nor is the flesh by any necessity of usage or context to be taken in a purely physical sense. The latter interpretation indeed, with or without the former, would make Paul a docetist, which he certainly was not. The view most consistent with Pauline usage is that which takes *σάρξ* as standing for a corporeally conditioned being (referring to man of course) and *ἁμαρτίας* as in effect the predicate of a synthetic proposition. The whole phrase then means simply that when Christ came he did not differ in outward appearance from sinful men. If 7:24 were an expression of desire for deliverance from the body in death, one might plausibly argue that Paul conceived of the body as the cause of sin and release from it as the only way of escape from sin. But this is manifestly not the case, since Paul never thinks of Christ as the author or cause of death, as on this view vs. 25 would imply that he did. It is rather a moral victory which he desires, and doubtless in the present life. That he uses the word "body" at this point instead of "sin" bears witness to the apostle's deep sense of the intimate relation between the evil impulses, which he has previously personified under the name "sin," and the body (cf. vs. 23 and I Cor. 9:27), and the addition of *τοῦ θανάτου* reflects his belief that sin is the cause of death. The passage is one of several that bear testimony that Paul was not blind to the obvious fact of human experience that the tendency to sin is closely associated with the physical nature; but it by no means follows nor is it probable that the body as such is, in his view, the compelling cause of sin. Cf. Sanday and Headlam, *Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans*, p. 181, footnote, in which, commenting upon the claim that Paul held the doctrine of the essential evil of matter, they declare that the controversy is practically closed, agreeing with Lipsius on Rom. 7:14 (*Hand-Commentar zum Neuen Testament*) that "die paulinische Anthropologie ruht durchaus auf alttestamentlicher Grundlage; ihre angeblich hellenistisch-dualistischen Bestandtheile sind einfach zu bestreiten."

c) The fact that the ethical, non-physical meaning, which represents the latest step in the evolution, appears in one of Paul's earliest letters, and that the earlier, non-ethical meaning appears in one of his latest letters, shows that development of the distinctly ethical meaning did not involve the adoption of a new doctrine and the repudiation of the thought expressed by the unethical sense. The ethical is not physical. The physical is not ethical.

d) Not even to the *σάπξ* as a force that makes for evil does Paul ascribe compelling power. In faith with its consequent vital fellowship with God there is a power adequate to overcome the force that makes for evil (Rom. 6:1, 2; Gal. 5:16, 22, 23).

e) So far from sharing the feeling expressed by Plato, Seneca, and Plutarch that true blessedness is achievable only by getting rid of the body, Paul, retaining in this the point of view of his Hebrew ancestry, believed that the soul could not be wholly happy without a body. This thought, which is somewhat more clearly expressed in I Cor., chap. 15, and II Cor., chap. 5, and suggested by I Thess. 5:23, is implied in vs. 11 of the very passage now under consideration. The culmination of the work of the Spirit is that through it God makes alive our mortal bodies. It is true, indeed, as I Cor., chap. 15, shows, that the making alive involves a transformation into a spiritual body; but a spiritual body is still a body; and that not the transformation of the body but the permanent possession of it is what the apostle here has chiefly in mind is shown by the fact that he makes no mention in vs. 11 of the former, but speaks only of bringing to life again our mortal bodies. Had the apostle thought of the body as such as the cause of sin, he must here have spoken, not of its being made alive (in the resurrection), but of its being destroyed, or of the spirit as being released from it.¹ Had he thought of its materiality as

¹ It may be alleged that the usage of the time requires us to understand Paul as actually personalizing, not simply personifying, sin, that by it he means a demon and that the abode of this demon is for him in the flesh, in the sense either of the body or of the whole physical environment. (See Dibelius, *Die Geisterwelt im Glauben des Paulus*, pp. 119 ff.). The writer finds himself unconvinced by the arguments that seem to some to establish this view. But even if it be correct, it does not materially affect our interpretation of *σάπξ*, but only requires the substitution of the idea of a demon for the more vague expression "hereditary impulse" used above.

the cause of sin he must at the least have spoken here of its transformation; cf. Phil. 3:21.

Thus in three respects the evidence is against the view that Paul found in the flesh as a physical thing a compelling force for evil. The flesh that makes for evil is not the body or matter as such, but an inherited impulse to evil. This force is not compulsory, but can be resisted by the power of the spirit. The body is not an evil, but a factor of the best life. The inherited evil impulse is, of course, related to the bodily life. The body is inferior to the spirit and the occasion of temptation. But embodied man may, by the power of the Spirit, triumph over all evil tendencies.¹

The foregoing discussion of *πνεῦμα* and *σάρξ* suggests what further examination confirms, that when these two terms stand in antithesis, as they frequently do in Paul, it is by no means always the same meanings that are contrasted. In Gal. 6:8; I Cor. 5:5; II Cor. 7:1; Rom. 2:28, 29; Col. 2:5, the contrast is between the flesh, or the body, and the spirit of man—an antithesis that in most Greek writers would have been expressed by *σῶμα* and *ψυχή*—but in most of the foregoing cases at least with an emphasis on the religious capacity of the *πνεῦμα* that would not have been conveyed by *ψυχή*. In Gal. 6:8 the sowing to the flesh is the devotion of one's goods (see vs. 6) and energies to the satisfaction of the demands of the body; sowing to the spirit is devoting these things to the development of the spirit-life, which is both intellectual and religious. In Gal. 3:3 the flesh is, as in the preceding cases (see especially Rom. 2:28, 29), the physical flesh, that in which the circumcision which they were urged to accept took place; but the spirit is the Spirit of God, which they received (vs. 2) when they accepted the gospel and by which miracles were wrought

¹ Siebeck, "Neue Beiträge zur Entwicklungsgeschichte des Geist-Begriffs," in *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, Band XXVII (1914), 1-16, gives a compact summary of the history of the usage of *πνεῦμα*, including its use in the New Testament and in later times. In remarking upon the New Testament antithesis of *πνεῦμα* and *σάρξ*, however, he does not observe the variety of senses in which *σάρξ* is used in the New Testament and describes the *πνεῦμα* as an ethico-supernatural principle whose operations are directed toward the destruction or suppression of the activities and influences of the corporeal. Failure to recognize adequately the various uses of *σάρξ* issues in creating a false antithesis between *σάρξ* and *πνεῦμα*.

among them (vs. 5). In Gal. 4:23 *σάρξ*, as in Rom. 9:3, 5, 8, is clearly the basis of natural generation, the contrast being with the promise in fulfilment of which Isaac was born extraordinarily; in the application of the allegory *ὁ γεννηθεὶς κατὰ σάρκα* (vs. 29) refers to the Jew who depends upon his heredity for salvation (the word thus verging toward meaning 6) in contrast with one whose life is according to the Spirit of God, or possibly with one who has been born according to the Spirit, an idea suggested in Rom. 6:4 and further developed in John 3:6. In Rom. 1:3, despite the similarity of the phrases to those in Gal. 4:23, 29, *σάρξ* is probably to be taken as denoting a corporeally conditioned being, and *πνεῦμα* as a generic term for an unembodied being (III, B, 5), *κατὰ* meaning "viewed as" and the whole passage indicating the high rank of Jesus, first, among earthly (corporeally conditioned) beings, and, secondly, among holy heavenly (not corporeally conditioned) beings. Somewhat similar is the contrast in I Tim. 3:16, but *σάρξ* probably denotes the body or the corporeally conditioned mode of life, and *πνεύματι*, by a further metonymy suggested by the desire to parallel *ἐν σαρκί*, denotes an incorporeal mode of being rather than an incorporeal being. In Phil. 3:3 *πνεῦμα* manifestly denotes the Spirit of God, and *σάρξ*, as already pointed out, all that man obtains by heredity. In Rom. 7:5 *σάρξ* probably means the totality of the life apart from the spirit (as in Phil. 3:3), while *πνεῦμα* in 7:6 stands for the human spirit as the seat of religious life. In Rom. 8:4-11 there is, as indicated above, a gradual transition from this meaning of *σάρξ* to the more positively ethical sense, while in vss. 12, 13 there is probably a return to the earlier meaning. Throughout these verses *πνεῦμα* denotes the Spirit of God, and sometimes the Spirit of Christ. The absence of the article gives the phrases in which it is lacking a qualitative force, by which *πνεῦμα* approximates to the generic sense, as inclusive of the divine and human spirit, but probably always retaining in the apostle's mind a reference to the divine Spirit. In Gal. 5:17-25 the flesh is the force that makes for sin, and *πνεῦμα* is the divine Spirit, the omission of the article having the same effect as in Rom., chap. 8.

V. THE USAGE OF THE SYNOPTIC GOSPELS AND THE ACTS

In the Synoptic Gospels *πνεῦμα* always means "spirit." The meanings "wind" and "breath" do not occur. As applied to the human spirit, the reference to the religious life is less frequent than in Paul, and the idea of the human spirit as permeated by the divine does not occur. On the other hand, we find here instances of *πνεῦμα* denoting that in man which departs at death, or returns in revivification, for which Greek writers use *ψυχή* only, but Jewish-Greek sometimes *ψυχή* and sometimes, following the Hebrew, *πνεῦμα*. Cf. I Kings 17:21 (Hebrew and LXX); Jos. *Bell.* vii, 185, and ii, 156. Akin to this latter is the use of the term of a ghost, a specter. Akin also, as is shown in Jos. *Bell.* vii, 185, is the use of *πνεῦμα* to denote a demon. This usage, not found at all in Paul, is frequent in the Synoptic Gospels. In the body of the Synoptists *πνεῦμα*, referring to the Spirit of God, is used almost exclusively in the charismatic sense, referring to the Spirit as the cause of such extraordinary phenomena as prophecy, and of power over demons. Only in John the Baptist's prediction of the baptism in the Holy Spirit by his great successor, and in connection with Jesus' own baptism and temptation, does the term seem to approach an ethical reference, and even here there is no sharp distinction of the ethical from the charismatic.

The use with reference to the conception of Jesus in the womb of his mother, found only in the infancy sections of Matthew and Luke, is without parallel in literature earlier than the New Testament or in the earlier parts of the New Testament itself. It apparently represents a unique development of the charismatic sense of the word.

The synoptic usage of *ψυχή* and *σάρξ* calls for little comment. It is substantially that of Jewish-Greek writers generally. There is no occurrence of the characteristically Pauline uses of *σάρξ* or any suggestion of Pauline influence. The whole evidence of the Synoptic Gospels tends to confirm the impression gained from the study of Paul, that his usage is not as a whole a reflection of common usage in his day, but to an important extent the result either of exceptional influences or of his own thinking.

The only important respect in which the usage of Acts differs from that of the synoptists is in the non-appearance of *πνεῦμα* in reference to the conception of Jesus, and in the ascription to the Spirit of God of power in the external world (Acts 8:39; cf. II Kings 2:16).

VI. THE USAGE OF THE JOHANNINE WRITINGS

The Fourth Gospel contains one instance of *πνεῦμα* meaning "wind" (3:8), introduced for the purpose of comparing the action of *πνεῦμα* as spirit and *πνεῦμα* as wind. Aside from this exceptional case and the employment of the word of that which departs in death (John 19:30) the Johannine use of the word is very similar to that of Paul. It is used neither of a demon, as so commonly in the Synoptic Gospels and Acts, but not in Paul, nor in reference to the conception of Jesus in his mother's womb. In reference to the Spirit of God *πνεῦμα* occurs in three ways. In chap. 1 it is used, in evident dependence on the Synoptists, of the descent of the Spirit on Jesus at his baptism. In chaps. 3 and 6 it is used, much as in Paul, of the Spirit as the source of life to men. In chaps. 14-17 it is employed of the Spirit as not yet present, but as coming to supply the place of Jesus. Here, as in Paul, there is no clear distinction of function between the Spirit and the heavenly Christ. The Johannine representation is the Pauline conception converted from experience into prediction of experience.

To these references to the Spirit of God there must be added the unique statement of John 4:24 that God is spirit or a spirit. This, as already pointed out, Paul never says, but this use of the word as a generic term for incorporeal intelligent being is illustrated in Paul. The proposition itself had been affirmed two hundred years before by Posidonius, but with the addition of the expression *νοερόν καὶ πυρῶδες*. The absence of these adjectives in John marks not only the elimination from the idea of God of the notion of materiality suggested by *πυρῶδες* (or at least its reduction to a minimum), but the inclusion of the idea of intelligence in that of *πνεῦμα*, marked by the fact that it is no longer necessary to add *νοερόν* to express this idea.

Πνεῦμα used in reference to men denotes the seat of intellectual or emotional life, chiefly with reference to its religious aspects.

John 3:6b is without exact parallel, but explicable in view of the use of πνεῦμα to denote the spirit of man permeated with the Spirit of God. See I Cor. 14:14, 15, 16. For the idea of a human spirit under the ethical domination of the Spirit of God, Paul uses ἐν πνεύματι (Rom. 8:9) and other similar phrases, but closely approaches the Johannine use in Rom. 8:10.

In I John we find the same use in general of πνεῦμα with reference to the Spirit of God. The generic use comes out distinctly in its employment as an inclusive term covering both the Spirit of God and those other beings which purport to be such, but whose anti-Christian utterances betray their real character. See I John 4:1 ff., and cf. list of meanings, III, B, 5. Here also we are on familiar Pauline ground. Cf. I Cor. 12:10.

The Apocalypse has no usages that call for special discussion.

Ψυχή in John and I John is used chiefly in the phrase "to lay down one's life." The instances in the sense of soul are of the familiar type.

The use of σάρξ in John, chap. 3 (the others require no discussion), reminds us of the Pauline use in Phil. 3:3, 4. In John, as in Paul, there is the thought that the Spirit of God is essential to true human life, and σάρξ is used in antithesis to πνεῦμα in a way to suggest that it denotes that which comes by heredity and is not dominated by the Spirit. Paul the Pharisee might almost have sat for the picture of Nicodemus; and the language of Jesus to Nicodemus, affirming the inadequacy of all that had come to him by heredity and the indispensableness of the transforming power of the Spirit, reads like an affirmation in general terms of what Paul had learned by personal experience.*

* Considerations of space forbid an extended discussion of all the interpretations which have been or might be proposed for this verse. It must suffice to call attention to a few points of importance. (a) There is no presumption in favor of an interpretation that takes the two instances of σάρξ in the same sense, for this is not the case with the two instances of πνεῦμα in the second clause. The first is the Spirit of God; the second cannot be this, but must refer in some way to man, and indeed quite clearly in the sense of man filled with the Spirit of God and thus born anew. The two senses must manifestly be related but not necessarily identical. (b) Aside from objections to a strict identity of meaning, the interpretation, "that which is born of the body is body," is foreign to the context; for that which Nicodemus possessed was manifestly far more than a body. (c) Nor is the meaning "that which is born of a corporeal being

But though there is this clear affinity between the Johannine and the Pauline thought, neither the Fourth Gospel nor I John furnishes any certain example of the Pauline use of *σάρξ* meaning the force in men that makes for evil. I John 2:16 might seem to be such a case, but the parallelism of the phrase "the lust of the eyes," in which no evil sense attaches to eyes in themselves, makes it probable that there is none such in the word "flesh," but that in itself it simply means the body, the evil sense of the phrase being suggested by the word *ἐπιθυμία* (cf. Rom. 7:7). It is clear in any case and most important to observe that to the flesh in the physical sense this writer attached no taint of moral evil. For it is one of the cardinal points for which he contends that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, evidently meaning to affirm the reality of the bodily life of Jesus (I John 4:2; cf. II John, vs. 7), yet clearly also believing in his sinlessness. Of similar purport is John 1:14; for though the term *σάρξ* does not mean flesh in the physical sense, but a corporeally conditioned being, yet no one who believed, as this writer did, that Jesus was sinless could affirm that he became a corporeal being if he also believed that to be corporeally conditioned was *ipso facto* to be sinful.¹

is a corporeal being" more satisfactory, for if the idea of moral deficiency be not included in the term, it is impertinent to the discussion, and if this idea is associated with both instances, it would imply what is again wholly out of harmony with the context, that the moral deficiency of the child was conditioned on the moral state of the parent. (d) Nor can it be translated "that which is born of a sinful being is a sinful being," for similar reasons, and because there is no evidence that *σάρξ* means a sinful being. The interpretation which is most consonant with the context and best sustained by lexical usage may be paraphrased somewhat thus: That which is born by natural generation is, however good, inadequate to fit one for the Kingdom of God. Only that which is produced by the Spirit of God is like unto it, being a human spirit filled with the divine. The whole sentence is a formulation in intentionally sharply antithetical phrase of the same doctrine that is implied in Paul's experiential statement in Phil. 3:3 ff.

¹ The abstinence of this writer (or these writers) from such language as Paul uses in Gal., chap. 5, and Rom., chap. 8, may be due to a wish to avoid words which by their ambiguity might seem to imply that there was moral taint in incarnation, and so suggest that Jesus either did not really come in the flesh or that he was not sinless. It may be due to the disposition to trace all sin to the devil. What is of importance is that the idea of a necessary moral taint in the body as composed of matter is definitely excluded.

It may be said, however, that by their opposition to the doctrine that Jesus Christ is not come in the flesh, those writings testify to the existence, in their time, of the belief that the flesh is necessarily polluting. But not even this is a certain or even probable inference from the evidence of this letter. For I John 5:6-8 shows that the docetism which this epistle opposes is that which affirmed that the Christ entered the body of Jesus in the baptism and withdrew before the crucifixion; and this type of docetism has its basis, not in the affirmation of the evil of matter, but in the desire not to affirm that the Christ suffered.

On the one hand, therefore, the evidence of the Johannine writings shows that in the circle from which they issued the flesh was not regarded as causing sin, and on the other fails to show that they were directly in contact and conflict with such a view. This fact is not without its reflex value in confirming our conclusion that Paul, who wrote earlier in a similar environment, or under less influence from Greek thought, did not impute sin to the body as its cause.

VII. THE USAGE OF THE REMAINING BOOKS

The uses of *πνεῦμα* in Hebrews are quite diverse and interesting, but present no special difficulty. Nor do *ψυχή* and *σάρξ* call for extended discussion. Respecting *πνεῦμα* we may note its use alongside of *ψυχή* as an element of man's nature (4:12), as in I Thess. 5:23, but probably neither here nor there as expressive of a tri-chotomous view; its reference to the eternal Spirit of Christ, but qualitatively spoken of (9:14); and its broadly generic use (1:14; 12:9). *Σάρξ* has no ethical implications.¹

Limitations of space forbid the extended discussion of such interesting passages as I Pet. 3:18; 4:6; II Pet. 2:10, 18. It

¹ In Heb. 12:9, it is most consonant with the context and the Alexandrian character of the book to understand that "fathers of our flesh" refers to our human fathers as those who beget our bodies, and that "the Father of the spirits" designates God as the source of the spirits of men. Nor is the absence of a possessive pronoun in the second phrase a serious objection to this view. See Matt. 26:41; 27:50, and cf. John 11:33 with Mark 8:12. This interpretation need not, however, imply that each spirit is a fresh product of divine generative power. The phrase probably means only that the spirit comes eventually from God, and is not a product of natural generation. See Wisd. Sol. 8:19.

must suffice to call attention to the fact that whatever the precise sense of the terms or the grammatical force of the datives, the basis of the antithesis between the *σάρξ* and *πνεῦμα* is the idea of corporeality and incorporeality. *Ψυχή* in I Peter is noteworthy because of its distinctly religious sense and its futuristic aspect. The *ψυχή* is the soul as the seat of religion (2:11, 25), capable of existence after death, and its salvation is to be revealed in the last time (1:5, 9; 4:19). Cf. the similar use in Jas. 1:21; 5:20. This usage has apparently had more influence than any other in the New Testament in fixing the meaning of the word "soul" in modern religious terminology. In II Pet. 2:10, 18 *σάρξ* may perhaps denote the body as itself the cause of sin. It would not be strange if this writer had already come to hold this view which was held by others in his day or soon afterward. On the other hand, the passage does not strictly imply anything more than that the writer recognizes the fact, recognition of which involves no philosophic theory, viz., that the body furnishes incitements and temptations to sin, and to follow these is sin. It is perhaps not without significance that in the kindred book of Jude it is clear that *σάρξ*, though used in speaking of sensual sins, itself means only the body. Note especially vs. 8, in which it is not the *σάρξ* that defiles but that is defiled. It is most probable that the usage of II Peter is the same.

VIII. ΠΝΕΥΜΑΤΙΚΟΣ, ΨΥΧΙΚΟΣ, AND ΣΑΡΚΙΚΟΣ (ΣΑΡΚΙΝΟΣ)

The problem of the relation of these adjectives to one another demands a few words. The difficulty pertains almost wholly to *ψυχικός* and the manifestly derogatory sense which it bears in the New Testament.¹

¹ The meanings of *πνευματικός* are clearly associated with those of *πνεῦμα*. They are about as follows: (a) of persons, dominated by the Spirit of God (I Cor. 2:15; 3:1; 14:37; Gal. 6:1); (b) of things, proceeding from, given by, the Spirit (Rom. 1:11 [?]; 7:14; 15:27; I Cor. 2:13; 9:11 [?]; 12:1; 14:1; Eph. 5:19 [?]; Col. 1:9 [?]; 3:10 [?]); (c) pertaining or adapted to the spirit of man (Rom. 1:11 [?]; I Cor. 9:11 [?]; 10:3, 4; Col. 1:9 [?]; 3:16 [?]; I Pet. 2:5); (d) pertaining or adapted to a spirit, i.e., a supercorporeal being (I Cor. 15:44, 46; Eph. 6:12).

The meanings of *σαρκικός* and its synonym *σάρκινος* are also easily derived from the meanings of *σάρξ*: (a) consisting of flesh (II Cor. 3:3); (b) pertaining to the body (Rom. 15:27; I Cor. 9:11; II Cor. 10:4; I Pet. 2:11; Heb. 7:16); (c) possessing only the things that come by natural generation, not those that are given by the Spirit (Rom. 7:14; I Cor. 3:1, 3, 4; II Cor. 1:12).

In I Cor. 15:44 the ordinary body that men possess in this life is described as *ψυχικόν σῶμα*, in contrast with the post-resurrection body, which is *πνευματικόν*.¹ The term is associated (vs. 45) with the fact that Adam was a *ψυχή* and of the earth earthy (vs. 46), in contrast with the risen Christ, who is *πνεῦμα* and in heaven. The basis of the antithesis between the two adjectives is in the antithetical use of the two nouns. The way in which the words are introduced seems to imply that *ψυχικός* in this sense is already familiar, and this is probably the case, despite the fact that no earlier examples of such a use have been pointed out, and that there is only a suggestion of a basis for it in Philo. Cf. pp. 190 f.

In I Cor. 2:14 *ψυχικός* occurs in antithesis to *πνευματικός* in vs. 15, and as a synonym of *σάρκινος* in 3:1, which is further defined by the phrase "babes in Christ." These facts indicate that *ψυχικός* denotes one who is not possessed of the Spirit of God—not *πνευματικός* in the sense of Gal. 6:1. This conception is nearer than that of 15:44-46 to Philo's view (see pp. 158 f., 161), but neither terminology nor thought are quite identical with those of Philo. The idea is still more clearly expressed in Jude, vs. 19, *ψυχικοί, μὴ πνεῦμα ἔχοντες*, though whether *πνεῦμα* refers specifically to the Holy Spirit qualitatively expressed (cf. vs. 20) or to the human spirit permeated with the divine is open to doubt. With this use of the term that in Jas. 3:15 is practically identical.²

IX. FINAL SUMMARY

It remains to state briefly some of the more important results to which, in the judgment of the writer, this study leads.

1. The New Testament use of *πνεῦμα*, *ψυχή*, and *σάρξ* is not simply a reflection of earlier usage, but has certain marked differences from that of any earlier literature. As respects *ψυχή*, these differences are slight, being chiefly a retirement of the word into less prominence, and a certain emphasis on the religious aspects

¹ Cf. the fiery body in which, according to the Hermetic literature, the soul is clothed after death.

² On a usage of the magical papyri which seems to Reitzenstein to point to the source of the Pauline antithesis of *πνευματικός* and *ψυχικός*, but which seems to the writer to furnish a slender support to the view, see Reitzenstein, *Hellenistische Mysterien-Religionen* (Leipzig and Berlin, 1910), pp. 42 ff.

of the term. The difference is greater in respect to *πνεῦμα*, but greatest in respect to *σάρξ*.

2. New Testament usage is much nearer to that of Jewish-Greek writers, and indeed to that of the Old Testament, than to that of Greek writers in general, or to that of any other literature of which we have knowledge.

3. The peculiarities of New Testament usage appear most strongly in Paul, and it is probable that it is to him that we owe them, either as originator or transmitter, and most likely the former.

4. Of the characteristics of New Testament usage which differentiate it either from all previous usage or from that of non-Jewish Greek, the following are the most important:

a) *Πνεῦμα* is no longer prevailingly a substantial term, as in Greek writers, but, with few exceptions, individualizing, as in Jewish-Greek literature, following the Hebrew.

b) Its most frequent use is with reference to the Spirit of God. For this there is only the slightest precedent in non-Jewish-Greek writers. New Testament, especially Pauline, usage shows a marked advance even on Jewish-Greek.

c) As applied to man *πνεῦμα* largely displaces *ψυχή*, but carries a suggestion of special reference to the religious capabilities of the soul which was not associated with *ψυχή* as used by the Greeks.

d) For the Pauline exaltation of *πνεῦμα* over *ψυχή* there is no observed previous parallel. It marks an advance on Philo, for which there is no precedent in non-Jewish Greek, and only partial and imperfect parallels in the magical papyri. It is the reverse of Hermetic usage.

e) The use of *πνεῦμα* as a generic term for incorporeal beings (inclusive in Paul of those who have heavenly bodies) is found in Paul and those who followed him. No precisely similar use is found in earlier writers, though a basis for it is found in the application of *πνεῦμα* on the one side to God and the angels and on the other to the demons.

f) The clear distinction between the charismatic and the ethical work of the Spirit of God and the exaltation of the latter over the former is probably original with Paul; it at any rate receives from

him an emphasis found nowhere else before his time, or in the New Testament.

g) The extension of the meaning of *σάρξ* from the basis of natural generation and kinship to mean all that one acquires by kinship and heredity, and its still further extension, or rather limitation, to denote the force in men that makes for evil, the hereditary impulse to sin, are, so far as we can see, Pauline contributions to the usage of this word.

h) The antithesis of *πνεῦμα* and *σάρξ*, which is so marked a feature of Pauline usage, occurring also in other New Testament writers, is in large part a new development, there being but slight precedent for it in earlier literature. By an extension of usage and an increased frequency of both terms they come to stand in frequent opposition to one another, the antithesis, moreover, involving not a single meaning of each term, but several meanings of both variously opposed to one another. For fuller discussion see pp. 197 f.

5. Neither the evidence of contemporary usage nor that of the New Testament itself warrants us in finding in Paul or in the Johannine writings the notion that the flesh is by reason of its materiality a force that makes compellingly for evil, or that a corporeal being is by virtue of that fact a sinful being. It may perhaps be found in II Peter, but probably not even there.

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The numbers in List I refer to pages of this book on which the author or school indicated is quoted, cited, or discussed. In Lists II, III, and IV the numbers separated by a colon and followed by a dash denote chapter and verse of the work referred to; those after the dash indicate pages of this book. These latter lists cover only those passages the text of which is printed or discussed. In all the lists the numbers immediately following the † designate pages on which passages containing *πνεῦμα*, or its Hebrew or Latin equivalent, are referred to; those after ‡ refer to passages containing *ψυχή* or its equivalent; those after § passages containing *σάρξ* or its equivalent.

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